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Security technologies (STs) are increasingly being positioned, developed, and 
implemented as technological-fixes for addressing crime; never more so than in the 
wake of the numerous terrorist attacks beginning with September 11th 2001. However, 
despite the purported security benefits afforded citizens by these technologies, their 
smooth assimilation into society is never assured. STs which evoke social controversy 
and resistance fail to survive unscathed over the mid- to long-term; subjected instead 
to enforced modification, restrictions on acquisition, restrictions on use, or in the 
worst case scenario - outright banning. Such controversies can negatively affect the 
companies designing these STs, end-users who employ them, governments who 
authorise them, and citizens whose security may genuinely remain compromised. 
The aim of this thesis is to assist the developers and designers of STs in anticipating 
and mitigating negative societal responses to their technologies upstream in the 
design process. The logic being that; by targeting STs before they are completed those 
elements of design most likely to evoke controversy can be modified, which in turn will 
produce STs the public are more likely to afford legitimacy through acceptance. 
To achieve this aim, three objectives were set. The first was to identify the causes of 
social controversies arising from the design and operation of STs. Through repeated 
focussed case-studies of previous controversial STs a taxonomy of forty-three 
commonalities of controversy was produced. The second goal was to generate 
guidelines for the development of future methodological design-tools that could be 
produced to assist those developing STs in identifying these controversies. This was 
achieved by conducting interviews with scientists and engineers actively involved in 
the design and production of STs. Finally, this taxonomy and guidelines were applied to 
produce two prototypes of potential design tools; with one subsequently applied to an 
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My motivations for undertaking this dissertation were a combination of exasperation 
and dismay over the development and deployment of numerous security-centric 
technologies supposedly justified by the threat of terrorism in our post 9/11 World. In 
particular I was struck by just how poorly conceived, poorly implemented, and 
disproportionate a number of these interventions ultimately turned out to be. I was 
also struck by what seemed an inability by those commissioning, designing, 
developing, and deploying whatever the latest social unacceptable security technology 
was to the learning of lessons from their previous failure(s). It is worth stating here 
that these assertions should in no way be read as a personal rejection of a 
government’s need to employ technologies in their efforts to reduce crime and afford 
their citizens a measure of security. Despite my unashamedly libertarian inclinations I 
fully acknowledge the need for, and value of, proportionate and justifiable 
technologies designed to achieve these goals. I simply assert that socially unacceptable 
security technologies are not the way forward, and ultimately bring harm to 
governments, end-users, designers, and society.  
And so my dissertation, Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies, 
focusses on the upstream development of security technologies in an effort to assist 
designers identify and mitigate potential sources of social controversy arising from 
their design choices before their technologies are deployed. It is about enabling hard-
scientists, engineers, and mathematicians to recognise and incorporate ethical, social, 
and rights-based concerns in their technical endeavours. However, while my 
dissertation seeks to address the problem of socially unacceptable security 
technologies, the inherent complexity of producing measures for addressing crime and 
national security means there are no silver bullets in this area. My efforts focus on only 
one element of a much wider process.  
What will strike the reader of my dissertation is its unconventional approach and 
format, and yet once one takes into account the following three factors which underlie 
this research project, this unconventionality is explainable. Firstly I am a member of 
the initial cohort of PhD candidates within UCL’s Security Science Doctoral Training 
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Centre (SECReT), situated within the Department of Security and Crime Science. 
SECReT pursues research into the crime and security domains by adopting the widest 
multidisciplinary approach possible; bringing together all natural and social sciences, 
engineering, mathematics, as well as law and ethics. This multidisciplinarity is not used 
as a catchphrase; research projects are expected to cross domains and candidates are 
required to find their two supervisors from different departments. As my dissertation 
is one of the first from within this newly-constructed multidisciplinary Centre, the 
‘typical’ SECReT PhD format has not yet been created.  
Secondly there is the expectation on producing tangible scientific and technical output. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given; (a) we are situated within the Engineering Faculty, 
(b) the multidisciplinary focus forces the interaction of social sciences and STEM fields, 
(c) the crime/security problems we are tackling are not abstract notions but ongoing 
concrete problems, and (d) our PhDs are funded by the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (the UK’s main agency for funding research in engineering 
and the physical sciences). For those with a technical background this is less of a 
challenge; however my primary academic background is in law, human rights and 
ethics. This legal knowledge has also been supplemented with a developing level of 
expertise in the discipline of Science and Technology Studies (STS) (specifically within 
the sociology of science and technology) as a result of my teaching within this field and 
the supervision of Professor Brian Balmer; one of my PhD supervisors.  While law and  
STS have value to add to SECReT, on a personal level this skill-set does not afford me 
the required knowledge to undertake cutting-edge natural science or engineering 
research. However, what it does provide me with is the knowledge-base, 
understanding, and outsider’s standpoint from which to assess the same problems 
being tackled by those scientists and engineers, but through a different lens. I have 
therefore sought to incorporate elements of law, STS, and security and crime science 
in an effort to facilitate the production of something practical and concrete – in this 
case methodological tools to assist the developers of security technologies to identify 
and incorporate social, ethical, and legal concerns into their designs before their 
products are released.    
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Thirdly, my dissertation does not follow a standard ‘aim-hypothesis-method-results’ 
format; a format which works well when the researcher is seeking to address a small 
gap in knowledge of an area which has been extensively researched. This is because 
my chosen area of research (the holistic examination of the design of security 
technologies and their associated social, legal, and ethical problems) is not developed 
enough to have created small identifiable gaps in the remainder. While there exists 
incredibly detailed, extensive research into both individual security 
technologies/problems (i.e. CCTV, ID cards, privacy, etc.) and categories of security 
technologies/problems (i.e. less-lethal weapons, digital technologies, surveillance 
technologies, data protection, etc.), relatively less research has been conducted where 
the focus is universal (looking across all of these ostensibly disparate technologies and 
associated problems to identify the possible presence of commonalities), let alone 
attempting to apply this knowledge to produce methodological design tools. As a 
direct result of this broad focus and the lack of an existing corpus of literature, when 
expanding upon the aim of my dissertation in Chapter 1 I have chosen to frame the 
constituent components as three research objectives rather than the more 
conventional research questions. I feel this ‘objectives’ depiction is a less artificial in 
the overall context of my research project. The three research objectives (1. identifying 
commonalities of controversy which exist across different security technologies; 2. 
generating guidelines for the development of future design tools to assist those 
developing STs in addressing these social controversies; and 3. applying these 
guidelines to begin the process of creating prototype methodological design tools) are 
all diverse in nature. This has the effect of dividing my research project into distinct 
stages; which further precludes the aim-method-results format. 
Throughout this entire undertaking I have apprehensively struggled with the 
unorthodox nature of my research project. However, upon completion I am proud of 
this lack of orthodoxy. For I contend that while the physical depiction of knowledge-
creation (i.e., a written dissertation or research paper) may become standardised 
through normative rules, the desire to adhere to these norms should not be afforded 
priority over the conduct of the research itself or achieving logical clarity in its 





Consider the following question: When an individual or company sets out to design a 
product for addressing an identified security threat, what value is there in them looking 
beyond the seemingly overriding inquiry; ‘does my product work’? Before one posits an 
answer to this question, it is worth reflecting upon the following two events:  
On the 14th of November 2011 the European Commission adopted new rules governing 
the use of body-scanners1 within European Union airports that effectively banned the 
backscatter variant due to its employment of x-rays (European Union 2011). In the 
United Kingdom, Manchester Airport had invested heavily in implementing this 
technology by making it central to their passenger screening processes. But despite the 
costs incurred, by October 2012 they too had removed all backscatter scanners at their 
own expense (BBC News 2012).  
Achieving the same effect, on the 18th of January 2013 with little prior public warning 
the United States’ Transportation Security Administration announced they had 
cancelled Rapiscan’s contract to provide backscatter body-scanners in US airports. As a 
result all deployed machines, 174 in total, were subsequently removed from thirty 
airports nationwide (Guardian 2013).  
What makes these two events noteworthy are the justifications behind them.  They 
are not based on a particular instance of catastrophic failure; for example where a 
passenger successfully smuggled concealed explosives through a backscatter scanner 
and subsequently detonated them mid-flight. Additionally, unlike previously removed 
technologies they are not justified by the failure of these scanners to reliably achieve 
their raisons d’être2, and neither are they based on a wider societal rejection of all 
body-imaging technologies; while backscatter scanners were removed from airports, 
the alternative millimetre-wave body-scanner variant remains.  
                                                     
1
 Referred to as security scanners by the European Commission. 
2
 Explosive trace portals (ETPs), for example, were systematically removed from US airports after failing 
to meet operational and reliability standards. Discrepancies between laboratory and operational testing-
results, their inability to cope with dust and humidity in airports, and their propensity for regularly 
breaking-down all contributed to this scenario (see GAO 2009). 
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Ultimately, these decisions are borne out of the social controversies and resistance 
that arise in response to the introduction of these scanners; resistance which in turn is 
a response to the design choices made by Rapiscan, the developer of this technology. 
Specifically this entails; (a) privacy concerns based on the nature of the graphic images 
Rapiscan decided their scanners should produce3, and (b) health concerns intrinsic to 
the fundamental decision to employ x-ray technology as the basis for their scanners. 
This failure of backscatter body-scanners does not stand isolated; rather it is one of 
many examples where aspects of the design of a security technology either directly or 
indirectly evoke controversies within societies4. It is the design of controversial security 
technologies such as these, and my refusal to accept the occurrence of such social 
responses as a fait accompli that are the driving forces behind my dissertation. Given 
that the shape of technologies reflect the design choices of those who create them, 
rather than being predetermined, the fundamental question addressed within my 
dissertation is how can we design socially acceptable security technologies?    
Before I commence a discussion of the aims, objectives, and methodologies of my PhD, 
it is necessary to define a number of terms employed throughout this dissertation. 
Specifically these are; security technologies, society, and societal response. 
By security technologies (STs) I am referring to ‘the product of an engineering 
endeavour that seeks to deter, prevent or detect crimes, and/or enhance the security 
of individuals, their property, or the state (including its infrastructure)’. This may 
include potentially lethal technologies, but for inclusion a technology must be available 
to civilian agencies and not restricted to the military. It is not restricted to technologies 
designed and/or developed by individuals holding formal qualifications, such as 
engineers, scientists, or industrial designers. Finally it encompasses all forms of 
engineering pursuit so long as what is produced has either a physical or digital 
presence. For example, while a bike-lock, body-scanner, or security centric data-mining 
programme are all examples of security technologies, a policy, law, or general 
computer operating system do not suffice.  
                                                     
3
 See Figure 2.1, page 64, for an example of this image. 
4
 Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines twelve such examples, including whole body-scanners. 
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When I employ the term society, I define this to mean ‘the situation of being in the 
company of, or associated with, other people through some determinable measure of 
proximity, or some shared trait(s) or belief(s), or external commonality’. In not 
restricting my definition to a large homogenous unit (i.e., British society) I also 
acknowledge that pluralities exist through the facts that; (a) an individual will 
simultaneously belong to many societies (e.g., UK citizen, male, Muslim, minor, white, 
etc.), and (b) different societies may react differently to, have different opinions of, 
and be treated differently by, the same ST. 
By societal response I am referring to the future acceptability of a proposed ST to 
society. However, to keep my research project manageable I am limiting the societies I 
am contemplating to Western cultures; primarily the United Kingdom 5 , though 
examples are included from the United States, Australia, and Northern European 
nations. 
 
1.1 Research aim and objectives 
The overarching aim of my research project is:  
To assist the developers and designers of security technologies in anticipating and 
mitigating negative societal responses to their technologies upstream in the design 
process. 
To achieve this overarching aim the following three primary objectives (with their 
accompanying requirements where appropriate) are as follows: 
1. To identify the causes of social controversies arising from the design and operation 
of STs. 
To consciously address a potential source of future controversy within the design of a 
ST before that technology is completed and deployed requires its developers explicitly 
identify these controversial design elements. This identification process would be both 
simplified and standardisable if individual controversies were not bespoke to each ST 
                                                     
5
 In the conduct of my research, and the subsequent production of this thesis, my focus of enquiries is 




but arose within diverse STs6. As such I endeavour to identify whether common 
controversies arise repeatedly across a range of diverse STs, thus allowing for their 
classification within an appropriate taxonomy.  
2. To generate guidelines for the assessment/development of future design tools 
produced to assist those developing STs, such that these tools can adequately 
identify potential sources of social controversies within the unique field of ST design. 
For future design-assisting tools to possess immediate relevance they must reflect the 
existing conditions prevalent within the security industry. This requires knowledge of 
the skills and training of those science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM) practitioners currently designing STs, their common organisational work 
structures, and rules enforced by state organisations. Acquiring this knowledge 
requires interviewing individual engineers and scientists actively engaged in the design 
and development of these technologies. This information is analysed and transformed 
into general guidelines used to both assess the usefulness of existing methodological 
approaches and to guide the development of new tools7.  
3. To begin the process of creating these methodological design tools. 
Finally I begin the process of applying the results from the first two objectives to the 
creation of methodological design tools for upstream-use by those scientists and 
engineers engaged in the process of designing and creating STs. Ultimately this 
requires the creation of entirely new design tools.  
I would contend at this point that measuring the success of this research project is not 
determined by any one of these three objectives, and in particular the creation of a 
successful design tool. Arguably this output (constituting a tangible product applicable 
to real world ST design projects) would be the obvious yardstick for determining 
success. However, the value in identifying and classifying into a single taxonomy the 
                                                     
6
 For if no such commonalities exist, or if they do but are only relevant to specifiable categories of STs at 
a narrow level of abstraction, then future design tools will have to either be created differently for each 
individual category of ST or, in the most labour-intensive scenario, constitute a bespoke creation for 
each design project. 
7
 The alternative (equally valid) approach would be to assess existing organisational and governance 
structures for weaknesses that contribute to the prevalence of social controversies arising from STs. I 
could then firstly recommend changes to these structures, then base any future tool design on this 
alternate reality. However, as discussed in Chapter 1.3 below I have chosen to ground this research 
project firmly within existing structures and constraints. 
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existence of common controversies that apply across the diverse spectrum of STs, as 
opposed to focussing on specific ST sub-groups8 (such as ICTs, CCTV, surveillance 
technologies, less lethal weapons, etc.) in itself represents a novel, valuable 
contribution to the wider ST literature. Equally the insights gained from the process of 
investigating whether it is even possible to create such design tools is as equally 
valuable as the production of any final product. Additionally, the results obtained by 
interviewing STEM practitioners engaged in the process of developing STs provides 
insights into the working practices of a group rarely opened up to examination due to 
the impact of secrecy9. The creation of guidelines for the construction of design tools 
based on these interview results10 possesses applicability beyond any tools created 
within my research project. In applying these guidelines, future design tools will also 
benefit from being grounded in existing corporate- and state-governance frameworks, 
as opposed to a counterfactual relying on changes to these frameworks that cannot be 
guaranteed11.  
 
1.1.1 Basic structure and methodology 
The structure of my research project, as depicted in Figure 1.1, is divided into five 
distinct, sequential occurring stages, each relating to specific chapters within my 
dissertation. These are briefly outlined below. Please note that detailed discussion of 
each stage’s methodologies and methods are included in each individual chapter, 
rather than being collated into a single methodology section here in the introduction, 
as a consequence of the particularly diverse formats of these stages. 
The content of each stage is as follows: 
Stage 1. Case-study analysis of controversial security technologies (see Chapter 2): 
Involves conducting multiple document-based case-studies of twelve selected STs that 
have all evoked social controversies, with the aim of identifying whether 
commonalities existed between these controversies regardless of the nature of the 
                                                     
8
 As achieved in Stage 1 of this research project, presented in Chapter 2. 
9
 See Chapter 1.4 for a discussion of secrecy and Chapters 3 & 7 for interview results. 
10
 See Chapter 6.1 for these identified guidelines. 
11
 See Chapter 1.3 below. 
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individual STs themselves. The presence of commonalities that transcend the spectrum 
of STs is successfully identified. As a result of this process, forty-three commonalities of 
controversy are identified and subsequently organised into seven categories to 
produce a taxonomy of ST controversies12. More granular information pertaining to 
each of these forty-three commonalities is also derived from the case-studies, for use 
in future tool designs.  
Stage 2. Interviews with engineers and scientists (see Chapter 3): Involves conducting 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews with fifteen STEM practitioners engaged in 
designing and developing STs, with the aim of understanding how this process occurs. 
This stage elicits valuable insights into both the motivations of these individuals, their 
skill-sets, and the constraints inherent to working within the ST industry.   
Stage 3. Case-studies of existing tools/methods (see Chapters 4 & 5): In Chapter 4, the 
results of the case studies from Stage 1 and the interviews from Stage 2 are combined 
to produce a set of assessment criteria by which to judge methodological tools seeking 
to identify and mitigate negative social reactions to STs during their design process. 
Chapter 5 involves focussed case studies of a selection of existing models, approaches, 
and assessment tools. These are then compared against the assessment criteria 
produced in Chapter 4 with the aim of identifying suitable candidates for use as off-
the-shelf design tools capable of being applied to all STs. Unfortunately, based on this 
process, no suitable candidates are identified. This necessitates the research 
undertaken in Stage 4. 
Stage 4. Creation of design rules and bespoke tools (see Chapter 6): Through 
combining the work undertaken in the previous three stages, Stage 4 involves the 
production of design rules for governing the creation of future design tools. These are 
then applied to produce two methodological tools for assisting the designers of 
security technologies in anticipating and mitigating possible negative social reactions 
to their future products upstream in their design processes. These are: 
 Framework of Common Controversies within Security Technologies (FCC) 
 Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies (DeSAST) 
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 See Table 2.13  Completed Taxonomy of Security Technology Controversies 
26 
 
Both of these, and their antecedent design rules, are presented in detail in Chapter 6.  
Stage 5. Assessment of created tools (see Chapter 7): Involves a non-comprehensive 
evaluation and validation process of one of the design tools created in Stage 4 
whereby DeSAST was applied to a ST currently under development by one of its 
designing engineers13 . Observations from this application and an accompanying 
interview are included in Chapter 7, along with preliminary observations for improving 
DeSAST. This process also identifies another potential use for DeSAST; that being as an 
interview tool to facilitate sociological and ethical investigation into the thought 
processes, prioritisations, considerations, and justifications employed by STEM 
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1.2 Why this topic and why the narrow focus? 
Before progressing further it is worthwhile addressing two questions at this point. 
Firstly why focus on STs and in particular their social acceptability? And secondly why 
narrow this focus even further to only concern myself with the upstream role of STEM 
practitioners engaged in designing and developing these technologies? 
In response to the first question, the simple and concise answer is: ‘because there is a 
need for focussed research on the social acceptability of STs’. To expand this response; 
I focuss on STs due to their increasing prevalence as instruments for deterring, 
preventing, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting criminal activity (see Roberts 
2011; PERF 2012; den Boer 2011 and others for examples of this phenomenon). They 
are already essential tools employed by law enforcement and national security 
agencies, and yet their full potential has by no means been tapped. For as our 
collective body of scientific knowledge grows, as new technologies and manufacturing 
processes are developed and refined, and as what we can achieve on a digital level 
continues to expand, we will possess the ability to create previously unachievable STs. 
Furthermore, the terrorist attacks both on and after September 11th 2001 (9/11) have 
provided an impetus (by way of opportunities and rationales) for investing in, 
researching, developing, and implementing new STs on scales and at speeds that might 
not have been possible otherwise (Lyon 2006; Schneier 2006). These factors all serve 
to highlight the importance of maximising social acceptability in relation to these STs. 
In relation to the second question, given the vast array of areas available and open to 
study it is sensible to narrow my focus. This decision to focus on both the upstream 
and the designer is justified for the following reasons. Firstly by failing to anticipate 
and address socially unacceptable elements within a new ST’s design, these elements 
can undermine what may otherwise have been an acceptable ST14. In other words, 
attempting to address problems after deployment can prove too late. Secondly the 
final design of any ST is not preordained to assume a certain form or achieve its 
functional goals in a certain way15; rather it is the result of design choices by the 
                                                     
14
 See Chapter 2.2.2 for a discussion of the failure of backscatter body scanners in US airports because of 
privacy concerns arising from initial design decisions about the images produced, and the developer’s 
subsequent inability to address these issues.   
15
 See Chapter 1.5.1 for a discussion on the rejection of technological determinism.   
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designers.  As such the upstream developers of these technologies both possess the 
scientific/technical skills and inhabit a privileged physical location to shape the form of 
those STs they are creating. However, it does not follow that they correspondingly 
possess the necessary skills, focus, tools, or training to identify potential future sources 
of social controversy within their designs, nor that their workplace organisational 
structures enable such actions16. As such, focussing on this specific group of actors, 
with the aim of assisting them in identifying potential sources of social resistance 
within the future products they are tasked with creating, becomes a logical, justifiable 
approach even if it only tackles one link in a much larger chain.  
One final reason for opting to conduct research focussed on the social controversies 
arising from STs, without limiting the scope of this enquiry to specified categories or 
specific examples of a ST17 or to specific types of controversies18, is the scarcity of 
existing literature adopting this approach. Existing approaches have tended to restrict 
the focus of their enquiries by specific ST, specific controversy, or a combination the 
two. While this approach is valuable, I believe there is increasingly a place here for also 
conducting more holistic examinations. Individual STs are increasingly being linked 
together into single platforms (e.g. closed circuit television (CCTV) combining with 
facial-recognition systems, behaviour algorithms, automated threat detection systems, 
automated number plate recognition, persistent authentications systems, etc.) and/or 
together into larger networks of multiple STs. As such, approaches designed to assist 
ST designers that are limited to a specific technology may find decreasing applicability 
here. Similarly the diverse nature of social controversies arising from STs makes it risky 
for the developer of a ST to limit what they seek to correct for in their designs, 
especially given the potential consequences of failing to address the source of a future 
social controversy19.  
                                                     
16
 See Chapters 3.3 & 3.4 for a discussion of the results from interviews conducted with STEM 
practitioners engaged in the process of designing STs whereby these skills and organisational limitations 
are identified.    
17
 For example; CCTV (Norris and Armstrong 1999), data mining and profiling technologies (Custers et al 
2012), less lethal weapons (Rappert 2003), etc. 
18
 For example; privacy issues (see Solove 2008), data protection issues (see Akrivopoulou and Psygkas 
2011), human rights issues (see Cunha et al 2013), etc. 
19
 See Chapter 6.1 for an expanded discussion justifying this holistic position.  
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Isolating and focussing on the upstream role of those engaged in the development of 
future STs (predominantly STEM practitioners) does not deny the importance of 
downstream actors/actions in affecting social acceptability. Insupportable rules of 
governance by elected officials, overuse, unacceptable use, and/or abuse by end-users 
all possess the propensity to undermine the public’s perception of otherwise 
acceptable STs20. But the fact is there is no silver-bullet approach to ensuring the social 
acceptability of any ST, and as such all aspects of the lifecycles of these technologies 
are necessary targets for research.  
 
1.3 A conscious decision to work within the world as it is 
The decision to focus my research on assisting the developers and designers of security 
technologies to anticipate and mitigate negative societal responses to their 
technologies upstream in the design process, necessarily generates the need to 
address another fundamental issue. That being: whether to ground any assistance 
measures in the existing structures 21 governing both the design of STs and the 
operation of the security industry, or whether to first produce new idealised structures 
and then base the design of any assistance measures on these. 
I have chosen to ground my research project in the existing structures governing the 
security industry22, characterised as the following: 
 The domination of secrecy throughout, actively enforced by governments. A 
system which pervades the design and development of STs23. Arguments often 
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 An example being the publically perceived misuse/overuse of surveillance powers under the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) whereby covert surveillance technologies were 
employed by various Councils to police school catchment zones, dog-fouling, and littering (BBC News 
2008; BBC News 2010). 
21
 Structures here refer to the various rules (formal and informal) which determine how STs are currently 
designed and developed within a country. This includes all legal provisions, codes of practice, and 
guidance provided by governments, as well as the contractual, organisational, and normative rules 
operating within the ST R&D industry as a whole.  
22
 In doing so I am focussing here on the UK. It must also be noted here that the concept of ‘the security 
industry’ is “neither well defined nor clearly identifiable” (ECORYS 2009, p.i). Blurring is identified 
between traditional external security (characterised by defence) and new internal security characterised 
by counterterrorism and law enforcement. External conflicts and global organised crime effect internal 
security, internal security threats may require military support, and STs may possess both 
internal/external dual-use applicability (ECORYS 2009). For my purposes when referring to ‘the security 
industry’ I am only including those segments of the industry whose products are not solely for military 
use.   
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used to justify this secrecy include; national security, commercial sensitive 
information is involved, projects may involve partners in more than one country, 
revealing information will compromise the effectiveness of technologies and 
procedures24.  
 The virtual absence of public engagement prior to the initial introduction or 
announcement of a ST25. 
 A commercial industry driven almost entirely by profit rather than any sense of 
altruism or national-duty26.   
 A competitive industry dominated by large operators, with small and medium 
companies typically restricted to niche markets or the licensing of their products 
to larger operators (ECORYS 2009). 
 The predominance of STEM practitioners as designers and developers of new STs.  
In so doing I am not endorsing these characteristics, especially the secrecy 
requirements adding to the lack of public engagement. Nor am I claiming such 
structures are optimal for minimising the propensity of STs to result in social 
controversies. Indeed the entire focus of my research project represents a tacit 
acknowledgement that there are serious flaws embedded in these existing ‘closed-
shop’ design processes. However, by working under the premises that; (a) the existing 
structures will probably remain largely unchanged in the short to mid-term, and (b) if 
they do change I have no way of accurately predicting their new forms, I am 
maximising the contemporary relevance of this research project by accepting the ST 
world in its current form. 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
23
 See Chapter 1.4 for further discussion of this phenomenon.  
24
 See Wright and Raab (2012) for a critical examination of these and other arguments within the 
context of surveillance activities.   
25
 See Chapter 1.4 for further discussions. Notable exceptions do exist here, such as the public relations 
campaign waged by the UK government when proposing the introduction of identity cards under the 
Identity Cards Act 2006 (ICA). 
26
 This ostensibly excludes government departments/agencies utilising solely in-house employees and 
expertise to produce STs, but even this becomes blurred when governments seek to license or sell 
products at a later date. 
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1.4 Secrecy within security technologies 
If I were ever required to identify the one single concept with the greatest impact on 
my dissertation it would be secrecy. In a variety of forms, secrecy repeatedly arises 
within, and often dictates the form of, my entire PhD; be this in the design of STs, the 
conduct of my data collection (especially the anonymity requirements insisted upon by 
the STEM practitioners interviewed in Chapter 3), or the construction of the design 
tools for assisting ST designers/developers undertaken in Chapter 6.  As such, what 
follows in Chapter 1.4 is a detailed discussion of this concept, its impact on my 
research topic, and how it has been accommodated for throughout my dissertation.       
Secrecy, defined by Bok (1989) as deliberate concealment, is a commonplace concept 
within the realms of national security and law enforcement, encompassing such 
diverse topics as the conduct of undercover operations, covert surveillance, the 
membership of various government agencies, and the use of closed material 
procedures 27  amongst others. Secrecy of scientific and technological knowledge 
possessing national security and/or military implications is also an established ideal 
(see Rappert (2007) and Balmer (2012) as examples of different contextual accounts).  
When it comes to STs, secrecy pervades their design, development, deployment, and 
continued operation. However, this claim embodies all manner of contradictions. 
Firstly private companies producing their own STs for commercial sale will generally be 
able to decide how open they will be regarding both the design process and 
information pertaining to their products. But, if they are working under contract and 
have signed secrecy requirements then their freedom to divulge information will be 
constrained. Secondly secrecy is neither universally applied nor required within STs, 
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 Commonly referred to as ‘secret courts’ these are procedures under the UK’s Justice and Security Act 





Figure 1.2  Secrecy within STs 
To provide examples, at one end of this spectrum international mass information and 
communications technology (ICT) surveillance programmes such as PRISM28, have 
been designed, developed, implemented, and operated under a blanket of complete 
secrecy. The incomplete secrecy category includes whole-body scanners whose 
existence and purpose are disclosed but whose detection capabilities/rates remain 
classified. Finally there are STs where complete disclosure is employed, such as simple 
bike locks and chains whose resistance to being cut is made public.  
These different approaches feed into a set of contradictions centred on the purpose(s) 
of any ST. Is the ST employed for deterring, preventing, detecting, investigating, and/or 
prosecuting criminal activities? Depending on what it is the end-user is hoping to 
achieve with a ST, the presence of secrecy can aid or hinder these goals. Using the 
examples above, data mining programmes like PRISM can be used to prevent, detect, 
and investigate criminal acts, but while they remain completely secret they cannot 
achieve direct deterrence. However, in regards to whole-body scanners, by 
implementing these in airports end-users can use them to prevent, detect, as well as 
deter and prosecute criminal activities. That said, it is arguable that the deterrence 
effect is maintained by both the scanner’s presence and the fact that information on 
just how effective these devices are at detecting non-metallic and organic materials is 
not released to potential attackers – thus making it harder for them to circumvent this 
technology29. Finally the manufacturer of a bike lock/chain for preventing bike theft 
may seek to be completely open about their product’s capabilities, thus relying entirely 
on deterrence and prevention, even though the thief has now been provided all the 
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 See Greenwald and MacAskill (2013). 
29
 There are numerous caveats to this claim. Firstly if in reality the classified detection capabilities of this 
ST are in fact very poor then its effectiveness relies entirely on its deterrence effect; what Bruce 
Schneier (2006) refers to as security theatre. Secondly, where the deterrence effect of a ST relies upon 
secrecy as to its capabilities, should attackers gain access to this information and circumvent this ST 
without the knowledge of the defenders then that ST will no longer be an effective deterrent.  
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information they need to successfully carry out an attack (i.e., the equipment and time 
required to break the lock).  
Despite the ostensibly legitimate applications of secrecy within STs described in the 
above examples, secrecy can also be employed to further rather more questionable 
ends. As noted by Balmer (2012), secrecy can act to prevent the public disclosure of 
information with the potential to result in public censure or exacerbate existing public 
resistance. This discussion on the application of secrecy goes beyond ST design, 
reflecting the wider debate of how to reconcile secrecy with democracy, where these 
two concepts are often presented as conflicting ideals. However, such a simplistic 
opposing conceptualisation masks a more nuanced debate. As Thompson (1999) points 
out, “[s]ome of the best reasons for secrecy rest on the very same democratic values 
that argue against secrecy…. The conflict involves this basic dilemma of accountability: 
democracy requires publicity, but some democratic policies require secrecy” (p.182).  
Thompson (1999) accepts as justifiable the need for government secrecy but with 
three important caveats. Firstly there should be a presumption of 
publicity/transparency, such that in any balancing of publicity and secrecy, publicity 
should be afforded primacy. Secondly, that if a reason a policy is kept secret is because 
it would be defeated by democratic processes if it was made public then that policy 
should be abandoned. Thirdly, for secrecy to be justifiable, the process by which this 
decision is justified must not itself be a secret one. Thompson advocates as 
democratically acceptable a concept of obscurity: situated “somewhere between deep 
concealment and full disclosure. Such secrets are not completely concealed …. But their 
content is not made explicit … [which is] necessary for the policy’s being effective” 
(p.186), which corresponds with the concept of incomplete security within Figure 1.2 
above.   
 
1.4.1 Secrecy and conducting research 
At the level of the STEM practitioner, secrecy can pose fundamental challenges to 
successfully undertaking research. By its very nature it prevents a research interacting 
with other colleagues not afforded access to the project at hand, which in itself can 
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slow the rate of scientific progress purely by restricting sources of potential input 
when seeking to solve problems. That said, Rappert and Balmer (2007) note that 
within military research establishments epitomised by secrecy (such as those engaged 
in the development of weapons of mass destruction), shadow communities of 
scientists have been encouraged to form which, amongst other things, assist 
information flows. Despite the possibility of such networks forming, the development 
of STs within private companies may pose additional challenges if the prioritisation of 
commercial secrecy is used as a justification for denying STEM employees access to 
even these shadow networks30.       
Another consequence of enforced secrecy is the isolation of scientists, not only from 
peers, but from those individuals and groups (including fellow scientists) morally 
opposed to the work being undertaken (Balmer 2012). This can result in a form of 
moral and ethical bounded rationality, whereby the negative aspects/consequences of 
one’s work are either diminished in importance or are simply not recognised31. 
In addition there are the (potentially severe) personal implications for a ST designer 
who subsequently rejects secrecy by violating national secrecy provisions. The US 
Government’s vigorous pursuit of computer programmer and former National Security 
Agency ‘contractor turned whistle-blower’ Edward Snowden, for the “unauthorized 
communication of national defense information” and “willful communication of 
classified intelligence with an unauthorized person” (Finn and Horwitz 2013) under the 
US Espionage Act 191732 provides a poignant case-in-point. 
As a concluding point to this section, despite the negative aspects of the above 
discussion it must be noted that within the specific constraints of this research project, 
secrecy may actually assist in the operation of my proposed design-tools. If the 
intended end-users of these tools apply them knowing their responses will be 
protected under a cover of secrecy, then they may approach their task with greater 
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 To some extent, staff changing employers and moving between ST companies will involve a level of 
knowledge transfer, though its speed and scope will be limited.  
31
 For an example of this phenomenon occurring within this research project see Chapter 7.2.1 under 
the subheading: Considering a rejected section.   
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candour, confident that their actions and responses will not be divulged to 
unauthorised outsiders.  
 
1.4.2 Direct implications for this project 
The effects of secrecy manifest themselves primarily within two elements of this 
research project: (1) the interview components, and (2) the composition of the design 
requirements I produce to governing future tool design. 
Regarding my interviews with the fifteen STEM practitioners conducted in Stage 2 (and 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3.2.1), due to the restrictions placed on these individuals 
under legislation such as the UK’s Official Secrets Act 1989 and the consequences of 
breaching this Act, my interviewees were understandably cautious about both 
agreeing to be interviewed and the reporting of their comments. As a result they 
stipulated (and have been provided) full anonymity throughout my dissertation, 
including the complete disassociation of comments/quotes from the individual 
sources. These stipulations for anonymity also impact the format of the interviewee 
consent form. As presented in Appendix A, this form is somewhat unconventional 
(though not without precedent33) in that it is not intended or designed to be signed by 
the interviewees, an action that would have undermined anonymity. Rather its primary 
purpose is to expressly set down how I (the researcher) will protect the interviewees 
when collecting, storing, and presenting their interview data. I base the decision to 
proceed with completely anonymised data collection in the absence of signed consent 
forms on the following: 
1. Consent is still obtained through the particular consent forms I do use34 which 
clearly set out the protections afforded the interviewees. 
2. The potential benefits of conducting this research (in the form of more responsibly 
designed STs) outweigh the costs of keeping total anonymity. 
3. Collecting and analysing anonymised data, stripped of identifying features, is 
better than not being able to collect any data at all.  
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 See Farrimond (2013) for a good discussion of this problem. 
34
 See Appendix A 
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Regarding the design requirements presented in Chapter 6.1, the effect of secrecy 
translated into Requirement 4: The tool must be usable without any direct public 
interaction or input. Thus rather than challenging the efficacy or legitimacy of 
excluding the public from ST design projects I have chosen to create a requirement 
that any future design tool must be usable without such input.  By including this 
requirement I am not making the obviously false claim that all STs are developed 
under a secrecy requirement. Nor does this mean I am advocating the creation of 
design tools which expressly prohibit the designers/developers of a STs from engaging 
with the public should they have permission to do so. Rather this requirement simply 
seeks to ensure that any future design tool is able to operate effectively in an 
environment where public engagement is not possible/permitted. 
 
1.5 Factors pertaining to, and influencing, the theoretical 
positioning of my research 
 
1.5.1 A rejection of technological determinism 
Martin and Schinzinger (1996) highlight the potential for theories developed within 
Science and Technology Studies providing important insights into engineering ethics 
and practice; in particular the rejection of technological determinism. Technological 
determinism is the view that technology develops independently from society via 
some internal logic, and upon its release it affects the character of society (MacKenzie 
and Wajcman 1999). Science and Technology Studies orthodoxy holds that there is 
influence and shaping passing both ways between technology and society, beyond 
simple cause-and-effect mechanisms, which affect the development and nature of 
both. On a practical level, if this was not the case (such that the development 
trajectory of a ST was entirely predetermined by technical factors and incapable of 
social influence) then this research project would have no justifiable theoretical basis.  
However, this inclusion of social factors does not negate the real restrictions inherent 
within science and engineering. While Science and Technology Studies seeks to draw 
out into the open the important social components of technoscience, in a discussion 
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on engineering Vincenti (1995) warns his fellow practitioners of privileging the social 
over the technical (or vice versa) when examining the activities of engineers. Vincenti 
makes clear that one can accept the importance of social construction to the shaping 
of technology without abandoning the fact a real world exists beyond human wishes; a 
world that that “imposes intractable, non-negotiable constraints on what engineers 
can and cannot do” (p.553). 
The important implications of social shaping on my research are that engineers are not 
merely unearthing a predetermined technological artefact, devoid of social influences, 
assumptions, and biases, when creating a ST. That STs do not simply shape a society 
upon their deployment, rather they are also being interpreted, constructed, and 
shaped by that same society. And finally Science and Technology Studies perspectives 
imply that because the designers of a ST have discretion in what they produce they 
cannot escape broad ethical responsibilities for their work. 
 
1.5.2 Persevering with STs as technological fixes to crime35 
The development and interpretation of new technological advancements are 
incorporated into STs with considerable enthusiasm by governments, law enforcement 
agencies, and private companies as potential methods for preventing, detecting, and 
prosecuting criminal activities. In this regard STs represent technological fixes for the 
social problem of crime; a technological fix being broadly defined as a technological 
solution for solving social problems (Weinberg 1967).  
STs are often presented as a panacea for addressing crime by being cheaper and/or 
more effective than the alternative human-centric approaches. Whole body scanners 
at airports utilise X-ray backscattering or millimetre wave technology so as to identify 
metallic and non-metallic objects, plastic and liquid explosives, flora, fauna, drugs, and 
cash, concealed within or beneath the clothing of passengers (European Commission, 
2010; Mitchener-Nissen et al 2012). Data mining, being the application of database 
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 Barring some modification I have published the text of Chapter 1.5.2 in the following article during the 
course of my research project: Mitchener-Nissen, T (2013) Addressing social resistance in emerging 




technology and techniques (such as modelling and statistical analysis) to data so as to 
identify valid, novel, implicit and potentially useful information and patterns within 
that data, is employed with the aim of analysing intelligence and detecting terrorist 
activities, fraud, and other criminal patterns (Schermer 2011; Steinbock 2005; Tien 
2004). The use of biometrics enables crime-scene technologies that can assist in the 
identification and prosecution of offenders (such as DNA databases and fingerprinting 
technologies), tackling identity fraud, and counteracting illegal immigration (Goldstein 
et al 2008; Grijpink 2006). To assist in the investigation and prosecution of criminal 
acts, researchers and private companies are trying to develop lie detection 
technologies designed to directly access brain functions by employing fMRI and EEG 
(Wolpe et al 2010). This selection represents a tiny snapshot of the cornucopia of STs 
both under development and already implemented.  
Without further examination it is tempting to conclude that STs do indeed constitute a 
justification for Weinberg’s vision of technological fixes as the solution to social 
problems. However the notion of the technological fix is subject to robust criticism. It 
is also described as “a quick cheap fix using inappropriate technology that creates 
more problems than it solves” (Rosner 2004). The truth of this statement is evident 
within the social controversies (or in the case of the lie detection technologies, the 
possible future social controversies) produced by each of the ST examples provided 
above. Whole body scanners have been accused of conducting digital strip-searches 
(Klitou 2008), and the backscatter variation has been removed from US airports 
because of the images produced. Data mining has been associated with both a fear of 
totalitarian-style state observation, as well as the targeting of individuals by 
governments (Steinbock 2005). Different biometric technologies can discriminate 
against various groups within society and are plagued by the problem of false positives 
(Hunter 2005; Whitley and Hosein 2010). Additionally the UK’s DNA database (the 
largest in the world) has created controversy by holding the details of innocent people 
and a disproportionate number of samples from ethnic minorities (Jobling and Gill 
2004; Human Genetics Commission 2009). And finally the new generation of potential 
lie-detection technologies have faced criticism over the potential ethical, social, and 
legal implications of their operation to existing social and legal institutions should they 
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ever be made to definitively and consistently ‘work’ (Rusconi and Mitchener-Nissen 
2013). 
Despite the new problems created by these technological fixes (i.e., by STs), I have not 
discerned any reduction in governments’ appetites for their development and 
deployment. On the contrary, rather than questions being raised over the wisdom of 
persevering with the ‘ST as technological fix’ approach, quite the opposite response is 
observable. To fix the social problems created by the technological fixes that are STs, 
what are often developed are additional technological fixes; i.e., new technological 
fixes to fix the new social problems created by the old technological fix created to 
address the old social problem of crime. For example; developing privacy enhancing 
technologies (PETs) such as image modifiers36 to address the privacy concerns37 
created by the whole-body scanners38 that were introduced to address the problem of 
people smuggling non-metallic items concealed within or under their clothing onto 
aircraft39. The definitive message to be taken away here is that we should not expect 
the creation and deployment of STs to diminish in the near future given the 
enthusiasm of their adoption, regardless of the associated problems they may create.  
 
1.5.3 Imposing additional ethical responsibilities on engineers/scientists 
By focussing on the upstream development of STs, while maintaining the requirement 
of secrecy, a concomitant implication is the imposition of additional responsibilities 
onto the STEM practitioners involved in creating these technologies. These individuals 
will be held accountable for identifying and addressing sources of social controversy 
within their products. This approach raises two related questions: 
1. Is it appropriate to impose this ethical burden on these STEM practitioners? 
2. How equipped are they for achieving this task? 
Regarding question 1, the referenced ethical burden essentially requires the designers 
of a ST accept responsibility for the social controversies their products subsequently 
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 Representing the new social problem. 
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 Representing the old technological fix. 
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 Representing the old social problem.  
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evoke. This is admittedly a contentious requirement, though in relation to engineers it 
reflects modern trends and the culmination of gradual yet profound changes to their 
responsibilities over the past century. These have influenced how engineers conduct 
their business, particularly in relation to the development of engineering ethics, and 
the responsibilities they bear for the misuse or negative effects of their creations.  
Examining the historical development of ethics in engineering from the formation of 
the Society of Civil Engineers in 1771 onwards, Mitcham (1997) identifies the 
emergence of three distinct ideas that influenced the conduct of engineers. The first 
idea is the primary duty of engineers to be loyal to their employer; an ideal formalised 
in the early ethics codes of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers in 1912 and 
the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1914. However, such a duty of obedience 
gives rise to the concern that it could open the engineer to unjust manipulation by an 
employer. Later, during the first third of the twentieth century, a second idea known 
as the technocracy movement arises. This holds that engineers should have political 
and economic power as they pursue technological efficiency, thereby allowing them to 
apply their own standards of good/bad and right/wrong without being beholden to 
business interests. The belief being this would result in better products for the 
consumer and a stronger economy (Mitcham 1997).  
Yet pursuing technical perfection as a goal in and of itself has limitations and can result 
in human, societal, environmental, and other factors being ignored. Questioning of, 
and opposition to, technocracy began to grow post World War II giving rise to calls for 
social responsibility (Mitcham’s third idea) as a component of ethics in engineering 
(Mitcham 1997). 
Following a number of technological developments, designs and failures that 
negatively impacted human wellbeing throughout the period beginning with the 
development of atomic weapons40, the academic field of engineering ethics was born 
in the early 1980s to assist engineers in making the right decisions when facing 
ethically difficult situations (Johnson and Wetmore 2008). This modern engineering 
ethics has been defined as: 
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 A sample includes; the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear reactor meltdowns, the widespread 
use of chlorofluorocarbons, DC-10 engines separating from the aircraft, the Union Carbide chemical 
plant disaster at Bhopal, and the dangerous fuel system design in the Ford Pinto. 
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(1) the study of moral issues and decisions confronting individuals and organizations 
engaged in engineering and (2) the study of related questions about the moral ideals, 
character, policies and relationships of people and corporations involved in 
technological study (Martin and Schinzinger 1996, pp.2-3).  
Martin and Schinzinger highlight the potential for theories developed with Science and 
Technology Studies to provide important insights into engineering ethics; the first 
being the rejection of technological determinism as discussed in Chapter 1.5.1 above. 
The second theory is the acceptance that engineers are not isolated individuals; rather 
they work within, and are influenced by, a network of actors that exert influence on 
the development of technological artefacts before, during and after the engineer 
ceases work (see Latour 1987 & 1996). As such the responsibility of the engineer for 
their creations, while important, is also diluted and redistributed (Johnson and 
Wetmore, 2008).  
This leads into the vexed question of whether engineers should be responsible for the 
negative side-effects or misuse of their creations. Here there exist a wide range of 
responses, from the extreme view that engineers should be responsible for all the 
negative consequences of the devices they design and develop, through to the equally 
extreme opposing view that engineers should bear no responsibility for the misuse or 
negative effects of their inventions. This is another area in which Science and 
Technology Studies academics have been active.  
Modern Science and Technology Studies and engineering ethics literature appears to 
adopt a moderate middle-ground. For example Whitbeck in Ethics in Engineering 
Practice and Research contends that while engineers do have a responsibility to make 
technology safe, this duty is restricted to foreseeable failures and misuses, for: 
[t]o be morally responsible for outcomes people must have some ability to foresee and 
influence them. I draw attention to this seemingly obvious point because some 
commentators have sought to blame technology (and engineers and scientists) for 
everything that is objectionable in modern life (1998, p.117). 
Doorn and Fahlquist (2010) also list foreseeability as an accepted component of 
responsibility, before going on to raise the common problem of how to apportion 
responsibility when engineers work as part of a team whereby responsibility is diluted. 
They suggest embedding engineering ethicists within design teams at earlier stages, 
shifting the questions from ‘whom to blame’ or ‘how to apportion collective blame’ to 
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‘how can we carry out the research such that ethics acts as a guide’. This approach can 
be contrasted to that of Johnson and Wetmore (2008), who contend that as engineers 
are engaged in building sociotechnical systems they still possess personal 
responsibility, but this responsibility shifts to become ‘a need to communicate and 
coordinate with the other social actors’.  
Despite these differences in determining the appropriate nature of the STEM 
practitioner’s ethical burden, existing orthodoxy appears to display no compunction in 
assigning ethical burdens to these STEM practitioners in relation to their products. As a 
direct result I feel I am not unjustified in imposing a responsibility to identify and 
mitigate societal concerns.  
While Question 1 at the start of this section sought to determine the appropriateness 
of imposing the ethical burden of identifying and mitigating societal concerns arising 
from the design elements of their creations onto STEM practitioners, Question 2 
inquired as to how well-equipped STEM practitioners are for undertaking this task. On 
the mitigation requirement, I argue they are often the only people with the necessary 
skills to do so. Given the complex technical nature of many (but not all) STs, it requires 
trained engineers, natural scientists, computer programmers, and mathematicians to 
make the necessary changes and/or advancements to a ST’s design so as to mitigate 
potential societal concerns. However, on the identification requirement I argue their 
ability to achieve this is severely hampered for a number of reasons41. 
The first is the paucity of social and ethical education within university STEM courses. 
From the interviews with STEM practitioners undertaken in Stage 2 of this research 
project42 it was repeatedly highlighted that in university engineering, mathematics, 
and hard sciences courses in the UK, it is highly likely that a student can (and will) 
complete their education without ever undertaking a single lecture on the importance 
of identifying and incorporating social and ethics factors into their work. This is despite 
the creation of the field of engineering ethics as discussed above. For those who 
counter with the claim that ethics and ethical research is ensured by the presence of 
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 I have published the text of the first two reasons included here in the following article as part of my 
research project: Mitchener-Nissen, T. (2013) Addressing social resistance in emerging security 
technologies. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, August 2013 (7), doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00483 
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 See Chapter 3. 
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university ethics boards, while a particular research or design project may meet all 
official conduct requirements such that it is considered ethical, this does not mean 
that what is being undertaken or created will be accepted by the public. The diverse 
groups which comprise a society ultimately determine what is considered socially or 
ethically acceptable, and yet university engineering and hard science courses regularly 
fail new researchers and designers by not equipping them with an understanding of 
this fact nor the tools to adequately interact with the public.  
The second element in the lack of priority afforded social and ethical issues within 
research and design projects. Again the interviews in Chapter 3 highlighted a clear 
hierarchical structure to the design process. For commercial projects it begins with 
cost; if it is determined that there is not a viable market for a product then it will not 
be produced. If this test is passed and the project is considered feasible than design 
specifications are produced in accordance with the client’s requirements and the 
product is created. Similarly with university research projects, the presence of funding 
and/or the potential for future commercial exploitation dictates the research 
undertaken. When this is directed towards addressing perceived security deficiencies 
the focus is on attaining a specific security goal. These processes leave little space for 
the consideration and incorporation of social and ethical issues – the focus is on ‘can 
we achieve what we have set out to achieve’, and not ‘is this a socially acceptable way 
of achieving the desired goals’ or ‘are these goals socially acceptable per se’.     
The third is the combined effects of secrecy discussed in Chapter 1.4, including the 
restrictions on public participation within the design and development of STs, and the 
effects on scientists not being exposed to dissenting views challenging the underlying 
ethical values of their research projects.  
 
1.5.4 The distinction between legality and legitimacy of STs 
The fact that either democratically elected officials, or state agents/agencies who 
enjoy widespread popular support, that commission and/or support the development 
and deployment of ST, this does not prevent public resistance arising in relation to 
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these technologies. It is this fact that I contend highlights a fundamental division 
internal to STs; the contrast between legality and legitimacy. 
The legality of any ST is determined by that technology meeting all the legal 
requirements (be they local, national, or international) for its use within a particular 
jurisdiction, as will be set by the political and legal structures governing that 
jurisdiction. In contrast, a ST attains legitimacy by being accepted by society at large. 
Legality cannot ensure legitimacy while legitimacy does not provide legality. But while 
legality can be created before a ST is designed deployed or made public, legitimacy by 
its nature can only be obtained after the public have been made aware of a ST, which 
requires the technology (or information on it) entering the public domain. 
While legality and legitimacy are distinct concepts, the need for a ST to possess both 
cannot be overstated. For while possessing legality enables the introduction of a ST 
into the field, if that same ST does not also gain and maintain legitimacy through active 
public support or passive public acceptance it will not survive unscathed over the mid- 
to long-term. This definitive assertion is supported by the examinations undertaken 
within this research project of multiple STs that have all evoked social controversy that 
undermined their legitimacy43. As a result they have all been either prohibited, forcibly 
modified, their distribution restricted, and/or their usage constrained by various rules. 
The concomitant danger here is that by introducing these socially unacceptable 
technologies, trust in government and state agencies is threatened, research and 
design capacity is diverted from acceptable technologies, and money is wasted that 
could otherwise have been used for legitimate programmes. It has also been noted 
that the rejection of a technology can lead to its permanent inferiority through neglect 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999).  
As a result of these factors, once a ST that evokes social controversy is deployed, the 
negative implications arising from its lack of legitimacy will begin to take effect. The 
challenge, therefore, is identifying what aspects of a ST’s design are more likely to 
evoke social controversy before a technology is developed and deployed. Once 
identified, the designers of a ST can consciously address these issues upstream in the 
design process. Thus they can attempt to mitigate future negative social reactions, 
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before these responses materialise, via explicit design decisions during the STs 
development process.   This practical challenge forms the basis of this research project. 
 
1.6 Precedents to the upstream approach  
The upstream focus of this thesis, whereby attempts are made to influence the 
research and design of a technology by incorporating certain requirements and/or 
values, is not without precedent. From the technology design perspective, approaches 
such as Value Sensitive Design and Privacy by Design emerged during the 1990’s and 
sought to infuse design processes with human-centric values and privacy protections 
respectively44. 
From the technology governance perspective, Article 23, Paragraph 2, of the proposed 
General Data Protection Regulation of the EU45 adopts as default mechanisms for the 
processing of personal data which minimise the collection, processing, and retention of 
such data. These mechanisms (themselves comparable to STs) must also ensure that 
default settings prohibit the accessibility of personal data to an indefinite number of 
individuals. Adopting such a position pushes data protections upstream from individual 
users.    
 
1.7 Adopting a mid-range approach to research 
In an effort to both foster debate and challenge a perceived status quo, it was 
provocatively noted by Wyatt and Balmer (2007) that within Science and Technology 
Studies much of the work undertaken has tended to constitute either grand ‘macro-
level’ theories or focussed ‘micro-level’ case studies. What was presented as lacking 
was a robust corpus of mid-range research; i.e., research that seeks to bridge the gap 
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between grand theories and focused studies. By drawing on Robert Merton’s46 claims 
in respect of sociology, Wyatt and Balmer (2007, p.621) note that: 
[F]or Merton the failure to develop such theories, by focussing instead on the 
production of descriptions or the production of theories of everything, meant that 
sociology was unable to engage wider audiences with its work. For Merton, middle-
range theory meant engaging with reality, albeit a limited aspect of it; producing 
theoretical accounts that engaged with that reality [that] … could be used to 
communicate with others.  
Geels (2007) characterises a mid-range theory as one which “[does] not address the 
whole of science and technology, but focus[es] on limited themes and topics. [One 
which makes] … explicit efforts to combine different concepts in an analytical model 
and … search[es] for patterns and explanatory mechanisms” (p.635). While my 
dissertation is foremost a Security and Crime Science dissertation and not a Science 
and Technology Studies one, in my efforts to produce a multidisciplinary piece of 
research that would be accessible and relevant to a range of actors, I have adopted 
just such a mid-range approach.  
Applying Geels’ characterisation of a mid-range theory to my own research project; to 
move up from the micro-level I begin in Chapter 2 by exploring controversies within 
STs through repeatedly undertaking case studies of twelve controversial ST. This is 
complemented in Chapter 3 with individual interviews with fifteen STEM practitioners 
working in the field of ST design and development. From this data I seek to elevate the 
discussion beyond the individual (be that a technology or person) to a mid-range level 
with greater applicability. This is characterised by the identification of forty-three 
commonalities of controversy47 and five essential design rules48 that are subsequently 
combined in Chapter 6 to produce the two design tools (FCC and DeSAST). The 
analytical model produced in Chapter 249 represents an explicit effort to combine and 
incorporate different concepts (in the form of the commonalities of controversy) based 
on perceived patterns and a search for explanatory mechanisms.  
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Similarly, in drawing down to the mid-level from the macro-level throughout my 
dissertation, I am not seeking to address the socially acceptable development of all 
technologies. Rather I am restricting my focus solely to a sub-group within the 





2. Stage 1 – Case-Study Analysis of Controversial 
Security Technologies 
 
The methodology adopted for Stage 1 entails undertaking individual case studies for 12 
controversial STs (comprising Chapters 2.2-2.13 below), with the results of this process 
coded by common events/words to identify commonalities. A discussion of the 
methodology employed within this Stage is set out below, followed by an expansion on 
the methods employed. 
The results of Stage 1 were used to create a framework of controversies which is 
presented at the end of this chapter50. This framework underpins the later tool design 
work undertaken in Chapter 6. 
 
2.1 Methodology 
As outlined in Chapter 1.1 above, the purpose of Stage 1 is the examination of a 
number of controversial STs; the aim being the identification and expansion of the 
social controversies which arise from the development and/or introduction of each ST. 
The most accessible sources of data on these controversial STs are in the form of 
documents, primarily consisting of media reports, journal articles, books, and reports 
by governments and NGOs. As such, to achieve the aim set here I have employed the 
methodology of a multiple case study based on documentary evidence. Given that I am 
examining multiple instances of a phenomenon (i.e., the social controversies 
associated with STs) at essentially the same point in time, this multiple case study 
approach can also been referred to as a comparative analysis, comparative case study, 
or parallel case study (Baxter 2010). 
While there are multiple definitions for a case study, for the purposes of this project I 
employ the following; ‘the intensive study of a single case or small number of cases 
where the purposes are to explain those cases and shed light on a larger class of cases’ 
(incorporating Baxter (2010) and Gerring (2004 & 2007)).  
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Stake (2008) categorises case studies into three types; intrinsic, instrumental, and 
multiple. Intrinsic case studies focus solely on a single interesting case with no purpose 
of understanding some wider phenomenon; i.e., examining that individual case is the 
end justifying the means. Instrumental case studies describe where “a particular case 
is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue…. The case is of secondary 
importance; it plays a supporting role, and it facilitates our understanding of something 
else” (p.120). Multiple case studies describe an instrumental study which has been 
expanded to incorporate several cases “chosen because it is believed that 
understanding them will lead to better understanding, and perhaps better theorizing, 
about a still larger collection of cases” (p.123). I have chosen to employ multiple case 
studies as: 
i. I am interested in a specific issue (that being the sources of social controversy 
within STs) rather than developing a deep understanding of a ST (thus ruling 
out intrinsic case studies). The narrowly-focussed examination of each ST 
serves to provide the necessary insights to understand the social controversies 
inherent to that ST. 
ii. As my focus is on identifying whether the same controversies appear across 
STs, such that generic and universally applicable (as opposed to bespoke) 
design tools may become a possibility, it is necessary to incorporate several 
cases; hence the multiple case studies approach was decided upon.  
The nature of the research undertaken within each individual case study is 
predominantly cross-sectional as opposed to longitudinal, in that it was undertaken at 
a single point in time51. There are two limited exceptions here. In relation to whole 
body scanners52, regulatory decisions of 2013 to restrict the use of the backscatter 
variant within airports require a limited revisit, as do the conclusion of criminal court 
proceedings in 2013 over the development of the fraudulent ADE-651 Handheld 
Explosives Detector. 
The case-studies display elements of both depth-orientated idiographic research and 
breadth-orientated nomothetic research (see Baxter 2010), without being committed 
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to either method. They are idiographic to the extent that they seek to develop an in-
detail understanding of that which provokes controversy in relation to the design and 
operation of ST; however they ignore all other aspects of those STs. Similarly, they are 
nomothetic in that they investigate the common nature of these elements as they 
appear across twelve different controversial STs; while at the same time ignoring STs 
which have not evoked social controversy.  
Navigating this path between idiographic and nomothetic research is instrumental in 
my attempts to produce mid-range theories, as previously discussed in Chapter 1.7. 
Furthermore, by adopting this comparative approach I can counter a criticism 
sometimes levelled at case studies; that they “focus too much on the particular and not 
enough on what is common across case studies” (Baxter 2010, p.93).  
As stated above, data sources for these controversial STs are documentary, in the form 
of media reports, journal articles, etc. Documentation is one of the most commonly 
used sources of evidence when conducting case studies. They benefit from being 
stable, unobtrusive, exact, and broad in scope; though it must be noted that they can 
also be difficult to retrieve, subject to selection bias, and may themselves be biased 
(Yin 2009).       
For the purposes of Stage 1, multiple case studies were chosen over alternative 
qualitative data collection methods such as surveys, questionnaires, and interviews for 
three reasons. Firstly the multiple case study approach provides an established 
methodology for examining a particular phenomenon across a relatively small sample 
of subjects while facilitating the development of theories for application to the wider 
population. Secondly they can be undertaken using existing evidence (i.e., documents). 
The third reason is related to the fact that individuals are simultaneously members of 
many different sub-groups within a society; one of these being those who consider a 
specific ST to be unacceptable. There is not an easily identifiable or accessible single 
sub-group of society who are against each specific ST, let alone all STs, making their 
inclusion as respondents for possible interviews or questionnaires unfeasible. Also the 
purpose here is not to identity common characteristics across those who oppose all (or 
the majority of) STs, rather to identify possible common sources of controversy within 
the STs themselves. Furthermore, those who oppose one of the STs incorporated as a 
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case study may indeed support all of the others STs included. Thus the problem of 
identifying suitable respondents will need to be addressed at the start of each 
separate case study undertaken (i.e., twelve times for twelve case studies). This point 
turns the conducting of interviews, questionnaires or surveys into an untenable option.     
 
2.1.1 Multiple case study method 
Before commonalities of controversy can be identified across different STs, it is 
necessary to individually examine each selected technology. This is achieved by 
undertaking individual document-centric case studies on the following twelve STs: 
 Whole body scanners  Mosquitos 
 Profiling technologies 
 Data mining 
 Data matching  Closed circuit television 
 Hand-held explosive detectors  Less-lethal weapons 
 The UK’s national identity scheme  The UK’s national identity register 
 National identity cards  Mass biometric systems 
The purposes of each review are to identity and expand upon social controversies 
which arise from the development and/or introduction of that individual ST. This is 
achieved by narrowing the focus of the literature searches to isolate: 
a. Controversies arising from how the technology is designed: By ‘how the technology 
is designed’ I am referring to; the physical construction of the technology, its 
innate characteristics, the scientific principles employed by and/or incorporated 
within the technology, and its functionalities and capabilities. To provide 
examples; for the design of a CCTV system this includes the resolution of the 
images captured, the ability to pan and zoom, the recording functions, whether it 
operates as a platform for other technologies such as face-matching, automated 
threat detection (ATD), and/or automated number plate recognition (APNR), etc. 
For an airport whole body scanner this includes the images produced, the 
incorporation of any privacy enhancing technologies (PETs), whether or not 
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ionising radiation is employed, what the dose rate is and the health effects of this, 
the time to complete one scan, what materials can be detected, etc53.  
b. Controversies arising from how the technology is operated: Aside from the design 
of a technology, a ST may evoke controversy by its method of operation. The 
controversy here may be systematic (i.e., if it refers to the normal usage of the 
technology - such as the injuries caused by kinetic less-lethal weapons54, and/or 
usage as a result of an official policy – such as the refusal to all passengers to opt 
for alternative secondary screening procedures rather than undergo an airport 
body scan55) or isolated (i.e., in the event of specific instances of misuse/abuse of 
a ST by an operator – such as an individual CCTV operator using a street-based 
camera to spy through the windows of a private dwelling56).    
c. Negative public reactions to the concept of a particular ST: This category acts as a 
back-stop to avoid excluding those social controversies not included within the 
design and operation of a particular ST. Such instances are likely to occur when a 
particular ST is being proposed by a government but has not yet been developed 
and/or implemented. An example here being national identity cards within a 
society traditionally opposed to such devices57. 
It must be stressed that social controversies readily cross the artificial boundaries 
created by these three categories; for example the image created by a backscatter 
body scanner58 evokes elements of controversy falling within all three of the above 
categories. The purpose at this stage is to ensure a comprehensive scope of social 
controversies is incorporated into the individual case study literary reviews; not to 
seek to categorise these controversies into discrete boxes.   
Non-social controversies are excluded from these case studies; by which I refer to 
controversies that do not manifest within the public domain and hence possess the 
capacity to evoke a social impact. For example this includes technical disagreements 
between engineers/scientists over a technology (or aspect thereof) within 
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predominantly closed-source peer-reviewed journals; especially where such 
discussions are not reported and repeated within the wider public domain, and/or 
where social aspects of the technology are not discussed.   
The sources included within these case studies are academic papers, newspaper 
articles, published reports (produced by governments, intergovernmental agencies, 
NGOs, and advocacy groups), legal cases, books, and online publications. Publications 
referring to controversies are predominately focussed on a single ST. To date there 
does not exist a corpus of work on the controversies created by STs where the focus is 
on comparing and contrasting those arising across disparate technologies, hence there 
are no seminal texts with a cross-technology focus. There are however respected 
writers who comment on different STs (such as Bruce Schneier), and those whose work 
has application across different STs (such as the PET work of Ann Cavoukian). These are 
included where appropriate.  
The individual case studies undertaken do not represent an exhaustive historical 
account of all STs that have evoked controversy. Those included are limited to the 
twelve listed above. Their selection for inclusion is the result of a number of factors: 
1. They represent a contemporary snapshot of the types of STs being introduced 
and/or expanded upon in the 10 years directly preceding the commencement of 
this research project59. Many have been linked to the fight against terrorism and 
have been suggested as appropriate security responses to the methods of terrorist 
attacks inclusive of, and subsequent to, the Al-Qaeda airline suicide attacks of 
September 11th 2001 within the US (hereafter referred to as ‘9/11’). 
2. These technologies are at the epicentre of controversies within different western 
societies.  
3. The types of controversies they are linked to resonates at a societal level, with 
different societal sub-sets adversely affected by the design and/or application of 
these technologies seeking to express their opposition/concerns. It should be 
noted here there is no requirement that such protesting groups represent a 
majority of a society for a technology to be included.  
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4. All of the technologies listed above are the subject of negative press. As such the 
controversies are at least afforded the opportunity to be brought into the 
consciousness of the wider public.   
The final selection of twelve STs is assisted by keyword searches60 of individual UK 
newspaper databases. On the basis of these results this process of keyword searching 
is then expanded and repeated to include UCL library databases and Google Scholar for 
each identified ST to identify case study materials. This secondary process resulted in 
the identification of approximately 180 documents.   
Ultimately the time constraints of this research project preclude a historically 
exhaustive review of all security technologies that have elicited social opposition. 
Regardless, given the broad scope of those STs included herein, this artificial 
truncation is not considered inappropriate or detrimental.     
 
2.1.2 Coding method 
The coding of the completed individual ST case studies entailed a three-step process: 
Step 1: Starting with the first ST (whole body scanners; Chapter 2.2), and focussing on 
the identified associated problems with this technology (see Chapter 2.2.2), each 
individual instance or aspect of specifiable controversy pertaining to that ST within its 
literature review is identified. These are individually separated, listed, and assigned an 
identifier code (e.g. WBS1, WBS2 … etc.) within the individual tables titled Identified 
controversies arising from n (e.g. see Chapter 2.2.4) 61. This step is repeated for each of 
the remaining eleven identified technologies; the tabulated results of which are 
presented in Chapters 2.3.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.4 … 2.13.4. 
Step 2: The individual instances/aspects of controversy identified for all twelve STs in 
Step 1 are further categorised within Step 2 by both their origin and nature; the results 
of which were presented within Appendix E (see also Chapter 2.14).  
The Origin of Controversy refers to ‘where the locus of the controversy appears to 
originate’; i.e. does it appear to stem from: 
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a) Design Features: aspects of the physical construction of the ST itself. 
b) End Users: actions by, or criticisms by, the end-users of the ST. 
c) Policy Decisions: political and/or institutional decisions; further divided into: 
i. rules governing use: specified codes-of-practice, best-practice, rules-of-
engagement, rules for use as designated through primary or secondary 
legislation, etc. 
ii. wider policy decisions: higher level political and/or institutional policy 
decisions, which often form the basis/impetus justifying the lower level 
rules governing use. 
The Nature of Controversy refers to eight broad categories which encapsulate the 
broad nature of each of the coded instances/aspects of specifiable controversy 
identified within Step 1 above. These are; health, legality, the public, rights & liberties, 
cost, safety & security, functionality, and use & misuse62. 
More than one origin and nature of controversy can be identified respectively when 
coding each controversy, with no upper-limit set. 
Step 3: Finally for each coded instance/aspect of controversy keywords, key-phrases, 
and key-concepts were identified. These represented a reductionist attempt at 
expressing each of the controversies through usually no more than one or two words. 
Again more than one key-word/phrase/concept can be identified for each coded 
controversy. 
 
2.2 Whole Body Scanners 
To date whole body scanners (WBSs) have predominantly been utilised at airport pre-
boarding security checkpoints. They operate by producing an image of an individual 
passenger which highlights any undeclared items concealed within or under that 
passengers clothing. There are two types of WBSs operating within airports, each 
based on different technologies; backscatter X-ray scanners (BXSs) and millimetre 
wave scanners (MWSs).  
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BXSs conduct a 7-8 second high speed scan of a person’s body with a narrow beam of 
low intensity X-rays as they stand motionless, either facing a single scanner (thus 
requiring a second scan to obtain front and back images) or by standing between two 
scanners which allows the simultaneous production of both images. The radiation 
backscattered (reflected) near the surface of the skin is measured by detectors within 
the scanner and converted into an image of the individual. This is displayed on a 
remote viewing monitor, identifying both metallic and non-metallic objects concealed 
within and under the individual’s clothing (DHS 2009; NCRP 2003; Klitou 2008; Sweet 
2009).   
MWSs create an image by rotating antennas around a person emitting millimetre wave 
radio frequency energy. While both metals and the human body are highly reflective of 
these waves, ceramics, plastics and other organic matter (including organic explosives) 
are less reflective (Elias 2010). By collecting energy reflected off the body, a three-
dimensional image is created that highlights any items being carried (TSA no date). 
 
2.2.1 Purported benefits of whole body scanners 
The purported technological strengths of incorporating WBSs into the current security 
regime include the following: 
 It adds an extra layer of defence and detection to existing security measures; 
representing what Schneier (2006) refers to as defence in depth. 
 WBSs possess the ability to identify metallic and non-metallic objects, plastic and 
liquid explosives (European Commission 2010), in addition to drugs, money, flora 
and fauna; all of which are smuggled under the clothing of airline passengers.  
 Undertaking a whole body scan is quicker than undertaking a thorough pat-down.  
 WBSs can reduce the negative human factors 63  inherent to the process of 
screening for the hidden objects listed above (Klitou 2008). 
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imposes on, the people doing it. For screeners, the human factors issues cited in past studies include the 
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Arguments supporting the introduction of WBSs (again predominantly arising from the 
aviation security sector) are as follows: 
1. WBSs enforce the passenger’s right to security/safety 
It has been the UK government’s position to date that: 
Ultimately the rights of individuals must be balanced against the need to protect 
passengers and others at risk from terrorist threats and accordingly the use of 
[WBSs] … is, we believe, proportionate in these circumstances” (DfT 2010b, 
para.42).  
2. As attackers adapt their attacks so must defenders adapt their defences 
The crime scientist Paul Ekblom posits that “[c]rime prevention faces a perpetual 
struggle to keep up with changing opportunities for crime and adaptable offenders”, 
likening this challenge to evolutionary struggles and military arms races (1999, p.27). 
The development of WBSs to prevent suicide bombers from smuggling liquid and 
plastic explosives into aircraft cabins provides a case in point. 
3. WBSs are less intrusive than pat-downs 
In a study of the publics’ attitudes towards WBSs it was found that the vast majority of 
passengers64 find the process of undertaking a WBS both less intrusive than, and 
preferable to, the traditional pat-down with its intrinsic physical contact (Mitchener-
Nissen et al 2010). 
 
2.2.2 Associated problems with the design of whole body scanners 
Reflecting the substantial level of controversy surrounding the introduction and on-
going operation of WBSs, a diverse variety of arguments are put forward challenging 
this security technology. These are set out below.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
appearances of dangerous objects, and the stress involved in dealing with the public, who may dislike 
being screened or demand faster action to avoid missing their flights” (Klitou 2008, p.318).  
64
 A ratio of 11 to 1 in favour of WBSs over pat-downs. 
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1. Legality concerns: 
The legality of this technology is an issue which to date has never been addressed by a 
UK court or the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)65. Neither is there bespoke 
UK legislation specifically governing the presence and operation of WBSs. The question 
of legality can therefore only be addressed by examining pre-existing legislation that 
might be applicable to this technology. Any assumptions or conclusions made by this 
process will necessarily be contestable.  
Commonly cited pieces of legislation which may be engaged by WBSs include the 
following: 
 Protection of Children Act 1978 (PCA): in relation to the images of children 
produced by these scanners. Early BXS trials did not include under-18s out of 
concern over potential breaches of the PCA (Telegraph 2009), specifically s.1(1)(a) 
Indecent photographs of children. This position changed after the publishing of the 
DfT’s Interim Code of Practice which requires children undergo a scan if selected 
(DfT, 2010b); a position reinforced in the subsequent consultation paper which 
states “we will be requiring all children who are selected to be screened using the 
scanners” (DfT 2010c: p.9). 
 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA): in relation to the potential contravention of the 
privacy rights under A.8(1) HRA. Based on previous ECtHR judgments the Court has 
adopted a wide view of what constitutes a person’s private life thereby involving 
A.8(1)66; a concept which includes a person’s right to their image67. Hence the 
images produced by WBSs are considered to fall within the existing legal ambit of 
a person’s private life under A.8(1) HRA (Mountfield and Gearty 2010). The true 
question becomes whether the interference of this right by airport operators is 
justified under A.8(2) by possessing a legitimate aim, is proportional, and is in 
accordance with the law? 
 Equality legislation: Finally there is the issue of compliance with the general 
equality provision which infuses UK law as made explicit in a number of statutes. It 
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 Within the US, the Federal Court of Appeals ruled in 2011 that WBSs did not constitute an 
unreasonable search (Kravets 2011). 
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 In S and Marper v United Kingdom, nos.30562/04 & 30566/04 ECHR 2008. 
67
 As per Sciacca v Italy, no.50774/99 ECHR 2005. 
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has been argued that the Secretary of State for Transport failed to exercise his 
duty to ensure equality (as per the Race Relations Act 1976, Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 and Disability Discrimination Act 1995) either when considering the 
introduction of WBSs into UK airports or when compiling the Code of Practice for 
their use (Mountfield and Gearty 2010).  
2. Disability discrimination concerns: 
In a submitted response to the body scanner consultation paper, the Disabled Persons 
Transport Advisory Committee (DPTAC) raise specific concerns regarding what they see 
as the one-size-fits-all approach adopted by the Department for Transport (DfT) 
whereby “if a passenger is selected for security scanning, they will not be offered an 
alternative method of screening” (DfT, 2010c para.21). In response DPTAC submit that 
“there are certain disabilities with associated conditions and/or equipment where a 
physical search is preferable and where a security scanner would be either inadvisable, 
inappropriate and in some cases impossible” (DPTAC 2010, para.4). 
Because of the strict requirement of offering no alternative screening method, the DfT 
feels compelled to explicitly state that “[p]assengers must not be selected on a basis 
that may constitute discrimination” (2010c para.21). However in Manchester Airport, 
body scanners are operated in conjunction with traditional metal detectors, such that 
if the passenger triggers the metal detector they are required to submit to a body scan. 
As DPTAC points out, disabled passengers are more likely to require mobility 
equipment, assistance devices and medical devices which will trigger metal detectors 
thereby requiring the passenger be body-scanned. As such these passengers may 
experience indirect selection discrimination via the operational processes adopted by 
airport operators, despite the DfTs best intentions.  
3. Equality and Human Rights Commission Concerns: 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), in response to the DfT WBS Code 
of Practice consultation, outlines four concerns regarding the operation of WBSs (EHRC 
2010).  
a. WBSs infringe Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
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b. The failure to publish the selection criteria employed for deciding who is scanned 
and the absence of independent monitors to police this operation opens the 
operation of WBSs to charges of discrimination and arbitrary usage.  
c. The proposed future Code of Practice lacks sufficient details and consistency and 
as such may result in discrimination and arbitrary usage of WBSs. 
d. The lack of evidence on either the effectiveness of WBSs or the positive impacts of 
their usage is a source of real concern.  
It is the EHRCs view that “there is a serious risk that implementation of body scanners 
will occur in a way that will discriminate directly or indirectly on the grounds of race or 
sex, in particular, and that their use will have an adverse effect on community 
relations” (EHRC 2010, para.5).  
4. Operational concerns relating to WBSs: 
Since WBSs have been introduced into airports a number of concerns have arisen in 
response to the way these machines are operated in the real world by the airport 
administrators. Those that I have identified are discussed briefly below: 
a. Questions regarding the safety of undertaking WBSs 
Much of the debate surround the use of WBSs has focussed on the potential negative 
health implications of undertaking BXS scans. Contrary to the name ‘backscatter 
scanner’ these involve subjecting the passenger to a dose of ionising radiation as some 
X-ray photons penetrate the subject’s body (Callerame 2010). Ionising radiation can 
result in the formation of mutated cancerous cells (Shapiro 2002), though the risk of 
developing a fatal cancer from one scan is approximately 1 in 1,000,000,000 
(Mitchener-Nissen 2010; DfT 2010a) given the low dose rates involved. 
According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), any 
measure which exposes individuals to ionising radiation must adhere to the principles 
of radiation safety (Ball and Moore 1997), including the Principle of Justification; 
whereby any exposure to radiation should do more good than harm (ICRP 2007). 
There are two opposing positions as to whether BXSs meet this requirement; both 
arrived at by comparing different criteria. Klitou (2008) takes the view that the 
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justification requirement is not met for there is no positive net benefit as the intrusive 
nature of the images produced is disproportionate given the threat to security posed 
by liquid/plastic explosives, ceramic knives, etc., which he considers over-exaggerated. 
Strom (2005) however adopts the opposite position, claiming BXSs meet the 
justification requirement by comparing the increased security benefit they provide 
against the health risks they pose which he describes as so trivial as to be meaningless. 
Despite repeated claims by various national governments’ and the manufactures of 
BXSs that this particular technology is safe, in 2011 the European Commission adopted 
new guidelines for the use of body scanners within airports which effectively banned 
those scanners employing x-ray technologies (i.e., BXSs) (European Commission 2011). 
Alternative MWSs remained deployable.  
b. Controversies arising from the actions of the operators 
Various actions of scanner operators have resulted in negative media reporting of 
WBSs which may act to indirectly undermine public support for these scanners by 
reducing trust in the operators. These events include: 
 A Heathrow Airport screener receiving a police caution for making lewd comments 
about the breasts of a female colleague after she passed through a scanner 
(Mirror, 2010).  
 A screener in the United States attacked a colleague over taunts at work resulting 
from a WBS image taken of the screener during a training exercise which appeared 
to show he had a small penis (AoL News 2010; SMH 2010).  
 An incident whereby 35,000 images were retained from a MWS in a Florida court 
building and subsequently posted on the internet (EESC 2011).   
c. Refusal to allow alternative screening methods 
One of the recurring criticisms of the operation of WBSs was the refusal within Europe 
to allow passengers the option of refusing a body scan, undertaking instead a physical 
pat-down. This was in contrast to the situation in the United States whereby 
passengers must be allowed to refuse a scan in favour of a pat-down because of their 
constitutional rights. Ultimately this social criticism within Europe culminated in the 
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European Commission adopting a new legal framework for security scanners in line 
with the US model whereby passengers have the right to opt out of a scan in favour of 
some alternative screening method (European Commission 2011).  
d. Children undertaking WBSs 
The controversies over children undertaking WBSs centre on the health risks of 
scanning children and of the legal status of the images produced68. The health 
concerns arose despite DfT claims that scans pose no additional threats to children (or 
a foetus) beyond that faced by adults (DfT 2010a).  
e. Use of profiling to select passengers for screening. 
Profiling is addressed in depth as a separate controversial crime technology in Chapter 
2.7. For the purpose of the operation of WBSs in airports the main concern is that 
profiling will equate to discrimination under a different guise. This concern is reflected 
in the DfT Interim Code of Practice which states “[p]assengers must not be selected on 
the basis of personal characteristics (i.e. on a basis that may constitute discrimination 
such as gender, age, race or ethnic origin” (DfT 2010b, p.5). However the human rights 
group Liberty have criticised the Interim Code for failing to disclose what selection 
criteria are used to selecting passengers for screening; information withheld on 
national security grounds (Liberty 2010).  
f. The inability of WBSs to detect all concealed items 
When detecting non-metallic items, WBSs are not perfect. In reference to the failed 
airline attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, former Home Secretary Alan Johnson 
confirmed “there would have been a 50 to 60 per cent chance of [the 3 ounces of PETN 
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5.  The intrusive nature of the images produced – specifically those by BXSs 
Perhaps the single issue with the greatest propensity for provoking controversy is that 
of the graphic nature of the images produced by BXSs (see Figure 2.1). Like any image, 
whether or not an individual finds it to be 
pornographic, or a disproportionate breach 
of privacy, is a subjective judgement for 
that individual. Critics of these images are 
strong in their condemnation, equating 
them to digital strip searches. As Klitou 
illustrates “the use of a backscatter body 
scanner, without the employment of a 
privacy algorithm, is comparable to 
conducting a strip search, and thus is 
considerably more intrusive than an 
appropriately conducted pat-down” (2008, 
p.317). After years of complaints over the 
intrusive nature of these images and the 
subsequent failure by Rapiscan to modify 
their algorithms so as to create less 
revealing generic images, in 2013 the U.S. Transportation Security Administration 
cancelled their contract with Rapiscan. All 174 BXSs were removed from all US airports 
by mid-May 2013, replaced with less intrusive MWSs (Bloomberg 2013; New York 
Times 2013; Guardian 2013; Daily Mail 2013a). 
 
2.2.3 Reactions and responses to whole body scanner problems 
The efforts to address WBS concerns have focussed on operational fixes, technological 
fixes, and restrictive legislation. The first seeks to implement the best procedures for 
how the scanning process is undertaken within an airport. The second focuses on 
developing the technology such that the scanners themselves are less controversial. 
While the third has resulted in BXSs being forcibly removed from airports in countries 
throughout the world. 
Figure 2.1  Rapiscan Secure 1000 scanner image 
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1. Operational fixes 
The primary operational fix has been the introduction of the Interim Code of Practice 
governing how airport operators are to operate their scanners. This code contains 
numerous procedures and requirements designed to minimise the propensity for 
controversy. A selection of these includes: 
 Only security vetted and trained airport staff will be able to view the images 
produced by the WBSs. 
 Security staff viewing images will be physically separated from the person being 
scanned.  
 Security staff with the passenger will not be able to see the scan. 
 All images are deleted immediately after analysis. 
 The machines have no capacity to save, print or store the images viewed by the 
screener (DfT 2010b). 
2. Technological fixes 
Two avenues of technological fixes are currently being developed; (1) privacy 
enhancing technologies (PETs) whereby the images created by scanners are modified 
such that privacy is ensured without affecting the security offered by the scanner, and 
(2) automated threat detection (ATD) systems which remove the need for humans to 
view images by automating the process of detecting threats from the images created. 
PETs and ATD are sometimes treated as silver bullets by academics, officials and 
governing bodies for both protecting privacy and ensuring security when utilising 
WBSs. Law professor Jeffery Rosen fêtes the substitution of computer generated 
images for those of the scanned individual as “guarantee[ing] just as much security 
while also protecting privacy” (2007, p.292).  
Ann Cavoukian, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, writes 
extensively on her concept of privacy by design: the “approach of embedding privacy 
into the design specifications of various technologies” (no date: p.1). Applied to WBSs, 
Cavoukian concludes “[WBS] technologies that incorporate strong privacy filters – de-
identifying raw images for backroom screeners, and using generic body images (or 
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rendering body images to mere outlines) for frontline screeners, can deliver privacy-
protective security” (2009a, p.6).  
Additionally, a European Commission’s communication to the European Parliament 
specifically referred to PETs and ATD as possible solutions for data protection, human 
dignity and fundamental rights concerns, achieved by:  
 the computerised modification of images to protect privacy and prevent 
identification,  
 the prevention of image storage, printing and transfer, and  
 the eventual phasing out of human image interpreters as automated threat 
recognition technologies improve (European Commission 2010).  
However these technological fixes do not always meet with immediate success. Within 
the United States, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA 2010) considered 
the current generation of ATD as insufficient to meet its unpublished detection 
standards. However, by 2013 this position had obviously changed as it had become a 
requirement that all airport body-scanners implement ATD systems so as to protect 
privacy. 
3. Restrictive legislation 
As discussed throughout Chapter 2.2.2 above, BXSs have been removed from all US 
airports on the basis of privacy concerns, as the manufacturer Rapiscan had been 
unable to integrate privacy enhancing ATD technologies into their products. To the 
same effect, but for different justifications, BXSs have also been removed from all EU 
airports on the basis that the radiation produced jeopardised citizens’ health and 




2.2.4 Identified controversies arising from whole body scanners 
Table 2.1: Identified controversies arising from whole body scanners 
Code Technology = Whole Body Scanners 
WBS1 Potential breach of s.1 Protection of Children Act 1978; specifically the 
prohibition on creating indecent pseudo-photographs of children69. 
WBS2 Potential breach of Art.8(1) Human Rights Act 1998 & European Convention 
on Human Rights; the right to respect for one’s private and family life. The 
images created by WBSs engage this right, so the question becomes 
whether the interference complies with the qualifications under Art.8(2); 
potentially the proportionality requirement, but more likely the accordance 
with the law requirement. 
WBS3 











Potential non-compliance with the rule of law; specifically the lack of clarity 
and sufficient narrowness of scope within the Interim Code of Practice70 
governing WBS usage to prevent arbitrary decision making. Specific 
concerns on this point include: 
 Lack of a statutory basis for WBSs in the UK 
 Lack of justification for exceeding EU standards 
 Basis for selecting passengers not outlined within the Interim Code 
 Few details governing the use of WBSs found within the Interim 
Code 
 No independent review process, independent monitoring 
mechanism, or independent complaints mechanism 
 No statutory scheme to safeguard against arbitrary selection 
processes whose effect can equate to discrimination based on 
religious dress, nationality, nation of origin, destination 
WBS4 Potential non-compliance with the Race Relations Act 1976 and Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975; specifically the equality requirements under both 
Acts by (a) disproportionately inhibiting free movement by particular 
groups, and (b) by the lack of clear safeguards to prevent discrimination. 
Potential areas of discrimination here include sex, religion, religious dress, 
nationality, nation of origin, and destination. 
WBS5 Potential non-compliance with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995; under 
the Interim Code of Practice no passenger selected for WBS screening will 
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crimes. 
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 UK Department for Transport (2010) Interim Code of Practice for the Acceptable Use of Advanced 
Imaging Technology (Body Scanners) in an Aviation Security Environment. 
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be offered an alternative screening method. The Disabled Persons Transport 
Advisory Committee noted that for certain conditions and/or equipment a 
WBS would be unadvisable, inappropriate, or impossible. Also this may 
constitute indirect discrimination as disable passengers are more likely to 
require mobility devices which will activate the metal detector thus 










Safety concerns arising from the use of X-rays within Backscatter X-Ray 
Scanners and the associated radiation dose rates received by those scanned; 
under exposure requirements of the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection’s principle of justification any exposure to radiation 
should do more good than harm. If the harm caused by the intrusive nature 
of the images or the radiation exposure is disproportionate to the security 
threat posed by non-metallic materials then this may not be met.  
 Specific health concerns over exposure risks to children 
 Specific health concerns over exposure risks to pregnant women and 
their foetus 
 Failure to release official specifications and dosimetry data    
WBS7 Incidents of misuse of WBSs by airport staff undermining public support and 
trust; lewd comments by screeners and one screener attacking another over 
penis-size slurs. 
WBS8 Posting of scanner images on the internet despite constant official 
assurances these machines have no capacity to store images; WBS public 
support is partly based on the understanding that these machines cannot 
store images, however 35,000 images from a Florida court WBS were posted 
on the internet.  
WBS9 UK continues to refuse to allow pat-downs as an alternative screening 
method unlike the US where this choice is protected by constitutional rights.  
WBS10 Failure of governments and WBS manufacturers to release statistical data 
proving the security effectiveness of WBSs; as a result of governments and 
manufacturers failing to release data on the ability of WBS to detect non-
metallic materials, or data comparing WBSs to pat-downs to prove the 
effectiveness of WBSs, the public cannot make informed decisions on 
whether to support the introduction of WBSs. Also the case is not made 





Passenger profiling concerns; the Department for Transport claims 
passenger profiling is not used to select passengers for WBSs however they 
do admit that in practice passengers are selected in response to evidence-
based concerns about a passenger, which is profiling by another name. 
 The selection criteria used to select passengers publically disclosed. 
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WBS12 Concerns over the graphic nature of the images produced by WBSs; these 
have been considered a breach of privacy and compared to conducting a 
digital strip search. Critics consider them more intrusive than a pat-down. 
 
 
2.3 The UK’s National Identity Scheme 
On March 30, 2006 the Identity Cards Act 2006 (ICA) entered the UK statute book 
despite its choppy progress through both Houses of Parliament in the face of 
concerted opposition from within all political parties (Morris 2007-2008), public 
activist groups71, and independent academic researchers. Whitley and Hosein (2010) 
describe the ICA as comprising seven components: 
1. the National Identity Register (NIR): a central population register of every UK 
citizen and resident aged from 16 years; 
2. National Identity Registration Number (NIRNo): everyone in the NIR would receive 
a unique number to identify them; 
3. [mass] biometrics: everyone in the NIR would submit to various biometric 
sampling and recording, including at least fingerprinting; 
4. the ID Card: a physical card containing information from the NIR; 
5. legal obligations: legal requirements to produce your ID card; 
6. administrative convergence: the NIR and NIRNo would be used by agencies and 
organisations as an administrative base; 
7. legal liabilities: the ICA created a number of crimes and financial sanctions to 
enforce compliance. 
Collectively these components form the UK’s National Identity Scheme (NIS). Chapter 
2.3 focuses on the overall NIS while the following three Chapters 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 
focuses on national identity registers, national identity cards, and mass biometric 
systems respectively.  
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2.3.1 Justifying the national identity scheme 
A number of benefits have been put forward by those advocating for a national 
identity scheme. These include:  
 Helping to protect cardholders against identity theft and fraud; 
 Providing a reliable way for checking the identity of people in positions of trust; 
 Make travelling within Europe easier; 
 Creating a secure way of applying for financial products/services as well as 
conducting financial transactions (including internet based ones); 
 Providing a simple and secure way of proving your age; 
 Confirming eligibility for public services and benefits as well as reducing the 
amount of fraud relating to these benefits/services; 
 Assisting in the prevention of organised crime and terrorism; 
 Reducing illegal immigration into the UK as well as helping combat illegal working; 
 Making it quicker for police to identify suspects, those incapacitated and those 
they have arrested (Morris 2007-2008; Whitley and Hosein 2010). 
Additionally there are the arguments that implementing a NIDS will make it harder for 
terrorists to obtain fraudulent IDs (Morris 2007-2008), and that as states must already 
hold information on its citizens so as to operate an effective government then a 
national identity scheme will simply allow such information to be more effectively 
compiled. This will help ensure wrongdoers such as illegal immigrants and those 
engaged in criminal acts will not fall through the cracks of bureaucracy or be 
anonymous when travelling (Roy 2005). 
 
2.3.2 Associated problems with the design of the national identity scheme 
Prior to the ICA receiving Royal Ascent, in 2005 the Identity Project group within the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) published a comprehensive 
report assessing the then Identity Card Bill. It was the view of the authors that “the 
establishment of a secure national identity system has the potential to create 
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significant, though limited, benefits for society” (LSE 2005, p.9). Hence the authors did 
not reject outright the value of a national identity system. However, upon examining 
what the Government envisioned the UK’s system would entail they conclude “the 
proposals currently being considered by Parliament are neither safe nor appropriate … 
the proposals are too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a 
foundation of public trust and confidence (author’s emphasis)” (LSE 2005, p.9). 
1. The lack of public trust  
For a NIDS to be successful it needs to be trusted by the public. This trust must 
encompass all aspects of the scheme including the technologies involved, the 
intentions of the state which oversees the NIDS, as well as how the NIDS operates and 
interacts with individual citizens. 
It is held that the Home Office failed to address this public trust issue which resulted in 
a steady decrease of public support for the ICA NIDS, a general view that the scheme 
did not respect individual privacy, and the belief that it was “relying too heavily on 
centralized government management of data” (Whitley and Hosein 2010, p.210). 
Exaggerated government claims as to the benefits of the UK NIDS, the use of spin, and 
some dubious accounting methods, all did nothing to help their cause when 
attempting to win over the general public.  
Finally there were trust concerns over NIDS function creep with Gordon Brown 
reported as planning “a massive expansion of the ID cards project that would widen 
surveillance of everyday life by allowing high-street businesses to share confidential 
information with police databases” (Hinsliff 2006). 
2. Privacy and other civil liberty concerns regarding the NIDS 
One area of considerable concern is the infringements of civil liberties inherent in the 
ICA NIDS. Primarily centred on privacy this also incorporates questions of informational 
self-determination and the propensity for future abuse.  
While there are other national identity schemes operating throughout the world72 
there are three design features which distinguishes the UK NIDS from all others:  
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1. The accumulation of a lifetime audit trail under s.1(5) ICA of every occasion an 
individual’s identity is verified and information from the database is disclosed.  
2. The construction of a biometrics scheme for an entire population to be used for 
broad purposes. 
3. The insistence of a single gold standard of identity in order to generate trust, with 
the effect of either replacing or reframing the UKs social and economic 
relationships. (LSE 2005) 
Concerns over this scheme included the following specific issues: 
 Such pervasive surveillance could have a chilling effect on the actions of citizens 
(Gutterman 1988). 
 The UK NIDS enrolment process entailed mandatory biographical checks whereby 
masses of data on the individual would need to be collected prior to their 
enrolment interview so as to form a series of questions for establishing the 
individual’s identity (Whitley and Hosein 2010). This raises many privacy concerns, 
not least being the inherently intrusive nature of such a search, as well as 
questions over what happens to this data once the interview is successfully 
completed.  
 This scheme entailed a lack of informational self-determination which is less about 
anonymity as about the ability of an individual to maintain control over what 
information is known about them (Roy 2005). Under the ICA NIDS the individual 
would have no direct control over who could access their information or what 
information was stored on the NIR.  
 The NIDS offers a ready-made police-state tool of control for a future less 
trustworthy government.  
 Demanding to see an individual’s ID card could form a convenient pretext for 
those in authority to question and harass individuals on the basis of their 
appearance or ethnicity thus exacerbating societal divisions (NO2ID no year). 
3. Questions over whether the ICA NIDS would achieve its goals in a reliable manner 
On achieving its goals, the scheme envisioned creating a single secure biometric ID 
card which would be used for an incredibly diverse range of activities; from accessing 
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medical treatment, receiving state benefits, and opening bank accounts through to 
accessing pan-European travel hubs. The problems identified with linking all these 
benefits under a single card is the unintended consequences and lack of flexibility 
which arise from only having a single card and making this card indispensable (Whitley 
and Hosein 2010).  
There are also serious doubts over the ability of the ICA NIDS to produce appreciable 
national security benefits by identifying terrorists. Terrorists would circumvent the 
proposed ID card requirements by (amongst other things) using tourist or student visas 
(as nineteen of the 9/11 attackers did), acquiring false identities outside the UK, 
spoofing identities and/or failing to carry a card which does not have to be produced 
on demand (Roy 2005; Whitley and Hosein 2010).   
Additionally the reliability of the UK NIDS would depend on the quality of the initial 
biographical check conducted pre the initial enrolment interview. This quality is 
doubtful given the time, cost and capacity constraints in collecting reliable data on 50 
million people. Furthermore, over time the number of errors within the data will 
steadily increase as a proportion of the total, as a result of errors in the entries; the 
classic garbage-in garbage-out problem which affects all data-sets (Roy 2005). 
4. Public opinion ultimately turned against the NIDS 
Despite reportedly high initial public support for the UK NIDS in 2002/3 (Home Office 
2003) once information about the scheme’s details started filtering through to the 
public, according to Morris (2007-2008) this support began to dwindle away as people 
realised what the scheme involved and how much it would cost. By July 2006 an ICM 
poll placed support for a UK ID card at 47% in favour to 51% against (ICM 2006). 
YouGov Daily Telegraph polls placed support for the NIR database at 22% happy -  78% 
unhappy, with only 11% of respondents trusting the government to keep the collected 
data confidential.  
Two specific factors of the NIDS which undermined public support were the 
compulsion aspects (e.g. mandatory attendance for interviews and biometric sampling 
backed up by possible fines) and the centralised database as opposed to a federated 
scheme (Joinson et al. 2006).  
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5. The scheme was too complex to be delivered  
The UK has a poor track history when developing previous large-scale information and 
communication technology projects (Beynen-Davies 2006); a challenge exacerbated 
within the UK’s NIDS with its diverse range of objectives. Neither the lifetime audit 
trail, population-wide biometric system, nor the formation of a single ID aimed at 
transforming the nation’s economic and social relationships, are present in any of the 
world’s other NIDSs. It has been noted that such a format goes against the best-
practice experience gathered from other countries experiences (LSE 2005). 
On the operational side, it has been claimed the government was inaccurate in a 
number of their predictions which would have had fundamental repercussions. This 
included an overestimation of the usable life of stored biometrics, and an 
underestimation of the required high standard (and associated costs) of the biometric 
equipment required to both capture and compare biometric data over an entire 
population (LSE 2005).  
6. The NIDS was itself a security risk 
Those countries that have created a single general reference source for their citizens73 
suffer much higher instances of identity theft than the UK, as such nominally secure 
and trusted identification is much more useful to fraudsters (NO2ID no year). 
Additionally single national identity databases are valuable and vulnerable targets for 
attackers (whether they be they organised criminal gangs or foreign powers) and open 
to abuse by domestic forces. They have repeatedly been used to facilitate atrocities 
including genocide and ethnic cleansing; examples being the Nazi national ID 
document J-stamp; the racial information on ID cards under South Africa’s apartheid 
system; and the ethnic classification information on the Rwandan ID cards which 
facilitated Hutu militia identify and kill Tutsis at roadblocks (Roy 2005).   
7. The burdens and risks are placed on the citizen with the with benefits for the 
government 
The argument was made that the scheme provided greater benefits for the UK 
government (e.g. assisting police, saving money through public service administration, 
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etc.) than it did for citizens (Whitley and Hosein 2010), while at the same time the risks 
posed by small errors within the scheme’s administration fell on the citizens. NO2ID 
(no date) argued that by making large swathes of ordinary life dependent upon the 
reliability of a complex administration system, small errors within this information 
could have potentially catastrophic repercussions for an individual by denying them 
their rights to public services or their property with no immediate solution or redress.  
8. The NIDS was too expensive  
It was asserted that the cost of the NIDS would far exceed the Government estimates 
(approximately £5.84 billion over ten years), ending up somewhere between £10.6 
billion and £19.27 billion over ten years.  Furthermore, as biometric technologies are 
changing and improving all the time, unless the initial creation of the NIDS IT 
infrastructure was designed to be compatible with these changes, it will be 
increasingly difficult (and expensive) to update the future system infrastructure 
(Whitley and Hosein 2010). 
 
2.3.3 Reactions and responses to the national identity scheme problems 
Following the change in government after the 2010 general election, the incoming 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition made good on their respective election 
manifestos to repeal the ICA. To do so the coalition passed the Identity Documents Act 
2010 that repealed the ICA on 21 January 2011, signalling the end of the NIS in its 
current form. Under s.2 Identity Document Act 2010 (see Appendix C) all ID cards were 
invalidated on this day. The physical manifestation of the NIR was destroyed on 10 
February 2011 with the mechanical shredding of 500 hard drives. Conservative MP 
Damian Green, who participated in this physical act, was quoted as saying “[w]hat we 
are destroying today is the last elements of the national identity register, which was 
always the most objectionable part of the [ICA] scheme” (Mathieson 2011).  
Despite both (a) the much-vaunted security applications of the NIR and ID card system, 
and (b) the money spent developing this technology from a policy initiative to a 
realised entity, that this wholly premeditated act of destruction was met with no 




2.3.4 Identified controversies arising from the national identity scheme 
Table 2.2: Identified controversies arising from national identity schemes 
Code Technology = National Identity Scheme 
NIS1 Exaggerated claims over outcomes, spin, and dubious accounting; all 
undermined public trust and support in the scheme when they came to light, 






Concerns over function creep; plans to expand the NIDS project such that 
high-street businesses would share confidential information with police 
databases and surveillance would be widened to include the actions of 
everyday life, such as using a cash card or an iris scan machine to enter a 
building.  
 Doubts over government’s ability to resist pressures to use collected 
data for purposes beyond that for which it was collected given the 









Privacy concerns over the NIDS; 
 Questions about informational self-determination given personal data 
was collected mandatorily and used for purposes outside of the 
individual’s control. 
 Information on an individual within the NIDS is collected, retrieved, 
and processed without the individual’s consent or even their 
knowledge; hence the individual effectively has no control over the 
information about themselves. 








The lifetime audit trail; would record every instance an individual’s identify is 
verified and every time information on an individual held on the database is 
disclosed.  
 This data would form a record of a person’s life covering such 
mundane activities as purchasing goods and withdrawing money and 
would be retained even after the death of the individual.  
 The presence of this audit trail would have a chilling effect on the 
actions of individuals.  
 The systematic observation of individuals by the government negates 
an individual’s efforts to maintain private information about where 
they go, what they do, and who they associate with.  







individual prior their enrolment interview. 
 Raised privacy questions as to the intrusive nature of searches 
required to collect this data. 
 Questions over what happens to the data afterwards, how is it 
stored, who has access to it, what protections are in place, who is it 
shared with, how are the interviewers vetted, etc. 
NIS6 The NIDS offers a ready-made tool for controlling citizens within a police 
state under a future less trustworthy government.  
NIS7 The Home Secretary had the power to designate new classifications under 




Not certain NIDS would enhance security; terrorists are trained to blend-in 
thus avoiding actions which would make them noticeable under NIDS.  
 Terrorists/criminals could circumvent NIDS requirements by using 
tourist visas, student visas, acquiring false identities outside the UK, 




Garbage-in-garbage-out; the time, cost and capacity restraints of collecting 
information on 50 million people for the initial checks raises doubts as to the 
quality of the system it will produce.  
 Errors within the system will steadily increase as the data entries 
increase, making analysis of this data increasingly prone to error.  










People withdrew support from the scheme in response to; 
 Public awareness as to what the scheme entailed.  
 The compulsory aspects of the scheme (i.e. mandatory interviews, 
biometric sampling, financial sanctions, etc.).  
 A centralised database and lack of public trust in governments to 
secure information on databases following a number of embarrassing 
failures.  
 The cost.  




NIDS is a security risk; placing such valuable data on a single database creates 
a honey-pot for attackers.  
 Countries with single universal reference sources for citizens suffer 
higher levels of identity theft as the nominally secure and trusted ID 
source is given greater weight by other citizens/companies thus is 
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more useful to fraudsters.  
NIS13 Single NID databases have been used repeatedly to facilitate atrocities; such 
as the Nazis, SA apartheid, Rwandan ethnic cleansing, etc.  
NIS14 
NIS14a 
Scheme benefitted the government more than it benefitted citizens. 
 The risks posed by small errors in data having potentially catastrophic 
effects fell on the citizens, potentially denying them the right to 
public services and their property with no immediate solution or form 
of redress.  
NIS15 The scheme was too expensive.  
 
2.4 The National Identity Register (NIR) 
The NIR was a component of the Identity Cards Act 2006 (ICA) and comprised a central 
population register of every UK citizen and resident aged from 16 years. The purposes 
of the NIR were set out in s.1(3) ICA74; namely the creation of a method for individuals 
to prove their identity and to collect together facts on individuals which could be 
ascertained and verified when necessary and in the public interest to do so. Section 
1(4) defined the scope of what was ‘necessary in the public interest’, while s.1(5)(i) 
created the ‘audit trail’ requirement which would record every occasion an individual’s 
NIR information is provided to another. Every individual on the register would also be 
assigned a unique number known as their National Identify Registration Number 
(NIRNo). 
 
2.4.1 Purported benefits of the national identity register 
The purported benefits of the NIR seem only to be limited by the imagination of those 
developing policies and/or technologies which require the presence of (or would be 
enhanced by) a system for the collation of identifying information on every citizen 
within the UK. A very small snapshot of these benefits incudes: 
 the provision of a system for proving people’s identity; 
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 the creation of an audit trail detailing whenever an individual’s identity is verified 
against the register; 
 when coupled with the NINRo it facilitates the creation of a system whereby 
information could be shared between both different government 
departments/agencies and  with private organisations; 
 enhancing national security; and 
 reducing identity fraud. 
 
2.4.2 Associated problems with the design of the national identity register 
Cost of the NIR 
Introducing a new uniform numbering system for the entire UK population will require 
all government agencies and departments modify their individual systems to operate 
on this identifier. As Whitely and Hosein (2010) point out: 
[a]t present over 80 departments and agencies have their own unique identifiers 
for each record because that numbering system is appropriate for their systems, 
processes, and policies. Introducing a new uniform numbering system will not 
only be costly but also burdensome and most likely unnecessary. (p.111)  
Privacy concerns 
There are serious privacy concerns over creating a single all-encompassing government 
database allowing the surveillance of citizens that would also be accessible to private 
companies and individuals, such as insurers, landlords and employers (Morris 2007-
2008). Because of the scope of information collected on the NIR, the Information 
Commissioner Richard Thomas publically attacked the scheme questioning both this 
scope and the wide range of bodies to which this information would be made 
available. He was not alone in these concerns with the House of Lords/House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights expressing their own deep concerns over 





Disproportionate collection of information under the audit requirement 
The systematic collection of information of individuals under s.1 ICA (especially the 
audit trail requirement under s.1(5)(i)) could amount to the entire life history of an 
individual which would be retained even after their death (Morris 2007-2008; NO2ID 
no year). Not only would citizens not be able to opt out of this recording process they 
would be legally required to notify the register of any changes in their registerable 
facts regardless of their personal beliefs as to the legitimacy of the NIR.   
Security concerns 
Of all the concerns regarding the NIR it is probably the security issues such a database 
would create which attracted the most critical attention. Various security critiques of 
the NIR have identified the following issues: 
 Because of the scale and complexity of the NIR it is infeasible to build a computer 
system that can provide the necessary level of security assurance required to 
protect the safety and privacy of records contained therein (LSE 2005).  
 There is no obligation on the Secretary of State to protect the NIR data or to 
authenticate an individual’s consent permitting their records be accessed (LSE 
2005). 
 Police and others will have almost unconstrained access to data held in the NIR, 
opening UK citizens to serious new risks and creating significant new opportunities 
for criminals (LSE 2005). 
 A centralised singular ID database creates an inherent and serious security risk, 
acting as a honey-pot for hackers, those engaged in identity theft, attacks by 
foreign governments, and insider attacks. This threat is exacerbated by the lack of 
an explicit obligation within the ICA to ensure data held in the NIR is secured with 
appropriate access controls (Joinson et al 2006; LSE 2005). Furthermore the NIR 
database would need to be on a network if it is going to be usable by border 




Abuse of data held in the NIR by third parties and insiders was a recurring complaint by 
critics. On the issue of third party abuse, NO2ID (no year, p.6) noted the following 
problems created by the ICA: 
The requirement that all those registered notify all changes in details risks 
creating the means of tracking and persecution through improper use of the 
database. A variety of persons have good reason to conceal their identity and 
whereabouts; for example: those fleeing domestic abuse; victims of “honour” 
crimes; witnesses in criminal cases; those at risk of kidnapping; undercover 
investigators; refugees from oppressive regimes overseas; those pursued by the 
press; those who may be terrorist targets. The seizure of ID cards (like benefit-
books and passports now) will become a means for extortion by gangsters. 
On the specific issue of insider attacks, given the volume of data collected and 
processed daily by the NIR (estimated at 1 gigabyte of data per day), analysing the data 
to detect suspicious behaviour by users/operators becomes a massive problem. This 
would not be adequately tackled through automated/semi-automated audit analysis 
programs, rather would also require manual audits which are costly and subject to 
budget cuts (LSE 2005).  
Legal concerns 
There are three areas of specific legal concern regarding the formation and operation 
of the NIR: 
1. Article 8 HRA – Right to respect for private and family life 
Under Art.8 the ICA obviously constitutes a breach of privacy rights. However this right 
is not absolute and can legitimately be breached by the UK government providing 
(amongst other things) it is necessary in a democratic society. For any infringement to 
by the state to be lawful, courts have required such actions be both proportionate and 
necessary. On the proportionality issue Morris (2007-2008) argues the range of 
information collected by the ICA is so broad that it will exceed its stated goals. On the 
necessity requirement Khan (2006, pp.142-3) questions whether the ICA is indeed 
necessary to meet legitimate aims for a number of reasons, stating: 
It seems that the Government has failed to prove the case for such a scheme for 
several reasons. First, terrorist atrocities do not always stem as a result of false 
identity. Recent calamitous attacks in London have shown that suicide bombers 
do not always worry about the concealment of identity. Secondly, the use of 
biometric devices could have significant health implications in that the safety of 
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such devices has not been fully tested. Thirdly, the immigration status of an 
employee can be amply determined by the employer through a perusal of the 
employee’s passport or National Insurance number. Fourthly the project is 
expensive and difficult to monitor…. Finally, the scheme could be controversial in 
circumstances where personal details on the central database can be accessed 
by public sector organisations without the individual’s consent. 
2. Data protection principles 
As the NIR would hold an increasingly large amount of data on all those registered, and 
this data is matched to each individual (creating the digital footprint of that person) 
data protection concerns are engaged, specifically in relation to the follow principles: 
 Purpose (personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful 
purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with 
that purpose or those purposes) - Both the broad nature of the uses outlined in s.1 
ICA and the intention to link many different public service providers to the scheme 
may undermine this requirement. 
 Proportionality (personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed) - The NID 
infrastructure raises concerns over data creep should it become an all-purpose 
system for monitoring and controlling the UK population. Also the proposed NIR 
system theoretically allows for behavioural profiles to be created for every 
member of the UK population. 
 Security – The creation of a central registry containing personal identification data 
for the UK population raises serious security concerns given the value of this 
information to criminals. As such “[a]ppropriate security measures, technical and 
organisational, should be taken by data controllers to protect personal data from 
unintended or unauthorised disclosure, destruction or modification” (Beynon-
Davies 2006, p.15). The technical challenges of achieving this security would also 
be considerable.  
3. The rule of law 
Finally for an Act to be considered in accordance with the rule of law the requirements 
therein must be sufficiently clear and foreseeable so as to place individuals on nation 
of its application to them, and thus avoid constituting arbitrary interference with the 
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citizen. Morris (2007-2008) questions whether the ICA meets this requirement on the 
basis that as information can be entered onto the NIR without the consent or 
knowledge of the individual then they may be unaware their privacy right is being 
breached. 
 
2.4.3 Reactions and responses to the national identity register problems 
Reactions and responses to NIR problems are the same as those already covered in 
relation to the NIS. See Chapter 2.3.3 above for this discussion. 
 
2.4.4 Identified controversies arising from the national identity register 
Table 2.3: Identified controversies arising from national identity registers 







Creating a single numbering system used by over 80 government 
departments/agencies for all UK citizens; 
 Would be very costly. 
 Would force these departments/agencies to modify their own 
bespoke systems designed specifically to suit the needs of these 
bodies. 
 Would be a burdensome process, and most likely unnecessary.  
NIR2 Privacy concerns over creating a single NIR; would be used for citizen 
surveillance and accessible by private companies/individuals such as 







The systematic collection of information under the audit requirement would 
amount to a person’s life history, retained after their death. It could not be 
opted out of, and citizens would be legally required to register and 
information of any changes to registrable facts. 
 Many people have legitimate reasons for concealing their identity 
and whereabouts which would be undermined by the requirement 
they must keep the ID database updated.  
 This includes those fleeing domestic violence, victims of honour 
crimes, witnesses in criminal cases, those at risk of kidnapping, 




NIR4 A computer system cannot provide the necessary level of security assurance 
to protect the privacy of the information given the scale and complexity of 
the NIR.  
NIR5 No obligation on the Secretary of State to protect NIR data or to confirm 
consent by an individual when their records are accessed.  
NIR6 Police and others will have almost unconstrained access to data held on the 




Centralised singular ID database is the perfect target for hackers, inside 
attackers, or foreign governments.  
 No explicit obligation to ensure appropriate access controls to the 
NIR.  




Vulnerable to insider attacks; the volume of data/daily processes means 
automated/semi-automated audit analysis programs will not adequately 
detect insider attackers. 
 Manual checks are expensive and will be prone to budget cuts, 












NIR potentially breached Art.8(1) HRA; 
 The information collected may not meet the proportionality 
requirement of Art.8(2) as the information collected is so broad that 
it will exceed its stated goals. 
 The information collected may not meet the necessity requirement 
of Art.8(2) as; 
o terrorist atrocities don’t always result from false identities,  
o suicide bombers don’t always worry about concealing their 
identities, 
o the immigration status of an employee can be adequately 
ascertained by passports and national insurance numbers 
without resorting to a NIR. 







Concerns regarding European data protection principles, specifically; 
 Purpose; personal data under the NIR would be collected and 
processed for purposes other than those for which it is collected. 
 Proportionality; collected data should be adequate, relevant and not 








 Accuracy; given the size of the NIR and the constant addition to data 
to it, inaccuracies will increase and affect the individual concerned.  
 Anonymity; personal identifiable data should be held only as long as 
required for the purpose for which it was collected. The NIR system 
allows behavioural profiles to be created for every UK citizen. 
 Security; appropriate security measures should be taken to protect 
data to prevent unintended or unauthorised disclosure. Given the 
value of the NIR to attackers and the range of people who could 
access it, maintaining security would be extremely difficult.  
NIR13 NIR may breach the rule of law; it would not be sufficiently clear and 
foreseeable to citizens when their rights have been breached as 
people/organisations could unlawfully access their data without their 
knowledge.  
 
2.5 National Identity Cards 
This was not the first time NIRs or ID cards have been used in the UK. During both 
World War I & II national registers were created, with the WWII register combined 
with an ID card linked to wartime rationing. While the WWI register did not survive 
into peacetime, the WWII system lasted for a period after the war (Agar 2005; Whitley 
and Hosein 2010). While accepted by the public upon its introduction, discontentment 
levels rose after WWII ended, especially in response to the increasing practice of police 
demanding to see ID papers. As a direct result the National Registration Act 193975. 
was allowed to lapse in 1952 (Roy 2005). 
It is arguable that the UK Government ignored the lessons from its previous national 
identity schemes. While there seems to be support for national ID cards (or at least the 
concept of one) within the UK during times of crisis, such support appears to quickly 
wane once the threat justifying their introduction has passed or if unpalatable details 
of the scheme become widely known.  
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 The National Registration Act 1939 introduced at the beginning of World War II.  
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2.5.1 Purported benefits of national identity cards 
National identity cards have been successfully introduced into other European 
countries and accepted by their citizens (Beynon-Davies 2006). Out of a total of 
twenty-two such schemes twelve are compulsory and ten are voluntary (Whitley and 
Hosein 2010). Indeed following 9/11 there have been public opinion polls showing 
strong support for national identity card schemes with both the UK and the US (Home 
Office 2003; Roy 2005); two countries which have traditionally opposed such schemes.  
The UK Government’s website for identity cards cited the following benefits as arising 
from such a scheme:  
 ID cards will help in the protection of people from identity fraud and identity theft; 
 They will strengthen security and improve public confidence; 
 They will help tackle immigration abuse and illegal working; 
 They will disrupt the use of false and/or multiple identities by those involved in 
terrorist activities and organised criminals; 
 They will ensure that only those who are entitled to do so will be able to use 
free public services (Whitley and Hosein 2010). 
Indeed the former Home Secretary David Blunkett stated in 2004 that ID cards would 
help the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and stop people from using 
multiple identities (BBC News 2004). However it should be noted that by 2009 Blunkett 
had changed his position on ID cards and a compulsory national ID database holding it 
would be sufficient to introduce mandatory biometric passports instead (Guardian 
2009).  
Other supporters of national identity schemes have utilised utilitarian arguments 
holding that such schemes constitute a worthwhile trade-off in that we sacrifice a 
small reduction in anonymity for a significant gain in security. Though as Roy points out 
such positions have been based on the assumption that ID cards will be fool-proof and 
that and problems arising from the excessive collection and storage, or misuse of 
information held by a national identity scheme are separate issues in the earlier 




2.5.2 Associated problems with the design of national identity cards 
It is the view of Whitley and Hosein (2010) that while the national ID cards proposed 
under the ICA were viewed by the UK government as a simple solution to complex 
problems such as identity theft, fraud and terrorism, the government failed to realise 
that this security technology is itself a complex entity which creates its own complex 
problems. These controversies were such that the national ID card, along with the rest 
of the ICA, did not survive the change of government in 2010.  
Firstly was the risk of increased crime that accompanies a national ID card to the 
extent that they actually make people less secure with one than without one. Being 
extremely valuable documents, there is greater incentive to forge national ID cards, as 
well as the fact that “[n]o matter how unforgeable we make it, it will be forged” 
(Schneier 2008, p.98). Indeed there has not been a card created that cannot be forged 
regardless of the security measures incorporated. An example being the French 
national ID card which was promoted as un-forgeable when introduced in the 1990s 
but forgeries of which now enjoy brisk trade. Even adding biometrics to the ID card 
does not guarantee security as iris scans, fingerprints and facial recognition systems 
can all be fooled (Roy 2005), and should the IC cards incorporate radio frequency 
identification (RFID) technology then there is the growing security risk that they will be 
read from ever increasing distances by attackers (Hunter 2005). Even if an attacker 
lacks the technical skills to forge the card itself, they can simply forge the documents 
required to obtain a legitimate card , or even more simply they could bribe one of the 
officials issuing the cards (Schneier 2008).  
Creating hard to forge singular ID cards increases the risk of identity theft as well as 
the successful fraudulent use of the cards. If they are promoted as the gold standard in 
identification (as the UK ID card was) then it will be trusted for more and more 
applications under a linked, centralised system, thus allowing a fraudster to commit 
more offences with a single forged card than would be possible if many organisation 
issued their own bespoke cards (Schneier 2008). It will also require a centralised 
database which, as identified above, will be vulnerable to attacks by hackers and 
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insiders, data compatibility problems, erroneous and unreliable data as well as 
mistakes during data entry (Schneier 2008).   
Moving beyond the security risks created by national ID cards there was the 
controversial question of whether they would actually be able to make us safer from 
terrorists, and there is strong evidence that this was not the case and that the UK 
government had come to realise this fact. To highlight, in 2004 then Home Secretary 
David Blunkett claimed UK ID cards would boost the fight against terrorism, though by 
2009 he had reversed his position on this in the face of the mounting evidence from 
recent attacks in London and Madrid. 
Firstly an ID card, while it may tell us something about the carriers identity, it tells us 
nothing about their criminal intentions (NO2ID no year; Schneier 2008) achieving little 
to nothing by way of prevention (per Lord Carlile in Morris 2007-2008)  and so are 
effectively useless post an event. This is crucially important when the attackers a 
country is facing have no previous recorded links to terrorism or are legitimate citizens 
and therefore entitled to a national ID card; such as Timothy McVeigh, the DC snipers, 
many of the 9/11 bombers, the 7/7 London bombers and the Madrid bombers 
(Schneier 2008; Whitley and Hosein 2010). 
Secondly research suggests no link exists between the prevalence of terrorism within a 
country and the presence of a national ID card, hence they do not significantly deter 
terrorists (NO2ID no year; Privacy International 2004) “nor are they recognised by 
analysts as a meaningful or significant component in anti-terrorism strategies” (Privacy 
International 2004, p1). Specifically it has been noted that: 
Of the 25 countries … adversely affected by terrorism since 1986, eighty per cent have 
national identity cards, one third of which incorporate biometrics. This research was 
unable to uncover any instance where the presence of an identity card system in those 
countries was seen as a significant deterrent to terrorist activity. … [Indeed almost] 
two thirds of known terrorists operate under their true identity (Privacy International 
2004, p.2).  
Focussing on the scheme anticipated under the ICA, it is claimed that the UK ID card 
would only assist in anti-terrorism efforts if terrorists were (a) willing to register for 
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one, (b) used their true identity when doing so, and (c) there exists intelligence data 
that can be connected to that identity (Privacy International 2004). 
Looking beyond terrorism concerns, traditionally there are other risks to citizens from 
ID cards, especially for ethnic minorities. Police harassment of minorities have been 
noted in countries with mandatory national ID cards, and such systems offer ready-
made tools of oppression for future less-trustworthy governments (NO2ID no year). 
Other purported benefits of a national ID card are also brought into question. 
Regarding illegal immigration and working, it is difficult to see how ID cards will prove 
any more an effective deterrent then passports or visas given that these requirements 
are already in place and yet ignored (NO2ID no year). Nor, it is claimed, would the ICA 
ID card model be effective in reducing identity fraud (LSE 2005). 
Finally there is the issue of the lack of public support for ID cards, which was especially 
problematic given the recognition that both public trust and business buy-in were 
essential for the success of the ICA scheme (Whitley and Hosein 2010). This trust was 
undermined on a number of fronts including, (1) the excessive cost of the scheme, (2) 
the fact that the NID would fail to meet its (over)stated objectives, and (3) concerns 
over privacy rights and the excessive collection of data involved (Morris 2007-2008).  
 
2.5.3 Reactions and responses to the national identity card problems 
Reactions and responses to NID problems are the same as those already covered in 
relation to the NIS. See Chapter 2.3.3 above for this discussion.  
 
2.5.4 Identified controversies arising from national identity cards 
Table 2.4: Identified controversies arising from national identity cards 





NIDCs used for many official purposes are extremely valuable to 
attackers/criminals; 
 Using an ID card for multiple purposes and promoting it as secure and 
un-forgeable makes it extremely valuable especially to attackers. The 










make people less secure. 
 Hard to forge singular ID cards increase the risk of identity theft and 
the successful fraudulent use of the card. 
 Unjustifiably promoting a card as the gold standard in identity 
security, and un-forgeable, increases public/business trust in the 
cards such that they will automatically be considered genuine making 
the task of the fraudster even easier.  
 Linking these cards to a centralised system rather than each 
department/business having their own bespoke card and system 
allows an attacker to make many more attacks with a single card. 
NIC2 
NIC2a 
No ID card in history has ever been un-forgeable.  
 The addition of biometrics will not make an ID card un-forgeable. 
NIC3 Incorporate RFID technology adds the risk ID cards can be read from ever 
increasing distances by attackers.  
NIC4 Security measures are easily circumvented; if the attackers lack the skill to 
forge the NIDC, they can forge the documents required to obtain a card, or 





A centralised database for NIDCs creates problems; 
 It is a honey-pot for hackers and insiders, presenting a single target 
on which to focus their efforts.  
 It compounds problems of data compatibility, erroneous and 







No evidence NIDC will make citizens safer from terrorists: 
 NIDCs tell us something about the carriers identity but nothing about 
the criminal intentions 
 Doesn’t assist in crime prevention, and are effectively useless post an 
event. 
 No causal evidence of a link between prevalence of terrorism within a 
country and a NIDC within that country, hence they do not 
significantly deter terrorists.  
NIC7 Traditionally NIDCs pose a risk to ethnic minorities through police 
harassment; police have used supposed random checks of NIDCs as an 
excuse to detain, delay, and harass minorities.  
NIC8 NIDCs provide a ready-made tool for oppression by future less trustworthy 
governments.  
NIC9 Lack of public trust in the NIDC scheme due to excessive costs, privacy 
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concerns, and the excessive collection of personal data, undermined the 
probability of the schemes success. 
  
2.6 Mass Biometric Systems 
By conflating natural physiography and bio-dynamics, a biometric can be defined as “a 
measurable physiological and/or behavioural trait that can be captured and 
subsequently compared with another instance at the time of verification” (Beynon-
Davies 2006, p.7). This definition includes, amongst other things, fingerprints, ear-
prints, blood-vessel mapping, iris scans, hand and knee geometry, face and voice 
recognition, handwriting and signature matching, keystroke patterns, and DNA 
matching. 
The ICA envisioned recording various biometrics, such as fingerprints, iris scans and 
facial scans, from all those enrolled in the NIR, in effect creating a national biometric 
database. This data could also be stored on the national ID card and would be used for 
authentication and identification purposes. According to Beynon-Davies (2006) such 
biometric systems operate over three stages; (1) the sampling stage where a biometric 
sample is collected from the subject; (2) the storage stage where this sample is 
transformed into a digital template (which is typically encrypted) for storage on a 
database and potentially a local token (like an ID card); and (3) the recognition stage 
whereby a biometric reader measures a subject’s biometric and compares this against 
the stored template.  
 
2.6.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, mass biometric systems 
Proposed benefits of the large-scale use of biometrics include the following: 
1. To enforce border control; both by incorporating biometrics into passports so as 
to tighten access controls at a country’s border, and within the issuing of visas so 
as to reduce instances of over-staying (Goldstein et al 2008; Grijpink 2006).  
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2. To better regulate asylum applications and avoid instances of asylum shopping76 
(Goldstein et al 2008). 
3. The automation of access controls and the management of social processes; both 
within private companies and for government services. According to Grijpink 
(2008 p.317) “biometrics is the only way of physically determining to whom a 
document, object or piece of data relates”.  
4. For law enforcement purposes. Particular benefits cited here include; tackling 
identity fraud, counteracting illegal immigration, enhancing crime-scene 
investigations, and preventing crime by identifying suspects in advance of criminal 
acts (Goldstein et al 2008; Grijpink 2006). 
There is also the goal of tackling terrorism. According to Privacy International (2004) 
UK Ministers have suggested four ways national biometric ID systems may be used to 
combat terrorism: 
1. A central database of biometric identifiers will detect whether a person is using 
multiple identities. 
2. A process of comprehensive “biographical footprint checking” will help determine 
whether a person is using a false identity. 
3. A comprehensive vetting of card applicants might detect those people who have a 
background that is indicative of a terrorist profile. 
4. The existence of a compulsory identify card will expose those terrorists in the UK 
who have not registered. 
 
2.6.2 Associated problems with the design of mass biometric systems 
The effectiveness of biometrics for these purposes depends on the type of biometric 
chosen, the quality of the sample taken (which itself is affected by a multitude of 
factors including the skill of the person collecting the sample, the individual from 
whom the sample is taken, the quality of the machine used to capture the sample, and 
the environmental conditions where the sample is collected), and the methods used to 
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 The process whereby an asylum-seeker attempting to obtain asylum within the EU lodges an 
application with one Member State having already been rejected by another. 
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compare the individual’s biometric with the earlier sample held on file (Whitley and 
Hosein 2010). Each of these factors can undermine the effectiveness of a biometric 
system, increasing the rates of false positives (false matches) and false negatives (false 
non-matches) during the recognition stage.  
On the issue of the reliability of the different biometrics, each one has its own bespoke 
problems affecting a minority of the population, thus the total number of those 
affected will increase as the population of the system increases. For example 
fingerprints are affected by: people with missing digits, the elderly and those with dry 
skin, and those whose hands are calloused or suffer regular damage from their work 
(such as labourers, chefs, farmers, builders, etc.). Iris scans are affected by cataracts 
and those who suffer conditions such that they are unable to hold their head steady or 
fix their gaze on a single spot. Facial recognition systems are affected by beards, 
makeup and weight changes (Hunter 2005; LSE 2005; Whitley and Hosein 2010). Each 
of these groups is a minority but they may well find themselves disproportionately 
affected and disadvantaged by the fact they cannot properly enrol in the scheme nor 
be able to use the various scanners during the recognition stage if they are successfully 
enrolled onto the national database. They may suffer constant delay and 
embarrassment as they will always be singled out for secondary screening. 
Furthermore, the types of biometrics suggested for use under the ICA can be forged. 
Iris scans can be fooled using patterned contact lenses, fingerprints can be copied 
using ‘gummy fingers’, and US researchers have identified dozens of ways to fool facial 
recognition systems (Roy 2005; Whitley and Hosein 2010).  
However the real problems with mass biometric systems are the rates of false 
positives and false negatives, especially when the systems attempt to move beyond 
one-to-one-matching authentication and try to deliver one-to-many-matching 
identification. To expand, all biometric systems suffer the problems of false positives 
and false negatives. One can reduce the propensity threshold for either of these two 
problems occurring during the recognition stage (for example by adjusting the 
tolerated rates of false-positives or false-negatives) by adjusting the level of 
match/miss-match at which an alarm is sounded. However this will have the 
concomitant effect of increasing the probability that the other problem (the rate of 
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false-negatives or false-positives) will occur. Should the rates of either of these 
problems occurring be too high then the system will soon lose the trust of those 
administering it as well as those subjected to it. These false matches may be 
manageable if we are operating a system of authentication whereby we are 
performing a one-to-one comparison77 with an accuracy rate of 99.99%78 whereby an 
individual will on average only trigger a false alarm once every 10,000 times their 
biometric ID is authenticated. However while biometrics is good at authentication it is 
bad at identification (which requires one-to-many checking) especially as the size of 
the database to be checked increases. For example under the proposed ICA scheme 
with eventually 50,000,000 people registered a face-recognition, iris scan or fingerprint 
system, with 99.99% accuracy would result in every person who is checked by a 
biometric scanner being falsely identified as a terrorist 5,000 times; and that is every 
single person every single time they are scanned. Such a system is useless, fails to 
provide any measurable security benefits, and would quickly be ignored (Roy 2005; 
Schneier 2006). 
Finally there are two further problems with biometric systems. Firstly, all a biometric 
ID does is match a person to their card. It does nothing to ensure that the original 
information and documents used to obtain this card were genuine or legitimately 
obtained (Roy 2005). This goes back to the problem identified earlier that promoting 
biometric ID cards as the gold standard of identification measures will undermine 
security and increase fraud as they will be unquestioningly accepted as legitimate. 
Secondly there is the problems that once a biometric stored on a database has become 
compromised through identity theft it is very difficult to restore the victim’s identity 
through the production of a new digital identity as they cannot spontaneously 
generate new biometrics for themselves (Roy 2005).  
Ultimately the mass biometric system envisioned under the ICA required UK citizens 
put their trust in unproven technology with questionable robustness which would 
result in errors resulting in inconvenience (or worse) for these same citizens. The cost 
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 Comparing just the sample taken during the recognition stage with that taken during the initial 
sampling stage. 
78
 99.99% is the probability the system will correctly identify a match (a positive positive) or not-match 
(a positive negative) without producing either a false positive or false negative. This level of accuracy is 
well beyond the capabilities of any current commercial biometric system.   
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of creating this system (including the multitude of readers which would be required 
throughout the UK if the system is to be usable once created, and the training of 
people to operate these readers) would also be enormous. It is highly questionable 
whether the security benefits flowing from such a system would be worth this outlay.  
 
2.6.3 Reactions and responses to mass biometric system problems 
While the UK NIR and UK NID Cards containing biometric information have been 
scrapped for the time being79, one form of biometric has been included on UK 
passports. Also known as ePassports, these machine-readable passports have been 
issued since 2006 and contain a digitised image of the holders’ face allowing for facial 
recognition. While the previous Labour Government intended to introduce second 
generation ePassports in 2012 incorporating fingerprint data, this measure was 
rejected by the new Coalition Government as confirmed within their Coalition 
Agreement of May 2010. As such it has not been acted upon (Gower 2012).  
 
2.6.4 Identified controversies arising from mass biometric systems 
Table 2.5: Identified controversies arising from national/mass biometric systems 








The effectiveness of biometric systems is not a given, but depends on many 
variables including; 
 The type of biometric sampled. 
 The skill of the person taking the sample. 
 The quality of the machines used to capture the sample. 
 Environmental conditions. 
 The methods used to compare an individual’s biometric with the 
earlier collected sample.  
MB2 Fingerprints are affected by; people missing digits, the elderly, those with dry 
skin or other skin conditions, workers whose hands are regularly damaged or 
calloused.  
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 See Chapter 2.3.3 above for more detailed information.  
96 
 
MB3 Iris scans are affected by; cataracts, the blind, those with condition such that 
they cannot hold their head steady or fix their gaze on a single spot. 
MB4 Facial recognition systems are affected by; beards, make-up, and weight 
changes.  
MB5 Minority groups are adversely affected; such as certain age groups, certain 
occupations, and sufferers of certain medical conditions. They may all find 
themselves disproportionately affected by a scheme they either cannot enrol 
in, or where they constantly suffer delay and embarrassment as they are 
constantly singled out for secondary screening.  
MB6 Biometrics can be forged; patterned contact lenses for iris scans, gummy 
fingers for fingerprints, and there are dozens of ways to fool facial 
recognition systems.  
MB7 All biometric systems suffer from false positives and false negatives. 
Reducing the threshold for one with increase the likelihood of the other.  
MB8 A one-to-many biometric system within 50,000,000 people (like the UK 
proposed one) with a 99.99% accuracy would still result in a person being 
falsely identified as 5,000 other people every single time they are scanned. 
Such systems are operationally useless and would quickly be ignored by 
security staff.  
MB9 Biometric systems just link a person to a card. They cannot check that the 
original documents/information used to obtain this card were genuine, nor 
can they tell us anything about the intentions of the person even if this card 
was obtained legitimately. 
MB10 Once a biometric stored on a database is compromised it is very difficult to 
restore a person’s identity through producing a new digital identity as they 
cannot spontaneously create new biometrics for themselves.  
 
 
2.7 Profiling Technologies 
Profiling refers to both: 
a) The process of building profiles; i.e. discovering correlations between data in 
databases that can be used to create a representation of an individual or group 
(referred to as a profile which is essentially sets of correlated data). 
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b) The process of trying to match a subject to a profile; i.e. applying profiles of 
individuals or groups to a subject to determine the likelihood this subject 
matches the previously created profile (Schermer 2011). 
While the term profiling has other common uses in related fields; most notably DNA 
profiling and criminal profiling which is defined as “the process of using available 
information about a crime and crime scene to compose a psychological portrait of the 
unknown perpetrator of the crime” (Muller 2000, p.235). When I refer to profiling I will 
be restricting the concept to definitions ‘a’ and ‘b’ listed above. 
 
2.7.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, profiling 
The primary purported benefit of profiling is that by identifying those individuals who, 
as a result of matching your previously determined criminal profile, possess the 
highest probability of themselves being a criminal, you can better target your security 
resources by subjecting these individuals to additional security/screening measures. It 
is argued this will result in a net drop in successful attacks as well as manage costs by 
improving resource allocation. 
Additionally it is argued that profiling acts as a deterrence, dissuading prospective 
criminals from certain activities and/or places out of fear of capture before they can 
achieve their goal.  
 
2.7.2 Associated problems with the design of profiling 
Determining the efficacy of profiling is incredibly difficult, especially if the algorithms 
which form profiles are kept secret under the auspices of intellectual property and/or 
national security. Without the publishing of automated profile hits, search results, 
arrest numbers and subsequent conviction statistics, along with the details of the 
profiles themselves, it remains impossible to form an accurate statistical picture of the 
effectiveness of automated profiling. 
Indeed the feasibility of even creating a profile of certain criminals such as the typical 
terrorist is highly suspect. There are nearly as many variant personalities for terrorists 
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as there are variants of personality, and without an identified terrorist personality 
there is nothing to form the basis of a usable profiling algorithm that will identify 
terrorists while not red flagging most of the population (Hudson 1999). Terrorist 
organisations recruit people for operations who look normal and do not stand out. 
Because the physical and behavioural descriptions of terrorists could describe almost 
any normal young person, terrorist profiling based on personality, physical, or 
sociological traits would not appear to be particularly useful (Hudson 1999, p.63). This 
view is supported by MI5’s behavioural science unit through a leaked document which 
recognised that terrorists in the UK do not match popular stereotypes (they are not 
sexually frustrated youths, religious zealots, loners, gullible, unintelligent or suffering 
mental illnesses) rather they “are a diverse collection of individuals, fitting no single 
demographic profile, nor do they follow a typical pathway to violent extremism” (Travis 
2008). According to Borrion et al (2008) it is still virtually impossible to build a system 
that will detect unknown terrorists before an attack, and it not clear whether any 
future technology will succeed in this regard.  
However, if we obtained statistical data that terrorists within a specific organisation 
predominantly shared certain racial, national, religious or cultural traits then a profiling 
system based on these could narrow the statistical probability that an individual 
attempting to board a plane is a terrorist (Hudson 1999)80. However by definition such 
a system of religious or racial/ethnic profiling would be inherently and unavoidably 
discriminatory in nature.  
Focussing on racial profiling, Press (2010) powerfully sets out just how offensive such a 
measure is: 
Racial profiling, as commonly defined, is any actuarial method that conditions an 
individual’s prior probability of criminal behaviour explicitly on his or her race, 
ethnicity, nationality or religion. Mature democratic societies recognise racial 
profiling as not merely another type of actuarial policing, but as something 
deeply corrosive of democratic values. Racial profiling violates the democratic 
covenant that individuals are to be judged by a universal rule of law, not by 
shifting standards that vary with their being assigned to stereotypical racial or 
other categories (p.165).  
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 However, the best that could be achieved here would be this narrowing of statistical probability 
rather than the ability to identify terrorists with any degree of regularity, as the statement ‘all terrorists 
are Australians’ does not equate to ‘all Australians are terrorists’. 
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This challenges the position that profiling technologies are ethically neutral. Profiles, to 
be valid, must be based on data and where this data is itself infused with racial bias 
then any subsequently created profile (and its operation) will itself be discriminatory. 
Furthermore as noted by Schermer (2011), because profiles are created using only 
selected pieces of the puzzle that makes up an individual, those elements that are 
included in the profile will have their effects magnified. Thus racial bias (and 
discrimination) is exacerbated by these profiles. Given that Ministry of Justice figures 
show that black people were 10.7 times more likely, and Asian people 2.2 times more 
likely, to be stopped and searched than white people under discretionary police 
powers within the UK (Runnymede 2010) it is easy to see how crime figures can 
become biased against blacks and Asians, and if this becomes a variable within a 
profiling algorithm then the algorithm itself become subsequently tainted.  
Further controversies arising from profiling include what Schermer (2011) refers to as 
the de-individualisation of individuals from within minority groups as the profiles judge 
them based on the fact that they share common characteristics and traits with the 
group profile while ignoring the characteristics and merits of the individual being 
compared. Group profiling can reinforce the stigmatisation and stereotyping of the 
group in question and damage social cohesion, especially when people start treating 
others based on their knowledge of the stereotypes and not on the individual that they 
see before them. 
Taking de-individualisation further, another criticism of profiling is that an individual is 
probabilistically identified as a likely terrorist/criminal and subject to whatever security 
repercussions this may bring on the sole basis of their conformity with a pre-
determined profile of the typical terrorist/criminal a priori. As such it is not based on 
any evidence of actual criminal conduct on the part of the individual (Press 2009). 
Examining profiling from a purely utilitarian perspective it is claimed that profiling fails 
to provide a net benefit to society. This is especially the case when profiling is based on 
race where it is claimed that the moral toll this inflicts on a democratic society 
outweighs any security benefits which arise (Press 2010), or to put it more directly the 
costs far outstrip the benefits (Runnymede 2010).  
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It also deliberately imposes a greater burden on the liberties of a minority within 
society (as determined by the profile itself) so as to provide a security benefit to the 
majority. This burden is itself compounded by the fact that those chosen by a profile 
are not subjected to secondary screening as a false positive on just one occasion, 
rather they will be repeatedly subjected to this additional screening regardless of how 
many times they have proved their innocence in the past, as profiling operates via 
selection with replacement (Press 2010). Each time the same individual passes through 
a profiling security checkpoint such as an airport terminal they will continually be 
flagged as a potential threat if no mechanism exists for downgrading the threat 
quotient of that individual in response to their repeatedly displayed innocence, thus 
the burden imposed on these individuals becomes compounded.  
 
2.8.3 Reactions and responses to profiling technology problems 
Despite the concerns over profiling, this technology has found widespread and diverse 
use in the crime and security spheres. Responses restricting its usage have largely 
focussed on the factors used to form the profiles themselves. Given the enormous 
potential for profiling technologies to be misused as implements of discrimination, 
efforts have been made to prevent controversies from arising by controlling what 
variables can be used to form profiles.  
In the Department for Transports’ Interim Code of Practice for the Acceptable Use of 
Advanced Imaging Technology (Body Scanners) in an Aviation Security Environment, it 
is explicitly stated that the selection criteria for determining which passengers will 
undergo airport body-scans must not be based on their personal characteristics. 
Examples of such characteristics are listed as including; gender, age, race or ethnic 
origin (DfT 2010b). This reflects the variety of UK anti-discrimination legislation now 
drawn together within the Equality Act 2010 which would apply to profiling but which 
was enacted without any specific security technology focus. This includes 
discrimination based on age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
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partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, or sexual 
orientation81. 
 
2.8.4 Identified controversies arising from profiling technologies 
Table 2.6: Identified controversies arising from profiling technologies 
Code Technology = Profiling Technologies 
PT1 Impossible task; there is no profile for a typical terrorist as there is nearly as 
many variant personalities for terrorists as there are variants of personality.  
PT2 
PT2a 
Terrorists possess normal personalities and physical characteristics; 
 They are recruited specifically on the basis that they are 
indistinguishable people who look normal and don’t stand out.  
PT3 Automated systems cannot detect unknown terrorists before an attack; 
there are no terrorist-specific features from which we can form a profile to 
check against. 
PT4 Profiles can be discriminatory; when based on statistical data employing 











Racial profiling which that calculates an individual’s prior probability of 
criminal behaviour by their race, ethnicity, or religion should be avoided 
because; 
 Racial profiling is corrosive to democratic values. 
 Violates the democratic convention that individuals are to be judged 
by a universal rule of law, not shifting standards based on racial 
stereotypes or categories.  
 Democracies require in practice more than simple majority rule but 
also an acceptance of the rights of minorities.  
 It is fundamentally objectionable to disadvantage anybody because of 
their race. 
 It can create resentment by those profiled, and leave victims feeling 
paranoid, depressed, vulnerable, and targeted.  
PT6 Profiling technologies are not ethically neutral; racial bias in the data will 
infuse the profile. 
PT7 Profiles magnify racial bias and discrimination; as only selected elements of 
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 These represent protected characteristics under S.4 Equality Act 2010.  
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Group profiling has negative effects; 
 It ignores the characteristics and merits of individuals within that 
group. 
 It reinforces stereotypes. 
 It damages social cohesion, especially when people start treating 
others in accordance with the stereotype and ignore the individual 
they see before them.  
PT9 Profiling is not based on any actual evidence of criminal conduct by a person; 
when it identifies individuals as terrorists/criminals based on probabilistic 
conformity to a profile. 
PT10 Profiling does more harm than good when based on race; any immediate 
security benefits are outweighed by the moral toll this inflicts and the 
increased risk of protest and violence by those who feel disenfranchised and 
discriminated against. 
PT11 Profiling minorities may inadvertently increase overall crime rates; when 
secondary screening resources are focused on a narrow proportion of the 
population who match a profile, the remaining majority of the population 
may increase their criminal activities on the basis that they are less likely to 
be stopped.  
PT12 Profiling places a greater burden on the liberties of a minority of the 






Individual false positives are repeatedly targeted; the burden of profiling will 
be repeatedly imposed on the same innocent individuals as selection for 
secondary screening operates via selection with replacement.  
 Being cleared after one infliction of secondary screening does not 
mean that individual’s risk profile is amended. 
 Because finite secondary screening resources are repeatedly applied 
to the same individuals who match the profile but are innocent, 
profiling is no more effective a selection method than randomised 
selection 
 
2.8 Data Mining 
Data-mining is the application of database technology and techniques (such as 
modelling and statistical analysis) to data to identify valid, novel, implicit and 
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potentially useful information and patterns within that data (Schermer 2011; Steinbock 
2005; Tien 2004).  
It originated in the commercial sector where it is routinely used to target advertising, 
identify customer buying patterns, assess creditworthiness, etc. Within the fields of 
crime and security, data-mining is employed with aims which include detecting fraud 
and other criminal activities and patterns, detecting terrorists and analysing 
intelligence (Steinbock 2005).  
Data-mining can be distinguished into descriptive and predictive. Descriptive data-
mining algorithms seek to discover previously unknown correlations between different 
data objects and their attributes within a database. By doing so one hopes to gain 
insights into the populations from which the objects were drawn.  
Predictive data-mining seeks to “make a prediction about events based on patterns 
that were determined using known information” (Schermer 2011, p.46). When applied 
to profiling this entails mining-data of an individual to determine the probability that 
they match a previously established profile; such as the probability an airline 
passenger matches the previously constructed profile of a terrorist. 
 
2.8.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, data mining 
Automated data-mining has made possible the analysis of huge amounts of data to 
identify patterns and relationships which previously would have, (a) been hidden by 
the vast scale of the data available, or (b) would have remained implicit within each 
separate data source but is made explicit by combining and mining a variety of sources 
(Kreimer 2004-2005). 
The subject of the data-mining process is incredibly flexible. It is not limited to a 
person, but could also be an email address, a place, event, telephone number or 
purchase (Tien 2004). The list here could be endless. 
The patterns identified by data-mining can be used to build or strengthen profiles, thus 
allowing more targeted searches, and hopefully reducing the number of false 
positives/negatives. Also by identifying previously hidden patterns and relationships, 
104 
 
data-mining can assist both policy makers and those implementing policies to improve 
the quality of their decision taking. 
Finally it can be argued that computerised decision-making brought about by data-
mining (and data-matching) is ethically and inherently neutral in that “a computer 
algorithm will undoubtedly produce the same decision every time, with no bias or 
favouritism toward any party” (Steinbock 2005, p.45).  
 
2.8.2 Associated problems with the design of data-mining 
The controversial aspects of data-mining falls into a number of categories.   
1. What data-mining represents: 
a) Steinbock (2005) notes that data-mining is associated with both a fear of 
totalitarian-style state observation, as well as the targeting of individuals by 
governments. One previous data-mining project ‘MATRIX’ was designed to identify 
potential terrorists from the general population based on their statistical terrorism 
quotient (i.e. propensity to commit terrorism) by data-mining an individual and 
comparing the results against a pre-constructed terrorist profile. This system 
produced a list of 120,000 people identified as being statistically likely to be 
terrorists which was passed on to US authorities (Tien 2004). It is obvious is that if 
there were 120,000 terrorists operating in the US then the country would be 
under constant attack, therefore MATRIX either produced too many false positives 
or didn’t work at all.   
b) There is also the perceived threat of information asymmetry whereby data-mining 
may alter the status quo existing between citizens and their governments by 
handing to the government masses of data on every citizen. As will be discussed 
below, knowing that every action will be recorded by a watching government may 
have a chilling effect on the willingness of individuals to engage in political 
activities deemed critical of the government and making them subject to future 





2. Operational concerns with data-mining: 
a) Data-mining is used to make proactive administrative decisions which can have 
concrete negative implications for an individual in the absence of any initiating 
action and are virtually impossible to challenge due to the lack of transparency 
surrounding the decision making process (Steinbock 2005). It is also questionable 
how society can also effectively govern such searches (Tien 2004). 
b) The fact that the algorithms which underpin the decision-making process are not 
revealed (for intellectual property and/or national security reasons) makes it hard 
to mount an effective legal challenge. If you do not know what evidence was used 
to make the decision affecting you then you do not know what it is you need to 
challenge (Steinbock 2005). 
c) When data-mining results in some form of secondary screening (for example a 
strip search at an airport), it may be impossible to determine whether the data-
mining algorithm is good enough to produce sufficient reasonable suspicion to 
justify these secondary measures (Steinbock 2005).  
d) The negative repercussions of being a false-positive under a data-mining/data-
matching algorithm will not be one-offs rather will reoccur every time that 
individual enters a situation where they are assessed against that same algorithm. 
This will be compounded further if the algorithm is shared between government 
departments or within the private sector, increasing the situations where innocent 
individuals will be wrongly identified as being whatever their profile identifies 
them as (Steinbock 2005).  
e) Computer-based reasoning (based on a digital decision-making algorithm) is 
harder to both evaluate and understand than human assessments; whereby the 
assessor can set out their thought processes justifying their decision. Because of 
the number of variables that can make up a data-mining algorithm they become 
little more than black-boxes, and computer neural networks can give no rationale 
for why they made the decision that they did (Steinbock 2005; Tien 2004). 
f) Just because a data-mining programme produces a correlation between an 
individual and the elements of a profile, this only represents a correlation 
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between variables. It does not represent causation; i.e. it does not explain why 
that individual possesses those characteristics or has performed the activities that 
they have done (Schermer 2011). 
g) From a legal perspective, administrative decisions with potentially adverse 
consequences are being carried out in the complete absence of any form of due 
process. As Steinbock (2005, p.45) notes, “[d]ata matching and data mining give 
no process as the law understands that term. There is no evidence, no opportunity 
to be heard, no confrontation with adverse evidence, and no reason given – only a 
result. Under any theory of due process, decisions based solely and irrevocably on 
the results of data matching or data mining are deficient, at least when they affect 
substantial interests”.  
h) There is little by way of public accountability or oversight of data-mining 
(Schermer 2011) especially when private companies are involved.  
i) Administrative decisions arising solely from data-mining lack the benefit of human 
judgement, with a human’s ability to weigh evidence and apply their knowledge of 
the real world, the environmental situation and current events (all of which will be 
outside the scope of a static algorithm) to inform their decisions. Nor can 
algorithms be persuaded to change their output in the face of reasoned 
arguments or additional information; they are a black box lacking the ability to 
independently interact (Steinbock 2005).  
j) Interoperability of databases and computer systems is critical to the success of 
data-mining projects seeking to join-up the data held by different government 
agencies. However the fact that these systems were not designed with 
interoperability in mind (indeed in some cases they have been designed not to be 
accessible/usable by outside agencies) can limit the usability, accuracy and 
efficacy of data-mining systems (Seifert 2007). 
3. The quality and nature of the data 
a) A US Congress report noted that “[d]ata quality is a multifaceted issue that 
represents one of the biggest challenges for data mining. Data quality refers to the 
accuracy and completeness of the data. Data quality can also be affected by the 
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structure and consistency of the data being analysed. The presence of duplicate 
records, the lack of data standards, the timeliness of updates, and human error 
can significantly impact the effectiveness of the more complex data mining 
techniques, which are sensitive to subtle differences that may exist in the data” 
(Seifert 2007, p.21).  
b) The results from data-mining processes which examine a person’s behaviour with 
the goal of predicting terrorist intent have been described by Jeff Jonas82 as being 
“so far from reaching the level of accuracy that’s necessary that I see them as 
nothing but civil liberty infringement engines” (Gellman et al 2006). However we 
are increasingly using the results from data-mining to make important decisions 
about the criminality of individuals even despite these shortcomings (Steinbock 
2005).  
c) In response to the claim that algorithms are ethically neutral, if the data being 
mined is biased (or simply inaccurate) or was collected using biased means then 
the results of the data-mining will also be tainted. Furthermore these algorithms 
are created by people, and in construction if they have based any of their 
decisions regarding what variables to include/exclude on the basis of biased 
perceptions (with or without malice) then again the algorithm is a tainted entity. 
3. Civil liberty based arguments: 
a) Data-mining processes have a chilling effect on political expression. The 
monitoring of innocent people may deter them from engaging in legitimate 
protests out of fear of repercussions. Similar tactics were employed in the US by 
Nixon and McCarthy in response to Vietnam War protests and the perceived 
threat of communism; a fact acknowledged by the US Defence Department 
(Kreimer 2004-2005).    
b) Privacy controls were weakened in the aftermath of 9/11 where under the auspice 
of fighting terrorism companies surrendered massive amounts of data they had 
collected on customers/employees, etc., to the government (Kreimer 2004-2005). 
This represents mission-creep, whereby data is used for purposes other than 
which it was originally collected. The problem here is that such data, having been 
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 Chief scientist at the IBM Entity Analytics group. 
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originally collected for other purposes and by questionable means, is often lacking 
in reliability which can result in increased false-positives (Seifert 2007).  
c) Data-mining of massed data from disparate data sources makes explicit that which 
was implicit (Kreimer 2004-2005) thus affecting privacy and opening the individual 
to exploitation.  
d) Privacy helps protect people from being abused by others, especially those in 
power or possessing nefarious intent. As Kreimer (2004-2005) points out, it is hard 
for a government to retaliate against a dissenter when they cannot track who that 
dissenter is.  Also Schneier (2006) writes that systems such as the now defunct 
Total Information Awareness programme would have produced databases that 
would themselves have been prime targets for criminals (both outsiders and 
trusted insiders).   
e) There is refusal by the owners/operators of the algorithms to disclose exactly 
what variables are included within them as such disclosure will negate the 
effectiveness of the algorithms by enabling circumvention (Steinbock 2005). 
However this lack of transparency forever leaves the data-mining algorithms open 
to charges of racial, religious, ethnic, and other forms of discrimination. It also 
deprives the potential for feedback loops with members of the public who can 
identify problems with, or improvements to, the algorithm which would improve it 
(Muller 2000). 
f) The practical repercussions of being a data-mining false positive includes the 
stigmatisation and embarrassment of the innocent as they are, sometimes 
publicly, forced to undergo secondary screening to prove their innocence having 
been deprived of their presumption thereof by the data-mining/data-matching 
processes (Steinbock 2005).  
g) Data-mining is being used for fishing expeditions whereby authorities search 
before they suspect. Democratic societies which value the presumption of 
innocence should suspect first before the search (Tien 2004). Otherwise this is 
merely the digital equivalent of police randomly carrying out house to house 




2.8.3 Reactions and responses to data mining problems 
Responses by governments to data-mining have been mixed to date. At least two US 
data-mining projects that have been shut down in response to public outcries based on 
the fear of overreaching state observation; these being the Terrorist Information 
Awareness83 (TIA) programme and the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange 
(MATRIX) programme. Both of these were intended to mine immense quantities of 
data, potentially on an entire population. However, through revelations by whistle-
blower Edward Snowden, we now know that another mass electronic surveillance data 
mining programme entitled PRISM has been secretly developed (Greenwald and 
MacAskill 2013) which potentially may be exceed the scope of either TIA or MATRIX84.   
In 2007 a US Bill requiring federal agencies to report to Congress on any activity to use 
or develop data mining to identify terrorist or criminal activity85 and the impacts this 
would have on citizens’ rights died in Committee. And yet outside of security-centric 
data-mining, in 2013 Massachusetts introduced a Bill banning the mining of student 
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 Originally designated the Total Information Awareness programme. 
84
 The controversy over PRISM is ongoing, having divided politicians both within the United States and 
between the United States and other national governments. PRISM has not been included within my 
dissertation as; (a) information on its existence was only made public in June 2013 (see Greenwald and 
MacAskill 2013) and hence near the end of the write-up of my dissertation, and (b) as I stated within the 
methodology section of Chapter 2.1, the case-studies undertaken within my dissertation were cross-
sectional in nature and not longitudinal. Hence new candidates were not included after these analyses 
were completed. While undoubtedly qualifying as a controversial ST, it remains to be seen what effects 
(if any) the currently expressions of public resistance will have on the design and operation of PRISM 
over the mid- to long-term. 
85
 Entitled ‘A bill to require reports to Congress on Federal agency use of data mining’, this would have 
required annual reports be made available to the public covering, amongst other things; (1) a 
description of data-mining activities and goals, (2) an assessment of the efficacy of mining and the 
impact on individual privacy and civil liberties, (3) a discussion of the policies and procedures to protect 
individual privacy and due process and to guard against harmful consequences of potential inaccuracies. 
This information was taken from www.govtrack.us 
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2.8.4 Identified controversies arising from data mining 
Table 2.7: Identified controversies arising from data mining 




Data mining is associated with the fear of totalitarian-style state observation 
and the targeting of individuals by governments.  
 These fears have resulted in two data mining projects being shut 
down in the US. 
DMI2 Data mining which produces too many false positives will be ignored by 
security staff.  
DMI3 Intrusive data mining systems represent a disproportional trade-off of 
individual privacy and liberty for minimal security benefits.  
DMI4 Data mining resulting in proactive administrative decisions without any 






Impossible for individuals to effectively challenge the legality of decision 
making based on data mining;  
 Lack of transparency surrounding the decision making process.  
 When the algorithms used are not revealed as you do not know what 
evidence was used to make the original decision so you cannot 







Society’s governance of data mining is questionable;  
 Complex mining algorithms and opaque decisions make society’s 
governance questionable. 
 Little public accountability or oversight of data mining, especially 
when conducted by private companies. 
 Without disclosing the algorithm used, data mining is open to 
charges of racial, religious, ethnic, and other forms of discrimination. 
This approach is not accepted in other aspects of the criminal law 






It is nearly impossible to challenge the reasoning of the decision maker when 
it is a computerised decision making algorithm; 
 Human assessors can set out and explain their thought processes 
leading to a decision; computers cannot set out the rationale for 
their decision, nor answer questions posed to them.  
 Because of the number of variables involved, data mining algorithms 
111 
 
become little more than black boxes. 
DMI8 Unclear whether a data mining algorithm can determine what is sufficient to 
constitute reasonable suspicion to justify a secondary search. 
DMI9 A data mining programme only identifies correlations between an individual 
a profile. It does not represent causation explaining why that individual 
possesses those characteristics or has performed the activities they have 
done.  
DMI10 Data mining produces administrative decisions without due process; there is 
no evidence, no opportunity to be heard, no cross examination of evidence 




Data mining administrative decision lack the benefit of human judgement 
and human experience; 
 No ability for data mining algorithms to weigh evidence, apply 
knowledge from the real world, the current situation, and current 
events, beyond its programming so as to inform their decision. 
DMI12 Algorithms have no brain and cannot interact, thus they will not change their 









Garbage-in-garbage-out; the accuracy of decisions by data mining algorithms 
is directly influenced by the accuracy of the data that is mined. It is affected 
by: 
 The structure and consistency of the analysed data. 
 Duplicate records. 
 Lack of data standards. 
 How often data is updated. 
 Human error. 




Data mining across computer systems depends on interoperability between 
those databases; 
 Systems are not necessarily designed to be accessible by outside 
organisations/agencies which can limit their data mining usability 
and accuracy.  
DMI15 Predictive data mining processes are increasingly being used to make 
decisions about the criminality of individuals even though they possess no-
where near the required level of accuracy, thus are seen as civil liberty 
infringing engines.  
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DMI16 Data mining is used for fishing expeditions where authorities search before 




The negative repercussions of false positives will be repeatedly felt by those 
selected by the data mining algorithms; thus the individual is repeatedly 
being falsely accused or suspected.  
 This is compounded when these algorithms are shared between 




Data mining algorithms are not ethically neutral; if the database data is 
biased then the results of the algorithm will also be biased.  
 Decisions over what variables to include or exclude from the 
algorithm are human subjective judgements made by people with 













Civil liberty arguments pertaining to data mining include the following; 
 Data mining processes have a chilling effect on political expression as 
individuals become worried about repercussions/consequences from 
engaging in legitimate protests.  
 Observation and surveillance by others limits the autonomy of 
individuals by repressing dissent.  
 Weakening privacy controls allows for data to be collected from 
companies by the government which can then use that data for 
purposes other than for which it was collected.  
 Data mining across different sources can make explicit that which 
was implicit, thus negating an individual’s privacy and opening them 
to exploitation. 
 Privacy protects people from being abused by others, including 
governments.  
 Data mining alters the status quo between citizens and government; 
the government has more knowledge/power than the citizen. 
 
2.9 Data Matching 
Data-matching can be conceived as “matching individuals with data about them” 
(Steinbock 2005, p.4) which historically covered such activities as the manual 
comparison of the fingerprints of a suspect with those lifted from a crime scene, or a 
witness looking through books of mug-shots on the chance they recognise someone. 
While such activities still occur today, when I refer to data-matching I am restricting 
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this to computer-based systems which have automated the process. Examples here 
include comparing the identity of prospective airline passengers with those on no-fly 
lists, or the undertaking of DNA sample comparisons against those held in a national 
database. As such for the purposes of this examination I am employing the definition 
of data-matching adopted by Steinbock, that being “the computerized comparison of 
two or more systems of records” (2005, p.10). The obvious change brought about by 
the computerisation of data-matching is it greatly enhances that number of 
comparisons which can be made and reduces the time this takes.    
Data-matching can be employed when addressing both past-events such as using 
biometric evidence to match an individual to a crime scene, and future-events such as 
matching a suspected terrorist to a flight watch list which triggers additional airport 
screening even though no offence may have been committed at this point.  
 
2.9.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, data matching 
Automated data-matching allows for the comparison of individual pairs or sets of data 
at a rate which was physically unachievable when conducted manually, regardless of 
resources. This matching speed makes the technology operationally feasible for busy 
setting such as airports and sporting events.  
Automated data-matching technology has made possible biometric identifier systems; 
such as DNA databases and biometric passports. Non-biometric systems include 
automated number-plate recognition systems for both tracking movement and for 
identifying vehicles which are not insured or are stolen.  
 
2.9.2 Associated problems with the design of data matching 
While it is noted that data-matching is likely to produce more accurate results than 
data-mining due to the simpler algorithms involved, it is not without its problems. 
Matching data from different databases, each with their own system of data entry and 
storage, can result in real problems arising from the most innocuous of factors, such as 
the inclusion or exclusion of a second initial. This is before one even considers the fact 
that many people throughout the world will share their name with at least one other 
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person; a fact which becomes more pertinent when databases grow to include millions 
of people and links different countries. People have been subjected to secondary 
screening or even the denial of services because their name matches (or even 
resembles) aliases used by suspected terrorists (Steinbock 2005). 
Another factor which undermines the reputation of data-matching procedures is when 
watch-lists become so large that they lose public credibility, calling into doubt the true 
purpose of the lists themselves and raising questions as to the underlying assumptions 
and/or quality of the data used to justify the inclusion of an individual on such lists. To 
illustrate, by 2005 the terrorist watch list for American airports (both ‘no-fly’ and 
‘selectee’ lists) contained 70,000 names, while the US Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) 
database held over 230,000 names as potential terrorists (Steinbock 2005) out of an 
approximate population of 295 million86. This large number can be explained by the 
position of the TSC to include anybody on this list where any degree of terrorism nexus 
could be shown; hence the number of false positives would potentially be staggering.  
Once an individual is nominated for inclusion on a watch-list by any number of sources 
or government agencies there is no further review by the database administrator; the 
individual is simply included. Nor is the information justifying the application for 
inclusion made available for integrity checking by the database administrator or made 
available at the point of screening to those who would be charged with undertaking 
this secondary screening to allow the application of human intuition (Steinbock 2005). 
Given that watch-lists may be shared between different government departments and 
with private sector organisations, membership of a watch-list as a false positive can 
result in one experiencing multiple sanctions far beyond those applied by the original 
organisation (Kreimer 2004-2005).  
 
2.9.3 Reactions and responses to data matching problems 
As a process, data matching has not elicited the same level of social resistance as some 
of the other technologies discussed in this chapter, and hence there has not been the 
impetus for any overarching official remedial responses to date. Rather, negative 
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 Estimated 2005 US population according to www.census.gov/popclock/ 
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public reactions have focussed on specific applications of this process; with the prime 
example being the UKs national DNA database (NDNAD). 
The NDNAD contained 6,969,396 DNA profiles relating to an estimated 5,950,612 
individuals as of 31 March 201287 and is continuing to grow in size. The scale of the 
NDNAD can be attributed to the legislative framework governing its operation88 which 
allows the police “to take and to retain indefinitely, without consent, fingerprints and 
DNA samples from a person of any age who has been arrested in connection with a 
‘recordable offence’” (Hepple 2009, p.78). These samples remained even if the person 
was not charged with an offence, had the charges dropped, or if they were 
subsequently acquitted. Following the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case 
of S and Marper v The United Kingdom89 whereby the court unanimously held this 
system violated Article 8 ECHR the UK Government reformed the DNA collection and 
retention process via the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. This will both restrict those 
samples which can be retained as well as setting time limits on many of the retentions.  
 
2.9.4 Identified controversies arising from data matching 
Table 2.8: Identified controversies arising from data matching 










Data matching across increasingly large databases will result in more people 
becoming false positives as the total population size of the combined 
databases grows; 
 When this results in secondary screening or denial of services, more 
and more people will be adversely affected.  
 When databases are shared these effects will be felt by the 
individual across a range of services and situations.  
 The negative repercussions of false positives under data matching 
systems will be repeatedly felt by those selected by the algorithm, 
thus the individual is repeatedly being falsely accused or suspected. 
o This is compounded when these algorithms are shared 
between government departments or with the private sector 
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 As per House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 19
th
 June 2012: Column 866W. 
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 Namely the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. 
89
 S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581. 
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DMA2 Watch-lists which become increasingly large lose public credibility and call 
into question the true purpose of the lists themselves and the quality of the 




When individuals are nominated for inclusion on watch-lists no further 
reviews or integrity checks by database administrators are carried out; 
 The information justifying inclusion is not made available to the 
secondary screeners to allow them to apply human intuition.  
DMA4 Data matching produces administrative decisions without due process; 
there is no evidence, no opportunity to be heard, no cross examination of 
evidence or opportunity to present counter-evidence - there is only a result. 
DMA5 Data matching processes have a chilling effect on political expression as 
individuals become worried about repercussions from engaging in 
legitimate protests against the prevailing government or policies.  
 
2.10 Closed Circuit Television 
Kroener (2010) describes closed-circuit television (CCTV) as “the use of a video camera 
system to transmit a signal to a specific monitor or set of monitors (as opposed to a 
public broadcast source)” (p.11). The first generations of CCTV systems utilised as STs 
possessed limited functionality, operating solely as monitoring system; either in real-
time (whereby the end-user could look at a monitor connected to the CCTV camera to 
see what has happening at that moment in time) and/or displaced in time (whereby 
after the technology became available, CCTV systems incorporated a recording 
capability thereby allowing the recorded images to be viewed at the end-users 
discretion).    
Today such cameras are used for a wide variety of security purposes by different end-
users: “home owners [install cameras] on their gates in order to see visitors (or 
intruders) on a screen inside their houses. Businesses use them for the protection of 
commercial premises, and shopping centres have cameras installed with images 
watched by staff in a control room” (Kroener 2010, p.11). The state and its agents 
employ cameras in public and private spaces to deter, detect, and monitor the 
occurrence of offences; from simple traffic violations to counter terrorism operations.  
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However, moving beyond these initial iterations of CCTV systems, the latest 
generations have progressed past being simple monitoring/recording instruments. 
They can operate as platforms to enable the application of additional types of STs. This 
includes; biometric technologies 90 , ATD systems, profiling systems, persistent 
authentication technologies, ANPR capabilities, amongst others (see Introna and Wood 
2004; Burghouts et al 2011; McKenna and Gong 1997; and Thiel 2000 for expanded 
discussions on these applications).    
 
2.10.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, closed circuit television 
The benefits of CCTV are purported as the following (Gill 2003): 
 They aid in police investigations; 
 CCTV provide intelligence about an offender’s actions both before and after an 
offence; 
 Footage can encourage a guilty plea, especially when the defendant is clearly 
identifiable;  
 They can help enforce traffic and parking regulations; 
 They allow police to manage large crowds and sporting arenas; 
 They help protect the vulnerable.  
It is also claimed that CCTV reduces crime, makes communities feel safer, and is 
supported by around 90% of the UK population (Gill 2003; Mackay 2003). 
 
2.10.2 Weaknesses and drawbacks of closed circuit television 
Exaggerated claims of efficacy 
Despite the money invested, and the broad range of positive effects attributed to 
CCTV, a 2005 Home Office evaluation acknowledged that CCTV had been oversold as 
the answer to problems of crime by successive governments (Gill and Spriggs 2005). 
This ‘overselling’ may be fostering a negative long-term environment for CCTV. As Gill 
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 Such as facial recognition systems. 
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notes, “paralleling the widespread use of CCTV have been growing doubts about its 
capacity to deliver on early promises of effectiveness … it has yet to be proven that the 
benefits outweigh the drawbacks or that CCTV is cost-effective” (2003, p.1). Mackay 
(2003) claims there is little evidence that CCTV in town-centres have achieved their 
promises of reducing crime or the fear of crime, nor have they increased public 
confidence. And in 2007 DCC Graeme Gerrard91 admitted weaknesses with CCTV, 
specifically its failure to prevent crimes.  
Even when CCTV succeeds in identifying a criminal act in progress this does not mean 
an appropriate response will necessarily ensure. Gill (2003) notes that awareness of an 
offence occurring and the ability to respond effectively are two separate matters, 
especially in rural areas where distance is a factor, in out-of-town industrial parks 
when police are focussing their efforts on inner-town areas (Gill and Loveday 2003), or 
where the police are fully stretched such that there are no police resources available 
to respond at all such as during the 2011 London riots. 
Crime-reduction and crime-displacement claims 
According to police sources, in 2008 only 3% of street robberies were solved through 
CCTV as, amongst other things, 80% of the produced images were of such poor quality 
as to be useless (Hempel and Topfer 2009). Additionally the evidence behind claims 
that town-centre CCTV systems are good crime prevention measures is often disputed. 
Conflicting evidence claims CCTV has a minimal effect, only working as part of a 
package of crime prevention measures.  
Feelings of safety 
Evidence would suggest that the presence of CCTV does not make people feel safer, 
undermining one of the central argument of CCTV proponents. This was the finding of 
studies in Glasgow and Hamburg (Ditton 2000; Mackay 2003; Zurawski 2010). While 
there may be strong public belief that cameras will reduce crime before they are 
introduced, in a study by Gill et al (2007) this belief dropped off significantly after 
introduction with respondents “significantly less happy with the cameras than they 
had anticipated” (p.319).  
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 Former Deputy Chief Constable of Cheshire.   
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The existing consensus appears to show no simple direct causation between the 
introduction of CCTV and the attitudes of citizens as to their feelings of safety. Rather 
safety in public places is recognised to be a complex issue incorporating complex social 
dynamics, fears, experiences, and attitudes, which cannot all be simply addressed by 
the introduction of CCTV (Gill et al 2007; Zurawski 2010). 
CCTV as revenue raising tools 
Gill (2003) notes that there is concern by the public that CCTV is being used to raise 
revenues [through the imposition of fines]. While public support exists for the crime-
reduction/public-safety functions of CCTV, this does not extend to CCTV being used as 
a tool for raising money. 
CCTV being used inappropriately or not complying with legal requirements  
Within the UK, CCTV use is primarily governed by the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) and the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).  
RIPA was enacted to regulate the use of investigatory powers such as those used by 
police to tackle crime, and by extension terrorism. In doing so RIPA covered the use of 
covert surveillance by local authorities when fulfilling their statutory functions (such as 
preventing environmental crime, loan sharking, employment of minors, etc.). However 
local authorities also use these directed surveillance techniques when tackling dog 
fouling, littering, and for policing school catchment areas (BBC News 2008a, 2008b & 
2009a) resulting in negative public and media reactions, and in RIPA being dubbed the 
snooper’s charter.92 
The DPA places legal requirements on the use of CCTV. In a study of CCTV operations 
by McCahill and Norris (2003) only 43 of 81 premises surveyed were displaying the 
legally required signage stating the purpose of the surveillance and contact details of 
the data controller. They estimate that 78% of CCTV systems in London businesses 
were not compliant with the DPA.  
Apart from the DPA and RIPA there is very little to regulate the use of cameras in the 
UK prompting Norris and Armstrong (1999) to note that this proliferation of public 
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 The government’s Protection of Freedoms Bill (2011) plans to ban councils using RIPA powers unless 
signed off by a magistrate and required for stopping serious crime.  
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space cameras has not been facilitated by the passing of legislation but by the absence 
of legislation regulating or checking their installation. 
Proliferation of CCTV and associated liberty issues 
Extrapolating from a study of CCTV cameras present in two streets in Putney, it was 
estimated that there are at least 4,285,000 CCTV in the UK (McCahill and Norris 2003). 
While this number has not been confirmed there is a concern that if citizens begin to 
doubt the effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention measure then they will see 
these cameras as a big brother measure for spying on citizens (Gill 2003).  
Looking beyond the crime prevention raison d’etre, CCTV has been defined as a range 
of technologies aimed at classifying citizens, uncovering deviance, and inducing 
conformity (Norris and Armstrong 1999). CCTV systems are increasingly being used as 
platforms for, or facilitators of, additional technologies such as automatic number 
plate recognition (ANPR) and facial recognition which moves into the area of managing 
risk. Risk makes everyone a legitimate target for surveillance; “[e]veryone is assumed 
guilty until the risk profile assumes otherwise” (Norris and Armstrong 1999, p24). This 
provides a convenient avenue for addressing the question put forward by those 
against CCTV of ‘why am I being recorded if I am not doing anything wrong?’.  
A danger for civil liberties is the potential for misuse of CCTV. Street cameras have 
been used by council workers to spy inside houses (BBC News 2006), and authors have 
identified situations where operators discriminate by disproportionately monitoring 
the movements of young people or ethnic minorities (Loveday and Gill 2003).  
Public support for CCTV is overinflated 
A 1993 survey in Glasgow reported 90% support for CCTV in Glasgow city centre which 
has become a mantra for those who support such systems; however this survey lacked 
methodological rigour being conducted by post. Subsequent surveys placed the level 
of support at between 64% and 67%, nevertheless this 90% figure has become an 
iconic number (Mackay 2003; Norris and Armstrong 1999; Smith et al 2003). Indeed it 
is the view of Norris and Armstrong that it is impossible to ascertain the true level of 
support for CCTV. 
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 Using these headline figures without further examination may also provide a 
false picture of the public’s support for CCTV. As Zurawski (2010) notes, a study where 
66.4% of respondents supported CCTV only 32.1% offered absolute support, implying 
that the remaining 34.3% were not fully supportive, had doubts or only offered 
conditional support. Only 50% of those respondents were in favour of constant camera 
operation, 16.3% supported night-time only monitoring, and 6.7% monitoring of rush 
hours. The point being that CCTV support varies considerably when the question is 
rephrased into more detailed and nuanced questions. 
 
2.10.3 Reactions and responses to the closed-circuit television problems 
Legislation (both domestic and EU-wide) governing the acceptable usage of CCTV has 
been the main response by governments to concerns over this technology. Such 
legislation may have bespoke application to CCTV or possess more generalised 
application. Within the UK these include; the Data Protection Act 1998, Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and the Human 
Rights Act 1998. 
The main European directive addressing CCTV is EU Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC. There are attempts underway for this to be superseded by a single Europe-
wide law in the form of the General Data Protection Regulation though the possible 
adoption of this regulation is not planned until 2014.  
To meet their obligations under Article 28 Directive 95/46/EC, as given effect within 
the UK by the Data Protection Act 1998, the Information Commissioner’s Office was 
created. This office (amongst other things) provides an independent body to uphold 
the information rights of individuals, including those in relation to CCTV. 
 
2.10.4 Identified controversies arising from closed circuit television 
Table 2.9: Identified controversies arising from closed circuit television 
Code Technology = Closed Circuit Television 
CTV1 Over-exaggerated claims of efficacy means the technology is not able to 
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Live CCTV does not guarantee a timely response even when an operator 
identified a criminal act in progress; 





Poor image quality and/or poor positioning of CCTV cameras will negate the 
effectiveness of this technology; 
 Inability to identify the offender.  
 Lack of clarity will negate attempts to secure a conviction in court.  
CTV4 CCTV in city centres should be part of a package of crime prevention 
measures to be effective; it is not a silver bullet. 
CTV5 Evidence suggests CCTV does not make people feel safer once implemented.  
CTV6 When CCTV is used for crime prevention/public safety goals it enjoys public 
support. When it is seen as a tool for raising money it does not enjoy public 
support.  
CTV7 Covert CCTV used by councils for tackling dog fouling, littering, or to police 
school catchment areas does not enjoy the support of the public and is seen 
as a disproportional use of powers. 
CTV8 CCTV street cameras have been used by council workers to spy on women in 
their homes.  






Estimated there are at least 4,285,000 CCTV cameras in the UK; leading to 
claims: 
 They are for spying on citizens. 





Creation of a ring of steel type CCTV and ANPR system around two semi-
residential areas in Birmingham without public consultation resulted in 
significant community anger and loss of trust in the police; 
 Deliberately lying about the true purpose of a CCTV system (anti-
terrorism) and hiding it behind a smokescreen of non-deliverable 
alternatives purposes (anti-crime, safer environments, etc.) 
destroyed public trust and support for the scheme. 
CTV12 A system of covert and overt CCTV and ANPR cameras permanently ringing a 









surveying the residents as part of a counter terrorism measure represents a 
failure to balance the rights of privacy and security; 
 Police failed to consider the ethics of ringing a community with 
covert and overt CCTV and ANPR cameras.  
 They did not consider the effects this would have on the residents.  
 Those within the police who would have understood the 
consequences of this were not informed of the project. 
 
2.11 Hand-Held Explosive Detectors 
On numerous occasions since the 1990’s devices have appeared in the security market 
claiming to be able to detect from a distance everything from explosives, drugs, 
weapons, money, and ivory through to humans lost at sea or trapped under rubble. 
Originally these devices appeared as the Quadro Tracker which was marketed and sold 
to US local and national law enforcement authorities for US$995 per unit as a 
detection device for weapons and drugs. Other reincarnations include the GT200, ADE-
651, Mole detector and the SNIFFEX Handheld Explosives Detector. 
 
Figure 2.2  The ADE-651 detector produced by ATSC Limited. 
The physical construction of these devices is often similar. They are invariably hand-
held, usually contain no batteries rather claiming to be powered by static electricity 
generated by the user, may possess a slot for inserting some form of programmable 
substance detection card depending on what the user wishes to find, and will all have 
some form of swivelling antenna pointing out at right angles to the user which moves 
in the users hands to point at whatever substance the device is programmed to search 
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for. In effect these devices are the modern day equivalent to dowsing rods; an ancient 
superstition whereby people used forked sticks to look for underground water sources.   
These hand-held detection devices also have other similarities. Firstly they are very 
expensive, selling for as much as £45,000 each. The Iraqi government spent £52m 
purchasing ADE-651’s from ATSC Limited, a UK company based in Somerset (Hawley 
and Jones 2011a; Sengupta 2010). Secondly they are marketed as being hard to use 
and requiring extensive operator training; often due to the devices’ supposed 
sensitivity, as well as the requirements placed on the user that they be relaxed and/or 
in a certain mental state before the device will work.  
These devices are distinct from the explosive trace detection systems often found in 
airports, and hand-held explosive sniffer devices which employ a range of technologies 
and scientific principles to enable detection. This includes; ion mobility spectrometry, 
thermo redox, chemiluminescence, and amplifying fluorescent polymers (Ghosh et al 
2010; Thomas III et al 2005). The sensitivity, cost, and portability of these devices 
varies.   
 
2.11.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, hand-held explosive 
detectors 
According to the marketing literature produced by those selling these products93, 
hand-held explosive detectors possess the following attributes. 
1. They can detect any known drug or explosive substance for which they are 
programmed to detect. 
2. They employ electrostatic ion attraction technology to target these substances; 
i.e., the electro-static matching of the ionic charge to the structure of the 
substance. 
3. They require no internal power source, rather are powered by the static electricity 
generated naturally by the user. 
4. They ignore all known concealment measures, detecting substances through lead, 
other metals, concrete, and within the human body. 
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2.11.2 Associated problems with the design of hand-held explosive detectors 
Hand-held explosive detectors of the type described here have never been shown to 
work at detecting whatever they claimed they could detect in any independent trial, 
ever. Double-blind scientific experiments have all shown that they perform no better 
than random chance at detecting specific materials (National Institute of Justice 1999). 
Tests on the SNIFFEX by the US Naval Explosive Ordinance Disposal Technology 
Division  (2005) resulted in the conclusion that “the SNIFFEX handheld explosives 
detector is not capable of detecting explosives regardless of the distance between the 
device and any explosives….The SNIFFEX handheld explosives detector does not work” 
(pp.7-8). These facts have resulted in arrests and prosecutions of their manufacturers 
for fraud and bans on their sales. 
In short there devices do not work. They represent a scam which in the past has taken 
in many countries including the United States, Iraq, and Thailand. This fact could be 
used as justification for not including these detectors as a case-study here as these 
devices are not actually a technology94. Nevertheless, these devices are often treated 
as a legitimate ST by both governments and end-users. They continue to take in new 
countries and even today they remain in operation in Mexico, Kenya, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and China amongst others (Hawley and Jones 2011b). While this ‘scam’ claim could be 
made about many products available on the internet, it is the life threatening 
repercussions arising from the failure of this technology that sets it aside from the 
others. In reporting on the true nature of the ADE-651 which is used in dozens of Iraqi 
checkpoints in cities including Baghdad, Sengupta noted that “[i]t is claimed that it 
failed to detect two tonnes of explosives used by suicide bombers to murder 155 people 
and destroy three ministries in October [2009] …. There was a similar alleged 
shortcoming when 120 people were killed in another series of bombings” (2010). It is 
for these reasons, and the controversial nature of these devices, that I justify including 
them as a case study. 
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 This claim is made using the definition of ‘technology’ is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as the 
application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes 
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The anger which follows such tragedies upon discovering the truth of security scams 
may be directed far beyond the devices themselves and is something which also must 
be accounted for. An Iraqi teacher whose son was killed in one the bombings described 
above said: 
I am angry. I do not know who I am angry with more, the people who made 
these stupid things and then made money or our government officials who paid 
so much money for these things which failed to protect us. And the British 
Government, did they not know what was being done from their land? (Sengupta 
2010). 
 
2.11.3 Reactions and responses to hand-held explosive detector problems 
Both the US and UK governments have publically acknowledged the ineffectual nature 
of these particular devices. 
The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) along with Sandia national laboratories 
identified the Quadro Tracker as a fraud in 1995 warning all US agencies immediately 
cease their use; a warning they repeated in a 1999 report. Following this in 2002 the 
Mole detector, a reincarnation of the Quadro, was also identified as a fraud by Sandia 
national laboratories (Hawley and Jones 2011a).  
Within the UK the ADE-651 built by ATSC which has been sold to Iraqi government was 
the subject of two BBC Newsnight investigations, eventually resulting in the police 
arresting the company’s managing director James McCormick on suspicion of fraud by 
misrepresentation, and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills banning the 
export of this device to Iraq and Afghanistan. This is the limit of their legal powers, 
hence the limited nature of the bans (Sengupta 2010).  
McCormick’s trial commenced on the 6th March 2013 where he was charged with three 
counts of fraud for selling bomb-detectors which he knew did not work (Daily Mail 
2013b). He was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 10 years in jail (BBC News 




2.11.4 Identified controversies arising from hand-held explosive detectors 
Table 2.10: Identified controversies arising from hand-held explosive detectors 







These devices are a scam and do not work. Independent tests have always 
shown them to be a scam. 
 
 The damage is compounded by the fact that people believe they are 
security enhancing devices, providing protection by detecting 
explosives.  
 Hundreds of people have died in Iraq from insurgent bombings in 
buildings/areas supposedly protected by these fake devices. 
HED2 People rely on these devices and make decisions regarding personal risk 
based on the false belief that they do work.  
 
2.12 Mosquitos 
Mosquitos are electronic auditory security devices which emit a pulsed high frequency 
tone, the unpleasant nature of which is such that those within its range are commonly 
forced to disperse after a short period of time. It has two frequency settings; either 
around 17.6KHz which can usually only be heard by those under 25 years of age with a 
range of up to 40m, or 8KHz which can be heard by everybody regardless of age over a 
longer range of up to 60m. The reason those over 25 cannot usually detect the higher 
frequency tone is presbycusis; the naturally occurring phenomenon whereby humans 
lose the ability to hear high frequency sounds as they get older.   
 
2.12.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, Mosquitos 
The Mosquito is specifically marketed as a method of reducing teenage graffiti, 
vandalism, loitering and anti-social behaviour. This is based on the assumption that as 
this device makes the immediate area an unpleasant and annoying place for teenagers 
to be, they will leave the area and these activities will cease.  
According to the manufacturer ‘Compound Security’ the Mosquito MK4 operating on 
the higher 17.6KHz frequency setting is: 
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the most effective tool for dispersing groups of teenagers who loiter and behave 
in an antisocial manner… without confrontation! If you have problems with 
teenagers loitering near your property, causing criminal damage, putting off 
customers or abusing your customers and staff, the Mosquito MK4 is the most 
effective method of putting a stop to it (Compound Security (a), no date). 
The 8KHz frequency setting can be heard by everyone and is designed for use in areas 
such as subway tunnels, car parks, etcetera, where “homeless people sleep rough … 
[and] unpleasant characters gather at night” (Compound Security (a) & (b)). 
Compound Security go on to assert that Mosquitos pose no health concerns, even with 
prolonged exposure, and are perfectly legal to both own and use (Compound Security 
(a)).  
Their use is supported by the Association of Convenience Stores95, some retailers and 
police forces (Crawford 2009). The Labour government in 2010 indicated support for 
these devices, rejecting calls for a ban saying it is up to local Councils and police forces 
to regulate their usage. Similarly to date there has been no national legislation 
introduced regulating how Mosquitos are to be used. The end result being over 5000 
units have been sold in the UK (Peck 2010), with no figures available for international 
sales. Even critics of Mosquitos acknowledge their apparent effectiveness based on the 
testimonials of satisfied Compound Security customers (Walsh 2008). 
 
2.12.2 Associated problems with the design of Mosquitos 
While around 25% of UK local councils and police forces admit to using or endorsing 
the Mosquito, support is far from universal. The Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) refuses to nationally approve the device citing safety concerns, while the 
Council of Europe, human rights group Liberty International, former England children’s 
commissioner Sir Al Aynsley-Green, the Children’s Society and the Children’s Rights 
Alliance for England, amongst others, all oppose these devices on various legal, ethical, 
moral and social grounds (Peck 2010).  
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 Caroline Gall, BBC NEWS – 30 June 2010 – Stafford teenager fighting for mosquito device ban. Last 
accessed 12/05/2011 from  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10449634  
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The question of legality 
Within the UK while there is no national law specific to Mosquitos either restricting or 
regulating their use; conversely there is also no law expressly permitting their use 
either. Despite this certain local authorities have banned Mosquitos, including Kent, 
Edinburgh96 and Stirling97.  
Aside from these localised restrictions, the legality of Mosquitos may be susceptible to 
legal challenge through existing non-specific legislation. According to Walsh (2008) 
these include: 
 s.79 Environmental Protection Act 1990 which requires local authorities inspect 
their area for noise nuisances, 
 s.1 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 allowing for the imposition of an Anti-Social 
Behaviour Order (ASBO) against the operator, 
 s.1 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 whereby ‘a person must nor pursue a 
course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another; and which he knows 
or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other’, 
 and the potential breach of both the common law tort and crime of public 
nuisance.  
Additionally there are arguments against Mosquitos under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA) which incorporated most of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
into UK law. While the HRA applies to public not private bodies (so not shopkeepers), 
public bodies may become liable for failing to protect individuals against the actions of 
other individuals. The HRA rights most likely to be engaged according to Walsh (2008) 
are: 
 Article 8 right to respect for private and family life,  
 Article 11 freedom of assembly and association, and   
 Article 14 prohibition of discrimination. 
                                                     
96
 ‘Is the Mosquito Alarm an Infringement on Human Rights?’. From Civil Rights Movement website, last 
accessed online 03/05/2010 from http://www.civilrightsmovement.co.uk/mosquito-alarm-
infringement-human -rights.html  
97
 See BBC News (2008c).  
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Moving away from specific arguments based on UK legislation, questions have also 
been raised about the status of Mosquitos contravening various international 
Conventions of which the UK is a signatory. The Council of Europe (CoE), voted on the 
25th June 2010 to ban the marketing, selling and use of Mosquitos in all public places 
throughout CoE member states on the basis that such devices98: 
 Are illegal solutions under international human rights instruments, 
 Demonise young people, 
 Cause young people to lack confidence in the legal system, 
 Constitutes a possible health hazard, 
 Does not solve the problems facing young people.  
While the CoE does not have law making powers the views of the CoE will be 
persuasive should the ECtHR be asked to consider the position of Mosquitos in relation 
to the ECHR. Finally the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (which 
oversees the operation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC) of which the UK is a signatory) raised concerns regarding Mosquitos violating 
Article 15 UNCRC: freedom of association.99 
Moral and social issues surrounding the use of Mosquitos 
The design and operation of Mosquitos raises several moral and social questions of 
much wider scope than simple legality.  
1. What does this technology say about how UK society views its children?  
Crawford, in a single paragraph provides a succinct damning view on this question: 
The device purports to afford a technological means of dispersing youths 
regardless of their motivation or behaviour in an impersonal and indiscriminate 
way. It does so without any notion of what to say to them, how to engage and 
reason with them or even how to socialize them. It lacks any attempt to inculcate 
pro-social behaviour or moral values, but instead emits a droning noise that 
                                                     
98
 Council of Europe, Doc.12186 ‘Prohibiting the marketing and use of the “Mosquito” youth dispersal 
device’, 22 March 2010. Accessed online at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/ 
WorkingDocs/Doc10/eDOC12186.htm on 05/05/2011. 
99
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of reports submitted by states parties under 
article 44 of the Convention. Document CRC/C/GBR/CO/4, 20 October 2008, paragraph 35.  
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implicitly says ‘go away’. This would appear to reflect a rather hollow approach 
to young people on the part of adult society. (2009, p.21)   
The Buzz-Off campaign, a joint initiative of Liberty, 11 Million and the National Youth 
Agency, was formed to have Mosquitos banned. This campaign argues that one of the 
reasons why Mosquitos should be banned is that they demonize young people, 
creating divisions instead of mutual understanding and respect.  
2. Who owns public spaces?  
The purpose of the original Mosquitos (those with only the higher frequency setting) 
was to disperse teenagers, usually from public spaces. Those against Mosquitos argue 
that young people have as much right to be in public spaces as everybody else.  
By distilling the advertising literature and arguments of those promoting Mosquitos 
the results are predominantly economic arguments, whereby the presence of 
teenagers is viewed as either potentially impacting upon commercial activities or as a 
source of past and future damage. But this direction of argument either diminishes or 
ignores two important factors. Firstly, if teenagers are not engaged in illegal activities 
then what right do shopkeepers have of forcing them out of public spaces? As Walsh 
comments, “it should not be the role of shopkeepers to determine who can legitimately 
use public space” (2008, p.132). Secondly, where exactly are they expected to go? 
Crawford (2009) illuminates the inherent paradox for young people in dispersing them 
from public places in that they often congregated there to feel safe; a safety they 
derived from the feeling of gathering together and of being in public spaces, visible to 
others. By forcing them to break up and disperse, these youths felt at greater risk as 
they were forced into locations with less adult foot-traffic and were often less well lit 
and less safe.  
3. Equality of burden 
By developing the 17.6KHz Mosquito detectable only by the young, the manufacturers 
have succeeded in intentionally creating a discriminatory security measure which 
targets a minority group. This form of discriminatory security technology reduces the 
liberties of a minority to provide additional security for the majority, and those 




The Compound Security Mosquito MK4 with Multi-Age has the option of emitting an 
8KHz tone which can be heard by people of all ages. This device counters the first 
equality of burden issue identified in the preceding discussion in that ostensibly 
everyone will be equally affected by this technology. However on a deeper 
examination holes appear within this argument. 
Firstly the 8KHz operation suffers the same problem as the 17.6KHz in that it does not 
discriminate between those engaged in illicit activities and those simply legitimately 
exercising their right to occupy public spaces or even walk along a public street. 
Secondly the advertising literature proudly boasts that the Mosquito MK4 is a 
particularly effective solution for targeting the homeless and those ‘sleeping-rough’ 
(Compound Security (a), no date). It is questionable whether a device which seeks to 
force such vulnerable members of society out of the sight (and mind) of the more 
fortunate in society represents a socially acceptable pursuit. 
Operational limitations of the Mosquito 
As Mosquitos are an area-effect device they cannot distinguish their effect between 
those engaged in illegal activities and those who are not. Secondly Mosquitos do 
nothing to solve the underlying causes of anti-social behaviour but simply displace it to 
different areas. Thirdly, when operating at the 17.6KHz frequency the Mosquito will do 
nothing to stop those too old to hear the tone from engaging in anti-social activities. 
Lastly, not everybody can simply leave the area affected by the Mosquito. Babies react 
adversely to the tone but cannot communicate this fact to their accompanying parents 
who may themselves not be able to hear the tone nor realise what the Mosquito is or 
how it is adversely affecting their child. Young staff working within premises using the 
Mosquito may also be affected by the tone and again cannot simply walk away. Those 
with autism have also been identified as particularly susceptible to the Mosquito tone 
and may experience a greater adverse reaction than other members of the public. 
Safety Issues 
Mosquitos can cause dizziness, headaches, nausea, pain and impairment according to 
both the German Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and those subjected to 
them (Schreuder 2009). And yet determining whether or not Mosquitos are 
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completely safe in respect of exposure to children is not a question which can be 
answered with certainty due to the absence of specific data and the subjective nature 
of the effects induced by these devices.  
Compound Security boldly claims the Mosquito is “completely harmless to the 
health/hearing of individuals of all ages, even with prolonged exposure” (Compound 
Security (a), no date), citing studies by the Health and Safety Executive, National 
Physical Laboratory and the Applied Environmental Research Centre as all confirming 
current legislation regarding the emission of high frequency sounds are complied with. 
Nevertheless closer examination of the sources behind these claims does not appear 
to justify the robustness of Compound Security’s claims, especially in relation to the 
exposure of children.   
Lawton (2001) produced a report on the damage to hearing from very high frequency 
(VHF) sounds for the Health and Safety Executive. Here he concluded there was 
insufficient data to produce a dose/response relation between risk of hearing loss and 
VHF sounds100. But he did recommend against any relaxing of current restrictions 
acknowledging that:  
In particularly sensitive individuals, unpleasant subjective effects might be 
expected to appear shortly after the start of a VHF or ultrasonic noise exposure. 
An increase of permitted band level … may be expected to hasten the onset of 
adverse subjective effects … and possibly … involve a larger proportion of the 
exposed population. (2001, p.46) 
The lack of data pertaining specifically to children was highlighted throughout, as was 
the recognition that this group suffered greater to exposure to VFH sounds because of 
their heightened hearing ability. This lack of clarity regarding safety has been cited as 
the reason why ACPO refuses to endorse the Mosquito (Peck 2010).  
 
2.12.3 Reactions and responses to Mosquito problems 
Even though Mosquitos have not been subject to legal challenge within the UK, various 
local councils have restricted their use, including Stirling, Kent and Lancashire County 
Council. What is particularly telling here is that in Stirling Council the Mosquito was 
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banned after complaints by a 26 year old Councillor who could still hear the noise 
emitted (BBC News 2008c). This brings into question the long-term viability of security 
measures designed specifically to target the young. As the first generation of previous 
‘targets’ get older and enter positions of power they make take a dim view of such 
measures which they found degrading in their youth and take action against them. 
First Great Western stopped using a Mosquito during the normal operating hours of a 
Devon railway station following complaints by school children who used the station on 
their travels to and from school. They admitted that legitimate travellers which 
included these teenagers should not have been subjected to the noise (BBC News 
2009b). 
Furthermore, according to the Civil Rights Movement some retailers have removed 
Mosquitos from certain stores once they were made aware of the device’s harmful 
effects101.  
Nationally there have been no government plans to either ban or regulate the use of 
Mosquitos. This coalition position continues that of the previous Labour government.   
 
2.12.4 Identified controversies arising from mosquitos 
Table 2.11: Identified controversies arising from mosquitos 
Code Technology = Mosquitos 
MS1 Mosquitos have been banned in certain local authorities.  
MS2 Mosquitos may constitute a breach of s.79(1)(g) Environmental Protection 
Act 1990 if they constitute noise emitted from premises so as to be … a 
nuisance. 
MS3 Operating a mosquito may constitute anti-social behaviour under s.1 Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998 thus permitting the imposition of an ASBO.  
MS4 Mosquitos may constitute a breach of s.1 Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 whereby a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts 
to harassment of another102. 
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Under the Human Rights Act 1998 there are a number of potentially engaged 
rights: 
 Art.11 freedom of assembly and association – mosquitos prevent 
young people associating together in public places; 
 Art.14 prohibition of discrimination – mosquitos targeted at young 








The Council of Europe voted in 2010 to ban the marketing, selling, and use of 
mosquitos in all public places on the basis that such devices; 
 Are illegal solutions under international human rights instruments. 
 Can demoralise and frustrate young people. 
 They are a possible health hazard, targeting children and young 
people. 





The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child considers 
mosquitos violate the rights of children to enjoy freedom of movement and 
peaceful assembly which are essential for the development of children. 
MS8 Mosquitos reinforce negative stereotypes of children and adolescents, 





Mosquitos do not discriminate between youths who are and are not acting in 
anti-social ways; all youths are affected equally.  
 Law abiding children are affected in the same way as those 
committing offences. 
MS10 Mosquitos alienate young people from their communities which could be 
counter-productive.  






This technology raises questions about who owns public spaces; 
 If teenagers are not engaged in illegal activities then what right do 
shopkeepers have to force them away from public spaces? 
 It is not the right of shopkeepers to determine who can and can’t use 
public spaces, especially as they possess a vested (economic) interest 
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 The s.1(3) defence of preventing or detecting crime may not apply here if the argument that ‘these 
devices target teenagers rather than crime’ holds sway. 
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when making this determination so are not unbiased arbiters 
MS13 
MS13a 
Youths often congregate in public spaces out of feelings of safety; 
 They may be placed at greater risk of harm if forced away from areas 
with high levels of foot traffic into areas which may be less well lit, 




Mosquitos only detectable by the young discriminate by intentionally 
targeting a minority group; 
 It imposes a greater burden on the rights of this minority group for 






Multi-age mosquitos are disturbingly marketed as a solution to the problem 
of homeless adults who are sleeping rough; 
 A device designed to force vulnerable members of society out of the 
sight (and mind) of the more fortunate is morally bereft 
 It fails to tackle the underlying causes of why people are forced to 




As mosquitos are an area affect weapon they cannot discriminate between 
those engaged in illegal activities and those engaged in legitimate activities; 
 This includes young shop staff who may feel forced to endure the 
mosquito out of fear of losing their jobs if they complain.  
MS17 Mosquitos at the 17.6KHz frequency do nothing to stop the anti-social 








Not all people who can hear the mosquito can simply leave the area, nor 
even communicate what the cause of their distress is.  
 Babies will be affected while their parents may not even be able to 
hear the sound that is distressing them.  
 Mentally disabled people may be affected to a greater extent 
without being able to verbalise the cause. 





Young people who were affected by mosquitos may be less likely to support 
their continued existence as they become older and enter into positions of 
authority; 
 A young councillor in Stirling Council who could still hear the noise 
was instrumental in having them banned by his Council.  
MS20 Health concerns; mosquitos can cause dizziness, headaches, nausea, pain, 
and impairment.  
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2.13 Less Lethal Weapons (LLWs) 
There is no single accepted definition of what constitutes a LLW. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) defines LLWs as: 
weapons which are explicitly designed and developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, 
with a low probability of fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment, with 
minimal undesired damage or impact on the environment (2006, p. 6-5).  
The UK’s Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) defines LLWs as: 
weapons, devices or tactics designed and intended to induce compliance without 
substantial risk of serious or permanent injury or death. The aim will be to control and 
neutralise a threat without recourse to lethal force. The outcome may occasionally be 
lethal but this is less likely than the result of the use of firearms (NATO, 2006, pp. 6-4 - 6-
5).  
As a general term LLWs covers a diverse range of technologies with varying effects 
(such as length and nature of incapacitation), delivery systems, effectiveness ranges, 
and effective targets (i.e., individuals, crowds or physical areas). Lewer and Davison 
(2005) have categorised LLWs by way of the technology which underlies how they are 
effective against their chosen target. These categories are; kinetic energy, barriers and 
entanglements, electrical, acoustic, directed energy, chemical, chemical/biological, and 
combined.  
For any LLW to be considered effective it must be able to incapacitate, debilitate, or 
disrupt/alter the thought processes of either individuals or crowds. These effects must 
persist long enough so as to either prevent an advance or some other action, to cause 
them to voluntarily disperse, or to allow the relevant authorities to either restrain or 
disperse them (Council for Science and Society 1978).  
As a final point, while a goal of LLWs is repeatedly cited as to raise the threshold for 
the application of deadly force, they do not prevent police or other security personal 
from using such force. Nor are police required to substitute LLWs for lethal weapons in 
situations where the use of lethal weapons would be legitimate.   
 
2.13.1 Purported benefits of, and justifications for, less-lethal weapons 
Purported benefits or various LLWs include the following: 
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 LLWs have proven particularly effective in controlling riots, including riots in 
prisons (Lewer and Davison 2005). 
 Tasers could be cost-neutral by reducing the number of injuries to police and 
citizens, and their resulting medical and civil litigation expenses (Adams and 
Jennison 2007; Barfield 2010). 
 Tasers operate as a legitimate alternative to lethal force (Sprague 2007). 
 It has been identified that various LLWs have potential for use on aircraft to 
prevent 9/11 style attacks (Davison 2007) though this avenue has largely been 
ignored in favour of security advances elsewhere. 
 There is the general argument that even though they can cause injuries, using 
kinetic projectiles such as rubber bullets is still better than using real bullets; 
 There is evidence that the use of pepper spray and electronic control devices 
(ECDs) such as Tasers has reduced the number of minor injuries that were 
previously suffered from soft empty-hand controls when subduing actively 
aggressive subjects (Adams and Jennison 2007).  
 LLWs save lives (Davison 2009) and improve society providing preconditions for 
their use are met (Braidwood 2009). 
 
2.13.2 Weaknesses and drawbacks of less-lethal weapons 
However there is also data indicating that while ECDs decrease the arresting officer 
injury rates they do result in relatively high suspect injury rates (Lin and Jones 2010).  
1. LLWs as tools for suppressing political dissent and controlling populations 
It has been argued that “emerging non-lethal technologies offer an increasing 
opportunity for the suppression of civil dissent and control of populations” (Lewer and 
Davison 2005, p.40). If citizens believe the use of these weapons undermines 
democracy (an example being the use of water cannons against civil rights protestors 
in the US during the 1960s) this may have a lasting and negative effect. As Downs 
(2007) notes, “a water cannon may never [again] be acceptable in the USA as a less 
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lethal weapon” (p.362). A second argument is that existing LLWs such as Tasers are 
used too readily by police as tools of compliance (Sprague 2007).  
2. Threats to international arms conventions and international law 
The Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention prohibit the 
development of chemical and biological weapons respectively. However there is a 
caveat allowing for the research and use of chemicals for law enforcement purposes 
(Davison 2009). This has drawn considerable criticism by those who see the use of such 
chemical LLWs as potentially undermining the treaties themselves (Casey-Maslen 
2010; Davison 2009; Lewer and Davison 2005). It has also been noted by these authors 
that no bespoke international agreements exist to restrict or regulate the development 
of acoustic and directed energy weapons.  
3. Health concerns 
Probably the most controversies arising from LLWs are the health concerns their use 
entails: 
 LLWs kill: Despite the commonly employed moniker non-lethal weapon and the 
best intentions and efforts of the weapon designers the fact is LLWs can and do 
kill.  There is no way to manufacturers can prevent this given they cannot control; 
(a) how their weapons are used in the field, (b) the physical characteristics of the 
target, or (c) simple bad luck. LLWs kill in two ways; (1) the process by which force 
is applied from the LLW to the target (i.e. kinetic, chemical, electrical, etc.) has the 
extreme reaction of killing the target, regardless of any rules of use for that 
weapon, and (2) people use LLWs to facilitate the killing of the targets. To expand 
on the first point, blunt impact weapons, Tasers, OC spray and calmatives have all 
killed the intended targets despite the best efforts of police forces and 
manufacturers to produce and enforce rules for their use, such as not firing Tasers 
into a subjects chest, or requiring medical assistance be called when OC spray is 
deployed (Braidwood 2009; Downs 2007; Sprague 2007; Stanbrook 2008; Taylor et 
al 2011; Welch 2011). On the second point, LLWs like CS have been used on 
battlefields to flush combatants out of strongholds so they can then be 
subsequently shot. Also in the siege of the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow by 
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Chechen rebels, Russian security forces pumped an unknown aerosolised 
calmative agent (probably a fentanyl derivative) into the theatre incapacitating all 
the terrorists and the 800 hostages. This resulted in the deaths of approximately 
130 hostages but also allowed the Russian security forces to summarily execute all 
of the 50 Chechen rebels while they were incapacitated (Davison 2009; Fidler 
2005).   
 LLWs injure targets: Any application of energy to a human body, be it kinetic, 
electrical, electromagnetic or chemical, is potentially harmful (NATO 2006). 
Evidence from the analysis of injury data also shows that “suspects in ECD-
deployed incidents [i.e. Tasers] had a higher injury rate than those in non-ECD 
incidents” (Lin and Jones 2010, p.171).  
 The Lack of proper evaluations and the construction of biased evaluations: When 
there are operational needs, pressure exists to get LLWs into the market and as a 
result a thorough evaluation is not undertaken (Lewer and Davison 2005). There is 
also the building controversy surrounding manufacturers of LLWs funding safety 
studies of their products where the independence of those conducting the studies 
is questionable. A knock-on effect of research which lacks perceived impartiality 
and independence is that people are now questioning the accuracy of reported 
device benefits (Lin and Jones 2010).  
 The variability of safety between devices: Individual Tasers have displayed much 
higher output then should be produced when tested independently (Davison 
2009). 
 The denial of health concerns: The denial of health concerns has included the 
indefensible statement that no clear causal connection exists between impact 
projectiles and reported fatalities (see Vilke and Chan 2007) which is akin to 
denying a causal connection between being shot and dying from being shot. 
Perhaps the most vigorous denier has been Taser. Taser has; (a) consistently 
refused to accept their weapon affects the heart maintaining their weapons have 
never caused a death or serious injury, (b) sued a researcher for publishing peer-
reviewed critical scientific evidence and a medical examiner for listing the Taser as 
a cause of death on a death certificate, and (c) created a refuted mental disorder 
(excited delirium) as an alternative to those deaths where a Taser was deployed 
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(Smith et al 2007; Welch 2011). According to Smith et al, Taser “has demonstrated 
a willingness to squelch any message that could hurt its bottom line” (2007, 
p.1402). 
 Physiological variability between targets: It has been claimed that “[i]ndividual 
differences [between targets] are perhaps the biggest single challenge for the 
designers of less lethal weapons” (Downs 2007, p.377). Certain categories of 
individuals are vulnerable to a higher risk of injury and death from the various 
LLW, including amongst others, those who have taken drugs, pregnant women, 
the elderly, children, the mentally disturbed, asthmatics, and those with 
underlying cardiac conditions (Downs 2007; Fish and Geddes 2001; Sprague 2007). 
 Medical ethics concerns: NATO (2006) acknowledges the inherent conflict for 
medical staff between the need to study the effects of prototype LLWs on human 
volunteers and the risk of death or causing harm these studies pose to the 
volunteers. 
4. Function creep 
Much of the controversy arising from the purported function creep of LLWs is borne 
from uncertainty over the true purpose for introducing these weapons in the first 
place; i.e., are LLWs alternatives to (or means of raising the bar for) the use of lethal 
force, or are they a means of forcing civilian compliance? As forcing compliance allows 
broader usage than restrictive situations such as those involving lethal force, allowing 
such usage will be interpreted as function creep if the LLW was sold to the public as an 
alternative to lethal force or for use in situations where the risk of serious harm is high. 
Using an example from Canada, the Braidwood Commission noted:   
In West Australia the shadow attorney-general John Quigley was critical of Tasers and 
how the police were using these weapons. He was reported as saying “[t]hey’re (the 
police) using the Taser as a weapon of punishment. They’re using the Taser as a 
weapon of control. They’re using it as a weapon of compliance. It was never so 
intended” (Marks 2010). According to Davison, “enduring ethical and moral concerns 
remain over the use of weapons solely designed to cause pain at the push of a button” 
(2009, p.182). These concerns are acutely felt by those doctors whose research into 
nociceptors (nerve cells that convey pain) with the aim of reducing chronic pain in 
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sufferers has been employed to help create weapons for hurting people (Editorial staff 
2005). 
5. Unacceptable usage and unacceptable targets 
Electro-shock stun weapons including Tasers have enjoyed widespread use as tools for 
punishment and torture. Devices which attach electro-shock stun devices to the 
human body, such as stun-belts, are opposed by Amnesty International and the UK 
government as tools of torture (Fish and Geddes 2001; Smith et al 2007; Sprague 
2007).   
On the unacceptable use of Tasers, Amnesty International adopts the position that: 
unarmed suspects should not be shot with a Taser for arguing or talking back, 
being discourteous, refusing to obey an order, resisting arrest or fleeing a minor 
crime scene, unless they pose an immediate threat of death or very serious 
injury that cannot be controlled through less extreme measures” (Sprague 2007, 
pp.310-1).  
This is in response to Tasers being used for just these situations. There is also the issue 
of the overuse of LLWs on certain ethnic groups. In Australia the use of Tasers against 
indigenous people between 2007 and 2010 was double that of non-indigenous targets 
(Guest 2010) raising questions over police racism. These questions were given a focal 
point when footage surfaced of an aboriginal man suffering from mental illness being 
shot 13 times while in custody and surrounded by 9 officers after refusing a strip 
search (Marks 2010). 
6. Use of LLWs when alternative methods should have been deployed 
The position that LLWs are more humanitarian than the alternatives is often 
undermined by discrepancies between how they are intended to be used and how they 
are actually used. They can subvert traditional policing practices by discouraging non-
violent methods of persuasion in situations where lethal force would be unacceptable 
(Casey-Maslen 2010). LLWs can also increase the instances police use force and 
decrease the threshold for lethal force by using pain-causing LLWs to produce 
compliance in situations where conventional (physical) force would not be justified 
(Davison 2009).  
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Others have noted that as different LLWs have inherently different levels of injury risk 
the type of LLW used should reflect the nature of threat faced. If a target suffer serious 
injury from a LLW (such as a rubber bullet), then any argument that it was better than 
a real bullet will be undermined if the use of a real bullet would have been 
inappropriate in the given circumstances (Downs 2007). 
7. The undermining of public support for LLWs 
Public support is essential for the survival of any LLW. When unpalatable facts about 
how a particular LLW works and its potential side-effects come to light these can act to 
undermine the credibility and acceptability of that weapon. As NATO (2006) points 
out, “[u]nacceptable facts or publicity can affect the public, politicians and the military 
user ... Policies will ultimately have to account for all elements of public awareness and 
acceptability” (section 6-11).  
Furthermore, incidents of user misuse may be highly publicised adding further fuel to 
the debate over these weapons. Without monitored and enforced policies for the use 
of LLWs to minimise such events, the resultant “negative public dialogue could 
potentially detract from the many benefits of the device … and ultimately culminate in 
a moratorium on the use of the electronic control device altogether” (Lin and Jones 
2010, p.172). This is a fact now recognised by police forces that are becoming acutely 
aware of the levels of scrutiny under which they now operate.  
Even when tightly drawn rules for use of a LLW permit its deployment, this may not be 
enough to convince a questioning public. As Smith et al (2007) have noted: 
no[] matter how unruly [the target, police] departments must consider how 
Tasering a minor or senior citizen will be viewed and digested by a highly critical 
media and public. … Tasering a pregnant woman or an individual in a wheelchair 
or on oxygen will not play well in the press or in front of a jury if the case makes 
it that far, even if an officer could otherwise articulate legitimate reasons for 
using the Taser under such circumstances” (p.410). 
 
9. Lack of clearly defined rules for the use and monitoring of LLWs 
There exists a lack of operational consistency over; (1) how Tasers are used, (2) where 
they fall of the police use-of-force continuum, (3) the level of training required, and (4) 
the monitoring procedures surrounding their use (Adams and Jennison 2007; Lin and 
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Jones 2010). There is also no definition of exactly what use of a LLW implies. It is not 
agreed whether the display of a LLW and/or a threat to use or fire such a weapon 
constitutes use of that weapon. 
 
2.13.3 Reactions and responses to less-lethal weapon problems 
The primary response to LLWs has been the controlling of their use via national 
regulation; the result being a particular LLW can be banned in one country but 
permitted in another. This is a political decision each individual state needs to take. 
If a particular LLW receives political approval then possession and use of that LLW 
depends on the domestic laws of the individual countries. In some jurisdictions civilian 
possession and use of pepper spray and/or Tasers is allowed; for example under 
Sections 12650-12655 of the California Penal Code, any person may purchase, possess, 
or use a stun gun (i.e. Taser) providing they do not fall within a number of restricted 
categories (i.e. drug addicts, under 16’s, those with felony or assault convictions, etc.). 
Whereas in other countries civilian possession of these items is restricted; for example 
within the UK the purchase, possession, manufacture, use, or sale of a Taser is 
prohibited under s.5(1)(b) Firearms Act 1968. However, UK police are permitted to 
carry Tasers on completion of a three-day training course (London Assembly 2013; 
Aiming for a safer solution 2013).  
In other instances a state may only sanction the use of certain LLWs in specific 
instances, such as for mass crowd control. These can include measures such as water-
cannons, CS gas, and baton rounds.  
 
2.13.4 Identified controversies arising from less-lethal weapons 
Table 2.12: Identified controversies arising from less lethal weapons 




Two conflicting purposes/justifications for their use, with support often 
dependent upon which purpose/justification is presented as the rationale for 
introducing these weapons; 





alternative means to subdue a person, and 
 (2) Providing tools of compliance to make citizens obey police orders 
out of fear of pain and/or incapacitating them.   
LW2 Once introduced, there is function creep pressure to employ LLWs for 
purposes other than as an alternative to lethal force.   
LW3 Tasers are too readily used by police to force people to comply. 
LW4 There are ethical and societal questions about police using pain causing 




The use of LLWs in inappropriately situations and for inappropriate purposes 
can undermine the continued use of such weapons;  
 Using crowd control LLWs against political protestors undermines 
democracy and individual rights (e.g., the use of cater cannons 
against civil rights protestors in 1960’s USA potentially means they 
will never by acceptable in the US again).  





LLWs can and do kill, even when operators follow proper operating 
procedures and guidelines; 
 Manufacturers and agencies who deny this fact lose credibility. 
 Manufacturers and agencies who deny this undermine the credibility 
of the LLW.  




Lack of thorough pre-deployment evaluation and safety studies by 
independent researchers denies a LLW a measure of legitimacy. 
 Positive research pertaining to a LLW paid for by the manufacturer is 
open to questions of bias. 
LW10 Variability in output between units of the same LLW, whereby they produce 
stronger effects than a unit acting according to manufacture specifications 
undermines the perception of that LLW and may increase the risk to safety of 
that weapon. 
LW11 The question manufactures should be addressing by their products is not are 




Individual differences in targets which increase the risk of injury and death 
from LLW use, and which may not be apparent to the user of the LLW 









 Those on medication or illegal drugs. 
 Asthma sufferers.  
 Heart conditions. 
 Mental conditions. 
 Pregnancy. 
LW13 Certain categories of people may not be appropriate targets for LLWs, such 
as pregnant women, children, elderly people, those on drugs, and those with 
medical conditions.  






Area effect LLWs such as malodorants and sticky materials may require 
decontamination of targets and the physical environment, and may also 
hinder police; 
 They may also make it impossible for police to effect arrests without 
protective clothing/equipment.  
 Obscurants like smoke grenades affect police trying to make arrests. 
LW16 Police are using Tasers as weapons of punishment.  
LW17 Tasers have been used on psychiatric patients in hospitals which is 
condemned by authorities and medical practitioners.  
LW18 Electro-shock weapons are used as torture devices where the absence of 
lasting marks makes them particularly useful. 
LW19 Use of LLWs on prisoners in jails risks overuse with little accountability. 
LW20 Shooting unarmed suspect with Tasers for arguing or talking back, walking 
away, or being discourteous undermines public support for these weapons 
and the people who use them.  
LW21 LLWs have been used on ethnic minorities in situations which give rise to 




Overuse of LLWs subverts traditional policing practices by discouraging non-
violent methods of persuasion. 
 Using LLWs in pre-emptive manners to induce compliance might lead 




LLWs can increase the use of force instances by police when used to produce 
compliance in situations where physical force would not be justified.  
 Using rubber bullets with the inherent risk of serious injury/death in 





the credibility of use. 
 LLWs cannot substitute good training, judgement, policies, 
procedures, and leadership within the police services.  
LW24 Citizens engaged in protests are demonstrating a grievance. Use of force via 




A LLW cannot survive without public support; 





There is no definition of what use of a LLW denotes for compiling statistics. If 
they are used as tools of compliance then threatening to use a LLW, 
removing it from a holster, or pointing it at a person may all constitute 
incidents of use.  
 Failure to correctly record the use of LLWs may hide abuse. 
LW27 Arguments have been made that LLW use should require both a subject 
matter threshold (such as actual bodily harm) and an immanency 
requirement. Thus acts of common law assault or walking away will not be 
sufficient grounds for deploying LLWs. 
 
 
2.14 Coding of Results 
The controversies identified in Chapters 2.2-2.13 are now collated and individually 
categorised by both the origin and the nature of the controversy103. The results of this 
process are presented in Appendix E. By origin of controversy I am referring to the 
generalised point in the process of creating a ST at which any specific controversy is 
seen to originate; starting from the process of physically designing that which was 
previously an idea or set of specifications, through to implementation, end-user use, 
and the on-going oversight of that technology. Origin is divided into three groups; 
1. Design Features: controversies originating from and/or in response to aspects of 
the physical/digital construction of the security technology. This includes not just 
what the technology is designed to do but also aspects such as the outputs 
                                                     
103
 The coding categorisations I have employ within Chapter 2.14 are the result of an initial analysis of 
the raw data collected through the case studies undertaken in Chapters 2.2-2.13. However, this remains 
a subjective process and another researcher analysing the same data may well settle on alternative 
categories.    
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produced by this technology (such as CCTV footage, the electrical discharge of a 
Taser, the digital image from a body-scanner, and the output of an algorithm), the 
physical appearance of the technology, etc. 
2. End Users: controversies arising from the actions of end-users (those actively 
employing the controversial security technologies). This group includes both state 
employees (police, local council workers, etc.) and private citizens (shopkeepers, 
corporate employees, etc.); restricted only by the existence of any technology-
specific rules governing the employment of a particular security technology. 
3. Policy Decisions: a broad category incorporating controversies which derive from 
official decisions as to how a technology will achieve its intended security goals, 
usually made by public officials (politicians, senior police, etc.) or those operating 
highly regulated industries with national security implications such as airport 
operators. This category feeds into both Design Features and End Users but exists 
either above or a step removed from these other two categories. Using an 
automated threat detection algorithm as an illustration; while the black-box that is 
the algorithm itself is a Design Feature, and the actions of those monitoring or 
acting in response to the algorithm-output represents End Users, the decisions to 
create/employ the algorithm and whether or not the final variables will be made 
public, rules as to what variables can/cannot form part of the algorithm, and the 
creation of codes-of-practice for end users are all Policy Decisions. Given the 
breadth of this category I have divided it into two sub-categories;   
i. Rules Governing Use: focuses specifically on official/unofficial guidance 
governing how end users shall use the technology and/or respond to 
any output. 
ii. Wider Policy Decisions: all remaining Policy Decisions not covered by the 
Rules Governing Use sub-category.  
By nature of controversy I am focussing on the specific fundamental element(s) which 
underlie and define each of the individual controversies identified in Chapters 2.2-2.13 
above. Eight nature of controversy categories were identified from a preliminary 
examination of the twelve controversial ST case-studies. These eight categories are 
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scrutinised further to identify sub-categories, as represented by the ‘Key words, 
phrases, concepts’ column of Appendix E. The eight identified common categories 
representing the nature of the controversies examined are: 
1. Health: controversies arising from real, perceived, or unknown health risks 
resulting from the security technologies in question. 
2. Legality: controversies arising from the potential or determined illegality of the 
security technologies as determined under national and international law. Note 
however that this section does not include potential or determined breaches of 
the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated into UK law under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 which are covered under the Rights & Liberties 
category.  
3. The Public: controversies based on the public’s views, opinions, and support for 
a security technology. Also controversies arising from the effect of the security 
technology on both the whole of society as well as minority groups within it.  
4. Rights & Liberties: controversies based on the perceived detrimental effects of 
the security technologies on the concomitant rights and liberties of individuals, 
groups, and the whole of society. This category includes potential or 
determined breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights as 
incorporated into UK law under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
5. Cost: the financial cost of a security technology resulting in controversy. 
6. Safety & Security: when a security technology directly or indirectly jeopardises, 
potentially jeopardises, or is perceived to jeopardise, the safety and security of 
citizens in the course of its operation. 
7. Functionality: controversies based on features and aspects of the actual design 
of the security technologies in question (such as whether or not the security 
technology works, its reliability, the proportionality and intrusiveness of its 
feature, etc.).  
8. Use & Misuse: controversies arising from the misuse of, or propensity for 
misuse/abuse of, security technologies. 
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2.14.1 Discussion of coding results 
There are a number of observations which can be made from the results of the coding 
process presented in Appendix E. These are as follows: 
1. The same controversy can arise repeatedly in relation to very different STs: forty-
three common controversies were identified from the case-studies, the vast 
majority of which appearing in more than one of the twelve STs examined. 
2. Categorisation of commonalities is possible: aided by the recurring nature of the 
controversies identified, it is possible to objectively organise those identified into 
categories and sub-categories (see Appendix E). 
3. Despite the objective elements of this categorisation process, it remains 
underpinned by subjectivity: the 7 categories employed within Appendix E to 
arrange the 43 identified commonalities does not represent the only possible 
configuration for arranging these commonalities. For example categories 2 
Liberties and Human Rights and 3 Questions of Legality could easily have been 
combined, and/or separate categories for data protection or the issue of trust 
could also have been included. Also, at the commonality level cases could be made 
for either reducing or increasing the number of commonalities from 43 by 
combining or breaking-apart those included. As these decisions remain at the 
discretion of those involved in producing any taxonomy, subjectivity remains. 
However, subjectivity does not mean totally arbitrary. I content that the 
categories chosen successfully incorporate all 43 identified commonalities while at 
the same time being sufficiently distinct, coherent, and largely recognisable to a 
first-time reader, that they constitute logical divisions.  
4. I had not anticipated all of the 43 commonalities identified before beginning the 
case-study process: while certain commonalities (such as those focussed on 
privacy infringement, direct discrimination, or illegality) were not unexpected 
based on my previous research projects, others were far from obvious to me. 
Commonalities such as: 3c. Citizens cannot determine if the technology is operated 
legally; 4c. The financial figures released into the public domain are not trusted; 
and 7c. The presence of the ST potentially jeopardises the safety and security of 
citizens, were ones I had not anticipated. This is an important point as it gives 
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weight to the argument that potential triggers for controversy are not always self-
evident during the design phase and before they manifest in the form of a social 
resistance. Thus those developing new STs may require assistance in identifying 
these triggers.  
5. The commonalities identified are not absolutes, rather they are based on spectra 
and balancing: few of the 43 commonalities represent binary acts or events whose 
simple presence can result in controversy104 with one possible exception being 1f 
The ST causes a fatality. Many of the commonalities are based-on/incorporate a 
spectrum; for example 4b. The cost of the technology is considered too high or 
excessive by the public (the implication being that the probability of avoiding 
controversy will be increased if the ST can be delivered and operated for a lesser 
price), and 5d. The ST is not necessary (the implication being that should 
circumstances change such and public opinion hold that the ST has become 
necessary then the probability of avoiding controversy will increase). Others imply 
the search for a balance between what is acceptable and what is not. Consider 5f. 
The ST represents a disproportionate response and 6e. The ST is ineffective and/or 
incapable of addressing the identified security problem(s); these two identified 
commonalities can be interpreted as two ends of a spectrum (disproportionate 
response versus ineffective response) implying that arriving at an acceptable ST 
will require developers/designers achieve an acceptable balance. 
6. The importance of ‘trust’: a recurring theme which crosses the seven constructed 
categories within Appendix E is that of trust. It is explicit in a number of the 43 
commonalities105, and for many of those remaining it is arguable that without 
public trust the likelihood of a commonality evoking social controversy increases.  
 
                                                     
104
 At no point here (or anywhere else in my dissertation) am I claiming that the presence of a 
commonality of controversy will result in social resistance to a proposed ST. Rather within point 5 I am 
discussing the different natures of the identified controversies (i.e. in what form they manifest). Even if 
they do appear within a ST, regardless of how the particular controversy arises, there is no guarantee 
controversy will follow as a result.    
105
 See 1g, 3c, 4c, 5b, 5g, 6b, 7a, 7b, 7c, and 7e within Table 2.14.  
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2.15 Taxonomy of Security Technology Controversies  
By combining the keywords/concepts identified in Appendix E it is possible to identify 
43 recurring concepts; referred to throughout this document as commonalities of 
controversy. To provide order these have been grouped into seven categories106, as 
described below. Each is accompanied by both a short statement describing the 
central focus of that category, as well as a number of bullet-points defining its breadth. 
This is followed by a depiction of the completed taxonomy on page 155 which 
incorporates the seven categories as well as the 43 commonalities of controversy.  
1. PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HARM 
The ST possesses the potential to cause physical or mental harm to an individual. 
 This harm does not need to be serious or life-threatening; for example any form of 
pain, discomfort, nausea, dizziness, physical or mental impairment will suffice.  
 This harm does not need to be likely; statistically rare events of harm will suffice. 
 The effects do not need to be permanent. It includes transient harms such as short 
episodes of nausea, pain or dizziness. 
 It is irrelevant whether this harm will only arise through either the misuse of the ST 
or some form of accident/failure. 
 While the harm may be rare it must be plausible; i.e. using a body scanner as a 
weapon by crushing someone with it is not a plausible harm, however using a 
Taser-style baton as a club in close-quarters is a plausible harm.  
2. LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ST possesses the potential to infringe upon other human rights when seeking to 
provide security. 
 Human rights of likely concern here include (but are not limited to): 
o privacy; 
o informational self-determination; 
o assembly; 
                                                     
106
 These are based on the eight nature of controversy categories applied within Table 2.13, with two of 
these categories (‘safety & security’ and ‘use & misuse’) combined into one (i.e. Safety, Security, Misuse 




o freedom of expression; 
o right to a fair trial; 
o freedom from torture or inhumane or degrading treatment. 
 The provision of security does not automatically outweigh or trump the enjoyment 
of competing rights. 
3. QUESTIONS OF LEGALITY 
The potential exists for the legality of this ST to be questioned, challenged, or brought 
into doubt. 
 This includes situations where: STs raise new issues of law where precedents have 
not been set; where the technology has not faced legal scrutiny; and where it is 
possible for somebody to evoke existing legislation to challenge its legality. 
 STs which possess the power to discriminate, or be used in a discriminatory 
manner are included herein. 
 STs which engage data protection principles are included here. 
 If the potential exists for the ST to be used in an illegal manner, or if this 
technology has been deemed illegal, subjected to bans or restrictions of use, then 
they are included in this category. 
4. FINANCIAL COST OF THE SECURITY TECHNOLOGY 
Given the financial cost of the ST, it does not represent a sound investment. 
 ‘Financial costs’ go beyond the purchase price; they also include any on-going 
operation, training, maintenance, calibration and upgrade costs, as well as any 
one-off charges (such as changes to building layouts, etc.). 
 This questions whether the security benefits of a ST outweigh the financial outlay. 
 If similar security gains can be achieved through other less expensive means, then 
a ST is called into question. 
 Public disclosure of costs is a factor within this category. 
5. PUBLIC AND END-USER ACCEPTABILITY 
Issues undermining public and/or end-users support for a ST. 
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 Covers the issue of gaining and maintaining trust within a ST from the public and 
end-users. Also questions whether support for a ST is conditional. 
 Asks whether a ST can be justified, whether or not it is proportional and whether it 
meets social acceptability standards? 
 Views the technology through the eyes of a society to determine whether it meets 
recognisable values possessed by that society. 
6. ISSUES OF FUNCTIONALITY 
The functionality of a ST allows it to be criticised or called into question (‘functionality’ 
of a ST encompasses; what it does, what it doesn’t do, what it’s intended to do, and 
what it is capable of doing). 
 Functionality represents the culmination of all the individual functions (i.e. the 
individual components/ abilities/modes-of-use/ capabilities/etc.) built into the ST. 
These should all be necessary, proportional, and reliable. 
 The maturity/reliability of the science/technology underlying the ST is examined 
here.  
 Both the operation and effectiveness of the ST are examined. 
 If the ST suffers from errors, or is susceptible to function-creep or dual-use, this 
will lead to questions over its functionality. 
7. SAFETY, SECURITY, MISUSE AND ABUSE 
The ability of a ST to be misused or abused thereby jeopardising the safety or security 
of citizens or their property, as well as the ability for attackers to avoid or circumvent 
that ST. 
 Includes past misuse/abuse of similar STs. 
 If a ST is only safe and/or secure if used in accordance with the manufacturer’s 
instructions then the potential for misuse or abuse cannot be ruled out. 
 Abuse or misuse of a ST can be by governments, police, state officials, insiders, 
end-users, businesses, external attackers, and citizens. 
 The ease with which a ST can be avoided or circumvented is examinable here. As is 
the propensity for a ST to become a honey-pot for attackers. 
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Table 2.13  Completed Taxonomy of Security Technology Controversies  
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3. Stage 2 – Initial Interviews with Engineers and 
Scientists 
 
Following the workflow illustrated in Figure 1.1 Macro-level structure for conducting 
the research project, this Chapter constitutes Stage 2 Interviews with Engineers and 
Scientists. The goal here is to gain an understanding of how STs are produced by 
interviewing those engineers and scientists with experience in actually developing 
these technologies. Areas focussed on included: 
 the education of these developers,  
 how a ST moves from being an idea or tender through to becoming a completed 
technology,  
 the roles of individual developers/designers within this process,  
 and how any future design tool for mitigating negative social reactions to ST would 
need to look and operate.  
The overarching goal of Stage 2 is to provide information that can be combining with 
the output from Stage 1. Combined, these will form requirements for any future design 
tool; a process to be undertaken in Chapter 4.   
 
3.1 Methodology 
As outlined in Chapter 1.1.1 above, the purposes of Stage 2 is to develop an 
understanding of how the designing and developing of STs occurs in practice. In turn 
this requires gathering knowledge on, and from, the individual designers involved in 
this process, including their motivations, their skill-sets, and the constraints inherent to 
working within the ST industry. To achieve these goals the methodology I am 
employing is semi-structured interviews.  
Semi-structured interviews are described by Longhurst (2010, p.103) as: 
a verbal exchange where one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit 
information from another person by asking questions. Although the interviewer 
prepares a list of predetermined questions, semi-structured interviews unfold in 
a conversational manner offering participants the chance to explore issues they 
feel are important.  
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This inbuilt degree-of-flexibility allows the researcher to tailor each interview to the 
interviewee so as to maximise the value of their responses, by “adjusting the level of 
language of planned questions or through unscheduled probes … that arise from the 
interview process itself” (Berg and Lune 2012, p.112). For my research project this 
flexibility is particularly useful for meeting the goals of Stage 2 for two reasons. Firstly I 
have already identified the general areas of information I wish to collect (i.e. ST 
development processes and the interviewee’s skill-sets) but lack first-hand knowledge 
of this area, so semi-structuring permits the exploration of responses while keeping 
the overall interview sufficiently focussed. Secondly, while the interviewees share 
many characteristics, in other aspects they differ greatly. They are on the one hand 
homogenous in that they are all STEM practitioners working on the development of 
STs, while on the other hand they are heterogeneous, possessing different levels of 
seniority, responsibilities, experience, education, and they work in different 
environments.  
There are numerous strengths to interviewing which mesh well with both the data I 
need to collect and my interviewees with their particular need for anonymity. These 
strengths (and the associated benefits for my research project) include the following: 
1. Interviews can fill knowledge-gaps more efficaciously than alternative methods 
such as observations or the analysis of documentary data (Hay 2010). Having 
already identified commonalities of controversy in relation to the finished design 
of STs through multiple case-study analysis in Stage 1, interviews can fill in gaps 
surrounding how individual STEM practitioners actually go about designing and 
building these STs.     
2. They enable the investigation of complex behaviours and motivations (Hay 2010) 
and the elicitation of ‘deep’ answers to questions (Guest et al 2013). Given the 
complexity and diverse nature of the ST industry, interviews provide a perfect 
vehicle for data collection here. 
3. They can reveal both consensus on issues and diversity of opinions and 
experiences (Hay 2010). As touched on above and examined in depth in Chapter 
3.2.4, both the diversity of the individual interviewees’ experiences and the 
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uniting factor that is their occupation as ST designers, can be effectively examined 
through the use of interviewing.    
4. Interviews respect and empower the interviewees, while also providing them with 
more information on the research project they are participating in than some 
other methodologies (Hay 2010). In the context of my research, interviews allow 
me to respect the anonymity wishes of interviewees who are naturally cautious 
about participating in research. Additionally, because interviews are an 
interactional process whereby information flows between the interviewer and 
interviewee thereby enabling the interviewee to develop a deeper understanding 
of the research project, I am better able to obtain specific, reflective feedback 
regarding future design tools. 
On the basis of these factors, semi-structured interviews constitute an excellent 
methodology for successfully completing Stage 2. Alternate methodologies that could 
be employed here include in place of interviewing include questionnaires, surveys, 
focus groups, and ethnographic research. However, these are rejected as being less 
effective, unsuitable, or impractical.  
The effectiveness of questionnaires and surveys is undermined by the small number of 
willing subjects and the difficulties involved in accessing more. Also, the detailed 
nature of the information I need to obtain from my participants, which itself changes 
depending on the particular characteristics of each participant, negates the value of 
producing and employing standardised collection tools such as questionnaires/surveys. 
Focus groups, while potentially just as effective as interviewing for meeting the goals 
of Stage 2, are necessarily excluded due to the anonymity pre-conditions insisted upon 
by a number of the participants. Finally, ethnographic methods are not considered a 
viable option for this research project as I do not have the necessary long-term access 





3.2.1 Constraints on conducting the interviews and publishing the results  
Before I expand upon the interview process and present the results collected therein, 
it is prudent to explain the prerequisite constraints agreed with the interviewees prior 
to their interviews and which have impacted how the results of this process are 
presented within this chapter. Ultimately these constraints constitute safeguards for 
protecting the anonymity of the interviewees. 
As discussed in Chapters 1.3 & 1.4 the research and design of STs conducted within the 
security industry often carries with it a number of unique challenges and restraints. 
These restraints are primarily a result of the secrecy requirements affecting much of 
the work in this domain. This secrecy can be propagated and enforced using 
commercial-secrecy justifications to prevent discussions of patents held and work 
undertaken, employment contracts which can include gagging provisions, and 
statutory legislation. Regarding legislation, within the UK the Official Secrets Act 1989 
applies to both Crown servants 107  and government contractors108  such that the 
disclosure of that information protected by this Act (such as the design of STs) may 
constitute an offence109. This includes information which if disclosed will impede the 
prevention or detection of offences or the apprehension or prosecution of suspected 
offenders (as per s.4(2)(a)(iii)). To provide context for how this offence may arise in 
relation to the design of STs, consider the example of whole body scanners examined 
in Chapter 2.2. The successful detection rates of these scanners in relation to plastic 
and liquid explosives hidden under clothing (as determined by both government 
testing and any detection figures collated from in-field use in airports) represents 
protected information which has never been publically disclosed. While this secrecy 
impedes public debate, makes it harder to gain public trust, and provides the basis for 
controversy, using the language of s.4(2)(a)(iii) Official Secrets Act 1989 the decision to 
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keep this information secret is justified by decision-makers on the basis that these 
figures possess the potential to impede: 
a) the prevention of offences: if the actual detection rates are low then the scanners 
will lose their deterrence effects; 
b) the detection of offences: if detection rates differ depending on the substances 
carried, the amount of this substance, where it is carried, etc., then attackers can 
modify their carrying methods to maximise their probability of becoming a false 
negative, thereby reducing the scanners’ detection capabilities;  
c) the apprehension of suspected offenders: a reduction in the detection of offences 
will have the concomitant effect of reducing the apprehension of offenders.  
It is clear from this discussion that those involved in the production of these 
technologies are necessarily apprehensive about discussing their work. To garner the 
cooperation of the interview subjects I needed to agree to all their preconditions to 
involvement; these differed markedly between interviewees. Some were either happy 
or ambivalent as to being identified while others demanded anonymity, so to proceed I 
collated the various requirements from all the participants and applied the most 
onerous versions of each of these to all the data collected. This approach allows me to 
retain the maximum number of subjects for interviewing. The following list of 
restrictions is the result of this process: 
 Anonymity for the interviewees.  
 The inclusion of measures to avoid or impede the identification of interviewees 
through the aggregation of their quoted responses. This was achieved via two 
means: 
1. By not assigning any identifier to any of the quotes included (such as 
subject A, subject B, etc.). 
2. The removal or modification of references to specific commercially-
identifiable STs which the interviewees personally worked on. As a 
fictitious example; if Subject A was employed by Taser International in the 
development of the TASER X26P110, I would remove any reference they 
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 See Chapter 2.13 for the case-study on less-lethal weapons. 
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made to their specific employer, and would substitute a generic moniker 
for the product – i.e. “a stun-gun”.     
This concern over the potential to identify individuals through data aggregation 
and the lack of trust in pseudo-anonymisation is justifiable based on research from 
various fields (see amongst others: Malin and Sweeney 2004; Sun et al 2012; 
Aimeur et al 2012) 
 The permanent deletion of all recordings and subsequent transcripts of the 
interviews after analysis to prevent non-consensual secondary analysis and 
function creep. 
 The opportunity was provided for interviewees to vet this section before 
publication. 
These restrictions do have a negative effect on the qualitative process of reporting 
interviewee quotes. Mainly in that it prohibits both: i) the joining together of quotes 
from a single interviewee to form a more detailed picture of that individual; and ii) 
comparing the views of one individual with others in the study. However, I believe the 
value and contemporary relevance added to this research project by being able to 
interview engineers and scientists who are directly engaged in the process of designing 
and developing STs far outweighs that which is lost.  
 
3.2.2 The interview process  
The three primary research questions/areas being examined within the interview 
process of Stage 2111 were the following: 
1) Developing an understanding of the professional education of the interviewee, 
with specific emphasis on determining what (if any) social science and engineering 
ethics training was both offered and undertaken. 
2) Examining how a ST goes from being an idea and/or prospective tender to a 
research and design project and finally to a finished product; including the 
divisions of labour, responsibility, knowledge, and power within a design project. 
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 See Figure 1.1 Macro-level structure for conducting the research project. 
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Also to determine what ‘social acceptability’ factors influence this process (if any) 
and how this occurs. 
3) Collecting what are essentially end-user views on what they see as the optimal 
design, format, and operation of practical tools for influencing the upstream 
development of STs so as to maximise their social acceptability.  
Obtaining first-hand information from the designers and developers of STs on these 
three areas was the primary motivation for engaging in this interview process.    
The interviews undertaken during this Stage were conducted in the form of semi-
structured interviews/guided conversations, as distinct from the more polar 
alternatives of either; (a) highly structured, standardised interviews, such as survey 
interviews with their quantitative orientation, or (b) unstructured interviews akin to 
free flowing informational exchanges where the interviewee directs the interview 
(Holstein and Gubrium 2004; Longhurst 2010; Dunn 2010).  
Semi-structured interviews were chosen so as I could focus the conversation on 
specific topics (Rubin and Rubin 2005) pertinent to the three primary research 
questions/areas listed above. While at the same time emphasising the content of what 
the interviewees have to say (Dunn 2010) by affording them the opportunity to 
express themselves beyond simple ‘yes’/‘no’ answers (Longhurst 2010). 
To facilitate this process an interview schedule was produced containing fully worded 
questions often accompanied by possible follow-up’s112; however the interviewer was 
not bound to ask only these questions, nor all of these questions. Based on factors 
including; the answers provided by the interviewee, their knowledge, employment 
position, experience, etc., the interviewer could modify the questioning to explore 
different areas of interest as they arose. Additionally it was the interviewer’s 
responsibility to redirect the conversation back to the pre-identified research-
topics/questions when this was the appropriate action.  
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3.2.3 The Stage 2 questionnaire  
Appendix F depicts the selection of questions posed to the interviewees. This question 
schedule is divided into four sections:  
 Education questions: focussing on the interviewee’s professional qualifications 
with dedicated questions to determine their social-science and ethical education. 
 Working practice questions: focussing on how they actively produce STs within 
their workspaces, how they interact with co-workers on projects, how work is 
divided and assigned, and their ability to influence designs.  
 Thoughts and opinions for design tool: these questions are designed to illicit 
opinions on what shape future STs should take (i.e. how they should operate, their 
output, how long they should take to use, etc.).  
 Miscellaneous: asks for any information not covered above which the interviewee 
deems relevant based on the exchange of information inherent to the semi-
structured interview process. 
The question schedule is divided into lead questions which are assigned an identifying 
letter/number combination (e.g. A1, B2, etc.). Each of these is linked to potential 
follow-up questions where appropriate.  
 
3.2.4 The interviewees  
To enhance the credibility of any interview-based research, Rubin and Rubin (2005) 
recommend selecting interviewees who: 
a) Possess first-hand knowledge of the research problems being examined. 
b) Ideally are speaking from first-hand experiences. 
c) Are individuals who reflect a variety of different perspectives. 
Within the research project, fifteen individuals were interviewed during this stage. 
When compared against the criteria of Rubin and Rubin; all of these individuals are 
either currently or previously employed in the research and development of STs. This 
affords them first-hand knowledge and experience in the research topics being 
examined. They also reflect a variety of different perspectives, though these can be 
164 
 
conceptualised as perspectives internal to the ST industry as opposed to external ones. 
In other words, even though all fifteen interviewees work(ed) within the ST industry 
they possess different perspectives given that; (i) the ST industry is vast and varied, 
and (ii) all fifteen subjects possess different combinations of experience, current/past 
employment positions, and university degrees/specialisations.  
I chose not to include similar individuals (scientists, engineers, etc.) from outside the 
ST industry (whose perspective will necessarily be external to the ST industry) because; 
a) this research project is not a comparative study of the work practices between 
different science and technology industries, and 
b) as discussed in Chapters 1.3 & 1.4 the unique nature of the ST industry sets it 
apart from many other science and technology endeavours. Hence the decision to 
focus only on those with first-hand knowledge of this industry. 
Regarding the diversity of the sample of interviewees, and without providing specific 
numbers to assist aggregation of personal data, the fifteen ST designers collectively 
possessed the following characteristics: 
Table 3.1  Diversity of interviewees within Stage 2 
Academic Qualifications: 
 Electronic engineering 
 Structural engineering 
 Software engineering 
 Medical physics 
 
 Physicist  
 Mathematician 
 Explosives engineering 
Employers: 
 University 
 Self-employed /company director 
 Government 
 
 Multinational ST company 
 Domestic ST company 
 Contractor 
Current employment role: 
These employment roles covered the full spectrum from:  
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 Junior research associates/engineers through to chief technical officers 
 The junior employees of an organisation through to the owners/directors 
 
The selection process for this Stage involved non-probability sampling; in that only 
those individuals with experience in developing and designing STs were considered 
eligible for inclusion. This form of sampling is described by Lewin (2005 pp.218-19) as: 
… [an approach] adopted when researchers target a particular group and are not 
always seeking to generalize findings to the population overall. This kind of 
approach is commonplace in small-scale research (particularly when costs need 
to be minimized) or qualitative approaches…. 
Non-probability sampling is widespread within social science research (Lewin 2005). It 
was particularly appropriate here given my focus on; (i) only targeting those 
scientists/engineers engaged in the process of designing STs, and (ii) my recognition 
that any findings within this research project are not intended as generalisable beyond 
the ST industry due to its unique nature.  
The particular forms of non-probability sampling undertaken were a combination of: 
a) Convenience sampling: whereby participants are selected based on ease of 
access113 (Bradshaw and Stratford 2010; Lewin 2005).  
b) Snowball sampling: “A technique used by researchers whereby one contact, or 
participant, is used to help to recruit another, who in turn puts the researcher in 
touch with another. The number of participants soon increases rapidly or 
‘snowballs’” (Clifford et al 2010 p.535).  
Obtaining initial access to prospective subjects was difficult given the nature of the ST 
industry (see Chapters 1.3 & 1.4) and the concerns-of/restrictions-on employees within 
this industry (see Chapters 1.4 & 3.2.1). To overcome this I began with convenience 
sampling by exploiting both my personal networks with practitioners, and those 
networks existing within UCL’s Department of Security and Crime Science to identify 
the initial cadre of willing participants. From this group I then employed snowballing by 
asking interviewees to introduce me to other potential subjects. Through this I was 
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 Though it should be noted here that ease of access is a relative term – the use of personal and 
departmental networks represented the easiest, most convenient method for gaining access to subjects. 
166 
 
able to conduct fifteen interviews with engineers and scientists possessing direct 
experience working in the design and development of STs.  
The interviews varied in length from approximately thirty minutes to four hours; 
however, these figures do represent outliers. The majority of interviews lasted around 
sixty minutes. Face–to-face interviews were undertaken throughout the United 
Kingdom and Europe. Interviewees outside these areas were interviewed via Skype. All 
interviews were recorded with a digital recorder before I transcribed them into scripts. 
Coding of these scripts was then undertaken manually so as to identify the presence or 
absence of common themes in relation to each question.    
While it would have been possible to conduct more than fifteen interviews, two 
factors truncated this process. Firstly, given that this interview component comprised 
only one stage of a larger research project, unlimited time could not be afforded to it. 
Secondly, after analysing these fifteen interviews it was determined that an 
identifiable saturation point114 in responses was being observed justifying the decision 
to forego further interviews.  
 
3.3 Results  
The following are selected results from the Stage 2 questionnaire115. The presentation 
of these results is governed by the restrictions described in detail in Chapter 3.2.1.  
Where there was an identifiable common theme or view in relation to a specific 
question, this will presented here, and they may be accompanied by unassigned 
quotes when this adds value. Given the semi-structured nature of the interviewing, not 
all of the questions set out in Appendix F were posed to all of interviewees (see 
Chapter 3.2.2 for more details), and as a consequence not every question provided 
suitable results for inclusion in the section below. Additionally as the interviewing 
process was designed to enable the examination of interesting concepts as they arose 
(including those beyond the scope of the original questionnaire), additional questions 
and their results are also included here.  
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3.3.1 Responses to Stage 2 questionnaire questions  
Education questions: 
 With regard to the composition of your university degree, was it rigid and 
structured or was there flexibility in the choice of subjects you could take? 
In responding to this question all the interviewees characterise their courses as rigid in 
structure regardless of their chosen discipline. However, there are two other themes 
which expand upon this characterisation. The first is that this rigidity is front-loaded in 
their chosen degrees in that there was little or no option to take elective courses in 
their first year. However, as their degrees progress the opportunity to select elective 
subjects increases (response: “we had a choice of 1 module in the second year and 3 
modules in the third year .. and they were all engineering courses, as in hard-core 
engineering. I didn’t consider them a big choice”). Though, in deciding whether or not a 
person has choice encapsulates a subjective determination. As the final sentence in 
this response indicates, the opportunity to select subjects is not necessarily equated to 
‘freedom of choice’ by the student if they perceive the options to choose from as 
largely homogenous.  
Secondly, as their degree progresses the opportunity opens up to specialise in areas 
which most interest them, though these specialised subjects are still built upon a core 
of prerequisite subjects. This opportunity to choose subjects is characterised as 
entailing both flexibility and restriction: flexibility in that it allows for greater choice, 
but restrictive in that once a specialisation path is chosen it becomes harder to change 
direction.  
 
 Were there any compulsory or elective subjects that you would describe as social 
or social-science subjects, such as the role of the engineer in society, the 
responsibilities of engineers, and/or the impact of engineering on society?  
The vast majority of respondents emphatically answer ‘no’ here. However, two 
engineers do indicate that their degrees include a level of ethical training. One holds 
this to be implicit to their education (response: “all engineers learn ethics. When we’re 
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taught to build a bridge you learn how to build it so it doesn’t fall down in five years 
from now. That’s being ethical”). The other identifies an explicit subject undertaken 
which teaches ethics (response: “on my MSc we had a course called xxxxx that dealt 
with the contractual and the public interaction of engineers [when] bidding for a job 
and that had ethics, engineering ethics, into it because that’s where we would put it”). 
 
 If there was something offered, would it have interested you? 
Responses here are generally non-committal, with ‘maybe’ being was the most 
common offered. However, there is not a rejection of social science or ethics displayed 
by the interviewees. In discussing this question, they will often caveat their response 
by adding that they would consider taking any social-science/ethical training providing 
they consider it to be useful. The following statement is a good example of such 
thinking (response: “I don’t think so no because the course was very much about 
maths” … {and then later} … “had they said ‘okay were going to look at the social side 
of security’ then maybe I would have been interested in that, had I known that I wanted 
to go into [the security] area”). That said, this example also displays the difficulty in 
applying this logic of useful social science training being acceptable. For a student will 
not know exactly what work their future career will entail, so is not going to know 
what training is going to be useful to them in their future when they are selecting their 
subjects.  
 
Working Practice questions: 
 What is the process whereby you decide whether or not to take on a new ST 
project put out to tender by the government? 
Those interviewees who were in more junior roles, or had never been exposed to this 
process because of their employment role, were unable to answer this question, citing 
a lack of knowledge of this process. Those in more senior positions working in non-
government roles were able to address this question. In their answers the single factor 
which determined whether or not they would even consider tendering for a project 
was the perceived ability to make a profit from any final product. This factor was the 
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primary, determining one. It was addressed and used to filter out possible projects 
even before considerations over the technical ability of the firm to deliver the tender 
were considered. The following response details how this process is undertaken by one 
of the interviewees with considerable experience in this area.     
(response: “The first thing that happens is it [the tender] goes to marketing. They talk to 
our clients, to potential end-users. And they come back and tell us, you know, if we 
actually build this thing, whether there exists a market for it. Can we sell enough of it to 
make a profit. If they [marketing] say ‘no’ then we don’t touch it [the tender] …. If they 
say ‘yes’ then the Chief Technical Officer (CTO) picks it up and [he/she] have to decide 
whether or not it’s feasible …. Do we possess the capacity, the capabilities, to build this 
thing? Also is this the sort of thing we [the company] want to be building. After this 
[he/she] will bring in the heads of the different departments to look at how it might be 
built”) 
Despite working in the national security area, this description of the tendering process 
indicates that private companies make their decision based on monetary factors rather 
than a perceived nationalistic duty.   
 
 Explain what happens when a new design project is announced? 
o How is the work for these projects divided?  
There was no uniformity of process displayed here in relation to how the work within 
projects was divided up, beyond the fact that somebody sufficiently senior divides the 
required work and then assigns it to others.  
o Do you work alone when working on a project or as part of a team? 
The majority of interviewees responded that they work within teams of two or more 
people to complete projects. However, an interesting observation here is that working 
with others is not necessarily equated to teamwork with individual team members (or 
sub-groups) maintaining responsibility for their own component within a larger project 
team. (response: “originally just myself and the technical director which did this sort of 
thing .. and then we’d work with the software guys .. they had their own software bits .. 
and the electronics guys worked on the electronics bit .. so it wasn’t much of a 




 Are projects divided up into the roles and capabilities of the specialised individuals?  
Recurring answer here was ‘yes’. 
 
 How does communication occur between the different people/groups working on a 
project?  
There was no standardised communication structure identifiable here. From the 
interviews distance was a factor identified by the respondents which did impact 
communication. Those who worked in the same factory/space as the other team 
members found communication an easier process. Conversely, it was noted that 
software developers would often be contractors who would work remotely which 
made communication difficult.  
 
 Are you given information about the whole of the project you are working on, or 
just the part of the project that you are specifically working on? 
Those interviewed all indicated that they knew about the projects they were working 
on, even when they were only completing a small part of them. Of course, there is 
level of bounded knowledge here, in that there may be unknown unknowns, and/or 
the individual may be supplied with false information.   
 
 From the moment a project has been announced and the work divided, how is the 
work overseen and completed as the project progresses? 
There was no standardised oversight structure or set of processes identifiable here. It 
differed depending on a multitude of factors including the project itself, who the 
person was, and the size and structure of the employer. The following are examples of 
the variety displayed within the responses provided to this questions: (responses: “it 
changed project to project”; “I do whatever [my boss] tells me to do until [] is happy 
with the finished product”; “the technical rep was supposed to be in total control of it 
or the senior vice president or his boss .. it depended what the projects were .. they kind 
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of dished [the work] out to either the vice president or the technical director .. and then 
there’s the engineering manager as well who was more on the building-it side rather 
than the physics-side”; “It’s my company .. I am the oversight”). 
 
 What happens when or if a previously unrecognised or unanticipated problem 
becomes apparent when completing a project?  
The common response was to notify those higher in the chain of command and any 
other groups that may be affected. If the problem was one which would ultimately 
affect the ability of the designer to produce the product asked for by the client, then 
senior staff interviewed said they would contact the client. 
 
 Are employees encouraged to come forward with a better solution? 
The responses here were particularly interesting. Those who were less senior 
indicated that they felt they could pass ideas on to their supervisors, but that the 
opportunity to do so did not arise very often as they were often given quite specific 
tasks to complete and they tended not to question these. Those in more senior 
positions indicated that they were always encouraging employees to come up with 
better solutions. However, this assertion was subject to caveat or a narrow 
interpretation of what this actually entailed. For example, one respondent stated 
they allowed employees to provide feedback, but that any subsequent decision 
making remained top-down and rigid; hence feedback did not equate to action. 
Another respondent welcomed new ideas but the example they provided of such an 
action was of minimal impact; (response: “we always look for our employees to 
come up with new solutions, [and] ideas. Only the other week one of our junior 
engineers came up with a new way for using a bracket”). The question of whether 
they would welcome more expansive, impactful feedback was not explored. 
 
 How detailed are the specifications you are given at the start of a project? 
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The recurring response is that this depends on the client. An expansion of this from 
one interviewee was that if the client has worked with the company in the past and 
has built up a relationship of trust and understanding then in turn their specifications 
tend to be less detailed.   
 
 How binding are these? Do they allow for ‘wriggle-room’ or are the parameters 
always stringently defined and adhered to? 
The recurring answer is this was very much context dependent. On a spectrum 
responses here ranged from ‘not being afforded the option’ (response: “I wasn’t 
involved in [setting] the actual physical design at all”), to ‘it depends’ (response: 
“depends what it is .. we always work towards [set national/international] standards .. 
we know we want [the product] to perform to ‘this’ level of standard .. that was on the 
majority of projects”), to ‘a lot of freedom to improvise’ (response: “a lot of the things I 
was working on were already existing products .. so it was ‘make this better’”).  
 
 What happens if you realise there is a better way of doing something which the 
client may not have realised but will require the specs be changed? 
For those interviewees working in direct contact with clients, a decision such as this 
very much depended on their relationship to the client. If it was an established 
relationship built up over time then they indicated they would be more willing to have 
such a conversation with them.    
 
 How much influence/flexibility do you have on projects you are given? 
Once a project was agree to with a client, the focus was very much on producing the 
agreed product to the agreed specifications. Within the designer, the work was divided 
accordingly. There was little opportunity to explore avenues of interest.  
This could be contrasted with those working on academic research projects. The 
emphasis here was on producing what they had agreed to secure funding. However, 
greater willingness or perceived freedom was reported here to explore different 
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avenues to achieve the intended goal, though there were still limits (response: “I didn’t 
have the time to do my own thing that much .. I mean once they had given me a project 
to work on then I could be a bit flexible .. I could look at it from different aspects .. but 
again I couldn’t really say ‘oh this is quite an interesting thing .. why don’t we look at 
this”).  
 
 How important is the cost of a ST to clients? 
This was repeatedly identified as the most important factor for any ST project 
(response: “cost is everything”). 
 
Thoughts and Opinions of any Future Design Tools: 
 Are you aware of any tool that can be used by the designers of security 
technologies for anticipating and mitigating negative social reactions to your 
designs? 
All respondents answered ‘no’ to this question. 
 
 What tools do you already use to identify social issues when beginning a project? 
All respondents answered ‘none’ to this question. 
  
 Do you think there needs to be different tools specifically for group-use and others 
specifically for use by individuals? 
Respondents were unsure as to whether or not different group-user versus 
individual-user tools needed to be produced. This lack of certainty is not surprising 
given that all respondents in the previous question noted that they did not use such 
tools. Hence the ability to base opinions to this question in past experiences is likely 
to be severely limited here.  
 
 When would be the best time in the design process to use the proposed tools? 
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All interviewees indicated that any tool should be designed to be used at the beginning 
of the ST design process. This reasoning’s behind this view included; (a) that it will 
prevent the need to modify the design later in the design process (response: “it’s got 
to be at the beginning .. because these things will affect the design .. and you don’t 
want to go back .. so we’ve designed this and we are starting to build it, and now we 
have to change the design”), and (b) that it will assist in the creation of clear design 
goals which can then be met.     
 
 Is it already too late once you’re telling the individual engineers what to build? 
This line of questioning was to determine at what level in the design process a tool 
should be used. The general consensus was that this should occur at higher levels of 
management. This answer then led into the next question. 
 But given it’s the lower-down people who actually have to build the ST, aren’t they 
better placed to actually build something in a different way? 
The overriding view of those more junior interviewees was that they would prefer not 
to have the responsibility of implementing this tool. They would much rather be 
presented with a set of specifications already modified by any tool which they could 
then set about producing. (response: “I would rather be presented with a set of specs 
already incorporating the social issues rather than being presented with a set of 
possible specs and potential social issues and then have to build it from there”) 
 
 How long should it take to learn how to use a tool for the first time? 
There was general resistance to any tool which takes a long time to learn. This 
appeared to be based on either bad experiences by the interviewees of previous 
courses which were viewed as a waste of time, by being too long and/or containing 
superfluous information.   
 
 Regarding the instructions for the tools, how long could they be before you 
stopped reading/following them? 
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Again, there was an overriding desire for brevity here (response: “literally a case of 
read for more than an hour ... I would be bored”; “if it’s a tutorial then maybe half a 
day tops”).  
 
 Would it be valuable if they contain concrete examples of how each aspect of the 
tools are applied to a real-life or hypothetical design project? 
Consensus view was that the inclusion of examples was preferred.   
 
 Would you want to have somebody step you through how the tools are used, 
especially if you had never used them before? 
There was no consensus on this issue. This appeared to reflect the different 
approaches of the interviewees. Some were in favour of immersion (response: “I think I 
would prefer just jumping in, with examples of how to use it”). Others liked the idea of 
being shown how to use something by a trainer. While others indicated that they 
would like to work it out for themselves but that a help line they could contact if they 
needed would be valuable.  
 
 How long should any tool take to use? 
Regardless of the seniority of interviewee the consistent view was that the time taken 
to use any tool should be minimal. No interviewees gave a use-time of longer than one 
day. Times varied from one hour through to one day. Some of the respondents did add 
the contextual caveat of ‘it depends on the project’, indicating that it might be possible 
for a tool to take longer than one day to use and still be acceptable if the 
circumstances so dictated. 
 




There was consensus that time would be made available if the tool was considered a 
valuable addition to the design process. The implication of this qualification is that if 
the value of a tool was not acknowledged then time might not be assigned to its use.       
 
 What format would you want the tool to be? 
There was no consensus on this issue. Different respondents preferred either digital or 
paper-based formats. Comments such as “I very much like a point-and-click type 
thing”, “an app would be good” and “I like things I can hold on to [so paper-based]” 
were all recorded. The differences in opinions here can be framed as both beneficial 
and frustrating. They are beneficial in that they do not rule out any particular format of 
tool, hence maximising the available options when designing such tools. However, they 
are frustrating in that they do not provide much guidance on form, and with the 
absence of a majority opinion and tool designed in a single format may struggle to 
maximise its uptake.  
 
 Would a tool need to be bespoke to a particular security product (such as CCTV) or 
could their design be generalised so as to apply to all products? 
Given the responses here, it is possible to conclude the view that a balance needed to 
be struck between tools that are of general application and those designed for specific 
security products. There was a general acceptance that certain aspects of a tool may 
need to be bespoke depending on the ST at hand (for example it was noted that a 
CCTV camera is very different from a metal detector in terms of the technology 
involved). On the other hand there was acceptance that it would be impractical to 
create a bespoke tool for every single ST being designed.   
 
 Should it offer potential solutions based on previous controversies from other 
similar or related technologies? 
Most of the respondents here valued the idea of information on previous solutions in 




 Do you think your final products would be improved by the use of such tools, and 
that engineers in general would benefit from such tools? 
There was general consensus that final products may be improved by such tools but 
without expansion on exactly how they would necessary be better.  
 
3.4 Discussion of Results  
The Stage 2 interview questions were divided into three themes (education, working 
practices, and tool design); the significant results of which were presented in Chapter 
3.2.1 above. Within this section the relevance and implications of these results are 
discussed, with the primary conclusions highlighted.  
Education: 
Table 3.2 provided a breakdown of the professional qualifications possessed by the 
interviewees. This included mathematicians, physicists, IT specialists, and a range of 
engineering specialities. While diverse, the education of all these individuals falls 
within a grouping which has become known internationally as STEM (i.e. science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics).  
When interviewing the subjects on their individual STEM degrees, three common 
factors emerged: 
1. Each interviewee’s course comprised a set of core modules on top of which they 
would choose electives to assist in specialisation and/or the exploration of fields 
of interest.  
Thus if topics such as ethics and/or social impact are to be taught to STEM students 
they would have maximal impact if incorporated into core modules rather than 
electives; purely because all students within a degree will take the core modules.   




This raises a number of related issues. Firstly it calls into question the level of impact 
that the rise of engineering ethics is actually exerting; especially if it is not filtering 
down into the education programmes of the current cadre of engineering graduates. 
Secondly, the obvious implication of point 2 is that the interviewees received no 
formal social-impact or ethics training as part of their STEM education. 
On the specific issue of ethics, there were responses by some of the interviewed 
engineers that ethics did form a component of their engineering education in that 
engineers are taught to build bridges that don’t fall down, and are built to standard. I 
question this characterisation of ethics; one which conflates competence as ethics. It is 
arguable that an engineer who builds a bridge that is stable and meets all relevant 
standards is merely an engineer competent at their job. To be an ethical engineer, 
(following on from the discussion of responsibilities within ethical engineering in 
Chapter 1.5.3) requires something more. The engineer must be prepared to challenge 
the bridge itself; i.e., its positioning, its impact on the environment, the materials used, 
its dimensions, whether it should be built, etc., rather than just building a stable 
bridge116. 
It should also be noted here that even if engineering ethics actually has an impact on 
the design of ST, by placing an onus on engineers to modify their work practices and 
products, many of those involved in the design of STs (mathematicians, physicists, etc.) 
are not engineers. No movement comparable to ethical engineering was identified 
through interviews with those from other STEM fields (i.e. mathematical ethics, 
physics ethics, etc.). Thus any overall impact of ethical engineering on the design of STs 
is further diluted. 
3. There was a lack of conviction amongst the interviewees that they would opt for 
a subject on the social impact or ethics of their chosen fields should it be offered.   
Few of those interviewed expressed interest in taking social-centric optional subjects. 
There was an expressed concern over the relevance of such subjects. There was also 
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 On the ethics bridge construction see Winner (1980) for a fascinating discussion of the incorporation 
of racism into the design of the New York parkways, whereby social-class bias and racial prejudice was 
(literally) built into their construction. By restricting the height of the overpasses, busses (frequented by 
African-Americans and poor people) were prevented from using them, leaving them free for the 
automobiles of the white upper- and middle-classes.  
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the view that as there was already so much to learn within their chosen fields, any 
optional subjects would be better spent on their core discipline and/or specialisation. 
Finally there was simply a relative lack of enjoyment or interest in social-impact or 
ethics; at least when compared to mathematics, engineering, etc.    
Working Practices: 
Of the three interview themes, the questions relating to work practices elicited the 
greatest diversity of responses. This is understandable given the multitude of 
influencing factors operating on each interviewee in relation to this theme. The size of 
their companies, the nature of their employment (i.e., academia, industry, 
government, independent contractors), established working practices, whether they 
work as individuals or as part of larger teams, their experience, and the nature of the 
STs they have worked on will all influence the interviewees’ opinions on how they 
perceive working practices. It was possible however to identify three common factors: 
4. There exists a distinct lack of uniformity or standardised set of processes over the 
structure and conduct of ST design projects. 
How work on projects is divided, who works on them, how communication occurs 
within these projects, and how oversight occurs within a ST design project all differed. 
This was evident both between different sectors (i.e. universities as opposed to 
commercial industry), within a sector (i.e. different companies within the commercial 
sector), and even within a single company (i.e. the processes associated with how a ST 
moves from concept to prototype can differ within the same company from project to 
project). 
5. The ability of an individual to directly influence the design of a ST appears to 
decrease the more junior the position of that individual within their employment 
structure. 
From the interviews it became clear that contact between a company and a client 
occurred at a higher level within a firm. As a rule junior staff were not involved in these 
negotiations/interactions. Within academia hierarchical structures also existed within 
laboratories and research projects; whereby the principal researcher who had been 
awarded the funding would direct the actions of more junior researchers and students. 
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Given the funding constraints within both research grants and a commercial budget it 
is understandable junior staff responded that they were not in a position to develop 
work of their own within a ST design project beyond that which had been pre-assigned 
to them from their managers.  
There were, however, avenues for feedback. Junior staff responded that they would 
inform a more senior manager if they identified a problem when attempting to 
complete a project. And senior managers responded that they actively sought 
feedback from their junior staff when it came to solutions and ideas. However it was 
clear that such ideas/solutions could not be implemented independently by the junior 
staff, but would require senior approval.  
Also while senior staff did say they encouraged employees to come forward with 
better solutions to problems, only concrete example of this happening could be 
provided by the interviewees. And the limited nature of this example (“one of our 
junior engineers came up with a new way for using a bracket”) does call into question 
the level of influence junior staff can exert.     
6. The overwhelming importance of costs to both clients and ST companies. 
Money (in the form of expenses, sales and/or profits) is the single identifiable factor 
which ultimately determines both whether a ST design project is undertaken and the 
final design of that ST. It determines whether or not a company will bid for a 
government tender, it sets boundaries to research projects, and it limits the design 
possibilities. No sector (commercial industry, government, or academia) is immune.  
A secondary factor which may influence how much a client is willing to spend is trust. 
Some responses indicated that if a relationship of trust already exists between the 
client and the ST developer then the client may be more amenable to altering their 
budgetary requirements. However from responses by senior staff, during a recession 
even a trusted relationship may have little sway over the amount of money a client is 
willing to spend.  
Tool Design: 
The results here were potentially the most informative of the three interview themes. 
The responses to questions on the structure of any future design tool were particularly 
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relevant given that the interviewees were the anticipated end-users of any future 
design tool.  
7. There was no awareness of, or experience using, tools for assisting the 
designers/developers of STs in mitigating negative social reactions to their 
products. 
The importance of this point is that future design tools cannot rely upon a presumed 
level of experience held by end-users acquired through using similar tools. An 
additional consequence is that the creation of any future design tool may have to 
begin from a blank page if there are not existing tools from which to draw experience.    
8. Any design tool should be intended for use upstream in the design process before 
any construction of a prototype/product begins. 
This was the unanimous view of all interviewees, and will influence the design of any 
future design tools. 
9. The time taken to: i) learn how to use a tool, and ii) to actually use it, should be 
minimised. In any event use-time should not exceed one day. 
Extended training courses were generally derided by the interviewees as a waste of 
time. However there was no consensus over the preferred design of any training (i.e., 
whether it was by trainers, online tutorials, a manual, etc.).  
What was agreed upon was that a design tool would be employed if the time taken to 
use it could be self-justified as a worthwhile expense of resources. To this end a period 
of one day was considered the most that would be spent on such a tool.  
10. There was no consensus over the format of any future design tool. 
The views here ran the gamut of purely paper-based, through to computer 
programmes and apps. 
11. A balance needs to be achieved between creating a tool intended for general 
application and one which is sufficiently bespoke to a specified technology.   
It was recognised that any design tool must have a certain level of general application 
otherwise a new tool would need to be created for each technology/design-project. 
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However, the view was also shared that there were benefits to tailoring a tool such 
that it focussed on specific STs. 
12. There was support for the concept of creating design tools to assist 
designers/developers of STs in mitigating negative social reactions to their 
products. 
This was good to see as it provides at least a level of external justification for the aims 
of this research project.  
 




4. Assessment Criteria Identified From Combining 
Stages 1 & 2 
 
As depicted in Figure 1.1 Macro-level structure for conducting the research project, 
Stage 1 of this thesis involved the analysis of a series of case-studies of controversial 
STs whilst Stage 2 involved interviews with engineers and scientists involved in the 
production of these technologies. Both stages are discussed in detail within chapters 2 
and 3 respectively.  
The results of these two Stages are of fundamental importance to this research 
project. By combining the information derived therein it is possible to develop 
assessment criteria by which to judge any methodological tool seeking to identify and 
mitigate negative social reactions to security technologies during their design process. 
This chapter sets out these assessment criteria for utilisation within Stage 3 of the 
project whereby existing tools/methods are assessed against them. The examination 
of existing tools/methods and their subsequent assessment against these criteria will 
be undertaken within Chapter 5 below.  
 
4.1 The Assessment Criteria 
By combining the results of the twelve case-studies into controversial security 
technologies and the results of interviews with the engineers and scientists engaged in 
the production of these technologies, a list of eleven criteria are produced below. Each 
one is accompanied by a short describing sentence and a brief discussion by way of 





One of the strongest messages to come out of the initial interviews was the unanimous 
opinion that any design tool should be applied as far upstream within the design 
1. For use before building commences: Any design tool should be intended for use 
before the physical act of constructing any prototype/initial-ST commences; in other 
words, at the stage when design requirements and design specifications are being 
identified and agreed upon.   
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process as possible. Certainly that it should be applied before any physical construction 
(or coding for digital products) of prototypes or products begins.  
While this view has been adopted as Criterion 1 here, there are challenges with this 
approach which need to be acknowledged. These challenges, and the counter-
arguments against them, are discussed below.  
Firstly Criterion 1 implies that the specifications of the ST will remain steady 
throughout the period of its design which may be a number of years, and this is not 
always the case. During the design period the technology will remain at the mercy of 
external factors and influences; including changes in - public opinion, the security 
threat, and the political landscape, amongst others. For example with the UK National 
Identify Card117 there was a significant drop in public support for this technology 
during the lifecycle of its construction; from a reported ‘79% for - 13% against’ around 
2002/3 (Home Office 2003) to ‘47% for - 51% against’ by 2006 (ICM 2006). And the UK 
National Identity Register was physically destroyed before national rollout following a 
change in government (Mathieson 2011).  
While this concern is valid it remains a fact that STs will always be susceptible to 
external forces during their design process. The real question therefore becomes 
whether it is more efficient to; (a) address all social concerns after the first version of 
the ST is developed, or (b) to address identified concerns both at the beginning of the 
design process and then reassess the final product against the prevailing social climate 
at the end? Given that it was the dominant view of those interviewed in Stage 2 that it 
is much easier to make changes to a design before work on a project has been 
undertaken, addressing as many social concerns as possible at the beginning of a 
design project appears the best strategy in that; (i) it does not prevent later social 
assessment and (ii) it will hopefully minimise the scale of any secondary assessment. 
Also given that the commonalities of controversy identified in Stage 1 represented 
causes of social concern that repeatedly arose across multiple STs, it would be illogical 
to ignore such concerns when the opportunity to address them for the minimal 
amount of effort presents itself at the beginning of a project.  
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 See Chapter 2.5 
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This last point (on the repeating nature of social controversies) also addresses a 
second concern with Criterion 1; namely whether it is feasible to identify potential 
sources of social unacceptability within the design of a particular ST before that 
technology is released into the public domain? The commonalities of controversy 
identified in Chapter 2 demonstrate that this is possible, though with two caveats: 
1. Newly arising and/or previously unidentified commonalities will not be consciously 
addressed; 
2. Unanticipated social reactions to STs are to be expected given you are introducing 
a (potentially complex) ST into an intrinsically complex and diverse system that is a 
society118. 
The consequence of this discussion being; while it may be optimal to attempt to 
minimise negative social responses to STs upstream in the design process (and hence 






While the interviews indicated the presence of feedback opportunities for staff within 
ST companies, the presence of strong hierarchical structures was also identified. Junior 
staff interviewed indicated that when work was assigned to them within a project their 
overriding objective was to complete that work as directed. This top-down authority 
structure was acknowledged by senior managers. Rather than complaining about this 
structure, those junior staff interviewed preferred being assigned work where the 
design specifications had already been set as it helped direct their work. 
                                                     
118
 One can visualise the complexity of society and its interaction with STs as an incredibly complicated 
engineering endeavour; one where accidents are to be expected. In his book Normal Accidents Perrow 
(1984) discusses complex systems where accidents are expected events given that the complexity of the 
system leads to complex interactions (i.e., unfamiliar, unexpected, or unplanned sequences of events) 
and tight coupling (i.e., the absence of a buffer or give between two items – what happens to one 
happens to the other). By extending this analogy to include the society in which the technology will 
operate, one can accept that negative societal responses to STs should be anticipated.  
2. Intended for senior-level use: Senior designers/developers should be involved in 
using any design tool, so as to make full use of their personal experience and 
authority to ensure any design decisions based on the tool are afforded sufficient 
weight by all those involved in the design process. 
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Additionally the task of deciding whether a tendered ST was feasible fell onto senior 
management within the commercial firms included in the interviews. These senior 
managers were engineers and scientists with considerable experience in developing 
STs and in directing teams and workflows.  
Given this existing structure and division of responsibilities it would be prudent to 
employ design tools at senior levels. This would allow the results of such to infuse the 





As discussed in Chapters 1.3 & 1.4, secrecy is often a defining characteristic of STs; be 
it secrecy to promote a commercial advantage or secrecy imposed by a government. 
This secrecy may be in relation to specific capabilities of a ST that the public are aware 
of (such as the detection rates of various substances by airport whole body-
scanners119) through to secrecy over the very existence of a ST (such as the US PRISM 
programme brought to light by Edward Snowden (Greenwald et al 2013).  
Public involvement or engagement during the initial design of these technologies was 
non-existent. Indeed for whole-body scanners in the UK, the Department for Transport 
(DfT) produced an Interim Code of Practice for their use in 2010 without public 
involvement (see DfT 2010c) and after many years of trials in UK airports. A public 
consultation was not held until after publication of this Interim Code when the DfT 
solicited information on a revised (non-interim) code. Notably this public consultation 
was only about the future operation of these scanners, not about their legitimacy or 
on-going presence in UK airports (DfT 2012b).  
Criterion 3 is recognition of the need to create design tools which operate within the 
existing paradigm governing the design of STs. It is not an affirmation of this paradigm, 
nor does it make claims as to the efficacy or legitimacy of the current systems. 
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 See Chapter 2.2 
3. Cannot involve external actors: Any design tool must be able to work under the 
condition that no public engagement/involvement whatsoever is allowed before or 






The purpose of any design tool must be to assist the designers themselves. At a 
fundamental level it is foreseeable this could be achieved through the identification of 
potential sources of social controversy within the proposed ST such that the designers 
can then consciously address them. To possibly add extra value it may prove useful if 
the design tool could also flag previously enacted technical solutions to the same or 
similar problems arising in previous STs. 
This task of producing design specifications is separate to that of governments or 
agencies in developing policies regarding the use of these STs. While of undoubted 
importance, such activities fall outside the scope of responsibilities that can reasonably 





Criterion 5 is similar to Criterion 4 in that they are both focussing on the output of any 
future design tool. While Criterion 4 focusses on the type/form of output produced, 
Criterion 5 focusses on what this output must achieve; namely the ‘adding of value’.  
Value here is a relative term as what is considered valuable will differ depending upon 
the views, motivations, and responsibilities of the individual beholder. The design 
company may value the profits derived from the sale of a ST. A law enforcement end-
user may value the way a ST enhances their ability to prevent or detect criminal 
activities. A false-positive citizen targeted incorrectly by a ST may value a society 
whereby the provision of security is not allowed to negate competing rights.  
Regardless, these different conceptualisations of value are not necessarily 
incompatible. A ST which is acceptable to the citizen will not become the target of 
social resistance, thus will be more likely to enjoy continued application. If it works 
4. Produces design specifications, not policies: The design tool must produce output 
that is usable by the designers. Most likely this will be design requirements and 
design specifications which will influence the STs they are about to produce. 
5. Output must add value: The output produced by the design tool must be such that 
it enhances the final products, thereby adding value to them. 
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then it can be endorsed and promoted by end-users. The result being the 
manufacturer of a socially acceptable STs enhances their opportunity to maximise their 




STs are designed in a variety of environments. The interviewees in Stage 2 included 
individuals working to develop STs within private companies, universities, 
governments, and as private contractors. As a result any design tool produced to assist 
these individuals should not be created with a single work-space in mind if it is to enjoy 
the widest possible application. Nor should any tool assume the existence of a 
standardised template for how the work within a particular organisation (or even a 
particular project) is divided and undertaken. Unless a tool is being created specifically 
for an organisation (or a particular project) then a level of flexibility and generic 





There was a complete absence of formalised social science training from the STEM 
educated interviewees in Stage 2. There was also a less-than-enthusiastic response by 
some of the interviewees to the possibility of taking social science focussed 
courses/subjects at university as part of their STEM degrees. On the assumption that 
this scenario is repeated within the wider ST-design workforce, it would appear 
counterproductive to require the end-users to change so as to make a design tool 
(supposedly created for their benefit) more usable. The preferred alternative is to 
create a design tool which requires no specialised skills or prior formal 
qualification/education on the part of the end-user. This criterion does not preclude 
6. Usable in any workplace: The tool must be usable regardless of the design 
environment or how this environment is organised. 
7. No prerequisite expertise required: The ability to effectively use this design tool 
should not be premised on the user possessing a particular qualification or formal 
social-science education/training beyond any training-course/instruction-manual 
which accompanies the tool itself. 
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specific training on the use of the tool itself in the form of a training course and/or an 




The interviewees in Stage 2 supported the concept of design tool to assist the 
developers of STs in anticipating and mitigating negative societal responses to their 
predations. However, they were also clear that there was a limit to the amount of time 
which could/should be assigned to the use of such tools. Few interviewees provided 
specific timeframes, but those that did ranged from a few hours to one day. Given 
these comments Criterion 8 seeks to ensure that any design tool strives to minimise 




Stage 1 of this research project identified 43 commonalities of controversy arising from 
previous STs. It would be wholly unrealistic to create a separate, bespoke design tool 
for each of these commonalities and expect the developers to actually use them at the 
start of every design project. As such Criterion 9 dictates that any design tool must be 




Similar to Criterion 9, given the incredible diversity of STs, any design tool created must 
be able to be applied to any ST as it would be near impossible to create a completely 
bespoke tool for every existing and potential technology. This would also impose 
additional training burdens on the developers. That being said, it was a view from 
some of the interviewees that the ability to modify a particular design tool so as to 
8. Minimal use-time required: The amount of time required to use any design tool 
must be made as short as possible. 
9. Addresses multiple, diverse controversies: Any tool must be able to address all of 
the commonalities of controversy identified within Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
10. Adaptable to all STs: Any tool must be applicable (and/or if necessary, adaptable) 
to any ST regardless of form or function. 
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ensure its relevance to the ST being developed would be a useful capability. The idea 
proposed was for the tool to comprise of a central core applicable to all technologies 
with additional modules which could be attached or removed so as to tailor the design 





The case study analysis in Stage 1 highlighted the contextual nature of many of the 
identified commonalities of controversy. This characteristic brings into question the 
effectiveness of designing a tool based solely on binary, definitive responses (such as 
yes/no, acceptable/unacceptable, etc.) when those responses are determined by the 
context within which a ST is designed and deployed.  
Such binary approaches may still be valuable and find a place within any design tool as 
there were certain commonalities which presented themselves as definitive choices120. 
However as these were the minority, Criterion 11 cautions against adopting this 
approach as the rule rather than the exception.  
  
                                                     
120
 See Chapter 2.14.1 (specifically point 5) above for examples of this. 
11. Not based exclusively on ‘yes’/’no’ answers: Given the complex contextual 
nature of the identified commonalities of controversy, a tool based exclusively on 
binary ‘yes’/’no’ responses will be inappropriate. 
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5. Stage 3 – Literature Review of Existing 
Tools/Methodologies 
 
Stage 3 of this project involves assessing existing candidate models, approaches, 
and/or assessment tools with two goals in mind. The first goal is to determine if (based 
on both the steps involved in carrying them out and the nature of output produced) 
any of these candidates can sufficiently meet the eleven criteria as set out in Chapter 
4.1 above without further modification? If they do then such candidates could operate 
as off-the-shelf design tools for assisting the developers of STs in identifying and 
mitigating sources of social resistance within the upstream design of these 
technologies. If no candidate can achieve this end-result then the second goal is to 
identify what (if any) value could be extracted from these candidates for incorporation 
into new design tools capable of meeting the criteria from 4.1 above.  
The methodology employed to achieve these goals is expanded upon below in Chapter 
5.1 with the results presented in Chapter 5.2. This is followed by a discussion 
addressing the implications of these results for the future direction of this research 
project in Chapter 5.3.  
 
5.1 Methodology 
Meeting the two goals outlined in Chapter 5 above requires an assessment of existing 
candidate models, approaches, and assessment tools based on the assessment criteria 
produced in Chapter 4.1. The information pertaining to each candidate which needs to 
be extracted is primarily the steps-for-use and the nature of the output. This data is to 
be collected through the use of multiple case studies. A general discussion of this 
methodology has already been undertaken in Chapter 2.1 above.  
The scope of the case studies to be conducted and the time required to complete 
them are both shorter than for those in Chapter 2.1, in that the particular 
phenomenon’s of interest (i.e., steps-for-use and nature of the output) are usually 
more settled and thus easier to extract. Again as per Chapter 2.1 the data sources are 
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documentation based; including journal articles, books, and instruction documents 
related to the use of these candidates. 
An alternative methodology for obtaining this information would be interviews with 
end-users of these candidates. I have rejected this approach as the primary sources are 
both available and inherently stable, which are important characteristics given that I 
am interested in ‘typical versions’ of these candidates. There is always the probability 
interviews with end-users will elicit information on how different end-users modify 
these candidates to suit their various needs, and by not conducting interviews I will be 
excluding such information. However, this level of detailed information is not required 
to complete the aims of Stage 3 and hence is not undertaken herein.  
 
5.1.1 Method 
There were three steps involved in conducting the research within this Chapter. These 
are described below.  
Step 1. Decide on candidate tools/methodologies: Any existing decision-making or 
assessment tool/methodology/model is a potential candidate as a design tool for 
meeting the aim of assisting the designers of STs. While this freedom opens the door 
to a range of diverse options regarding the shape of any future design tool, from the 
practical perspective of conducting this research project it creates a massive challenge. 
Given the existing constraints of time, word-length, and available resources, it is 
impossible to conduct a bespoke case-study for every individual candidate within this 
dissertation. To address this problem while still maximising the number of potential 
candidates included, three actions have been adopted herein: 
i. To combine related models/methodologies possessing largely generic traits into 
single case-studies wherever possible and appropriate - For example the single 
case-study Checklists (see Chapter 5.2.1) provides a generic series of steps 
fundamental to any checklist-centric model. 
ii. To wherever possible include tools which have been designed with STs in mind as 
potential targets for use – For example, Bruce Schneier’s five-step process for 
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analysing and evaluating security systems, technologies, and practices (see 
Chapter 5.2.6) 
iii. To triage – Two of the essential elements governing how tools are designed within 
this research project are that; (a) these tools must produce useful information for 
the designers of STs, and (b) these tools must be able to operate in an 
environment of secrecy (i.e., without requiring the engagement of external 
actors). As such certain classes of existing assessment models were excluded from 
consideration, which included those that provide policy-focussed information and 
guidance, and those where public-engagement was a central or essential 
component121.  
I readily admit these approaches may both exclude some viable candidates from 
consideration and necessarily gloss over some of the granular differences between 
individual models when collated. Nevertheless I see them as necessary and suitable 
compromises allowing for the incorporation of as many candidates as possible within 
the practical constraints of this research project.  
Step 2. Conduct focussed case-studies to identify the steps involved and outputs 
produced from the candidates identified in Step 1: Short case-studies were then 
carried out on the (categories of) candidates identified in Step 1. These are presented 
in Chapter 5.2 below. The specific focus of these case-studies is to identify both the 
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 As a direct result of this action a number of prominent models have been excluded from this analysis. 
These include the following non-comprehensive selection of examples. Social Impact Assessments (SIA); 
defined as “the process of identifying the future consequences of a current or proposed action which are 
related to individuals, organisations and social macro-systems” (Becker 1997, p.2). Underpinned by 
extensive public involvement (Becker 1997) SIA has been viewed separately as either a process which 
facilitates interest-group negotiations or as a means of assisting political decision makers (Barrow 1997). 
Also omitted are the various forms of Technology Assessment (TA); “a scientific, interactive and 
communicative process which aims to contribute to the formation of public and political opinion on 
societal aspects of science and technology” (Butschi et al 2004, p.14). The purpose of TA is to assist 
policy makers by offering knowledge and advice to those struggling with the decisions that will shape 
the technology in question (Butschi et al 2004). By association this omission also covers participatory 
Technology Assessment (pTA); “the class of methods and procedures of assessing socio-technological 
issues that actively involve various kinds of social actors as assessors and discussants” (Joss and Bellucci 
2002). As well as Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA); a core idea of which is that developers of 
technologies should enter into discussions with a diverse range of concerned parties and actors during 
the design process of a new technology, thus contributing to its future successful development (Schot 
and Rip 1996).  
In an attempt to counteract the effects of shutting off the public from the ST design process, my design 




steps involved in undertaking the particular methodology/model, as well as the nature 
of the resulting output. Given this narrow focus, these case-studies are not (and are 
not intended to be) comprehensive accounts of the candidates. Topics including the 
history and motivation behind their design are not included, and neither are critiques 
of their respective strengths and weaknesses based on previous use. 
Step 3. Compare the results of Step 2 against the eleven assessment criteria 
identified in Chapter 4: The results of Step 2 are then examined against the 
assessment criteria produced in Chapter 4.  
 
5.2 Results 
Table 5.1 below lists the case-studies of models and methodologies examined within 
Chapters 5.2.1 through 5.2.6. The results of this process were then employed in 
Appendix J to assess the likelihood that these candidates could be utilised as design 
tools within the remit of this research project with minimal or no modification. 
Table 5.1  List of models and methodologies for assessment  
      Candidates 
Ch. 5.2.1 Checklists 
Ch. 5.2.2 Impact Assessments 
 privacy impact assessments 
 surveillance impact assessments 
 ethical impact assessment framework for information 
technologies 
 anticipatory technology ethics 
Ch. 5.2.3 Frameworks 
 basic frameworks 
o Friedman’s framework for the governance of 
information security 
o Da Veiga and Eloff’s framework for the governance of 
information security 
 applied frameworks 




Ch. 5.2.4 Design-Focussed Approaches 
 value sensitive design 
 privacy by design 
Ch. 5.2.5 Quantitative Assessments 
 cost-benefit analysis 
 multi-criteria decision making 
Ch. 5.2.6 Miscellaneous Tests with a ST Focus 
 Bruce Schneier’s five-step process 
 ACLU’s necessary and defensible test 
 
5.2.1 Checklists 
Without meaning to overstate the obvious, at its most fundamental level a checklist is 
a formalised series of questions/activities that the end-user is required to 
undertake/assess before making the requisite ‘mark’ indicating the answer to the 
question and/or the completion of the activity. It is easy to disregard checklists as 
being little more than simple box-ticking exercises however they have been extensively 
and successfully used in many fields, including aviation (to prevent incidents during 
take-off, flight, and landing), medicine (to improve surgery safety, reduce infections, 
assist in diagnosing, etc.), as well as engineering, policing and legal practice (Gawande 
2011; WHO 2008; Thomassen et al 2010). According to Gawande they can provide 
protection against both “the fallibility of human memory and attention, especially 
when it comes to mundane, routine matters that are easily overlooked under the strain 
of more pressing events”, and people “lull[ing] themselves into skipping steps even 
when they remember them” (2011 p:36). They also allow for the minimisation of errors 
within incredibly complex engineering endeavours; such as the construction of high-
rise buildings involving the coordinated efforts of multiple specialist professions.  
Steps involved 
1. Create a checklist from scratch, acquire a pre-designed checklist, or modify an 
existing checklist so it is bespoke to your needs/organisational-structure/etc.  
2. Work through all of the questions/statements/activities comprising the checklist in 





The output of a checklist is often a binary yes/no response to whatever the question 
asked, though may include other information (for example, current flight speed and 
heading, or the number of forceps accounted for at the beginning and end of an 
operation).  
 
5.2.2 Impact assessments 
Based on the focus of this research project, impact assessments (IA) provide a means 
by which to assess a proposed technology or programme by focussing on a specified 
element of its impact upon a specified population (for example the privacy impact of a 
particular design of whole-body scanner on the total population of airline passengers 
and/or specific sub-sets of this population - such as women, ethnic minorities, 
different religious groups, children, etc.). The various forms of impact assessment (IA) 
incorporated here include surveillance, privacy, and ethical.  
Surveillance IA which is a very recent concept is essentially based on the privacy IA 
model122, hence it is easy to produce a combined summary of these two forms of 
assessment and their output. Ethical IA’s however, are more diverse in their 
construction, hence two different models are outlined below:  
1. Ethical impact assessment framework of information technologies 
2. Anticipatory technology ethics 
While the ethical impact assessment framework is accompanied by a fairly clear series 
of steps for using this framework, anticipatory technology ethics is somewhat vaguer in 
its description of use. However, it is still possible to discern a prescribed methodology. 
(privacy impact assessments; surveillance impact assessments) 
Steps involved 
The following set of steps represents those required for completing an IA; either 
privacy or surveillance (see Wright and Wadhwa 2012; Wright and Raab 2012, p.615): 
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 It differs by looking beyond just privacy-impact by also examining social, financial, political, legal, 
ethical and psychological issues. It also requires consultations with a wider range of stakeholders 
(Wright and Raab 2012). 
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1. Determine whether an IA is necessary  
2. Identify the IA team, setting its terms of reference, resources and time frame 
3. Prepare an IA plan 
4. Determine the budget 
5. Describe the proposed project to be assessed 
6. Identify stakeholders 
7. Analyse the information flows and other impacts 
8. Consult with stakeholders 
9. Determine whether the project complies with legislation 
10. Identify risks and possible solutions 
11. Formulate recommendations 
12. Prepare and publish the report 
13. Implement the recommendations 
14. Ensure a third-party review and/or audit of the IA 
15. Update the IA if there are changes in the project 
16. Embed privacy awareness throughout the organisation and ensure accountability 
Output 
As per Step 12, the physical output of an impact assessment is a report on the object, 
project, service or programme under consideration. However, from Wright and 
Wadhwa (2012) it can be inferred that the true value of an IA lies in the process of 
undertaking the impact assessment and the knowledge gathered as a result; with the 
report assisting in documenting this process. Output could therefore also be taken to 
include any resulting remedial actions or the mitigation of issues resulting from this 
process.  
(ethical impact assessment framework for information technologies) 
Developed by David Wight123 this model begins with a framework structured around 
five major ethical principles pertaining to the design and operation of information 
technologies, namely; respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, justice, 
and privacy and data protection. Each of these principles is further broken down into a 
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number of values and/or issues124. For each of these value/issues (and for the majority 
of the principles) questions have been posited to draw out possible sources of 
unethical design within the information technology to which it is being applied. This 
process is intended to occur as follows (Wright 2011): 
Steps involved 
1. Based on the framework of principle, values, and issues, direct the accompanying 
questions to the technology developers and/or policy-makers “to facilitate a 
consideration of the ethical issues which may arise in their undertaking” (p.204).  
2. Use these principles, values, and issues to engage with, and generate debate 
amongst, stakeholders. Tools which may facilitate this process include; 
consultations and surveys, expert workshops, checklists of questions, an ethical 
matrix, ethical Delphi, consensus conferences, and citizen panels.  
3. To complement and assist in the answering of the questions posed in Step 1 
(beyond engaging and consulting with stakeholders as per Step 2), a number of 
additional practices and procedures have been highlighted. These include; use of 
risk assessments, determining accountability within a project third-party reviews 
and audits, and providing information and responding to complaints.   
Output  
The adequate examination of ethical issues arising within new technologies, services, 
projects, policies or programmes by stakeholders to allow for necessary mitigating 
measures to be undertaken before deployment (Wright 2011).  
(anticipatory technology ethics) 
Developed by Philip Brey, anticipatory technology ethics (ATE) “distinguishes three 
levels of ethical analysis: the technology, artefact and application level” (2011, p.18), 
which each involve different processes of analysis. At the technology level, morally 
relevant features of both the wider technology and its subclasses are studied. The 
artefact level refers to specific black-boxes created from these wider technologies; for 
example x-ray body scanners are artefacts of nuclear technology. The application level 
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refers to how an artefact is used and the contexts within which it is used (Brey 2011). 
Steps involved  
The series of discernible steps for conducting ATE divides this process into three 
stages; forecasting stage, identification (ethical analysis) stage, and evaluation stage.    
1. (forecasting) Engineers provide ethicists with an understanding of the future 
developments of the technology at the technology level as described above. 
2. (forecasting) For both the artefact and application levels forecasting and 
technology assessment (TA) models/tools should be utilised to provide ethicists 
within information on the likely future emergence of artefacts and applications. 
3. (forecasting) Additionally for both artefacts and applications expert-surveys and 
round-tables should be conducted incorporating a range of actors, including; 
engineers, technology forecasters, TA experts, historians and sociologists of 
technology, and marketing experts.  
4. (identification) According to Brey “[a]t this stage, descriptions of the technology 
[as acquired in the forecasting stage] are cross-referenced with ethical values and 
principles” (2011, p.23). This is achieved by employing an ethical checklist125. The 
technology is applied to the values and principles contained within to determine 
how it frustrates and/or enables these values within real-word conditions. 
5. (identification) Survey technology ethics literature to identify additional ethical 
issues not contained within the ethical checklist and use bottom-up ethical 
analysis to evaluate the artefacts and applications against these. 
6. (evaluation) The importance of the identified ethical issues is assessed to 
determine how likely they will become significant societal issues, and how they 
may conflict with other rights/values126.     
Output 
Results of the evaluation stage can be used to guide how a technology is developed. 
Moral responsibilities can be assigned to relevant actors in relation to the artefact and 
application levels so as to ensure ethical outcomes. Recommendations can be 
produced for policy-makers (Brey 2011).  
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While the term framework has taken on numerous meanings within different contexts, 
the conceptualisation being applied here is that of: a supporting or underlying 
conceptual structure of interlinked items intended to act as a support or guide for: 
1. the achieving of a specific objective  
2. planning or deciding something 
and/or 
3. the creation of something that expands this structure into something 
practical.127 
There are three fundamental points arising out of this conceptualisation. The first is 
that frameworks can (and do) take on many different shapes and forms; there is not a 
single ‘correct’ construction. Secondly, given the versatility of frameworks (useful for 
many tasks and not restricted to a single discipline) there is a plethora of examples in 
the marketplace and academic texts.  
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, is that while a framework can help guide the 
end-user as they seek to address a problem, it will not by itself simply provide them 
the solution they seek. The end-user will still need to undertake other tasks to achieve 
their objective. The framework may inform the end-user as to what information must 
be considered or tasks undertaken when making their decision, but it will not prima 
facie provide them either the information itself or the answer being sought. It provides 
them with the basic skeleton onto which other methodological elements may be 
superimposed to create a dynamic tool or model, without determining for the end-
user what these other elements should be.   
To expand these points, I have included three examples of frameworks with possible 
application to security technologies. The first two, under the heading basic 
frameworks, represent diverse examples of skeletal frameworks which have not been 
built upon. They provide a visual representation of information to be considered by the 
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 This multi-faceted definition represents the compilation of a variety of different dictionary sources, 
including; Oxford, Cambridge, www.businessdictionary.com, and whatis.techtarget.com. 
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end-user but no guidance of how they should make use of this information. As such 
there are no Steps involved or Output subsections included here.  
This is followed by the Dual-use Decision Framework for Technology Governance, an 
example of what I have termed an expanded framework; referring to a framework 
which has undergone expansion to incorporate additional processes. There extra 
processes allow for the addition of meaningful Steps involved and Output subsections.  
(Basic frameworks) 
Figure 5.1 is a framework for the governance of information security whose aim is to 
integrate information security into the corporate governance structure of an 
organisation (Posthumus and Solms 2004).  
Figure 5.1  Framework for the governance of information security 
 
While this framework contains information as to actors, artefacts, and activities, as 
well as incorporating the use of arrows to imply dynamic interactions between entities, 
it is not intuitive how this framework is to be applied.  
Figure 5.2 also represents a framework for the governance of information security; one 
that encompasses technology, processes and people. It is intended to be utilised to 
cultivate an information security culture within an organisation so as to minimise risks 
to information assets (Da Veiga and Eloff 2007).  
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Figure 5.2  Information security governance framework  
 
The presentation of this framework is possibly more intuitive to risk managers within 
an organisation than the previous example for, according to Da Veiga and Eloff (2007), 
it is based upon a number of established information security frameworks, including 
ISO 17799, ISO 27001, and PROTECT. Nevertheless the creators have not provided 
instructions for how their own governance framework should be utilised by end-users. 
The approach adopted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (of presenting just the bare framework 
with no accompanying information on methods of utilisation) can be contrasted 
against the following example. 
(Expanded frameworks : Dual-use decision framework for technology governance128) 
This model is a “decision framework that policy makers can use to assess the risk that 
individual emerging technologies will be misused for hostile purposes, and to develop 
tailored governance strategies” (Tucker 2012, p.67). There are three interconnected 
processes comprising this decision framework; those being: (i) technology monitoring 
for detecting candidate emerging dual-use innovations; (ii) technology assessment to 
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determine the likelihood of misuse and the potential for bespoke regulation; and (iii) 
governance measures.  
Steps involved 
The steps involved in using this decision framework are as follows:  
1. Monitor technological developments to identify emerging technologies in the 
biological and chemical fields with the potential for misuse. 
2. Assess their risk of misuse using four parameters of; accessibility, ease of misuse, 
magnitude of potential harm, and international diffusion. 
3. If aggregate misuse risk from Step 2 is adjudged low: no urgent governance 
needed, just maintain monitoring. 
4. If aggregate misuse risk is medium to high: assess governability of the technology 
using five parameters of; embodiment, maturity, convergence, rate of advance, 
and international diffusion. 
5. If aggregate governability of the technology from Step 4 is adjudged low: focus on 
informal governance measures. 
6. If aggregate governability is medium: consider also adding soft-law governance 
measures. 
7. If aggregate governability is high: consider all measures (informal, soft law, and 
hard law) 
8. If risk of misuse appears exceptionally grave and imminent: consider governance 
measures beyond those normally adopted under this framework 
9. Use a cost-benefit analysis to produce a package of governance measures for 
reducing misuse of the technology for an acceptable cost, and in a manner 
acceptable to all major stakeholders.  
Output 
The Dual-Use Framework identifies and prioritises those emerging dual-use 
technologies which are likely to warrant governance measures, as well as guiding on 




5.2.4 Design-focussed approaches 
These are approaches aimed at influencing the development of a technology by 
incorporating certain values into the research and design processes. This approach of 
incorporating societal values during the design-stage is as much an ethos for the 
construction of technological artefacts as it is a range of practical models. As such it is 
not always possible to reduce these approaches down to a series of basic steps. While 
this has been achieved below for one model (value sensitive design), it was not 
possible for the second approach examined (privacy by design). As such for privacy by 
design in place of Steps involved I have included its seven foundational principles. 
These constitute a universal reference framework that may be developed into detailed 
criteria for application (Cavoukian 2011a). 
(value sensitive design) 
Emerging in the mid-1990s, value sensitive design is a principled approach to the 
design of a technology what seeks to comprehensively account for human values 
throughout the design process. It comprises a tripartite methodology incorporating 
investigations of a conceptual, empirical, and technical nature (Friedman 2004; 
Friedman et al 2008). A basic set of processes is as follows: 
Steps involved129 
1. (conceptual) Begin by identifying the core aspect(s)130 central to the current 
project. Use this/these as the starting point to draw out the others.  
2. (conceptual) Systematically identify the key direct and indirect stakeholders (i.e., 
respectively those who interact directly with the technology or its output, and 
those impacted by the system).  
3. (conceptual) Systematically identify the harms and benefits for each group 
identified in Step 2.  
4. (conceptual) Based on the harms and benefits for the stakeholders as identified in 
Steps 2 & 3, now identify the corresponding key values which are engaged. 
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5. (conceptual) Conduct a conceptual investigation for each identified key value to 
accurately define those values as they appear within the project. 
6. (conceptual) Examine potential conflicts for the key values (e.g. privacy versus 
security, etc.). 
7. (empirical) Interview stakeholders to elicit information about the values.  
8. (technical) Based on the identified values and value-conflicts, make explicit 
possible design trade-offs and their effects.  
Output 
The output here includes; the knowledge gained during the entire process which will 
be valuable to the organisation undertaking it, and the identification of different 
design options and (hopefully) will translate into a more value-sensitive product.   
(privacy by design) 
Developed and driven by Ann Cavoukian131 during the 1990s, the philosophy of privacy 
by design evolved from efforts to incorporate fair information principles directly into 
the design, operation, and management of information communication technologies. 
The results of which became known as privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) 
(Cavoukian 2009b; Cavoukian 2013). As discussed above, as privacy by design is 
foremost a concept rather than a prescriptive model, I have included here the seven 
foundational principles upon which it resides which themselves can be used as a 
framework to create applicable tools. 
7 Foundational Principles132 
1. Proactive not reactive; Preventative not remedial: the aim is to prevent privacy 
infractions occurring rather than waiting for privacy risks to materialise.  
2. Privacy as the Default Setting: Personal data should be automatically protected 
within any IT system or organisation by default. 
3. Privacy Embedded into Design: Privacy is built into the original design as an 
essential core component and not bolted on afterwards. 
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206 
 
4. Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum: Privacy by Design seeks to 
accommodate all legitimate interests and objectives rather than promoting false 
dichotomies (e.g. privacy versus security is rejected in favour of privacy and 
security). 
5. End-to-End Security – Full Lifecycle Protection: Because Privacy by Design is built-in 
from the beginning, personal data is protected to ensure privacy from the moment 
it is collected until deletion.  
6. Visibility and Transparency – Keep it Open: All stakeholders (including users and 
providers) should be able to determine that all privacy promises/objectives are 
being met by the relevant business-practice/technology. 
7. Respect for User Privacy – Keep it User-Centric: The interests of individuals should 
be prioritised through privacy defaults, notices, and user-friendly options.  
Output 
According to Cavoukian (2013) there is an emphasis on practical results within privacy 
by design. This includes such goals as; enhanced accountability and trust in relation to 
technologies and organisations, transparent data processing, enhanced accountability, 
preventing unauthorised access to and/or processing of data, etc.  
 
5.2.5 Quantitative assessments 
By quantitative assessments I am referring to those methodologies where the intrinsic 
processes involve the assignment of numerical values, and resulting numerical outputs 
are used to either influence or determine any subsequent decision-making. Two 
possible candidates are outlined below, these being; cost-benefit analysis and multi-
value decision making.  
(cost-benefit analysis) 
A cost-benefit analysis is a methodology for decision-making based on whether the 
benefits of an action outweigh its costs. It can be utilised to answer questions such as; 
when faced with a number of options (A, B, C, etc.) which of these should be selected 
based on the respective costs of each? (Quah and Toh 2012; Mishan 1976). While 
there are many different mathematical methods of varying complexity that can be 
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employed when conducting a cost-benefit analysis, essentially the entire process 
reduces down to the following three steps. 
Steps involved133 
1. Decide which items are relevant to include (and exclude) on both the cost and 
benefit sides of any analysis. 
2. Compute the values of the items included in Step 1. 
3. Compare the cost and benefit values thereby providing informed advice to assist 
the decision-maker. 
Output 
The outputs are the numerical values produced within the cost-benefit analysis. 
However just like any other form of evidence, it remains the prerogative of the 
decision-maker as to the weight they choose to assign this output when exercising 
their duty to arrive at any final decision. This seemingly objective process is 
complicated by the fact that the things the decision-maker values (and how much they 
value them) may be different from what others groups within the same society value.  
(multi-criteria decision making) 
Multi-criteria Decision Making (MCDM) refers to the process of deciding on the 
optimal decision out of a set of alternatives in an environment of multiple, often 
conflicting, criteria. It is often used to model practical problems such as the purchase 
of a house or choosing a suitable office-space.  
There exist a number of different MCDM processes. The one outlined below has its 
basis in those proposed by Roy (1990) and Balton and Stewart (2002).  
Steps Involved134 
1. Problem structuring: develop a thorough understanding of the problem and define 
the objectives. 
2. Identification of potential alternatives: identify alternatives based on combinations 
of independent choices. 
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 These steps were produced with assistance from Dr Sonia Toubaline, and are based on an 
unpublished work by her.  
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3. Construction of a family of criteria: this is the criteria used for basing your decision 
on. It can be a time consuming process and may require complicated calculations, 
surveys, expert advice, etc.  
4. Selection of the problematic: ‘problematic’ refers to methods used to present the 
alternatives – for example; rank ordering the alternatives, sorting them based on 
predefined categories (i.e., accepted, rejected), etc.  
5. Evaluation of the alternatives and problem parameters: evaluate each alternative 
against each criterion. 
6. Multi-criteria analysis: aggregate the selected criteria to produce the optimal 
solution. 
Output 
The outputs are the values produced by the MCDM approach and the subsequent 
ranking of alternatives. However, just like any other form of decision-making it 
remains the responsibility of the person(s) tasked with making the decision whether 
or not to apply the MCDM output.  
 
5.2.6 Miscellaneous tests with a ST focus 
(Bruce Schneier’s five-step process) 
Steps involved 
Security expert Bruce Schneier has devised a five-step process for “analyz[ing] and 
evaluat[ing] security systems, technologies, and practices” (2006, p.14). At a bare 
minimum this process requires contextual analysis of the proposed ST (including how, 
where, and why it will be used), risk analyses, and cost-benefit analyses. Step 2 may 
require the engagement of security experts and/or those possessing specific 
information on possible attacks. Additionally, while not specifically stated, public 
engagement may be needed to successfully address Step 5 and possibly Steps 4 and 1. 
1. Determine what the assets are you are trying to protect. Answering this question 
requires developing an understanding of the scope of the problem faced. 
209 
 
2. Determine what the risks are to these assets. Questions to be answered here 
include; what exactly is to be defended?, from who?, how and why will it be 
attacked?, and what are the consequences of a successful attack? 
3. Determine how well the security solution mitigates the risks identified in Step 2. 
This is to ensure that the security solution actually solves the security problem. To 
achieve this determination requires an examination of how the security solution 
interacts with its environment (both its successes and its failures).  
4. Determine what other risks the security solution causes. All security solutions may 
result in unintended consequences in the form of new security problems. The goal 
is to ensure that these new problems are smaller than the old ones. 
5. Determine what costs and trade-offs are imposed by the security solution. All 
security systems impose costs and require trade-offs; be it money, resources, 
time, convenience, freedoms, etc. It is essential to understand these trade-offs. 
Output 
According to Schneier (2006 p.15): 
These five steps don’t lead to an answer, but rather provide the mechanism to 
evaluate a proposed answer. They lead to another question: Is the security 
solution worth it? In other words, is the benefit of mitigating the risks (Step 3) 
worth the additional risks (Step 4) plus the other trade-offs (Step 5)? It is not 
enough for a security measure to be effective … we need to do the things that 
make the most sense, that are the most effective use of our security dollar. 
(ACLU’s necessary and defensible test) 
Created in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent clamour for new security measures 
and powers, this analytical tool was devised by the American Civil Liberties Union to 
test whether a specified privacy-infringing anti-terrorism measure is capable of 
achieving its stated purpose (Roy 2005). It requires the following three questions be 
addressed but without providing prescriptive guidance on how best to achieve this.  
Steps involved135  
1. Does the government already possess the resources to combat the problem that 
the new proposal is meant to address? 
                                                     
135
 See Roy (2005 pp.51-52). 
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2. Is the proposal narrowly tailored so as to limit the adverse impact on civil 
liberties? 
3. Does the proposal genuinely combat terrorism, or does it represent a wider 
legislative change unrelated to September 11?  
Output 
Ideally the output would be in the form of an answer to the question; will a proposed 
security measure achieve its stated purpose? This is presented as the logical and 
mandatory prerequisite requirement for any proposed anti-terrorism measure (Roy 
2005).    
 
5.2.7 Comparison against assessment criteria 
The case-studies undertaken in Chapter 5.2 on the methods and outputs from existing 
models and methodologies are compared against the eleven assessment criteria 
outlined in Chapter 4. The results of this comparison are presented in Appendix J 
through a series of tables, each representing a single model/methodology. In the 
following section (Chapter 5.3) the overall implications of this evaluation process for 
the future direction of this research project are discussed.   
 
5.3 Discussion of results 
By compiling the information obtained through the comparisons of the different 
candidate models/approaches against the eleven assessment criteria, as presented in 
Appendix J, the following conclusions are drawn.  
a) None of the candidates can be classified as perfect off-the-shelf design tools for 
assisting the developers of STs in identifying and mitigating social resistance 
upstream in the design process while operating under an environment of secrecy. 
When compared against the assessment criteria outlined in Chapter 4.1 all of the 
candidates experience difficulty meeting at least one of these criteria.  
b) As a caveat to (a) above, while all of the candidates would need some modification 
to meet the previously identified assessment criteria, the changes required vary 
211 
 
enormously between the different candidates. This ranges from minor 
adjustments (see the Ethical Impact Assessment Framework for Information 
Technologies) through to the complete reconstruction of a method (see Privacy 
and Surveillance Impact Assessments).  
c) There is value to be drawn from many of the candidates. Even if a particular 
candidate proves inappropriate, often elements of it can be adopted within a 
completely new design tool.  
Based on these conclusions, in Table 5.14 below the candidates are categorised 
according to their ability to add value to future design tools. 
Table 5.2  Potential of candidates to add value to future design tools 
Could act as the foundational basis for a future model 
Expanded Frameworks Could be designed from scratch to operate 
as a future design tool. 
Ethical Impact Assessment Framework for 
Information Technologies 
This combination of a framework with 
associated questions could be modified and 
expanded to encompass all commonalities 
and STs. 
Can provide elements for (or operate as an element for incorporation into) a 
future model 
Checklists   
 
Can operate as an element of a broader 
model. 
Anticipatory Technology Ethics Provides ethical checklists, and expands the 
role of engineers within the design process. 
Basic Frameworks  Can provide the skeleton upon which to 
develop a comprehensive model 
Value Sensitive Design The weighing of harms and benefits and the 
identification of key values. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Can operate as an element of a broader 
model. 
Multi-Criteria Decision Making Can operate as an element of a broader 
model. 
Not suitable for use within this project 
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Privacy & Surveillance Impact Assessments  
Privacy By Design  
Bruce Schneier’s Five-Step Process  
ACLU’s Necessary and Defensible Test 
 
From this analysis Expanded Frameworks (of which the Ethical Impact Assessment 
Framework for Information Technologies constitutes an example) appears to be the 
most viable identified candidate for forming the basis of a design tool that could meet 
the aims of this research project. It is worth reiterating here that this conclusion, and 
the concomitant rejection of the other candidates, is based purely on the capacity of 
these candidates to meet the assessment criteria produced in Chapter 4; assessment 
criteria formed from combining the interviews of STEM practitioners engaged in 
designing STs with the case-study analysis of previous controversial security 
technologies. No other conclusions or assumptions should be drawn from this 
rejection. These models/approaches are immensely valuable tools, they are simply 
inappropriate for meeting the designated requirements of this research project within 
the relatively narrow field that is the design and development STs in the environmental 
constraints that currently exist. 
 
5.3.1 Implications for the research project 
The implications of these results for the direction of this research project were: 
a) The identified need to create new bespoke design tools for assisting the 
developers of STs in identifying and mitigating sources of possible social resistance 
within their technologies upstream in the design process.  
b) That these tools should be based on an extended framework model. 
While these implications have provided the future direction for this research project 
(i.e. the need to create new design tools based around expanded frameworks) they do 
not provided guidance as to how such an undertaking should be completed; i.e., they 
tell us what to build but not how to build it. This problem is addressed at the start of 
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Chapter 6 which begins by providing rules for the construction of future design 




                                                     
136
 See Chapter 6.1. 
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6. Stage 4 – Creation of Bespoke Tools 
 
By this stage in the research project, forty-three commonalities had been identified 
from the analysis of the case studies into controversial security technologies. These 
were subsequently categorised into seven designated categories (see Chapter 2.2). 
Next it was concluded that while these was much value to be found within existing 
technology assessment tools, none were appropriate ‘off-the-shelf’ vehicles for 
simultaneously addressing all of these commonalities. Especially when designing a 
security technology within the specific secrecy constraints which dominate this 
industry. As a result of this limitation it became necessary to create new tools to meet 
the goal of assisting the designers of security technologies in anticipating and 
mitigating possible negative social reactions to their future products upstream in their 
design processes.  
Design rules governing the creation of these new tools, gleaned from the work 
undertaken in the prior chapters, are detailed in Chapter 6.1 below. These rules are 
then applied to create two design tools based on the design requirements outlined in 
Chapter 4 and in compliance with the rules outlined in Chapter 6.1. These are: 
1. Framework of Common Controversies within Security Technologies 
2. Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies 
Both of these are presented in Chapter 6.2 below. This chapter details why they have 
taken on the forms they have, as well as an explanation of how I envision these tools 
being used. 
 
6.1 Rules governing the design of the bespoke tools 
The multi-criteria conundrum faced when producing design tools within this project is 
to find a way to creating tools which can simultaneously address all of the forty-three 
identified commonalities of controversy while at the same time being applicable to all 
security technologies. To assist in overcoming this challenge (and taking account of 
both the results of the individual case studies in Chapter 2 and the responses of the 
developers of security technologies in Chapter 3) there are five identifiable and 
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essential design rules which can be used to dictate the form of any relevant tool 
produced within this project. I believe any tool must achieve all of these five rules if it 
is to stand a meaningful chance of adding value to the design process of security 
technologies, regardless of the technology or the nature of the social controversy it 
may evoke. 
Five Essential Design Rules 
1. Any tool should be applicable to all security technologies as they are defined within 
this project137. While at first glance it is tempting to limit the scope of any tool to 
some arbitrary subset of security technologies (for example; digital, biometric, 
aviation, weapons, autonomous, surveillance, CCTV, etc.) I have rejected this 
approach for two reasons. Firstly the identification of forty-three commonalities of 
controversy which had common application across a range of ostensibly disparate 
technologies gave weight to the argument that tools should be developed based 
on the central underlying purpose of security technologies (i.e., the provision of 
security as conceptualised within the definition of security technologies) as 
opposed to subsets of these technologies based on physical form or intended 
uses. Secondly, the melding together of different security technologies within the 
same platform and/or the encouragement of function creep within both the 
design and the operation of security technologies undermines attempts to black-
box these technologies by form or capability. This in turn undermines any 
attempts to create tools bespoke to a particular technology type.    
2. Any tool must be able to simultaneously address all forty-three commonalities 
identified within Chapter 2. As stated throughout, the goal of this project is to 
create tools for assisting the designers and developers of security technologies in 
anticipating, and thereby avoiding, potential design choices which are more likely 
to lead to social resistance upstream in the design process. To achieve this goal 
these tools must be able to address all of the identified commonalities for the 
following individual and grouped arguments. Firstly, having identified forty-three 
commonalities it would be both unrealistic and counterproductive to create 
                                                     
137
 This being; the product of an engineering endeavour which seeks to deter, prevent or detect crimes, 
and/or enhance the security of individuals, their property, or the state (including its infrastructure). This 
may include potentially lethal technologies, but does not include technologies restricted to military use. 
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individual, separate tools bespoke to each commonality and realistically expect a 
developer/designer to apply them all. It is highly doubtful they would possess the 
time, resources, inclination, or the patience to systematically work through forty-
three individual tools, all with ostensibly the same goal. However I believe a single 
tool which can successfully identify potential sources of social resistance for all 
forty-three commonalities is much more likely to see use138. The second grouping 
of reasons relates to the observed tendency for security technologies to evoke 
negative social reactions from both unobvious sources or as a result of 
unintended, unanticipated interactions/outcomes. Given how difficult it is to 
predict ex ante the source and nature of all controversies arising from either the 
operation of a newly designed security technology or the novel application of an 
established security technology, any tool designed within this project should at 
least possess the capacity to address all forty-three identified commonalities so as 
to maximise its potential positive impact. Thirdly designers should avoid arbitrarily 
restricting any examination they undertake of future social controversies given the 
harm each individual commonality can cause; regardless of how rarely that 
commonality arises. In the earlier case-study analysis (Chapter 2) not all of the 
identified commonalities appeared as often as the others. For some of these 
commonalities, their over or under representation within this project will be a 
direct consequence of the small sample size of technologies examined herein. 
However for others, such as those falling under Category 1: Physical or Mental 
Harm, the instances of these commonalities arising will be generally lower given 
the nature of security technologies currently being produced; there are more new 
security technologies for the collection and manipulation of data being produced 
than security technologies with the capacity to directly physically harm individual 
targets. While the temptation exists to create tools which only address the most 
popular commonalities, this should be avoided as there is not necessarily a direct 
correlation between the regularity of a particular commonality arising and the 
                                                     
138
 This point is not intended to negate the value of tools which seek to address specific individual social 
issues which persistently arise as a source of controversy (such as privacy, dual-use, data processing, 
etc.). For issues such as these which are already in both the publics’ and regulators’ sights, and hence 
more likely to receive media attention, it is wholly understandable for designers to employ additional 
tools which focus individually focus on such issues so as to thoroughly examine any future potential 
negative impact.    
217 
 
damage this commonality arising will cause to a security technology. To illustrate, 
while security technologies possessing the capacity to cause unintended deaths139, 
serious/permanent injuries, disfigurement, and/or loss of mobility/senses140 (for 
example, mosquitos141 and less lethal weapons including Tasers, baton-rounds142, 
and possibly millimetre-wave active denial technologies143) comprise a tiny subset 
of the total range of available security technologies, the potential level of public 
backlash (both by scope and scale) is very high. Alternatively, even a rarely 
observed commonality possesses the potential to result in disproportionate levels 
of harm if it is arises within a ST that becomes very widely used.  
3. Any produced tool must be usable by the intended end-users. The implications of 
this seemingly self-evident requirement are twofold. Firstly that the level of 
resources required for using a tool is not so high as to prevent or discourage their 
use. By resources I include both the time required to use the tool and any financial 
burden incurred. Secondly, that any tool should be designed such that it can be 
reasonably assumed that the intended end-users of the tool (i.e., the developers 
and designers of security technologies) will already possess the intellectual skills to 
do so; i.e., they should not have to acquire specialist social-centric academic 
qualifications to complete the tool, neither should the engagement of external 
experts be required. The justifications for this design requirement (that any 
produced tool must be usable by the intended end-users) are based on both; (a) 
the interviews with designers/developers of security technologies where they 
described the restricted nature of designing security technologies144, and (b) a 
rejection of time-consuming, resource-laden approaches as unrealistic. Time 
constrains set by government tenders, the quickly evolving nature of cybercrimes, 
the speed at which technologies evolve, and the need to remain ahead of 
                                                     
139
 Commonality 1f: Could the ST cause a fatality? With both the Framework of Common Controversies 
within Security Technologies tool and the Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies tool. 
140
 Commonality 1e: Could the ST cause physical injuries? With both the Framework of Common 
Controversies within Security Technologies tool and the Designing for Socially Acceptable Security 
Technologies tool. 
141
 See Chapter 2.12 
142
 See Chapter 2.13 
143
 See Global Security (2011) 
144
 See Chapter 3.4 
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competitors within the security marketplace, all combine to deny designers the 
luxury of long lead-times before a design project can commence.  
4. The tool must be usable without any direct public interaction or input. This is 
probably the most contentious design rule for a tool whose explicit purpose is to 
anticipate negative public responses, yet it is a necessary rule for reasons of 
secrecy145; a point confirmed by the interviews undertaken146. This design rule is 
not intended to devalue public engagement; it is merely a recognition of existing 
constrains governing the design of security technologies. Nor does this rule 
expressly forbid public involvement if a particular design project is not bound by 
secrecy. Indeed it may be possible to orchestrate the conduct of some design 
projects so as to include public involvement despite secrecy provisos147. However 
given the reality of constraints operating on many security technology design 
projects I believe any design tools should be constructed to operate successfully in 
the most restrictive of environments to thereby afford the tool the widest scope 
of usability. 
5. Any design tool must produce useable results. What constitutes useable results in 
this circumstance is determined by the target audience; i.e., the designers and 
developers of security technologies148. The goal of any tool should be to produce 
practical design recommendations specific to the security technology under 
consideration. Given that the focus of this project is to influence the upstream 
design of a security technology before it is produced, the tools should emphasise 
the identification of possible sources of social controversy in such a manner which 
focusses the mind of the user towards identifying design alternatives which can 
address these sources for inclusion in the initial blueprint of the security 
technology. It is not the intention of this project to produce tools for critiquing 
completed security technologies; the focus is to remain firmly fixed on identifying 
upstream design opportunities.   
                                                     
145
 See Chapter 1.4 for discussions on national and commercial secrecy, and the implications of 
introducing secrecy into the conduct of a research and design project 
146
 See Chapter 3.2.1 
147
 See Chapter 8.4 for a discussion of potential methods whereby the public may be involved in security 
projects despite restriction to the contrary 
148
 As discussed in Chapter 1.2 
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6.1.1 A critique of possible approaches for addressing the multi-criteria 
conundrum while maintaining a single design tool. 
In an attempt to address the multi-criteria conundrum, and thereby identify suitable 
methodological structures149 for the creation of design tools, I examine the structure 
of a number of existing methodologies. The resulting structural analysis is presented in 
Table 6.1 below followed by a discussion of the results150.  
The methodologies examined here are utilised for assessing security 
technologies/interventions, providing security, and/or reducing crime. For example, 
Problem Orientated Policing and Situational Crime Prevention and crime reduction 
measures utilised by police. Problem orientated policing moves police away from 
reacting to crimes towards analysing why specific crimes reoccur in particular places so 
as to develop pre-emptive solutions. Similarly situational crime prevention involves 
manipulating the environment in a permanent manner to reduce criminal 
opportunities (Newburn 2007). The ISO27001 Framework for compliance represents 
best-practice specifications that are used by businesses and organisations worldwide 
to develop their Information Security Management System151. Multi-Criteria Analysis 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis are decision-making tools used by private companies, law 
enforcement, and security agencies to assist in decision making and the allocation of 
resources. Privacy Impact Assessments, as the name implies, assess the possible 
impacts on privacy of policies, interventions, and technologies. They are used by 
agents of the state and by private companies, and may be either voluntary or a 
mandatory legal requirement (for example see Homeland Security (2006)). The 
remaining examples (Five-Step Process, Dual Use Decision Framework, and Surveillance 
Impact Assessments) are all relevant in different ways to STs and hence their inclusion 
here, however they are not employed to the same extent as the other methodologies. 
 
 
                                                     
149
 By structure I refer to both the step-by-step processes which comprise a methodology as well as the 
nature and form of the produced results 
150
 This examination also utilises some of the data collected in the Chapter 5 case-study assessments of 
existing methodologies 
151
 For more information see www.itgovernance.co.uk/iso27001.aspx#2 
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Table 6.1  Structural Assessment of Existing Methodologies 



































































▪ Five-Step Process for Analysing 
and Evaluating Security Systems 
▪ Dual Use Decision Framework 
▪ Privacy Impact Assessment / 
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format of results 
are both adaptable.  
▪ Problem Oriented Policing 








To expand upon the columns in Table 6.1 above: 
Style of assessment tool: Outlines four categories of existing assessment tools. I 
separated these tools on the basis of both the processes employed by which the 
relevant assessment tools arrive at some form of output as well as the nature of the 
output itself. These two factors were chosen as they directly impact upon the two 
criteria which form to comprise the multi-criteria conundrum; i.e., finding a way to 
create tools which can simultaneously address all of the forty-three identified 
commonalities of controversy while at the same time being applicable to all security 
technologies. 
                                                     
152
 Bad for different  technologies and commonalities 
153
 Can add/subtract different variables to the process 
154
 Bad for different  technologies and commonalities 
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Flexibility of Process: ‘Processes’ refers to the series of steps or actions required by an 
assessment methodology so as to achieve its purported purpose. It is my belief that an 
assessment tool with rigid processes will not be able to simultaneously address a large 
number of disparate commonalities, and will likely prove inefficient in operation. To 
expand; if the processes are rigid in nature (i.e., low flexibility) and hence cannot be 
easily amended, then the ability to assess future technologies with hitherto unrealised 
capabilities is not assured if these new capabilities are not already encompassed by the 
existing process structure. Conversely, highly flexible processes which can be modified 
to encompass novel features on future technologies are more likely to add value to the 
upstream design process of future security technologies. Additionally the greater the 
flexibility of process, the more likely a single methodology will be able to address all of 
the forty-three commonalities of controversy identified within Chapter 2; thus 
avoiding a situation where the end-user is trying to artificially pigeonhole health and 
safety or financial factors into an assessment methodology designed to address privacy 
or dual-use issues. It must be noted here that I am not suggesting there exists a direct 
relationship between the level of flexibility of process and the quality of those 
processes. An assessment tool with an inflexible set of processes may still produce 
high quality results while one with highly flexible processes can equally produce poor 
quality results.  
Flexibility of Output: ‘Output’ refers to the manner and form by which results are 
presented. This may range from a numerical value (including amongst others a 
probability, a monetary amount, or the sum of multiple factors), the ticks/crosses of a 
checklist, through to purely qualitative output in the form of comments or actions to 
be taken. Where the methodology employed is so well established and the format of 
the output is so highly prescribed such that universal rules for a ‘correct output’ exists 
(such as the score from a multi-criteria analysis or the quantification of a cost-benefit 
analysis) the methodology will possess low flexibility of output. Conversely where the 
end-user has considerable discretion in how they choose to present the results, either 
due to the qualitative nature of results, a choice of acceptably correct output modes, 
or the absence of consensus over what constitutes correct output then the 
methodology in question can be interpreted as possessing high flexibility of output. It 
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is my contention that successful security technology assessment tools of the type 
envisioned within this project require relatively high output flexibility; otherwise they 
will not be able to simultaneously address disparate commonalities of controversy. A 
methodology with low flexibility-of-output that produces only a single output measure, 
especially one which is narrowly defined (such as ‘probability of causing death per 
use’), will quickly become irrelevant when the commonality of controversy changes 
(‘probability of death’ may be relevant for less-lethal weapons but is irrelevant when 
dealing with fair-use principles and data-mining technologies).    
Consistency of Process: A process which comprises the repetitive application of the 
same required steps (regardless of what is being targeted) will have high consistency-
of-process. This will be a methodology where the steps to be undertaken are 
universally accepted and followed, or one where there are an accepted series of core 
steps with minor variations to ancillary steps for dealing with nuanced circumstances.  
High consistency-of-process does not necessitate low flexibility-of-process. A process 
can be flexible in its application to deal with different targets and circumstances while 
following consistent, accepted steps for each application.  
Consistency of Results: A methodology will possess high consistency-of-results when 
two different people/parties applying the same methodology will arrive at the same 
result(s). For example, mathematical processes (i.e., statistical tests, construction of 
preference/utility curves etc.) if conducted using accepted methodologies and the 
same input data will consistently produce the same output (barring user error) and 
hence possess high consistency of results. Open-ended questions and/or questions 
without some criteria or methodology for determining the answer will possess low 
consistency of results.  
 
6.1.2 Optimised approaches for addressing the multi-criteria conundrum 
while maintaining a single design tool. 
From Chapter 6.1 above, the five identified requirements for any future design tool 
are: 
1. It should be applicable to all security technologies; 
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2. It must be able to simultaneously address all forty-three identified commonalities; 
3. It must be usable by the intended end-users; 
4. It must be usable without direct public interaction or input; 
5. It must produce useable results. 
By applying these requirements to the structural analysis from Table 6.1, the following 
conclusions are reached: 
Processes with high flexibility will be better able to deal with diverse security 
technologies and address different commonalities. The questions asked, data 
collected, and methods of investigation will be modifiable to meet these two 
requirements. Conversely processes with low flexibility will struggle here when the 
security technology contains features not specifically catered by the existing processes. 
And as discussed earlier, the diverse nature of the different commonalities reduces the 
possibility that an inflexible process will possess the intrinsic capacity to cater for all of 
these without the inbuilt ability to adapt.   
It will be easier to tailor highly flexible processes and outputs to meet the needs of 
end-users given that these individuals are not a homogenous group. They possess 
different skill sets, work with different mediums, have different priorities, and work 
under differing conditions and restrictions. Rigidity here will restrict both usability and 
the propensity for use when the processes and/or outputs either are not usable by 
end-users, does not add value to the design process, or does not recognisably add 
value to the design process.    
Similarly given the diversity of end-users; the ability to produce results that these 
different individuals/groups will find usable (and the subjectivity embedded within 
such a concept) requires highly flexible outputs. An output whose form and nature is 
meaningless is useless to the designer of a security technology.  
Regarding the necessary absence of public engagement, the level of flexibility of 
process or output should not directly affect the achievability of this requirement.    
It is concluded therefore that any design tool will need to score highly in both flexibility 
of process and flexibility of output. As such from Table 6.1 those assessment tools 
which comprise either categories 1 (a structured set of repetitive questions and/or 
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processes) and 2 (a prescriptive methodology where the format of the results is pre-
defined) should be ruled out given their relatively low flexibility of both process and 
output. 
In comparison, categories 3 (an open framework) and 4 (an adaptable methodology 
where the processes and format of results are both adaptable) both represent 
potential candidate methodologies for design tools given their relatively high flexibility 
of process and output.  
As a word of caution, it should be acknowledged that the relatively low levels of 
consistency of process and consistency of results within categories 3 and 4 may have a 
negative effect on the quality of both the processes and outputs of these two 
categories. This will not necessarily be the case, however it does open the door to 
arbitrary output and processes which lack rigour. Replication of results here is also not 
assured155.  
That said, if we do not adopt a consequentialist mentality, any lack of consistency of 
processes or results only becomes framed as a problem if replication is treated as a 
goal or aim of the design tools. As an alternative, if we promote such concepts as 
thinking outside the box, re-framing a problem, or encouraging creative ethical 
thinking as our goals, then replication becomes less of an issue as each situation is 
deemed unique.  
 
6.2 The tools 
6.2.1 Framework for Common Controversies within Security Technologies 
The Framework for Common Controversies within Security Technologies (FCC) 
presented in Appendix K represents a category 3 - open framework style of design tool 
as described in Table 6.1 above. Adopting the form of a stand-alone framework it is the 
less prescriptive of the two tools developed, while still providing an identifiable 
structure to assist with use.  
                                                     
155
 These are problems not unique to the design tools proposed within this research project; they also 
affect the other established assessment tools cited as examples of category 3 and 4 methodologies 
within Table 6.1 
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The FCC reproduces the forty-three commonalities identified in Chapter 2 divided into 
their seven categories. Additionally, each of these commonalities is accompanied by 
information in the form of questions, caveats, statements and/or clarifications. This 
accompanying information was distilled from the case-studies used to identify the 
commonalities and represents some of the more granular information that might 
otherwise have been lost by just presenting the commonalities themselves. The 
amount of additional information presented in the FCC varies considerably depending 
on the specific commonality; a point illustrated within Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1  Extracts from FCC 
                    
                           
Here commonalities 1d and 2a are quite specifically focussed and consequently very 
brief; 1d is accompanied by a list of symptoms which have constituted pain or 
discomfort in the past, whilst 2a is accompanied by a single question pertaining to 
export bans. By way of contrast commonalities 2e and 4h have broader remits; a fact 
reflected by the volume of additional information accompanying this commonalities. 
2e focusses on compliance with data protection principles (an area with many sub-
components), while the social acceptability standards addressed in 4h have proven 
diverse in nature.  
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Also the ability to discern the intrinsic nature of a commonality based on a plain 
reading varies considerably. Using the selection from Figure 6.1, while 1d ‘Could the ST 
cause pain or discomfort?’ is relatively self-explanatory, the meaning of 4h ‘Does the ST 
meet social acceptability standards?’ is not apparent from its wording. As a result, for 
commonalities such as 4h more accompanying secondary information may be 
necessary.   
Some of the identified benefits of adopting this framework-based approach are that 
frameworks provide a foundational structure from which to begin any assessment 
processes. Additionally, being a basic framework existing at the highest level of 
abstraction there are no formalised instructions or rules governing how the FCC is to 
be used; these will need to be decided upon and produced by the end-user. While this 
process requires an initial expenditure of effort, ultimately the final product may 
better reflect the capabilities, resources, and organisational requirements/restrictions 
of the end-user than could be achieved if they followed a set of pre-constructed 
generic rules.  
Paradoxically, these strengths can also be interpreted as weaknesses of the framework 
design. A framework that is provided to guide investigations may become counter-
productive if the end-user applies it prescriptively such that they refuse to investigate 
(potentially valid) issues deemed to fall outside the scope of the framework itself. 
Additionally, if the end-user produces poor rules for applying a framework, any value it 
may have potentially produced could be negated.    
On the FCC specifically, I anticipate its strengths as: 
a) It provides a clear visual representation of the diverse range of social-
acceptability problems which have impacted upon the operation of security 
technologies in the past. 
b) It alerts the end-users to problems which they may not yet have anticipated. 
c) Its application is not restricted by either commonality or technology. 
d) It provides a basic frame onto which different end-users can attach secondary 
processes that facilitate design decision-making tailored to (i) meet the specific 
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needs of the designer and (ii) sympathetic to factors bespoke to the security 
technology being designed. 
Specific weaknesses of the FCC include the following: 
a) In isolation it is an abstract framework, hence does not provide guidance to the 
designer without the attachment of further processes. This fact reopens the 
door to the multi-criteria conundrum and the issues identified within Table 6.1; 
i.e. the secondary processes will need to be able to accommodate all possible 
security technologies and all identified commonalities of controversy.  
b) The creation of secondary processes increases the work burden on the end-
user before they can usefully use the FCC. 
c) Best practices regarding the optimal secondary process for each commonality 
has not yet been determined. This will only come through using the FCC and 
applying different secondary processes so as to develop a corpus of knowledge 
on optimisation.  
Moving beyond how the FCC is used is the question of what constitutes successful use. 
This is a question without a definitive answer given that it can be legitimately 
approached from both objective and subjective perspectives; see Chapter 7.1 below 
for an extended discussion on the challenge to measuring success. To summarise this 
discussion here; objectively one could define and measure success as the absence of 
social controversy and/or resistance to those future security technologies which are 
designed using the tools suggested herein. The difficultly here is that when success is 
defined as the absence of a phenomenon occurring it is incredibly difficult to 
determine conclusively whether this absence was the result of changes made because 
of the design tool or from some other factor(s); the classic correlation versus causality 
problem. Subjectively, success is determined by how different individuals and groups 
choose to frame such a result. This may include outcomes including; the identification 
of previously unrecognised problems, new design requirements, the modification or 
removal of existing design requirements, the uncontroversial adoption of a new 
security technology, or even either the abandoning of a proposed security technology 




6.2.2 Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies (DeSAST) 
design tool 
The second design tool produced within this project is titled Designing for Socially 
Integral Security Technologies (DeSAST). From Table 6.1 this design tool falls within 
category 4 - A malleable methodology where the processes and format of results are 
both adaptable. The DeSAST approach seeks to address some of the inherent 
weakness of the FCC; namely the absence of secondary processes to address the 43 
commonalities and the burden this places on the end-user. It operates by producing a 
different series of questions, activities and outputs tailored specifically to address each 
of the forty-three identified commonalities. The idea being that by maximising both 
the flexibility of process and the flexibility of output and by tailoring each of these 
specifically to the different commonalities of controversy, DeSAST will be uniquely 
placed to address the multi-criteria conundrum.  
DeSAST is reproduced in its entirety in Appendix L. What follows here is a discussion of 
the tool itself; specifically its design, purposes, and content. This is supplemented in 
Chapter 6.2.3 by an example method-for-use, and lists of anticipated benefits and 
weaknesses of adopting this design approach. 
In relation to the design of DeSAST, perhaps the most obvious feature of the printed 
version of DeSAST is its large size, being 117 pages long. However, the most important 
factor here is that 86 of these pages comprise the explicit steps to be undertaken; both 
the questions to be addressed and the specific information to better comprehend 
these questions. This focus on practical steps, both by length and depth, is much 
greater than in the other tools and methodologies examined within my dissertation. 
The danger of presenting this tool, in its detailed entirety, to a potential STEM end-
user is that its size will deter them from using it, especially if they are not already 
convinced that investing the required effort to complete the tool will add design value. 
As will be shown in Chapter 6.2.3 one way I have attempted to counteract this is I have 
designed the tool in such a manner that it can be reduced down to its ostensibly 
229 
 
relevant components depending on the proposed ST156. Another possibility is to 
develop DeSAST into a digital format. This would have the effect of obscuring the 
entirety of its content behind a constructed user interface, thus potentially negating 
feelings of being overwhelmed. It would permit easier updates based on the 
emergence of new STs, would potentially speed up the process of using this tool, and 
would facilitate the distribution of results.  
There also exist a number of purposes for employing DeSAST beyond the initially 
stated intention of assisting the developers and designers of security technologies in 
anticipating and mitigating negative societal responses to their technologies upstream 
in the design process. These purposes are not mutually exclusive, they do not need to 
be of equal weight to the end-user, nor do they even need to be something intended 
by the end-user. They include the following: 
 A public relations exercise by the ST developer. The ST developer does not to 
actually value social acceptability to use DeSAST. They may well prioritise sales 
and profits, and see DeSAST as a tool for maximising these goals. The irony here is 
that such a cynical yet rational approach doesn’t matter. If the relevant changes to 
a ST design are made such that it provides security in a socially acceptable fashion, 
then ultimately the ‘true’ intentions of the developer are irrelevant.  
 A tool for imbuing STEM ST designers with a social conscience. DeSAST moves the 
end-user beyond the simple question they are presented with (and one which they 
are eminently qualified to answer - i.e. How can we get X to do Y?) and forces 
them to address a question they may not otherwise be as inclined or equipped to 
do so (i.e. How can we get X to do Y in a manner which respects fundamental 
rights, minimises physical and mental harm, respects the rule of law, is financially 
justifiable, is necessary and proportionate, meets social acceptability standards, is 
not open to misuse… etc.).   
 DeSAST is a tool for sparking the imagination of designers. You cannot consciously 
address a problem you did not know existed. By highlighting potential sources of 
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 However, this reduction process does involve certain risks. These are discussed in Chapter 6.2.3 and 
shown to arise in practice in the application of DeSAST in Chapter 7.2 – specifically in relation to the 
potential misuse/abuse of the case-study ST.     
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controversy within a ST design, DeSAST can act as a catalyst for the designer to 
produce novel solutions to possible problems within a design while maintaining 
requisite functionality.  
Regarding the content of DeSAST (i.e. the information included describing each of the 
forty-three included commonalities of controversy and their associated 
questions/tasks), from the perspectives of the social scientist, lawyer, rights-activist, 
and ethicist, much/some of what is included may appear obvious, self-evident, or even 
naïve. However, this is to ignore the lack of social science training afforded STEM 
practitioners and the reality of their work environments when designing and 
developing STs157. It is essential to ensure here that any tool developed meets the five 
design rules set out in Chapter 6.1; the third of which being that any produced tool 
must be usable by the intended end-users. With this rule in mind DeSAST is entirely 
designed around the conduct of steps to be undertaken. It may require the end-user 
seek out data so as to answer each question, however no question presupposes or 
requires the end-user possess special knowledge or training in social research 
techniques. 
Finally, the content of DeSAST is entirely founded upon broad democratic values; a 
conscious decision on my part. This affords it the potential to transfer and entrench 
these values into any ST developed with this design tool. Such a fact could lead to the 
charge that DeSAST is pushing a particular liberal agenda by seeking to embed (or 
‘future-proof’) these values in solid form. Without engaging too deeply in this debate, 
or seeking to affirm/deny such claims, I would point out that the values promoted 
within DeSAST (respect for human rights, rejection of discrimination, the provision of 
security, etc.) are all values already embedded within our democratic society. Thus 
from a values-perspective, it is hard to charge DeSAST with being a radical, 
destabilising instrument. 
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6.2.3 A potential method for using DeSAST 
DeSAST begins by having the end-user identify which out of the seven categories of 
commonalities to include within their assessment of their proposed security 
technology; these seven categories are reproduced from the FCC. Two options for 
deciding what to include/exclude are presented to the end-user158.  
The first option is for the end-user to simply include all seven categories. The benefit of 
this approach is that it will ensure all identified commonalities of controversy are 
examined, including those whose relevance to the security technology in question only 
becomes apparent because they are examined. Restricting the examination of the 
security technology to only those categories of commonalities which the end-user ex 
ante considers to be relevant increases the risk of the non-identification of 
unanticipated problems. The drawback with this approach is that time and resources 
will most likely be wasted addressing categories which are not relevant.  
The second option seeks to narrow the scope of commonalities under investigation by 
presenting the end-user with a question to answer for six of the seven categories: 
1. Physical or Mental Harm: Does the security technology possess the potential to 
cause physical or mental harm to the subject? 
2. Liberties & Human Rights: Does the security technology possess the potential 
to infringe upon any of our other human rights when seeking to provide us with 
security? 
3. Questions of Legality: Does the potential exist for the legality of this security 
technology to be questioned, challenged, or merely brought into doubt? 
4. Financial Cost of the ST: Given the financial cost of the security technology, 
could questions be raised as to whether or not the security technology 
represents sound financial investment? 
5. Public & End-User Acceptability: (no question)159 
6. Issues of Functionality: Could any of the functionality aspects relating to how 
the security technology actually works (i.e., what it does, what it doesn’t do, 
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what it’s intended to do, and what it is capable of doing) be criticised or called 
into question? 
7. Safety, Security, Misuse & Abuse: Could the security technology be misused or 
abused thereby jeopardising the safety or security of citizens or their property? 
Additionally would it be possible for attackers to avoid or circumvent your 
security technology? 
To assist the end-user in answering these six questions, each of them is accompanied 
with between two to five points to consider when making this determination160. The 
benefit of his approach is that it saves time and resources by focussing attention to 
those categories of commonalities which are most likely to have relevance. The 
downside is that if the end-user erroneously excludes a category on the basis of this 
initial assessment, the possibility of not addressing relevant commonalities of 
controversy increases. 
Once the end-user has decided on applicable categories they then complete the 
relevant sections with the design tool. Guidance on this process is provided within 
DeSAST161, with the overarching aim being the production of a list of practical design 
requirements for incorporation into the future design of the proposed security 
technology. 
Each commonality of controversy falling within those categories being assessed is to 
be addressed individually. To this end the end-user is presented with information on 
the controversy followed by a series of tasks to be undertaken. The information 
component is presented within a short fact sheet describing the precise nature of the 
identified controversy. Where appropriate, this fact sheet will also include specific 
challenges facing the end-user when addressing the commonality; these were drawn 
from the case studies of previous controversial security technologies. 
The questions to be addressed differ markedly between commonalities, both by 
process and output; reflecting the fact that each different series of questions/activities 
is bespoke to the commonality for which they were created. Ultimately however, both 
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the manner in which the end-user chooses to complete each question and the form of 
the output they produce is entirely at their discretion. They can choose to follow the 
format/output contained within the questions provided or they can produce their own 
alternatives if they feel it better fits their project and/or work requirements. Should 
end-users choose to follow the DeSAST output format, then they will be encouraged 
throughout the process to identify design requirements to address potential future 
sources of social controversy.    
 
The anticipated benefits and weaknesses of utilising DeSAST 
Anticipated benefits of adopting the DeSAST approach include the following: 
a) By incorporating flexible processes and outputs, DeSAST should be well placed to 
cope with both any security technology and all the identified commonalities of 
controversy without further modification. 
b) The design of the individual questions accompanying each commonality is tailored 
specifically to that commonality, thereby increasing the relevance of those 
questions. 
c) DeSAST should be usable by all end-users without requiring specific training or 
qualifications. 
d) The information included within DeSAST is designed to highlight social and ethical 
elements of security technologies which may not otherwise normally receive 
attention by the anticipated end-users. It both focuses the minds of the 
developers and educates then for future projects. 
e) This tool is designed to be used without public interaction or engagement. 
f) DeSAST will produce a list of social design requirements for a security technology 
before that technology has been produced and avoidable mistakes have become 
locked in.  
g) DeSAST will stimulate imaginative thinking and assist in the formation of creative 
solutions. 
Anticipated weaknesses of adopting DeSAST include the following: 
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a) Quality of output will depend upon both the effort and foresight ability of those 
end-users using the tool. 
b)  The flexibility of processes and outputs may translate into variability of the quality 
of processes and outputs adopted by the end-users within a DeSAST assessment.  
c) The tool is not a silver bullet for guaranteeing socially acceptable security 
technologies. The fact that no problems are identified through the use of DeSAST 







7. Stage 5 – Determining Success for the Created Tools 
 
The activities and findings of the previous four Stages of this research project are as 
follows: 
 Stage 1 involved the completion of case studies of controversial STs which led to 
the identification of 43 commonalities of controversy. 
 Stage 2 involved interviews with STEM practitioners involved in the design of 
these STs so as to develop an understanding how these individuals operate within 
their particular field with its unique characteristics. 
 Stage 3 combined the output of Stages 1 and 2 to produce assessment criteria. 
These were applied to off-the-shelf candidates and it was determined that they 
were unable to meet the aims of this research project. 
 This necessitated Stage 4 whereby bespoke design tools were created to assist the 
developers of all STs in addressing all the identified commonalities of controversy 
in their designs so as to identify and mitigate future negative social reactions to 
their products upstream in the design process. 
As discussed in the introduction162 this structure was not settled upon as the somehow 
intuitively correct approach before this research project was undertaken; rather the 
results obtained from each Stage had implications for those Stages which followed, 
beyond dictating the form of those Stages. For example, had an existing design tool 
been identified during Stage 3 then it would not have been necessary to produce my 
own design tools. And as a direct consequence of the time and resources necessarily 
allocated to creating new design tools in Stage 4, my intentions to validate and 
improve upon these tools through a detailed iterative process with designers had to be 
curtailed. This action must now constitute future work in this area.  
Despite these circumstances it was still possible to at least begin this validation process 
by applying one of the created tools (DeSAST) to a ST currently being developed by 
engineers within University College London. Both the inherent challenges of this 
validation process and the results obtained are presented below.   
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7.1 The challenge of validation 
Having created two design tools based on the work completed in the earlier stages of 
this research project, the logical question arising is ‘do these tools work?’ This 
ostensibly simple question presupposes the existence of a definitive answer while 
belying the inherent complexities involved in formulating a valid response. 
Fundamental challenges to addressing this question include the following: 
a) The subjective nature of measuring success. The development and implementation 
of STs involves many different actors, including the manufacturers, governments, 
end-users, and the public. This last group (the public) is not a homogenous entity; 
rather it comprises a vast number of actor subgroups as determined by the criteria 
used to segregate each group163. Each of these actors may possess different 
interpretations of what outcome constitutes success. As an example consider the 
case of an airport whole-body scanner164. A government may prioritise security 
through the creation of a scanner which provides as clear an image of the 
passenger’s body as possible to control what is carried onto an aircraft. The airport 
operator end-user many prioritise speed of operation. The border control end-user 
may prioritise reliability through the absence of false positives/negatives. The 
travelling passengers may individually prioritise different combinations of 
convenience, speed, security, privacy, adherence to their religious beliefs, 
equality, etc. When each of these different actors prioritises a different outcome, 
success and failure become subjective concepts tied to the beholder. Indeed 
success for one group may be considered an abject failure by another, and vice 
versa. This situation becomes even more complicated in the absence of any 
agreed metric for determining success in relation to each of these prioritised 
outcomes. Even if, for the purposes of this research project, we disregard the 
                                                     
163
 Each subgroup is distinguishable by the combination of criteria its members must possess so as to 
enjoy membership to that subgroup (e.g. age, sex, ethnicity, medical conditions, etc.), and there is 
virtually no limit to what each individual criterion is or how they can be combined. As such the total 
number of subgroups can even outnumber the size of the population as individual citizens can 
simultaneously belong to multiple subgroups.  
164
 See Chapter 2.2 for a detailed case-study.  
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different subgroups and adopt as our measure of success ‘the introduction of a ST 
into society without social resistance’165 other challenges still exist. 
b) The problem of correlation versus causality. If the developers employ a design tool 
when constructing a ST, and that ST is subsequently introduced into a society 
without controversy, without further evidence it is not true to conclude that the 
ST was acceptable because the design tool was employed, as opposed to this 
acceptance simply being a coincidence. This represents the classic correlation 
versus causality dilemma which underpins the following scenarios: 
i. Equating the successful introduction of a ST as a success of the design 
tool. Just because a ST created with assistance from a design tool is 
successfully introduced into society, this does not mean its success is a 
direct result of this tool. The ST may still have been a success even if 
the design tool was not used.  
ii. Equating the unsuccessful introduction of a ST as a failure of the design 
tool. Just because a ST created with assistance from a design tool is 
unsuccessfully introduced into society, this does not mean its failure is 
a direct result of this tool. The ST may still have been a failure even if 
the design tool was not used. 
As stated in Chapter 7, actions to comprehensively address these issues in relation to 
the two created design tools so as to validate their efficacy goes beyond the length and 
time constraints of this research project166. Nevertheless, it is both possible and 
prudent at this point to present a preliminary case-study whereby the Designing for 
Socially Acceptable Security Technologies167 tool was applied to a ST currently under 
development; that being a passive Wi-Fi radar device for ‘seeing through walls’. 
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 Or at least resistance at a level which does not threaten the continued operation of the ST 
166
 However, it is worth noting here that despite the challenges listed in this section there is no need to 
assume that the design tools will be fixed and static. They can be adapted and improved upon by the 
end-users in light of problems that arise with their use. 
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7.2 Single case-study of DeSAST use: through-wall sensing of 
people by Wi-Fi radar 
The technology currently being developed seeks to achieve through-the-wall detection 
of the movements of people within a building by the passive monitoring of changes in 
Wi-Fi radio wave frequencies observed when radio waves reflect off moving objects168. 
This technology exploits those Wi-Fi radio signals increasingly present in homes and 
workspaces; signals constantly being emitted from devices such as wireless internet 
routers. The current prototype of this technology is about the size of a suitcase, and as 
it does not emit any radio waves itself it is undetectable (Chetty et al 2012; Clark 2012; 
Hambling 2012). Reported potential uses for this technology include detecting 
intruders, the unobtrusive monitoring of children and the elderly, hostage situations, 
urban warfare, spying, and improving CCTV operation by slaving a directional camera 
to a Wi-Fi detector. Given these uses this technology readily constitutes a ST. 
One of the engineers creating this device agreed to apply the Designing for Socially 
Acceptable Security Technologies (DeSAST) tool to their technology. This application of 
DeSAST was subject to a number of limitations and qualifications which must be clearly 
stated. 
Firstly no training had been afforded the participant on the use of DeSAST, with the 
only instructions provided being those contained within the tool itself (see pages 326-
330). Secondly due to the engineer’s busy schedule they spent less than an hour using 
the tool; hence they were unable to complete all of those sections and related tasks 
within DeSAST they had identified as applicable. Thirdly because this interviewee 
represents a sample size of one, our findings are not generalisable; i.e. I cannot make 
claims pertaining to the wider population of ST researchers, developers, and designers 
as I do not know whether our single sample represents a typical or atypical example of 
this population. Fourthly my proximity to this engineer may have influenced the 
results. I have known this individual for a number of years and have worked with them 
before. As a result they may have spent more time on DeSAST and produced more/less 
candid feedback then would have otherwise been the case. 
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Therefore this single case-study in no way constitutes a comprehensive validation 
programme. It was not a rigorous application of this design tool, and the results from 
this single sample cannot be claimed to represent those of the wider population of 
future STs. And yet, as will be seen from the following discussion, even with these 
caveats there is considerable value in presenting the responses of this engineer (which 
constitute the first application of DeSAST within a live ST research and design project); 
if only to provide a starting-point for the future evaluation and development of this 
and future design tool(s). 
 
7.2.1 Results, discussion, and implications 
DeSAST section selection process 
After reading the How To Use The Design Tool instructions at the beginning of 
DeSAST169, for Step 1 the subject chose to apply option B whereby they used the guide 
provided within DeSAST170 to determine which of the seven sections to include as 
opposed to examining them all. The resulting selection decisions are presented below 
in Table 7.1 (the accompanying quotations are the reasoning provided by the engineer 
when justifying their decisions): 
Table 7.1  Selection decisions within trial of DeSAST 
1. Physical or mental harm: rejected “There’s no harm from radio waves so this 
doesn’t apply”.   
2. Liberties and human rights: applied “Privacy is an issue”. 
3. Questions of legality: undecided “I have no idea of the legality of it” (at this point I 
advised the subject to consider including those sections for which they were 
uncertain as to relevance)  
4. Financial cost of the ST: rejected “It is a low cost technology; that is how we’d sell 
it. It piggy-backs off existing Wi-Fi and [the Wi-Fi is] the expensive part of it”.  
5. Public and end-user acceptability: (always applied) 
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6. Issues of functionality: applied (no reasoning was provided here by the subject) 
7. Safety, security, misuse and abuse: rejected “No, I don’t think there’s any safety or 
abuse issues here. The idea [is] it’s a covert technology so no-one knows about it. 
It’s not subject to issues of abuse really. And it is safe”.  
These selection decisions highlight both the benefits and drawbacks of including an 
option whereby the user can choose to limit those sections examined when 
undertaking the tool. While the decision to include Section 2: Liberties and Human 
Rights on the basis of obvious privacy concerns is easily defendable given the nature of 
the ST, four other selection decisions (for Sections 1, 3, 4, and 7) raise questions about 
both the wisdom of including an option to omit sections from any use of DeSAST, as 
well the ability of an end-user to critically examine their own ST.  
Section 1: Physical or Mental Harm was quickly rejected for inclusion by the engineer 
with little deliberation on the basis that radio waves are not physically harmful. 
However this decision displays a focus on the underlying science, rather than 
consideration of its application within a ST. It is at least conceivable that a sufficiently-
sensitive, operational Wi-Fi radar system could produce mental distress (and possibly 
harm) if it was applied in an oppressive, continuous manner. For example if could be 
employed by local government authorities to continuously monitor tenants within 
social housing to ensure they were not sub-letting rooms. Such an intrusion might 
result in negative mental implications. This example highlights the difficulty in 
determining how remote any harm arising from the application of a potential ST needs 
to be before Section 1 is included/excluded from DeSAST.  
Section 3: Legality highlights a lack of sufficient guidance within the existing directions 
to cover the situation whereby the end-user does not know if a section should or 
should not be included. A conservative approach would dictate the inclusion of those 
sections whose relevance is uncertain, and the instructions should be amended 
accordingly.   
Section 4: Financial Costs is also interesting in that the decision to reject, which from 
the provided reasoning is based solely on the initial unit price of their ST, may prove 
correct despite their apparent failure to engage with the other identified aspects of 
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this section. For example, what about on-going expenses, do the costs outweigh the 
benefits, and can the same results be active through cheaper means? 
For Section 6: Functionality the end-user applied this section without any justifying 
logic. Given the value derived from examining the justifying statements provided for 
other sections it may prove useful to require the end-user set down the reason(s) 
behind their selection decisions. This would certainly assist in any process of results 
validation by the end-user or their colleagues.  
Section 7: Safety, Security, Misuse & Abuse best highlights the danger of rejecting a 
section because the end-user of DeSAST (i.e. the engineer) fails to independently 
conceive of problems arising. As will be expanded upon below, Section 7 does raise 
issues and should have been included. This definitive statement is based on both 
online comments by individuals concerned about the misuse of this technology171, as 
well as recognition by the interviewed engineer that their ST could be abused or 
misused in a variety of ways after I had challenged them with a number of possible 
examples.  
This outcome is a source of concern. For if the end-user cannot recognise (or cannot be 
trained to recognise) when their proposed ST may lead to social resistance when 
applying DeSAST then this tool will not be able to act as a sufficient substitute for 
external actors172. 
Addressing subsections 
By following Step 2 of the instructions173 the subject examined the sub-sections and 
associated questions comprising the Framework for Common Controversies within 
Security Technologies (FCC)174 which forms the underlying structure for DeSAST. They 
began with Section 2: Liberties & Human Rights but quickly found it challenging and 
somewhat daunting to meaningfully address the questions as presented in this format. 
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 See Table 7.3 below for a selection of comments collected from forums, blogs, and responses to 
articles about the proposed Wi-Fi technology which appeared online 
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 Based on the interviews conducted with STEM practitioners in Stage 2, suggested reasons as to why 
engineers close to a technology may have difficulty identifying sources of social resistance include; a lack 
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within a design. For an expanded discussion see Mitchener-Nissen (2013)  
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242 
 
After reading through Section 2 their immediate response was “there’s loads of these 
questions, but the point that’s in my head is that [the ST] detects a person but it has no 
identity information around that person. So I don’t know. For me it’s hard to say ‘do the 
security benefits outweigh the losses to other rights’175”. 
At this point I suggested the subject attempt to undertake the detailed steps provided 
within DeSAST for addressing Qn.2a. Could the security technology impact someone’s 
right to privacy of Section 2, given that they had already identified privacy as a 
potential issue for their ST. It was also my hope that the concrete steps comprising this 
subsection would make the task of addressing the questions posed in the FCC appear 
more manageable and achievable for the subject. Table 7.2 below is a reproduction of 
Qn.2a as it appears within DeSAST and the subject’s accompanying responses176. 
Table 7.2  Responses to Qn.2a within trial of DeSAST 
Qn.2a: Could the security technology impact someone’s right to privacy? 
Step 1. What new security will the proposed technology provide us with? Surveillance.  
What (if any) privacy will we lose because of the proposed security technology? In an 
airport scenario [where we could apply this ST] it makes CCTV more efficient, so you’re 
not really losing anything to be honest. Where CCTV is monitoring it has a narrow field 
of view. [Our ST] is just monitoring what’s going on outside this field of view, and if it 
detects something it sends the CCTV there; it slaves the CCTV camera. So the privacy is 
already lost in my view … because the CCTV is a lot more intrusive. So what privacy will 
we lose? Nothing much. 
Show how this technology is justified by balancing this change in security against any 
change in privacy? My justification is that CCTV already infringed the privacy rights, 
and it’s got to an accepted level now by people. CCTV is accepted in an airport as it has 
already been deployed, so all the privacy issues have been agreed and dealt with. So 
this [my technology] makes CCTV do its job better. 
Step 2. What privacy is lost by people who are not engaged in criminal activities but 
are subjected to the proposed security technology (i.e. what is the privacy cost to 
innocent people)? Okay, so that he same thing [as step1]. 
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176
 Minus the text-boxes included within the tool proper – see Appendix L, pages 348-349 
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Step 3. What privacy will citizens be left with if the proposed security technology is 
successfully introduced? CCTV invades your privacy so they’ll just have a little bit less 
privacy because CCTV will work better. 
Step 4. What are the possible negative security implications of this privacy intrusion? 
The technology could be jammed. You could take a jammer and jam the signal; that’s 
the negative. So if people were relying on it, for it to work to detect motion, and it gets 
jammed, then they might think it’s working and it’s not. That could be an issue. 
Step 5. How can you minimise both any impact on privacy and any risk of negative 
security implications through the design of your security technology? I think that’s a 
good question. To make sure it does work with CCTV means that it overcomes all those 
obstacles like privacy. If it’s an attachment to an existing technology that makes it [the 
existing technology] work better – it just feeds information into it to work better – then 
it should be minimal. 
Step 6. If you were personally being monitored by your proposed security technology, 
would you be as likely to engage in the following legal activities: having an 
affair?______; writing a blog criticising your employer/the government/police?______; 
sending/receiving legal documents to/from your lawyer?______; organising or 
participating in a protest rally?______; purchasing, downloading, and/or viewing 
pornography?______; seeking online advice on abortions/ medical conditions/assisted 
suicide?______; supporting/sending money to Wikileaks?______. If you answered ‘yes’ 
to any of these your technology is having a chilling effect. How can you minimise this 
effect through your design? (This Step was not addressed by the subject as they did 
not consider it applicable) 
 
Upon completion of these, the subject was complimentary of both the content in 
Qn.2a. and the overall process of the steps contained therein. Their statements also 
imply they derived value from undertaking these processes in that now they could self-
justify why they believe privacy is not an issue here: 
The privacy issues have already been dealt with because it latches onto an 
existing technology. So it (DeSAST) has made me think about how I can justify 
this when discussing privacy, which is good. 
I say this is good because in a way now I am thinking about it, and I have gone 
through these questions and everything, and [to me] it just shows that privacy 
isn’t a huge issue actually.  
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In my efforts to develop a tool for end-users, and for what I was hoping this tool could 
achieve, it is this second statement which affords me the greatest encouragement and 
satisfaction, despite the end-user’s flawed conclusions. For I hold that in relation to 
this research project a design tool justifies its own worth if it possesses the capacity to 
encourage the developers of STs to at least recognise and contemplate social issues in 
relation to their technologies where they would not have otherwise done so. 
In relation to the responses afforded to each step, there are a number of observations 
to be made. The first is that the engineer interpreted at least one of the steps (Step 4) 
in a different manner to that which I had envisaged when creating it. They interpreted 
that step as focussing on the possible security implications of their ST failing to work. 
My intention when constructing this step was to focus their attention on the negative 
implications for an individual’s security as a result of their loss in privacy caused by this 
technology. It is possible that this represents a weakness in the manner I 
presented/worded that question; although equally it is an arguable a feature of 
language that all questions are open to multiple interpretations.  
Either way, I do not consider this different interpretation by the end-user in any sense 
constituting failure. Once I have produced this tool it is ultimately for the end-user to 
interpret and derive value from the steps therein. While I had a particular 
interpretation for this step in mind when producing it, the alternate interpretation is 
equally valid, as demonstrated by the results produced. Identifying the threat of 
jamming as a source of failure leading to decreased security is a logical, legitimate, and 
valuable outcome for the end-user. It is inescapable that when producing these design 
tools, just as for technologies, once they are passed on to others to use my control 
over these tools is diminished or extinguished177.  
Secondly, there will always remain the situation that the manner in which the end-user 
chooses to address a step will impact their ability to identify possible negative social 
implications via that and related steps. For example from Step 1 onwards the subject 
chose to focus on one particular application for their ST; that being enhancing CCTVs 
within airports. For this narrow application they concluded privacy would not be an 
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 By accepting this position I am essentially adopting Latour’s first principle; that “the fate of what we 
say and make [of facts and machines] is in later users’ hands” (Latour 1987, p.29). 
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issue. But from their final comments they appeared to extrapolate their results to 
conclude that privacy will not be an issue regardless of the context. This jump from a 
narrow application to all applications of their ST is not logically valid. While it is quite 
possible that the particular airport usage may be considered socially acceptable, it 
does not follow that other applications will be equally accepted. This point is afforded 
credence by the negative comments posted about this technology in various online 
forums, blogs, and in the ‘comments’ sections to articles describing it. The following is 
a selection of negative responses: 
Table 7.3  Negative comments regarding the proposed Wi-Fi radar ST 
Obviously this privacy violation is immoral and will foster criminal activity rather than 
regulatory since regulation has been defunded. (http://phys.org/) 
Great, now are we going to have to “WiFi-Proof” our houses? The military may not be 
interested in snooping on us, but who knows what lowlife or [private investigator] or 
other snooper may be keeping track of what’s going on in your home. 
(http://news.cnet.com/) 
We have a Constitutional right to privacy. This will be the last straw. 
(http://www.sodahead.com) 
More big brother. (http://www.sodahead.com) 
A clear violation of search and seizure. (http://www.sodahead.com) 
Good and Bad – if there [is] a guy behind that wall who is about to kill people that is 
good….If the police are spying on citizens – that is bad. (http://www.sodahead.com) 
I don’t know about anyone else, but I don’t trust the government to use such a device 
only for ‘good.’ Also, if the government has it, what’s going to stop the ‘bad’ guys from 
getting it and also using it? (http://www.sodahead.com) 
 
In spite of these comments, it is readily conceivable that within the specific contexts of 
airports the use of this Wi-Fi radar to enhance existing CCTV systems may constitute a 
socially acceptable use for this ST which does not raise specific privacy concerns. If so 
there is still value within the responses of the subject. What may be useful here is the 
development of best practice guidelines to assist end-users when completing the 
individual steps within DeSAST to avoid logical traps without stifling creativity.  
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Thirdly, the iterative process of improving DeSAST is made easier by having end-users 
apply it in ‘real-world’ situations. For example, based on the responses of the subject I 
agree that Step 2 is not sufficiently different from Step 1 to warrant separate inclusion. 
Fourthly, by requiring the end-user to physically set-down their responses to each 
step, these form a valuable source of data for future learning should they 
underestimate or fail to recognise a source of social resistance within their design 
which arises after implementation. It also constitutes an information resource which 
can be used by colleagues to validate or challenge the conclusions of the original end-
user.  
Considering a rejected section 
Given the limited remaining time available to the subject to spend on DeSAST, at this 
point I directed the discussion away from those sections they had indicated as relevant 
and onto one of the sections they had rejected as irrelevant; that being Section 7 
Safety, Security, Misuse & Abuse.  This was primarily chosen as a result of comments 
collected from online discussions whereby individuals indicated concern for the 
potential abuse of this ST as discussed above. 
Given the subject had rejected this section I presented them with hypothetical misuses 
for this technology so as to challenge their initial decision. Below are the scenarios and 
subsequent responses: 
 A legitimate end-user uses this technology to spy on an ex-partner to check if they 
are sleeping/living with somebody new: “There is the husband/wife thing, but 
what makes it a bit moot for me is that if a husband was to see how many people 
were in the house, rather than using this technology, for this is not what it’s for, it 
would be a lot easier to put a recorder under the couch or a small camera 
somewhere as opposed to getting this, and this would be a lot more expensive 
than those. But I see what you mean”. 
 A Council wants to use your technology to determine how many people are living 
in each of their social housing flats, which may prove a cost effective use of this 
technology: “Yeah, good point, yeah. I think that’s a really good question actually”. 
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 A thief wants to use this technology. Could they use it to tell me how many people 
are inside a bank at the moment, or whether there’s a security guard inside a 
building? “Yeah, I see what you mean”.  
These examples represent one of the fundamental challenges in creating these design 
tools; that being how to get the end-user to critically evaluate (or ‘red-team’) their 
own designs and ideas. As the subject said here; “I wouldn’t have been able to come up 
with these examples without you [prompting me]”.  
This challenge repeated itself when the subject reconsidered Section 7 within the FCC. 
In the format of a framework they were unable to identify any potential problems for 
their ST based on the information provided without prompting or challenges by the 
researcher. This led them to conclude:  
I mean I can see how it [the tool] can stimulate thought to make people think 
how it can be abused, but like I said, I think I have a lot more insight because you 
(the researcher) were here. If I was in my office reading this I would just write 
‘no, no, no’ and I think that’s [a point worth highlighting].  
These results call into question the efficacy of the FCC operating as a design tool. What 
was not determined here (as it was not applied) is whether the steps provided within 
Section 7 of DeSAST could act as a suitable substitute for the researcher, and 
encourage independent critical evaluation by the end-user. If it can do so then 
determining the optimal combination of design tool and associated training course will 
be fundamental to success here. 
Final observations by the subject 
There were other valuable insights provided by the subject during the course of this 
application of the design tools. The first relates to when a design tool should be 
employed, and how this changes in the context of who is employing it. Given that the 
science underpinning Wi-Fi radar is still being developed, the subject stated it was hard 
to answer questions on the potential capabilities of future STs. This in turn affected 
their ability to identify possible instances of social resistance. It was their opinion that 
such tools should be applied by “an academic in the late stages of development” 
(referring to a basic-science research stage) “or a project manager in industry in the 
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very early stages of development” (referring to a stage where this science is then 
applied to create a piece of engineered technology).  
This conceptualisation separates the basic and applied research stages; whereby 
development is described as moving from the basic science (in this case “basic 
physics”) to a “basic technology to a product”. By doing so the subject is subscribing to 
a linear model of innovation (see Godin, 2006). While the shortcomings of this linear 
approach as a depicter of how technological artefacts are produced are well 
documented 178 , this conceptualisation may serve another purpose here. By 
compartmentalising the basic from the applied science phases, and by attempting to 
move the application of DeSAST further downstream to the applied stage, the engineer 
(justifiably or otherwise) is creating the conditions whereby they are not responsible 
for addressing the tricky ethical and social questions DeSAST is designed to highlight. 
Secondly there was an express statement by the subject to the effect that even at this 
early stage in its development, they could conceive of multiple different ways in which 
the ST could be designed; “I have a list of about 10 different ways it can be realised, 
and each one looks different – has a different architecture, a different set of receivers, 
different way it looks and operates.” This represents an incredibly important validation 
for the approach adopted within this entire research project; that being to focus on 
the upstream design component of ST development. It confirms that the designer is 
not operating under a single deterministic vision for their completed ST, thus at least 
the possibility exists to shape the end-product by mitigating potential sources of social 
resistance through design requirements.  
Finally on DeSAST itself, there was recognition that it could add value to the research 
and design of STs. However, it is still likely to be challenging for end-users to identify 
potential sources of future social resistance within this products: 
We are still at the basic science stage [in this Wi-Fi project], and I think this 
[DeSAST tool] is very applications heavy, but I think it works. It seems to be good 
in terms of its guidance, but again, I think the misuse stuff (see Section 7 of 
DeSAST) – I would just say ‘how can it be misused?’ It’s difficult. 
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This concluding chapter begins by collating and presenting the primary findings of my 
dissertation. These results comprise my original contributions to the existing empirical 
research previously undertaken within the field of ST design and development. This is 
accompanied by discussions both of the limitations of my research and those areas 
identified as requiring future work.  
Following this, and to complete my dissertation, brief discussions on three related 
topics are included. These being: (1) the dual-use potential of the results produced 
herein; (2) alternative methods for incorporating the public into the design of STs while 
maintaining secrecy; and (3) a discussion of what my empirical research is able to say 
to the wider field of ST research. 
 
8.1 Statement of results  
Results with applicability beyond the borders of my specific dissertation were obtained 
within each of the diverse stages of the research project. I have collated and 
summarised the main findings here from each of the individual stages so as to highlight 
the contribution of my dissertation to the empirical research within the field of ST. 
Stage 1: Case study analysis of controversial STs 
Despite the diversity of form and function existing within the wide range of STs, it is 
possible to identify common controversies that appear repeatedly across multiple STs. 
Aided by the recurring nature of these controversies it is also possible to objectively 
organise them into categories. As a result of this realisation, in Table 2.13 I have been 
able to produce a taxonomy of common controversies incorporating forty-three 
controversies with applicability to the design and operation of any ST, irrespective of 
the nature of the controversy itself. 
Stage 2: Interviews with engineers and scientists 
The primary findings arising from the interviews with STEM practitioners engaged in 
the design of STs are as follows. Firstly there is the paucity of ethics or social impact 
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training for the interviewed ST designers. This was highlighted by the absence of ethics 
and social impact training within their core curriculum, which raises the question of 
whether concepts such as engineering ethics have any practical manifestation at the 
university level or only exist as an academic ideal? This lack of ethics and social science 
training is equally noted in those interviewees from disciplines other than engineering 
such as mathematics, physics, and computer science. Furthermore none of the 
interviewees undertook electives in social science or ethics. There is also an identified 
lack of conviction amongst the interviewees that they would opt for a subject on the 
social impact or ethics of their chosen fields should it be offered. Because there is 
already so much to learn within their chosen fields, interviewees are predominantly of 
the opinion that their time would be better spent on their core discipline and/or 
specialisation.    
On the construction and implementation of design tools to assist ST developers in 
anticipating and mitigating future negative societal responses to their technologies 
upstream in the design process, the interviewees confirmed that they currently did not 
use such tools. However, they were in favour of doing so providing they consider these 
tools add value to the design process.  
Stage 3: Assessment of existing tools/methods for use as an upstream design tool 
A set of eleven assessment criteria for the evaluation of tools/methods as suitable 
candidates for assisting the upstream development of STs are produced in Chapter 4.1. 
These represent the culmination of both the case studies undertaken in Stage 1 and 
the interview process undertaken in Stage 2. They are applied to selection of existing 
tools/methods in Chapter 5 and remain available for future assessment use.  
Stage 4: Creation of design rules and bespoke tools 
The primary output of Chapter 6 is a set of essential design rules for producing the 
upstream design tools envisaged within my dissertation179. These are essentially the 
combined product of all the previous chapters and can be used to guide the 
production of any future upstream design tool for assisting the developers of STs. 
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Also produced within Stage 4 are two design tools produced in accordance with these 
essential design rules; namely Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies 
and the Framework for Common Controversies within Security Technologies. These are 
reproduced in their entirety in Appendices K & L.  
 
8.2 Future research work 
As discussed in the preface my dissertation is intentionally broad in scope as it is 
intended to begin the process of addressing largely unexplored areas within the field 
of ST research. This is especially true in reference to the lack of research aimed at 
looking across both STs and commonalities of controversy (i.e. the multi-criteria 
conundrum as discussed at the start of Chapter 6.1). As a result there are a number of 
areas requiring future research work that are highlighted by the results of my 
dissertation. Additionally, given the dynamic nature of both ST construction and the 
values of societies, it is necessary to reflexively update many of the results contained 
herein. As such there would be value in engaging on future work within the areas 
identified below.     
In relation to the Taxonomy of controversial security technologies180, this is not 
intended to be a static document, but should be added to and refined as new 
controversial STs emerge. As stated in the case study methodology section (Chapter 
2.1.1), my research is cross-sectional, not longitudinal; in that it represents a temporal 
snap-shot of controversial STs operating at the time the case studies were undertaken. 
Since this point in time new candidates have arisen with the potential to add to this 
taxonomy, most notably PRISM and Tempora (see Huhne 2013), while in the future, 
advances in drones and their use in domestic policing and surveillance operations may 
well also constitute a viable candidate (see Pilkington 2013).  
Additionally, as new assessment methods are developed they should be assessed 
against the design criteria set out in Chapter 4.1 to determine; (a) whether they can 
operate as design tools for STs as conceptualised within my dissertation, (b) whether 
they can be modified to do so, or (c) if neither A or B is possible, whether there are 
                                                     
180
 See Table 2.13 
252 
 
elements of these new methods which can be included in future ST design tools. One 
promising area which may prove useful in this regard is that of Responsible Research 
and Innovation. Described by von Schomberg (2011, p.9) as: 
a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators 
become mutually responsive to each other with a view on the (ethical) 
acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process 
and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific 
and technological advances in our society),  
or more broadly by Stilgoe et al (2013) as “taking care of the future through collective 
stewardship of science and innovation in the present” (p.1570). While obviously 
relevant to the design of STs, with its emphasis on inclusion181 it remains to be 
determined how responsible research and innovation can incorporate a requirement 
for secrecy.    
Finally the two tools developed as part of my research (FCC and DeSAST) need to be 
fully tested. A preliminary application of DeSAST is undertaken in Chapter 7 but this is 
only intended a precursor to a rigorous assessment and validation process; not a 
substitute for one.  
 
8.3 The dual-use potential of this dissertation 
As stated throughout my dissertation, once a design tool (such as DeSAST or FCC) has 
been created and made public, the creator of these tools loses the ability to control 
who uses them and how they are used. Decisions on how they are to be applied now 
rest in the hands of future users. In an effort to move away from the notion of STEM 
practitioners utilising the knowledge incorporated within DeSAST and the FCC for the 
purpose of improving the social acceptability of their STs, I have identified three 
alternative end-users, each with different agendas.  
1. Campaigners opposed to STs: Both the FCC and DeSAST could be used by those 
opposing STs as blueprints for identifying specific shortcomings in the design of a 
ST. These shortcomings could then be used as focal points for developing social 
resistance through targeted media campaigns, etc.  
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2. Those seeking to circumvent and/or abuse STs: A number of the commonalities of 
controversy identified within my dissertation arise from the ability of a ST to be 
abused/misused or from a ST failing to achieve its purported security goals. It 
would be possible to use these commonalities to critique an implemented ST and 
identify weaknesses in its design that would assist in the circumvention of that ST, 
or to highlight ways to abuse that technology.         
3. Sociologists researching ST designers and developers: Chapter 7 entailed an initial 
application of DeSAST by a STEM practitioner to a ST under development. The 
resulting responses by this end-user were incredibly rich given the small amount 
of data collected. As a result, I argue that DeSAST could be used by sociologists, 
when examining how STEM practitioners go about developing STs, as a starting 
point for the construction and conducting of interviews. It could constitute a 
ready-made tool for eliciting the thought processes of those designing STs. By 
identify design elements and potential future controversies which the developer 
considers important and likely, and those which they reject, could provide 
valuable insights into the how ST designers operate.  
This list of possible end-users and their applications of the FCC and DeSAST is far from 
comprehensive, and I make no claims over the likelihood these design tools will be 
used in such manners. The point here is simply to argue that human ingenuity affords 
us the capacity to take an object developed for one purpose and apply it to another; 
and that my design tools are in no way exempt from this practice.  
   
8.4 Alternative methods for incorporating the public 
As stated in Chapter 1.3, in seeking to assist the developers of STs in identifying and 
mitigating potential sources of social controversy within their designs, I have chosen to 
work within those existing structures that govern the security industry. As such the 
dominant factor influencing my work here is that of secrecy. As a consequence DeSAST 
is designed to operate without input from external actors (i.e. the public). However, as 
I also state in Chapter 1.3, even though I adopt this approach throughout my 
dissertation I do not endorse processes which prevents the designers of STs benefiting 
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from the valuable views of the public upstream in ST design. Equally though, per my 
discussion in Chapter 1.4 of the legitimate need for maintaining elements of secrecy so 
as to maximise their potential of STs to provide security, neither do I advocate the 
wholesale abolition of secrecy. The question therefore becomes, if the restrictions on 
secrecy were to be relaxed (but not abolished) how could input from the public on a 
future ST be obtained without compromising its potential to work? I have two 
suggestions here. The first is the use of trusted citizen panels, and the second is the use 
of proxy technologies.  
Trusted citizen panels would consist of bringing together as diverse groups of 
individuals as possible (essentially a citizen jury) who would examine, and give their 
opinions of, proposed STs. They would be afforded complete access to the ST with no 
information being withheld from them. These individuals would volunteer to be 
members of such panels, though given the obvious security risks such panels would 
create, all those who are selected would first have to pass some form of security 
screening. However, so as to ensure these panels are sufficiently removed from the 
state and the security industry, such that they possess a different standpoint from 
those who desire the development and introduction of the STs under examination, no 
member of the panel can be a current/past member of the police, security services, 
military, etc., or employed as a ST designer. The results of these panel discussions 
would then be fed back into the ST design process. 
The use of proxy technologies for conducting research would work in the following 
way. Rather than presenting a particular proposed ST for discussion by the public, that 
ST could be anonymised by breaking it down into a number of elements/capabilities 
which are then presented as being parts of different hypothetical STs. These could 
then be assessed by different public focus groups. The anticipated benefit of this 
approach would be that the public could be involved in the design of STs in a manner 
which minimises the possibility of secrecy will be compromised. Additionally those 
members of the public on these focus groups would not need to be security vetted.  
Doubtlessly there are potential problems with both of these approaches, but the point 
of this discussion here is not to engage in a detailed analysis. Rather it is to make the 
point that with a little lateral thinking there are different ways the views of the public 
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can be ascertained and infused into the design of STs at only a minimal risk to those 
technologies. Given the potential damage arising from STs failing to attain public 
legitimacy, I argue that the benefits of such public engagement outweigh the inherent 
security costs.   
 
8.5 Points relevant to security technology research 
Looking beyond the knowledge generated throughout this project to specifically meet 
the originally stated research aim, in producing this dissertation my research also 
raises a number of points with relevance for the wider field of ST research. The first is 
the need to develop this field from a more holistic perspective. While there is a wealth 
of past and ongoing research in STs, it is primarily based on silos of knowledge; i.e. 
specific technologies or classes of technologies (such as CCTV or surveillance 
technologies), or specific controversies or classes of controversies (such as privacy or 
human rights). By continuing to focus research into these individual silos (as opposed 
to a holistic approach in which ST research is not limited by technology or controversy) 
two consequences arise. The first is the loss of opportunities taking such a narrow 
focus creates, such as the ability to; 
 make connections between different STs,  
 identify those factors which are common across STs and subsequently make use of 
such knowledge, and 
 recognise the value that work undertaken in one area may have beyond that area. 
The second consequence is that such an approach fails to reflect the development of 
STs with broader reach. This includes both the creation of ST systems (whereby 
individual STs are linked together) and the creation of STs with previously unachievable 
reach and functionality (such as the use of one ST as a platform to facilitate the 
operation of others, or a ST which brings together into a single black box STs which in 
the past would have been applied separately).   
The second point arising from my research is the imperative for researchers to gain a 
greater understanding of how the current STs are developed and to reflect this 
knowledge when producing methods for engaging with society. This point is primarily 
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aimed at the variety of innovation and impact assessment models as they are applied 
to STs which fail to take account of the impact of secrecy, and as a result assume a set 
of social rules/permissions which do not exist. Specifically I am referring to any 
assessment method which includes engagement with the public (as an identified 
stakeholder) as one of the steps involved. Failure to do so will result in the production 
of assessment methods which represent sound theory but cannot be applied to those 
STs that are designed and operate under constraints of secrecy (which arguably would 
include the majority of those that would benefit most from such assessment methods).  
My final point of relevance pertains to the field of ethics in relation to the design of 
STs. There is a need to challenge the lack of social training for STEM actors who create 
these products, beginning with the assumption that their formal education courses 
incorporate sufficient ethics training. In relation to engineering, there appears to be an 
element of a ‘job well done’ sentiment within the academic literature pertaining to the 
rise of engineering ethics. However, through my interviews with engineers it becomes 
clear that it is perfectly possible (if not highly likely) that these individuals will 
complete their formal education without ever addressing ethics or social issues. In 
addition, STs today are also created by scientists who are even less likely than 
engineers to encounter these subjects in their formal education; such as physicists, 
mathematicians, and chemists. While academics in the past have addressed the need 
for ethics within engineering given its perceived role in the design process of 
technologies, there is not the same focus on the need to address the same lack of 
ethics and social science training of mathematicians. Yet in the field of STs, the work of 
mathematicians may well possess the greatest potential to (negatively) impact the 
rights of citizens through the development of data mining and profiling algorithms. 
 
8.6 Reflections on the design of socially acceptable STs 
My decision to undertake this PhD began with a simple question, ‘why is it that we 
keep building such socially unacceptable STs?’ which in turn led to the reflective retort 
‘and what exactly can I do about it?’ My response is this dissertation, intended to assist 
those STEM practitioners who are designing STs to anticipate which of their design 
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choices are most likely to evoke social resistance so they can choose an alternative 
path. In so doing I am trying to work with the world as it exists today, accepting the 
enforced restrictions on public access and participation. These are ideals which are all 
too often sacrificed in the name of secrecy and national security. I also accept the 
undeniable fact that when it comes to the overall process of the design and 
deployment of STs, there are no silver bullets for ensuring public acceptability. From 
the chain of actors beginning with the state official who desires a particular technology 
so as to address a perceived security threat through to the end-point at which a 
technological fix in the form of a ST has been deployed into the hands of multiple end-
users, there are simply too many variables and actors at play for a single perfect 
solution for ensuring acceptability to exist. Incremental measures which seek to 
address individual links in the chain, such as the design tools aimed at upstream 
developers that I have proposed, may be the only realistic way forward.  
This imperative to provide security is often used by government, security services, and 
law enforcement officials to justify the design and development of some new ST. But 
there is a point I made in the introduction of my dissertation which needs to be 
reiterated here; that being the distinction between legality and legitimacy. A security 
technology can be conceived, designed, and deployed in a manner which meets all the 
legal requirements operating within a society. However, if this ST is not considered 
acceptable by the citizens who comprise this society, then they will not afford it 
legitimacy. As my research has repeatedly shown, if a ST does not attain this status of 
legitimacy then it will not survive unscathed in the mid- to long-term. When this 
happens everybody involved, including the state, the company producing the 
technology, the end-user, and those subjected to this unacceptable ST, suffer as a 
result. This is why the desire to design socially acceptable security technologies is a 
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Appendix A Interviewee consent form. 
 
I agree to be interviewed by the interviewer (Mr Timothy Nissen) as part of his PhD research 
project into the design of security technologies. The purpose of this interview is; (1) to gain an 
understanding of how security technologies are produced, including the freedoms and 
constraints under which you work as part of this process; (2) to understand what information, 
ethical considerations, and social values you import into the design of security technologies; 
and (3) to identify the components of your professional education. The overall goal of this 
research project is the creation of design tools which will ultimately assist you in the 
identification and mitigation of negative social responses to your security technologies, for use 
upstream in the design process.   
This research project is being undertaken at University College London within the Department 
for Security and Crime Science. This project is under the supervision of Dr Alex Braithwaite 
(020 76794986, alex.braithwaite@ucl.ac.uk) and Dr Brian Balmer (020 76793924, 
b.balmer@ucl.ac.uk). If you have any queries or complaints about the conduct of this research 
project you can contact either of these individuals.  
As the interviewee you have the right to refuse to answer any questions during the interviews. 
You also have the right to withdraw from this project at any time. If you do choose to 
withdraw after your interview, all data collected from you will be deleted from the dissertation 
and destroyed. 
After preliminary discussions with a number of potential interviewees regarding privacy 
concerns, the interviewer agrees to the following provisions in relation to this project: 
 I will strictly maintain the anonymity of all interviewees, both during and after the 
completion of this project. This will include: 
o Not including or divulging the interviewee names, their employers, or current/past 
projects undertaken by the interviewees to anyone – including my supervisors, 
examiners, or UCL.  
 Within the dissertation write-up, strict anonymity will be maintain, including the removal 
of all identifiers, no use of pseudo-anonymisation, and no use of identifiers that will 
permit the aggregation of responses.  
 All data collected will be stored as encrypted files on a non-networked computer. 
 After the interview data is collected and written-up, all interviewees will be afforded the 
opportunity to vet what is written so as to agree any changes they may require.  
 After the write-up is agreed, all collected data will be permanently destroyed. 
 



























Identity Cards Act 2006 
1 The National Identity Register 
(3) The statutory purposes are to facilitate, by the maintenance of a secure and 
reliable record of registrable facts about individuals in the United Kingdom- 
(a) the provision of a convenient method for such individuals to prove 
registrable facts about themselves to others who reasonably require proof; 
and 
(b) the provision of a secure and reliable method for registrable facts about 
such individuals to be ascertained or verified wherever that is necessary in the 
public interest. 
(4) For the purposes of this Act something is necessary in the public interest if, and 
only if, it is – 
  (a) in the interests of national security; 
  (b) for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime; 
  (c) for the purposes of the enforcement of immigration controls; 
(d) for the purposes of the enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised 
working or employment; or 
(e) for the purpose of securing the efficient & effective provision of public 
services 
(5) In this Act “registrable fact”, in relation to an individual, means- 
(i) information about occasions on which information recorded about him in 
the Register has been provided to any person 
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Identity Documents Act 2010 
2 Cancellation of ID cards etc 
(1) No ID cards are to be issued by the Secretary of State at any time on or after the 
day on which this Act is passed.  
(2) All ID cards that are valid immediately before that day are to be treated as 
cancelled by the Secretary of State at the end of the period of one month beginning 
with that day. 
 
3 Destruction of information recorded in National Identity Register 
The Secretary of State must ensure that all the information recorded in the National 
Identity Register is destroyed before the end of the period of two months beginning 
with the day on which this Act is passed. 
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Appendix E The origin and nature of the individually 
























































































































              
 
Whole Body Scanners 
WBS1    X  X       illegality  
WBS2    X  X  X     Human Rights Act; privacy; 
proportionality 
WBS3 X     X      X rule of law; arbitrary use  
WBS3a  X    X       rule of law  
WBS3b  X     X      unnecessary; unjustified  
WBS3c X     X X      undeterminable illegality; 
trust 
WBS3d X      X     X trust; lack of information 
WBS3e  X     X     X trust; lack of oversight 
WBS3f X     X  X    X discrimination; trust; 
propensity for abuse; minority 
burden 
WBS4 X     X  X     discrimination; minority 
burden 
WBS5 X   X  X  X   X  discrimination; minority 
burden 
WBS6    X X      X  unjustified risk; unproven; 
questionable necessity  
WBS6a    X X        unknown health effects 
WBS6b    X X        unknown health effects  
WBS7   X    X     X trust; misuse 
WBS8   X X   X    X X trust; unnecessary 
functionality; misuse 
WBS9 X X     X X     trust; unnecessary; 
unjustified; privacy 
WBS10  X     X      trust; unjustified 
WBS11 X      X      trust; unfair; minority burden 
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WBS11a  X    X X     X undeterminable illegality; 
trust; propensity for misuse 
WBS12    X    X   X  privacy; excessive 
functionality 
 
National Identity Schemes 
NIS1  X     X  X    trust; oversold; dubious 
claims; questionable 
accounting 
NIS2  X  X    X   X  function creep; excessive 
functionality; privacy 
NIS2a  X    X X    X  data misuse; trust; function 
creep 
NIS3  X  X   X X     data misuse; privacy 
NIS3a X   X    X    X privacy; informational self-
determination; propensity for 
misuse 
NIS3b X  X X  X X X    X data misuse; undeterminable 
illegality; informational self-
determination; privacy; 
propensity for misuse 
NIS3c X  X         X propensity for abuse 
NIS4    X       X  excessive functionality; 
questionable necessity  
NIS4a    X    X   X  privacy; excessive 
functionality 
NIS4b    X   X X    X privacy; freedom to protest; 
trust; chilling effect; potential 
for misuse 
NIS4c    X    X     privacy; freedom of actions; 
freedom of expression; 
freedom of thought; freedom 
of association  
NIS5  X      X     privacy 
NIS5a  X     X X     unjustified; disproportional; 
privacy 
NIS5b X  X X  X X X  X  X data misuse; trust; privacy; 
informational self-
determination; jeopardises 
individual safety; lack of 
information; potential for 
misuse 
NIS6  X  X   X   X  X trust; jeopardises security; 
potential for misuse 
NIS7 X       X    X discrimination; potential for 
abuse 
NIS8    X      X X  easy to avoid; ineffective 
NIS8a    X      X X  easy to circumvent; 
ineffective 
NIS9    X     X  X  cost; unproven technology; 
excessive errors; ineffective 
NIS9a    X       X  excessive errors; potentially 
ineffective; decreasing 
reliability 




NIS11  X     X      falling public opinion 
NIS11a X X  X   X      unacceptability to society 
NIS11b  X     X X     unacceptability to society; 
unjustified; unfair; 
unnecessary; privacy 
NIS11c    X  X X X  X  X data misuse; trust; privacy; 
jeopardises safety/security; 
propensity for misuse/abuse 
NIC11d  X  X     X    cost; questionable accounting 
NIS11e  X     X  X    unnecessary to society; falling 
public opinion costs outweigh 
benefits 
NIS12    X      X   jeopardises safety/security 
NIS12a   X X      X  X jeopardises safety/security; 
propensity for abuse/misuse 
NIS13    X   X   X  X minority burden; risk rests 
with citizens; jeopardises 
safety/security; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIS14  X     X      burdensome to citizens 
NIS14a    X   X      burdensome to citizens; risk 
rests with citizens 
NIS15  X       X    cost 
 
National Identity Registers 
NIR1    X          
NIR1a    X     X    costly 
NIR1b    X       X  burden outweighs benefits; 
disproportional effect; 
questionable necessity 
NIR1c  X         X  burden outweighs benefits; 
questionable necessity 
NIR2 X  X   X X X  X  X data misuse; trust; public 
opinion; privacy; jeopardises 
safety/security; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIR3  X  X   X X   X  trust; disproportional; 
unnecessary; unacceptable to 




burdensome to citizens 
NIR3a  X  X   X   X  X privacy; jeopardises 
safety/security; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIR3b  X  X   X   X  X privacy; jeopardises 
safety/security; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIR4  X  X  X X   X X X data misuse; privacy; 
jeopardises safety/security; 
risk to citizens; doesn’t work; 
propensity for abuse/misuse 
NIR5  X X   X    X  X data misuse; open to insiders; 
propensity for abuse/misuse  




determination; trust; risk to 
citizens; jeopardises 
safety/security; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 




safety/security; open to 
insiders; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 




safety/security; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIR8    X      X   jeopardises safety/security 
NIR9   X X      X  X jeopardises safety/security; 
open to insiders; propensity 
for abuse/misuse 
NIR10  X X       X  X jeopardises safety/security; 
open to insiders; propensity 
for abuse/misuse 
NIR11  X    X  X     undetermined legality; privacy 
NIR11a X     X  X     undetermined legality; privacy 
NIR11b X     X  X     undetermined legality; privacy 
NIR11b1 X          X  ineffective 
NIR11b2 X          X  ineffective 
NIR11b3 X          X  unnecessary  
NIR11c X     X  X     data misuse; privacy; 
informational self-
determination 
NIR12 X     X       data misuse 
NIR12a X     X  X   X  data misuse; informational 
self-determination; function 
creep 
NIR12b X     X  X   X  data misuse; informational 
self-determination; excessive 
functionality 
NIR12c X     X     X  data misuse; excessive errors; 
burden on citizens 




NIR12e X     X  X  X X X data misuse; privacy; 
jeopardises safety/security; 
lacking essential functionality; 
propensity for abuse/misuse 
NIR13 X     X       potential illegality; rule of law 
 
National Identity Cards 
NIC1   X X      X  X jeopardises safety/security; 
open to insiders; facilitates 
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crimes; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIC1a    X      X   jeopardises safety/security 
NIC1b    X        X propensity for misuse 
NIC1c  X     X   X   oversold; dubious claims; 
jeopardises safety/security 
NIC1d  X        X   jeopardises safety/security; 
facilitates crimes 
NIC2    X      X   ease of circumvention 
NIC2a    X       X  doesn’t work (doesn’t fulfil 
purpose) 
NIC3    X      X X  jeopardises safety/security; 
unnecessary functionality (risk 
causing design feature) 
NIC4    X      X   jeopardises safety/security; 
easy to circumvent; open to 
insiders 
NIC5  X           (na) 
NIC5a    X         jeopardises safety/security 
(creates a target); open to 
insiders 
NIC5b    X       X  burdensome to citizens; (open 
to) excessive errors; 
decreasing reliability 
NIC6  X         X  questionable necessity  
NIC6a  X         X  doesn’t work; not suitably 
effective 
NIC6b  X         X  doesn’t work (doesn’t fulfil 
purpose); not suitably 
effective 
NIC6c  X         X  doesn’t work (doesn’t fulfil 
purpose); not suitably 
effective 
NIC7   X     X    X discrimination; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
NIC8   X       X  X jeopardises safety/security; 
propensity for abuse/misuse 
NIC9  X     X X X  X  trust; cost; privacy; excessive 
functionality 
 
National/Mass Biometric Systems 
MB1    X       X  variable effectiveness  
MB1a    X       X  variable effectiveness 
MB1b    X       X  variable effectiveness; quality 
control 
MB1c    X       X  quality control 
MB1d    X       X  variable effectiveness 
MB1e    X       X  variable effectiveness 
MB2    X    X   X  discrimination; variable 
effectiveness; doesn’t work 
(excludes certain groups); 
minority burden 
MB3    X    X   X  discrimination; variable 
effectiveness; doesn’t work 




MB4    X       X  variable effectiveness; not 
suitably effective; 
burdensome to citizens 
MB5       X X   X  minority burden; unfair; 
discrimination; burdensome 
to citizens; doesn’t work 
(excludes certain groups) 
MB6    X      X X  easy to circumvent; 
ineffective 
MB7    X       X  false positives/negatives 
MB8    X   X    X  trust (end-users); oversold 
(end-users); unproven; 
doesn’t work; burdensome to 
citizens 
MB9    X      X X  can be circumvented; not 
suitably effective (limited in 
what it can achieve) 
MB10    X       X  burdensome to citizens 
 
Profiling Technologies 
PT1    X       X  doesn’t work 
PT2    X       X  ineffective 
PT2a    X       X  ineffective (easily 
circumvented) 
PT3    X       X  doesn’t work; ineffective 
(limited effectiveness) 
PT4    X  X  X   X  data misuse; discrimination; 
minority burden  
PT5    X  X  X     discrimination 
PT5a    X   X      unacceptable to society 
PT5b    X  X  X     rule of law; 
discrimination/inequality 
PT5c    X   X X     minority burden; 
discrimination (inequality) 
PT5d    X   X      unacceptable to society; 
unfair; minority burden 
PT5e    X   X      minority burden; 
counterproductive  
PT6    X    X     discrimination; (facilitates) 
inequality 
PT7    X    X     discrimination; (exacerbates) 
inequality 
PT8  X     X      unfair; minority burden 
PT8a  X     X      unfair; unjustified 
PT8b  X     X X     unfair; minority burden; 
discrimination 
PT8c  X     X      unfair; unacceptable to 
society 
PT9    X   X    X  unfair; unjustified; false 
positives 
PT10  X  X   X X     counterproductive; 
unacceptable to society; 
burden outweighs benefits; 
discrimination 





PT12  X     X X     minority burden; 
discrimination/inequality 
PT13    X    X   X  discrimination; false positives; 
burdensome to citizens; not 
suitably effective; excessive 
errors 
PT13a    X       X  not suitably effective; 
burdensome to citizens 





DMI1  X  X  X X X    X data misuse; unacceptable to 
society; disproportionate; 
trust; privacy; informational 
self-determination; 
jeopardises safety/security; 
propensity for abuse/misuse 
DMI1a  X     X      unacceptable to society 
DMI2   X X   X      trust (end-user); false 
positives 
DMI3  X      X     privacy; liberty; burden 
outweighs benefits 
DMI4 X X     X      unjustified; unfair; minority 
(individual) burden 
DMI5  X    X X      undeterminable illegality; 
unfair 
DMI5a  X    X X      undeterminable illegality; 
trust (opaque decision 
making) 
DMI5b  X    X X     X undeterminable illegality; 
trust; unfair; minority 
(individual) burden; lack of 
information 
DMI6  X          X lack of oversight 
DMI6a  X  X        X lack of oversight; lack of 
information 
DMI6b  X     X     X trust; lack of oversight 
DMI6c  X    X X     X undeterminable illegality; 
(possible) discrimination; 
trust; unacceptable to society; 
lack of information 
DMI7    X  X       undeterminable illegality; rule 
of law (unchallengeable 
decision-making) 
DMI7a    X  X       undeterminable illegality; rule 
of law (unchallengeable 
decision-making) 
DMI7b    X  X      X undeterminable illegality; lack 
of information; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
DMI8  X    X       undeterminable illegality  
DMI9    X       X  not suitably effective 
(correlation not causality) 
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DMI10  X    X      X rule of law (fair hearing); 
indeterminable illegality; lack 
of information 




DMI11a    X       X  not suitably effective (beyond 
limits of technology)  
DMI12    X       X  not suitably effective (beyond 
limits of technology) 
DMI13    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
susceptible to errors; 
decreasing reliability 
DMI13a    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
questionable data 
DMI13b    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
questionable data 
DMI13c    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
questionable data 
DMI13d    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
questionable data 
DMI13e    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
human error 
DMI13f    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
questionable data 
DMI14    X       X  doesn’t (always) work 
(dependent upon 
uncontrollable factors) 
DMI14a    X       X  doesn’t (always) work 
(dependent upon 
uncontrollable factors) 
DMI15  X  X    X   X  liberty; questionable 
accuracy; not suitably 
effective (beyond limits of 
technology) 
DMI16   X   X  X    X rule of law; presumption of 
innocence; misuse 
DMI17    X   X    X  minority (individual) burden; 
unfair; false positives 
DMI17a  X     X    X  minority (individual) burden; 
unfair; false positives; 
excessive functionality 
DMI18    X       X  questionable accuracy; 
questionable data; minority 
burden 
DMI18a    X       X  human (programming) 
error/bias 
DMI19  X      X     (na) 
DMI19a    X    X     chilling effect; freedom of 
expression; freedom to 
protest 
DMI19b  X      X     privacy; limiting autonomy; 
freedom to dissent; chilling 
effect 





DMI19d    X    X     privacy 
DMI19e  X X     X  X   privacy; jeopardises 
safety/security 
DMI19f  X      X     privacy; burdens outweigh 
benefits; chilling effect 
 
Data Matching 
DMA1    X       X  false positives; increasing 
errors; questionable 
accuracy/data 
DMA1a X   X   X    X  unfair; disproportional; 
increasing errors; 
burdensome to citizens 
DMA1b X X     X      unfair; minority (individual) 
burden; disproportional 
DMA1c X X     X      unfair; minority (individual) 
burden; disproportional 
DMA1c1 X X     X      unfair; minority (individual) 
burden; disproportional 
DMA2  X  X   X    X  unacceptable to society; 
disproportionate; trust; 
dubious claims; questionable 
accuracy/data; doesn’t work 
DMA3 X     X X      undeterminable legality; rule 
of law; trust 
DMA3a X X    X X    X  undeterminable legality; 
trust; lacking essential 
functionality 
DMA4  X  X  X  X     rule of law (fair trial); 
undeterminable legality; right 
to a fair hearing 
DMA5  X      X     chilling effect; freedom to 




Closed Circuit Television 
CTV1  X     X      oversold; doesn’t fulfil claims; 
falling public opinion 
CTV2    X   X    X  doesn’t fulfil claims; 
ineffective 
CTV2a  X     X    X  doesn’t fulfil claims; 
ineffective 
CTV3    X       X  (sometimes) ineffective 
CTV3a    X       X  (sometimes) doesn’t work 
CTV3b    X  X       (sometimes) doesn’t meet 
legal requirements 
CTV4  X     X    X  oversold; ineffective (on its 
own) 
CTV5  X     X      oversold; doesn’t fulfil claims 
CTV6  X     X      (some uses) unacceptable to 
society; conditional public 
support 
CTV7 X X     X     X unacceptable to society; 
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conditional public support; 
disproportional 
CTV8   X       X  X jeopardises safety/security; 
propensity for misuse/abuse; 
misuse 
CTV9  X    X       illegality; data misuse 
CTV10  X     X      unacceptable to society; 
disproportional 
CTV10a  X     X     X unacceptable to society; 
propensity for misuse/abuse 
CTV10b  X     X      unacceptable to society 
CTV11  X X    X      trust; unacceptable to society; 
minority burden 
CTV11a  X X    X      trust; unacceptable to society; 
minority burden 









CTV12b   X    X      trust; unacceptable to society; 
minority burden; 
counterproductive 
CTV12c   X    X      trust; unacceptable to society 
 
Hand-Held Explosive Detectors 
HED1    X       X  doesn’t work (scam) 
HED1a    X   X   X   trust; jeopardises 
safety/security 
HED1b    X      X   jeopardises safety/security 




MS1   X    X      unacceptable to society 
MS2  X    X       (potential) illegality  
MS3  X    X       (potential) illegality 
MS4  X    X       (potential) illegality 
MS5  X      X     potential human rights 
violations 
MS5a  X      X     freedom of association; 
freedom of assembly  
MS5b  X      X     discrimination (age) 
MS6  X    X       illegal 
MS6a  X    X  X     illegal; human rights violation 
MS6b  X     X      minority burden; 
counterproductive 
MS6c    X X        (potential) health hazard 
MS6d  X     X    X  minority burden; not suitably 
effective 
MS7  X  X  X  X     illegality; discrimination (age); 
289 
 
freedom of movement; 
freedom of assembly  
MS8  X     X      counterproductive; unfair 
MS9  X  X   X    X  disproportional; unfair; 
minority burden; not suitably 
effective 
MS10  X     X      counterproductive; unfair 
MS11    X X   X     physical discomfort; 
degrading; 
discrimination/inequality 
MS12  X      X     freedom of movement; 
discrimination/inequality 
MS12a  X    X  X     undetermined legality; 
discrimination; freedom of 
movement; freedom of 
assembly 
MS12b  X     X      unjustified 
MS13  X      X  X   freedom of 
assembly/movement; 
jeopardises safety/security 
MS13a  X        X   jeopardises safety/security 
MS14  X  X  X  X     undetermined illegality; 
discrimination (age) 
MS14a  X     X      minority burden 
MS15  X     X      disproportional; unacceptable 
to society; minority burden 
MS15a  X      X     discrimination/inequality; 
morally bereft 
MS15b  X     X    X  unfair; unjustified; not 
suitably effective; lacking 
essential functionality 
MS16    X       X  not suitably effective; 
indiscriminate 
MS16a    X   X    X  unfair; indiscriminate 
MS17    X   X    X  unfair; discriminatory; 
indiscriminate 
MS18    X   X    X  unfair; not suitably effective 
MS18a    X   X      unacceptable to society; 
unjustified 
MS18b    X   X      unfair; unacceptable to 
society; minority burden 
MS18c X   X   X      unacceptable to society; 
unjustified; minority burden 
MS19  X     X      counterproductive; 
unacceptable to society 
MS19a  X    X X      banned; counterproductive; 
unacceptable to society 
MS20    X X        unjustified health effect; pain 
 
Less Lethal Weapons 
LW1  X     X      conditional public support 
LW1a  X     X      (acceptable = public support) 
LW1b  X     X      unacceptable to society; 
unjustified 




LW3   X    X      unacceptable to society; 
unjustified (overuse) 
LW4  X   X  X X     pain; unacceptable to society; 
unethical 
LW5  X X    X      unacceptable to society; trust; 
falling public support 




LW6 X      X      unacceptable to society 
(overuse); counterproductive 
LW7    X X        can kill 
LW7a  X     X      trust 
LW7b  X     X      trust; falling public support 
LW8 X   X X        causes permanent injuries 
LW9  X   X  X      undetermined health risks; 
unacceptable to society; trust 
LW9a  X     X      trust 
LW10    X X  X    X  undetermined health risks; 
trust; quality control 
problems 
LW11  X     X      trust 
LW12    X X        variable/uncontrollable health 
effects; minority burden 
LW12a    X X        variable/uncontrollable health 
effects; minority burden 
LW12b    X X        variable/uncontrollable health 
effects; minority burden 
LW12c    X X        variable/uncontrollable health 
effects; minority burden 
LW12d    X X        variable/uncontrollable health 
effects; minority burden 
LW12e    X X        variable/uncontrollable health 
effects; minority burden 
LW13 X      X      unacceptable to society 
(targets) 
LW14  X   X        risk of injury/death (testing 
phase) 
LW15    X       X  indiscriminate; 
counterproductive 
LW15a   X X       X  counterproductive 
LW16   X   X X   X  X undetermined illegality; 
unacceptable to society; 
jeopardises safety; 
misuse/abuse (by officials) 
LW17   X    X     X unacceptable to society; 
misuse/abuse (by officials) 
LW18    X  X X X    X illegality; unacceptable to 
society; torture; 
misuse/abuse 
LW19 X         X  X jeopardises safety; lack of 
oversight; propensity for 
abuse/misuse 
LW20 X  X    X     X unacceptable to society; 










LW22 X      X      unacceptable to society; 
unjustified; 
counterproductive 
LW22a X  X    X     X unacceptable to society (use); 
undermining public support; 
misuse/abuse (overuse) 
LW23 X  X    X     X counterproductive; 
misuse/abuse (overuse) 
LW23a X      X      unacceptable to society; 
conditional public support 
LW23b  X     X      (na) 
LW24 X   X   X    X  unacceptable to society; 
disproportional; not suitably 
effective; counterproductive 
LW25  X     X      conditional public support 
LW25a  X     X      (dependent on) public 
opinion; conditional public 
support 
LW26 X           X propensity for abuse/misuse 
(overuse); lack of oversight; 
lack of information 
LW26a X           X propensity for abuse/misuse 
(overuse); lack of oversight 
LW27 X      X      conditional public support 














Appendix F The Stage 2 questionnaire 
 
Education questions: 
A1:    What academic and professional qualifications do you have? 
 are you currently studying for any others? 
 (if self-taught) how did you go about doing that? 
A2:    What professional work experience do you have? 
(depending on number/type of qualification, repeat question A3 for each) 
A3:    Describe to me the make-up of your undergraduate / postgraduate course?  
A4:    Give me an idea of the subjects that you were taught? 
 Was it rigid and structured or was there flexibility in the choice of subjects you 
could take? 
 What electives did you choose? 
 Were there any compulsory or elective subjects that could be described as 
social-science subjects, such as the role of the engineer in society, the 
responsibilities of engineers, the impact of engineering on society, that sort of 
thing?  
o What were they? 
o (if elective) Did you take them? (why? / why not?) 
o (if taken) What sorts of things were you taught? 
 Did topics such as these form smaller components of some of the technically-
focussed subjects within your course? 
o What were they? 
A5:    What about engineering ethics; was this covered/taught? 
 (if no social-science / ethics components were taught) In your opinion why is it 
that issues like ‘the role of engineers in society’ or ‘engineering ethics’ were 
not taught during your degree? 
 A7(if social-science / ethics components were offered but not chosen by this 
interviewee) Why did you choose not to take these subjects? What was your 
thinking on the matter?  
293 
 
A6:    Are you a member of any professional bodies related to your qualifications? 
 (if yes) Are you bound by certain codes of conduct as a result of your 
membership? 
o Do you know what they are?  
o How were you taught/informed about them? 
Working Practice questions: 
B1:    What’s your occupation?  
 What does this entail? 
B2:    Talk we through a normal work day for you, assuming one such exists? 
B3:    Explain to me what happens when a new design project is announced? 
 Are you part of the negotiations or tendering process for such design projects 
or do you only find out about it once others within your company have agreed 
to do the work? 
 What do the discussions leading up the start of accepting a project entail? 
 Do you work alone when working on a project or as part of a team? 
 How is the work for these projects divided?  
o Is all the work given to one person, or is it divided amongst a number 
of individuals?  
o Or is all the work given to one team and that team then divides the 
work? 
o Or is it divided up between multiple teams with each responsible for 
their own component? 
o (if not just one individual) 
 How does communication occur between the different people / 
groups working on a project?  
 Is it formal with specified meetings, informal in its occurrence, 
or a combination of the two? 
 Are you given information about the whole of the project you are working on, 
or just the part of the project that you are specifically working on? 
 So from the moment a project has been announced and the work divided, 
how is the work completed and overseen as the project progresses? 
 What happens when or if a previously unrecognised or unanticipated problem 
becomes apparent when completing a project?  
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B4:    How detailed are the specs you are given at the start of a project? 
 How binding are these?  
o Do they allow for ‘wriggle-room’ or are the parameters always 
stringently defined and adhered to? 
 What happens if you realise there is a better way of doing something which 
the client may not have realised but will require the specs be changed? 
 How much influence do you have on projects you are given? 
 Do specs include ‘desirable components’ as well as ‘mandatory components’ 
when working to time and cost constraints? 
B5:    When working to a budget within a project, how do you justify and rank the 
costs by importance?  
 Is this information decided when the project is negotiated, or does it fluctuate 
as the project progresses? 
Thoughts and Opinions of the Tools: 
C1: What tools do you already use to identify social issues when beginning a 
project? 
(for each listed) Explain how they work, how long they take, describe the output, how 
useful are they, and what are the strengths and weaknesses?  
C2: Do you think there needs to be different tools specifically for group-use and 
others specifically for use by individuals? 
 (if yes) Why? And how should they differ? 
C3: When would be the best time in the design process to use the proposed tools? 
 Why? 
C4: How long should it take to learn how to use a tool for the first time? 
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C5:    Regarding the instructions for the tools: 
 How long could they be before you stopped reading them? 
 Should they be very detailed or should they be fairly abstract? 
 Would it be valuable if they contain concrete examples of how each aspect of 
the tools are applied to a real-life or hypothetical design project? 
 Do you think there is a risk that providing specific examples of use would not 
just provide guidance to the user but would restrict the user by narrowing 
their perception of how the tool could be used? 
 At the point when reading the instructions for the first time, what would make 
you throw them away and give up on the whole idea entirely? 
C6:    Would you want to have somebody step you through how the tools are used, 
especially if you had never used them before? 
C7:    How long should any tool take to use? 
 Is it realistic to think this time would be available? 
C8:    What format would you want the tool to be in? (paper based or digital) 
C9:    Which of the following options for the form of this tool appeal to you most?  
 Firstly for tools aimed at individuals, would you want them to be based on: 
o Checklists 
o Risk assessment tools, such as event tree / fault trees, etc. 
o Frameworks 
o Games 
o Stories based on real life events 
o Probabilities 
o Some other basis (please state) 
 Are there any other designs of tools for individuals you think would make a 
suitable template? 
 Secondly for tools aimed at groups, would you want them to be based on: 
o Checklists 
o Risk assessment tools, such as event tree / fault trees, etc. 
o Frameworks 
o Games 
o Stories based on real life events 
o Probabilities 
o Some other basis (please state) 




C10:    Would they need to be bespoke to a particular security product (such as CCTV) 
or could their design be generalised so as to apply to all products? 
 Would it be better to have a generalised base with add-on components 
depending on the specific technology(s) being looked at (e.g. 
imaging/recognition, biometric, profiling, etc.)?  
C11:    Would they need to be bespoke to a particular engineering discipline (such as 
electronic, civil, or software) or could their design be generalised so as to apply to all 
disciplines? 
 Would it be better to have a generalised base with add-on components 
depending on the specific discipline(s) of the user? 
C12:    What do you think this tool should be able to achieve? 
C13:    What form should the output take so as to be of greatest value: 
 Should it be quantitative (a number or value) allowing the identification of 
potential issues, or should it be qualitative (offering advice or identifying 
future problems)? 
o Should it be both? 
 Should it offer potential solutions based on previous controversies from other 
similar or related technologies? 
o (if yes) Do you worry this might have the unintended consequence of 
stifling innovation by focussing designers on the past rather than 
looking for new solutions? 
C14:    Regardless of what form the output takes, what would you want a tool like this 
to actually tell you about what it is you are working on? 
 What is would it have to achieve / produce to make you want to use it? 
 Would you use these tools if they were mandatory within you project? 
 Would you use these tools if they were optional within your project? 
C15:    What would stop you or prevent you from using the tools I am describing? 
C16:    Do you see any value in using such tools? (why? / why not?) 
C17:    Do you think your final products would be improved by the use of such tools? 
 (why? / why not?) 
C18:    Do you think engineers in general would benefit from such tools? 
 Do you think they need such tools? 
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C19:    Do you see it as the responsibility of people in your profession to have to worry 
about any future negative social impacts of designs you are employed to build? 
 why? / why not? 
o (if not) primarily whose responsibility do you think this is then? 
Final Miscellaneous Questions: 
D1:    Is there anything else I should be aware of, or keep in mind, when designing 
these tools? 





Appendix G Ethical impact assessment of information 
technology framework182 
Ethical Principles   Related Values / Issues 
Respect for autonomy (right to 
liberty) 
 Dignity 
 Informed consent 
Nonmaleficence (avoiding harm)  Safety 
 Social solidarity, inclusion and exclusion 
 Isolation and substitution of human 
contact 
 Discrimination and social sorting 
Beneficence  Universal service 
 Accessibility 
 Value sensitive design 
 Sustainability 
Justice  Equality and fairness (social justice) 
Privacy and data protection  Collection limitation (data minimisation) 
and retention 
 Data quality 
 Purpose specification 
 Use limitation 
 Transparency (openness) 
 Individual participation and access to data 
 Anonymity 
 Privacy of personal communications: 
monitoring and location tracking 
 Privacy of the person 




                                                     
182
 Taken from Wright (2011) 
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Appendix H Anticipatory technology ethics checklist183 
 Harms and risks 
 Health and bodily harm 
 Pain and suffering 
 Psychological harm 
 Harm to human capabilities 
 Harms to society 
 Rights 
 Freedom 
o Freedom of movement 
o Freedom of speech and expression 
o Freedom of assembly 
 Autonomy 
o Ability to think one’s own thoughts and form one’s own opinions 
o Ability to make one’s own choices 
o Responsibility and accountability 
o Informed consent 
 Human dignity 
 Privacy 
o Information privacy 
o Bodily privacy 
o Relational privacy 
 Property 
o Right to property 
o Intellectual property rights 
 Other basic human rights as specified in human rights declarations (e.g., 
to life, to have a fair trial, to vote, to receive an education, to pursue 
happiness, to seek asylum, to engage in peaceful protest, to practice 
ones religion, to work for anyone, to have a family, etc.) 
 Animal rights and animal welfare 
 Justice (distributive) 
 Just distribution of primary goods, capabilities, risks and hazards 
 Non-discrimination and equal treatment relative to age, gender, sexual 
orientation, social class, race, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc. 
 North-south justice 
 Intergenerational justice 
                                                     
183
 Taken from Brey (2011) 
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 Social inclusion  
 Well-being and the common good 
 Supportive of happiness, health, knowledge, wisdom, virtue friendship, 
trust, achievement, desire-fulfilment, and transcendent meaning 
 Supportive of vital social institutions and structures 
 Supportive of democracy and democratic institutions 














                                                     
184
 Taken from Tucker (2012), p.69 
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Appendix J  Assessments of existing methodologies 
 
Candidate:  CHECKLISTS (5.2.1) Category:  N/A 










1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  Checklist-centric design tools could readily be created 
for use before work on the actual construction of a ST 
commences.  
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusion here. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
Yes  There is requirement of involving external actors when 
using checklists.  
4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  Checklists could assist designers by clarifying the 
elements of a proposed future design, thus highlighting 
areas of concern. 







The binary nature of the output from a checklist does 
possess the potential to add value to any ST. However 
because of the closed-ended nature of this output the 
level of detail it can provide to end-users is limited. 
This in turn could impact upon a checklist design tool’s 
ability to influence the design process.  
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Yes  No obvious preclusion here. 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
Yes  Checklists are probably the most intuitive to use of all 
the methodologies and models examined here.  
8. Minimal use-
time required 
Yes  Because of their simple nature, and the minimal data-
input required when using one, checklists should be 









The closed-ended nature of a checklist means it will 
struggle to deal with controversies which are not 
themselves presented in a ‘yes’/’no’ format. And given 
the contextual nature of the vast majority of 
controversies identified, it is likely a model or 
methodology possessing the potential to collect more 
granular information will be required to supplement a 
checklist-based approach. 







for each commonality of controversy. Additionally 
others may need to be created for each ST those 
commonalities are applied to. This may result in the 
necessary creation of an exponential number of 
checklists. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  




Checklists are essentially closed-ended questions; 
hence the value of any output may be limited. It would 
be possible to expand upon the nature of this output 
but this would demand the addition of secondary 
processes into a checklist-based model which would 
come into effect depending upon the answer(s) 
provided to the initial ‘yes’/’no’ question.   
Notes: Checklists have numerous benefits allowing them to successfully meet many of the 
identified assessment criteria. They can be relative quick, are intuitive to use, do not require 
external actors, and can readily be employed at the start of an ST project. However there are 
drawbacks. The nature of their output is limited, which in turn may limit the value they can 
add to a project. They will struggle to address commonalities which require open-ended 
responses, and a single defined checklist may not be applicable to all STs without modification. 
Conclusion: Checklists could readily be employed within design tools aimed at the developers 
of STs as envisioned within the constraints of this project, however not as a stand-alone tool. 
They would either need to supplement, or be supplemented by, other methodologies or 
models to overcome their intrinsic limitations.   
 
 
Candidate:  PRIVACY & SURVEILLANCE                                               
IMPACT ASSESSMENTS (5.2.2) 
Category:  IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 










1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  Providing there exists a sufficiently clear vision of the 
intended ST (i.e., how and where it is to operate, its 
functionality, etc.) then these impact assessments 
could be used at the start of a design project. 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes   No obvious preclusions here 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
No Possibly Stakeholder engagement (which includes the public 
affected by a ST) is an intrinsic component of privacy 
and surveillance impact assessments. While it would 
be possible to carry out these assessments without this 
engagement; (i) the value of the output may be 
severely undermined, and (ii) it would require the 
creation of alternative methods of data collection to 
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replace the now excluded stakeholder engagement. 
4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  These assessment methods identify both risks and 
possible solutions, thus providing usable output for 
designers. 
5. Output must 
add value 
Yes  By identifying risks and possible solutions for redress 
during the design stage, the output adds value.  
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 









Depending on the size of an organisation, and the 
expertise of its staff, the ability to carry out a 
sufficiently rigorous privacy/surveillance impact 
assessment may require either specialised training for 







A full privacy/surveillance impact assessment as it 
currently exists can take considerable time to carry 
out. It is not obvious that STEM practitioners working 
within a ST design environment would be able (or 








Surveillance and privacy assessments are primarily 
focussed on a small subset of the 43 identified 
commonalities of controversy. They could not 
obviously be modified to address commonalities with 
no reference to surveillance and/or privacy without 
completely modifying the nature of these assessments 
– and even if they were this would not be an efficient 
or recommended use of resources. 












As for Criterion 9 above, they could not obviously be 
modified to address STs with no reference to 
surveillance and/or privacy without completely 
modifying the nature of these assessments – and even 
if they were this would not be an efficient or 
recommended use of resources. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: Privacy and surveillance impact assessments rely on an environment of openness and 
the inclusion of stakeholders. They can also require considerable resources to conduct, and 
depend on the possession of specialised skills/training by those conducting them. 
Conclusions: These models are not appropriate for use as design tools within the constraints of 
this research project. Furthermore modifying these models so as to meet the assessment 
criteria would require fundamentally changing the nature of these models to the extent that 









Category:  IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 









do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building commences 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
No Yes As devised by Wright, one of the three steps involved 
in this ethical assessment requires stakeholder 
engagement to generate debate
185
. This step could be 
removed from the process, with the negative effects 




4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  The output is designed to identify mitigating 
measures for implementation prior to deployment of 
the ST.  
5. Output must add 
value 
Yes  By mitigating identified issues before deployment 
value is added to the final ST.  





Yes The stakeholder-engagement step as currently 
devised would require access to both citizens and 
existing networks of experts. This may be beyond the 
resources of individual designers or very small teams. 
However removing this engagement requirement, as 
per Assessment Criterion 3 above, would probably 
ensure the tool was usable within any workplace. 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
No Yes Expertise in engagement methods outlined in Step 2 
earlier would be required. However this would be 
negated by the removal of this engagement process. 
8. Minimal use-time 
required 
Possibly Yes Removal of the engagement processes would help 
ensure the use-time requirements of this ethical 
assessment process were kept to a manageable level. 
9. Addresses 
multiple, diverse 
No Yes The current model has been developed for 
information technologies, hence including 
requirements such as malfeasance
187
 which would not 
                                                     
185
 See Chapter 5.2.2. 
186
 See Appendix E 
187
 See Appendix E 
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controversies translate to controversies arising from less-lethal 
weapons. However, this could be addressed by 
modifying the framework produced without the need 
to begin again.  
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
No Yes As per Criterion 9 above. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: The current ethical impact assessment framework leading into a series of questions to 
be addressed, employs stakeholder engagement, and is designed around information 
technologies. However by removing this engagement requirement and expanding the scope of 
the framework and the questions asked, all of the Assessment Criteria above could be catered 
for.   
Conclusions:  The approach adopted here of using a framework coupled with questions to be 
addressed could be used as the basis for design tools capable of dealing with all of the 
commonalities identified within this project as well as applicable to any ST.  
 
 
Candidate:  ANTICIPATORY TECHNOLOGY 
ETHICS (5.2.2) 
Category:  IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
Employment of other methods: Incorporates Checklists, Technology Assessments, Forecasting, 









do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  Results from anticipatory technology ethics (ATE) can 
be employed to guide how a technology is developed. 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 







The first stage of ATE (the forecasting stage
188
) involves 
collecting input from a wide range of actors including 
engineers, historians, sociologists, marketing experts, 
etc. It would be possible to modify this stage to only 
involve STEM practitioners from within a ST design 
team. However this would obviously impact upon the 
types of views expressed given the radical reduction in 
the scope of voices heard.  
                                                     
188
 See the anticipatory technology ethics subsection of Chapter 5.2.2. 
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4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  ATE possesses the power to produce information to 
guide how a technology is developed, as well as 
recommendations for policy makers. The later however, 
does not preclude the former. 
5. Output must add 
value 
Yes  Guidance on the development of a technology as well 
as the identification of ethical issues all possesses the 
ability to add value to a final ST. 
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
No Yes The requirements under the current forecasting stage 
of ATE may make this tool unusable within all 
workplaces. However by modifying this requirement, as 
per Criterion 3 above, it would be possible to maximise 
the usability of this assessment tool.   
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
No Yes As per Criterion 3 above, modifying the forecasting 




Somewhat Yes ATE requires end-users undertake a number of steps 
which together become quite time consuming. 
However the changes mooted above to the forecasting 
stage would assist in bringing this down to a more 









By modifying and expanding upon the ethical checklist 
used for cross-referencing those elements of the 
technology identified by the engineers, it would be 
possible to account for all of the 43 commonalities of 
controversy identified. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
No Yes This should not be a problem once the ethical checklist 
component is expanded. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: The wide range of actors included within the presented ATE model contravenes the 
fundamental requirement of not including external actors. Without modification ATE would 
not be an appropriate method for meeting the requirements of this research project. However 
there is value to be taken from the approaches adopted within ATE. 
Conclusions: There are significant elements of ATE which could be employed within future ST 
design tools; namely the role of engineers within the process, and the use of ethical checklists.  
 
 
Candidate:   BASIC FRAMEWORKS (5.2.3) Category:  FRAMEWORKS 













1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
5. Output must add 
value 
No Yes A framework provides the skeleton onto which 
information and tasks need to be added so as to 
transform the framework into a practical tool. This is 
entirely possible, and its effectiveness here will depend 
on how the framework is shaped and padded. 
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
8. Minimal use-
time required 




Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  Can be designed to meet this requirement. 
Notes:  Frameworks need to be built upon if they are to be transformed into a practical tool. 
As such all of the Assessment Criteria here can be met. However, it would require the producer 
of a framework-based tool deliberately choosing to build their tool in a manner compliant with 
these requirements. Otherwise this completed framework-centric tool would not be 
appropriate. 
Conclusions: A framework is an incredibly useful model, and can form the underlying structure 
of potentially powerful design tools for meeting the requirements of ST design. They are 





Candidate:   EXPANDED FRAMEWORKS (5.2.3) Category:  FRAMEWORKS 








to do so? Comments 














Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 
2. Results intended 












Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 













Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 














Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 













Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 












Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 

















Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 














Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 















Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 













Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 












Can be designed to meet this requirement. Success 
here depends entirely upon the nature and 
construction of the additional processes added on to 
the basic framework. 
Notes:  Expanded Frameworks refer to frameworks which have been built upon, thus 
transforming them into practical tools. As a result while all of the Assessment Criteria here can 
be met, this will depend upon the producer of a framework-based tool deliberately choosing 
suitable additional process to add onto the bare frame that is the Basic Framework. 
Conclusions: Expanded Frameworks can form design tools for assisting the developers of STs in 
a manner compliant with those restrictions identified as existing within the security field. 
However, this is entirely dependent upon the nature of the attached additional processes.    
 
 
Candidate:  VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN (5.2.4) Category:  DESIGN-FOCUSSED APPROACHES 
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do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  Providing sufficiently detailed information on the 
proposed ST exists at the start of the project.  
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
No Possibly This model relies upon identifying the value-impacts of 
the proposed technology on identifiable stakeholders. 
Currently this requires stakeholder engagement. If this 
process cannot be substituted for an alternative which 
elicits the same information without engaging with 
these external actors then it will not be able to meet 
this assessment criterion.  
4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  A strength of this model is that it makes explicit the 
trade-offs of different possible designs. 
5. Output must add 
value 
Yes  No obvious preclusion here based on Criterion 4. 
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Possibly Probably If the external engagement requirement is removed 
then this criterion should be achievable.   




 Given the nature of the steps involved, it is probable 
that designers could undertake then but they may 
require more extensive training than for some of the 
other models discussed here. 
8. Minimal use-
time required 
Yes  Longer than some other models, but still within 
acceptable limits, especially once the external 




Yes  Should be achievable. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
Yes  Again, should be achievable. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusion here. 
Notes:  This model relies heavily on the engagement with external stakeholders. If this 
element can be suitably replaced then this modified version of Value Sensitive Design may 
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meet the requirements of this research project.  
Conclusions:  The weighing of harms and benefits for different groups, and the identification of 
key values engaged, are two elements of Value Sensitive Design that may be transferable to 
other models.  
 
 
Candidate:  PRIVACY BY DESIGN (5.2.4) Category:  DESIGN-FOCUSSED APPROACHES 









do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  While this approach can be used to produce ‘fixes’ for 
privacy infringing STs, it aims to be proactive rather 
than reactive by preventing privacy infractions through 
the design process. 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
Possibly Yes There is an element of stakeholder engagement within 
privacy by design. However, it should be possible to 
adhere to the 7 foundational principles of this approach 
within direct external engagement.  
4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
Yes  This is a very practical-orientated approach. 
5. Output must add 
value 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
Yes  Privacy by design seeks to capitalise on the technical 
expertise of the designers of STs by channelling these 
skills into creating privacy-sensitive products.  
8. Minimal use-
time required 
Yes  More than many of the other models here, privacy by 
design feels like part of the design process itself rather 




No No Focusses primarily on privacy. This model is not 
designed to accommodate other common 
controversies, nor could it be modified to do so.  
10. Adaptable to all No No As per the criterion above, there is no relevance for this 




11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: Privacy by design is concerned exclusively with privacy-related concerns. It is not 
applicable or modifiable to all STs and all commonalities of controversy. 
Conclusions: While not an appropriate approach for extrapolation beyond the sphere of 
privacy-related concerns, there are two elements of privacy by design which should be 
adopted into future design tools within this project. The first is the proactive focus on 
producing mitigating effects during the design process rather than reacting to controversies as 
they occur. The second is the early identification of issues within the potential design of a ST 
which are then passed onto the designers themselves so they can utilise their technical 
expertise to produce solutions within their designs.   
 
 
Candidate:  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (5.2.5) Category:  QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENTS 









do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  No obvious preclusions 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
Possibly Yes This depends on whether external actors need to be 
engaged with when determining which items are 
relevant for inclusion within any analysis and what 
weight to assign these. 





Indirectly This approach assists in deciding between alternatives, 
however these alternative will already need to have 
been created. Cost-benefit analysis will not produce 
these alternatives to begin with. 
5. Output must add 
value 
Yes  Value will be added by indicating the ‘best’ choice 
between identified alternatives. 
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 









Not all No Cost-benefit analysis will not be a suitable method for 
addressing all of the identified commonalities of 
controversy. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
Yes  While cost-benefit analysis will be usable for all STs it 
will only be of use for those commonalities which lend 
themselves to a cost-benefit approach.  
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: An appropriate method for those questions which can be framed as a cost-benefit 
scenario. However it is not an appropriate tool for dealing with all commonalities in all STs.  
Conclusions: A useful method when circumstances allow for such an approach, but probably 
best employed as part of a wider tool-kit of possible approaches. 
 
 
Candidate:   MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION 
MAKING (5.2.5) 
Category:  QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENTS 









do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Yes  No obvious preclusions 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
Possibly Yes This depends on whether external actors need to be 
engaged with when determining which criteria are 
included, as well as what weight to assign these. 





Indirectly This approach assists in deciding between alternatives, 
however these alternative will already need to have 
been created. Cost-benefit analysis will not produce 
these alternatives to begin with. 
5. Output must add 
value 
Yes  Value will be added by indicating the ‘best’ choice 
between identified alternatives. 




7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
No Possibly Multi-criteria decision making is a developed field 
containing a number of different approaches and 
schools. Without previous expertise in using this 
method, the quality of any results will be questionable.   
8. Minimal use-
time required 




Not all No Multi-criteria decision making will not be a suitable 
method for addressing all of the identified 
commonalities of controversy. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
Yes  While multi-criteria decision making will be usable for 
all STs it will only be of use for those commonalities 
which lend themselves to this approach.  
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: An appropriate method for those questions which lend themselves to multi-criteria 
decision making. However it is not an appropriate tool for dealing with all commonalities in all 
STs. 
Conclusions: A useful method when circumstances allow for such an approach, but probably 
best employed as part of a wider tool-kit of possible approaches. 
 
 
Candidate:   BRUCE SCHNEIER’S FIVE-STEP 
PROCESS (5.2.6) 
Category:  MISCELLANEOUS TESTS 










do so? Comments 
1. For use before 
building 
commences 
Possibly Yes It could be used during this point. 
2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
No Doubtful This all depends on what methods are required o obtain 




4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
No Possibly This process is aimed towards the analysis and 
evaluation of STs, not at producing design 
specifications. 
5. Output must add 
value 
No No There is immense value created by this 5-step process 
in answering the question of whether or not a proposed 
ST is an appropriate response. This however is a step 
removed from adding value to the actual design of the 
ST itself.   
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Possibly Possibly This depends on the resources of the designer, and 
their possession of the necessary data required answer 
the 5 steps. 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
Possibly Possibly This all depends on the methods you need to employ to 
collect the necessary data for addressing the five steps 
of this process. 
8. Minimal use-
time required 
Possibly Possibly As above, this will all depend on the time required to 




No No This process is not designed to address specific 
controversies. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
Yes  This process could be used on all STs, however the level 
of usefulness would vary considerably. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes: This five-step process is excellent at analysing and evaluating security systems, STs, and 
processes. However, it is not tailored to address the design processes of building a ST as 
required under this research project. 
Conclusions: This five-step process is not appropriate for this research project. However, there 
are elements of the five steps that have already been included within the identified 
commonalities of controversy.  
 
 
Candidate:  ACLU’S NECESSARY AND 
DEFENSIBLE TEST 
Category:  MISCELLANEOUS TESTS 









do so? Comments 






2. Results intended 
for senior use 
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
3. Cannot involve 
external actors 
Yes  It could be conducted without external assistance.  
4. Produces design 
specifications, not 
policies 
No No It is aimed at policy makers, not designers. 
5. Output must add 
value 
No No Again, the value is for policy makers, not designers. 
6. Usable in any 
workplace 
Yes  No obvious preclusion here. 
7. No prerequisite 
expertise required 
Yes  No obvious preclusion here. 
8. Minimal use-
time required 




No No This test is not designed for application to multiple 
controversies. Nevertheless, elements of value within 
the test itself can be found within a number of the 
previously identified commonalities of controversy. 
10. Adaptable to all 
STs 
Yes  This process could be used on all STs, however the level 
of usefulness would vary considerably. 
11. Not based 
exclusively on 
‘yes’/’no’ answers  
Yes  No obvious preclusions here. 
Notes:  This test is aimed at policy makers and has little direct applicability to this project. 
However, there are elements of the questions asked which are of use. 
Conclusions:  Useful elements of this test have already been incorporated in the identified 









Appendix K   Framework for Common Controversies within 





















Designing for Socially Acceptable Security Technologies is a design tool 
created to assist the designers and developers of security technologies* 
in anticipating, and thereby avoiding, potential design choices which are 
more likely to lead to social resistance when settling on the initial design 
specifications of a future security technology.  
 
Through identifying those design elements and choices which are more 
likely to result in citizens resisting or rejecting your security technology 
before they are incorporated into any initial product, you (the designer) 
afford yourself the best opportunity to create socially acceptable 
security technologies. By minimising controversy with socially responsive 
designs you will save money by preventing the need for future patches 
or modifications, as well as reducing the likelihood of social resistance 
which can lead to the regulation, restriction, or even the banning of a 
security technology. 
 
The purpose of this design tool is NOT to tell you how to build your 
security technologies; rather it is to highlight where design choices can 
lead to future social resistance based on an evaluation of previous 
controversial security technologies. You can only consciously address a 
potential problem within a design after you have first identified an 
element as being problematic.  
 
This design tool helps by asking you those questions which might not 
otherwise be asked. It remains your job to produce the best, most 
innovative and creative solutions when answering these questions; 






* A security technology is the product of an engineering endeavour which seeks to 
deter, prevent or detect crimes, and/or enhance the security of individuals, their 
property, or the state. This includes potentially lethal technologies; however they 
cannot be restricted to military use. Finally it encompasses all forms of engineering 
pursuit so long as what is produced has either a physical or digital presence. While 
a bike-lock, body-scanner, or security centric data-mining programme are all 
examples of security technologies, a policy, law, or general computer operating 





















   section                      page 
   Front-cover material       324  
   How to use the design tool     326 
   1. Physical or mental harm     331 
   2. Liberties & human rights     347 
   3. Questions of legality      363 
   4. Financial cost of the ST        379 
   5. Public & end-user acceptability          387 
   6. Issues of functionality            405 
   7. Safety, security, misuse & abuse          419 
   Identified design opportunities    431 
   Inside back-cover checklist      434 












HOW TO USE THE DESIGN TOOL 
step 1: Choose which of the 7 sections to 
include in your assessment of the ST 
 
(option A)  Use all of the seven available sections as printed on the 
outside of the back cover (see pages 436-437) 
 
       
 
 
(option B) Use the guide provided on the inside of the front cover to 
select which of the seven sections to include (see pages 324-325) 







Ensures all available 
questions are addressed, 
including those which may 
have value to add despite 
not being obviously 
relevant at first glance.  
Drawback: 
Increases both the length of 
time it will take to complete 
the design tool and the 
likelihood of including 





step 2: For each included section(s) answer all 
of the questions contained therein, 
making sure (wherever possible and 


















Use the accompanying 




should you require 
extra space to answer 




To assist you in identifying and collating socially-
responsive design opportunities: 
(a) Use the checklist found on the inside of the back cover 
to indicate both which sections were completed and the 
questions within the completed sections that are most 
likely to provide design opportunities, policy or public 
engagement opportunities, or represent areas requiring 


















(b) Use the space provided in the section entitled 
identified opportunities (page 109) to bring together 
any design opportunities, policy or public 
engagement opportunities, or areas requiring future 
work you identified when completing this tool. 
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important points to remember when 
answering the questions 
 
 
 Each Section comprises a number of different questions. These questions are 
then divided into a number of steps to assist you in answering the question. 
 The point of each question (and its steps) is to get you to think about the design 
of your future security technology from a social, ethical perspective. The 
questions you are asked and the tasks you are set throughout this tool are 
designed to highlight those issues which have led to social controversy and 
resistance to security technologies in the past. 
 You DO NOT have to answer all (or even any) of the steps which make up each 
question. Some will not be relevant to your particular security technology, while 
for others it is highly probable you will not possess the necessary information to 
do so. However for those questions which do apply it is important to remember 
that these are the questions a potential critic would ask when challenging the 
ethical and social credentials of your proposed security technology. 
 The questions you are asked here are deliberately confrontational. They are 
designed to challenge the design of your proposed security technology and the 
reasoning behind this design. They are directed at the technology, not you, so 
please do not take offence at them! 
 Just because you cannot answer any (or even all) of the questions contained 
within this design tool, or that you experience problems justifying your answers, 
this DOES NOT mean your proposed security technology will be socially 
controversial and/or unacceptable. However if a question is relevant and you 
find it hard or even impossible to answer, you may wish to consider the 





how to get the most out of this design tool or 
what this design tool can and cannot do for 
you! 
 
 This design tool CANNOT tell you how to build your security technology. You’re 
the designer, that’s your job! 
 
 It CANNOT tell you the best design for your proposed security technology. Again, 
you’re the designer, that’s your job! 
 
 It IS NOT a silver bullet for guaranteeing a socially acceptable security 
technology. But that is not to say we cannot learn lessons from the past. 
 
 What this design tool CAN DO is to highlight the social and ethical design 
mistakes of the past so that you, the designer, can modify the design of your 
security technology so as to afford yourself the best opportunity to avoid 
repeating these mistakes. As to identifying what exactly the best design 
solutions are to these problems – you’re the designer, that’s your job! 
 
 To this end, when answering the steps within each question, always try to 
identify design opportunities. How you answer the questions is completely up to 
you (there is no right or wrong way of doing so).  
 
 If you find it useful you may wish to frame your answers as future design 
requirements. By collating these into a list once you have completed this design 
tool you will have produced a practical set of design requirements to be 













Qn.1a: Could the overall risks to health created by the security 
technology outweigh the potential security benefits of that technology? 
  
A fundamental design principle when designing security technologies with the 
capacity to cause physical or mental harm to individuals is that these health risks 
should be outweighed by the opposing security benefits. This reflects the ethos 
behind the principle of justification within radiological protection whereby any 
exposure to radiation should do more harm than good. 
There is no universal formula for determining whether security benefits outweigh 
health risks. This calculation will depend upon the characteristics of both the harm 
and the benefits; i.e., the type of harm (transient, permanent, death, etc.), 
frequency of harm, and nature of security benefit (national, group, individual, 
physical, property, etc.) will all need to be considered and converted into common 
values which can be weighed against each other.  
In some cases a simple balancing of equivalent values (such as lives saved versus 
lives lost) may be possible.  However when the values are not ostensibly equivalent 
(i.e. risk of lives saved versus injuries caused; risk of injuries caused versus property 
protected) then the user of this tool will need to produce an explicit formula for 
converting these variables to a common denominator.  Additionally, if certain types 
of harm and/or certain security benefits possess greater weight within the public 
psyche, then the developer is advised to apply a weighting factor to those values 
when comparing harms and benefits.   
Challenge: The fact a security technology entails a very low risk to health does not 
automatically mean the benefits outweigh the risks. Also be aware of situations 
where a security technology is used very often while instances of attacks are very 
rare.    
 Airport backscatter whole body scanners attracted health concerns despite 
delivering an incredibly small dose (0.02 µSv) of ionising radiation to those 
screened with an estimated risk of death from a single scan of one in one-
billion. Given that more than 5 billion passengers fly each year, even this very 
small dose would statistically result in deaths. 
Challenge: In a hostage (or similar life-threatening) scenario where a security 
technology which is deployed to save lives results in a high death or injury count, 
this technology may prove controversial and be hard to justify even if more than 
50% of people are spared death or injury as a result of its deployment.  
 The use of an undeclared aerosolised anaesthetic agent to help end the 
terrorist siege of Dubrovka Theater, Russia, resulted in the death of 
conservatively 129 out of 850 hostages. This resulted in considerable 















Step 2. Apply a weighting factor to these harms if applicable._____________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 





Step 4. Are the ‘rates of harms’ and ‘security benefits’ common values which can be 
compared?__________ If ‘yes’ compare harms and benefits. If ‘no’ first convert harms 




Step 4. Do the security benefits outweigh the harms?________ If ‘yes’ what concerns 
remain regarding this calculation? If ‘no’ how can development and deployment of this 






Challenge: Despite a security technology possessing the capacity to cause harm, 
unless data already exists you will need to collect sufficient data from live 
experimentation. As a potential design ‘rule-of-thumb’ if it is too dangerous to test 
an ostensibly non-lethal security technology on human subjects because of the risk 
of death or serious injury, then justifying the deployment of this technology will be 
extremely difficult.  
 Less lethal weapons designed to subdue or disperse individuals, such as Tasers, 
baton-rounds, gases, microwave technologies, etc., can all be fatal. 
Nevertheless testing on human subjects still needs to occur before deployment 
























Step 1. Have you ascertained the level of health risk?_______ Has this level been 









Assume a starting position whereby according to statistical, experimental, and/or 
modelled data the security benefits of a proposed security technology outweigh 
the health risks associated with its use. This fact, while of fundamental importance, 
may not in itself be enough to ensure social acceptability on the issue of health, 
and it is unlikely a security technology which poses health risks (even if minimal) 
will survive without modification or restrictive legislation mid to long-term if it is 
not considered acceptable by the public. Further actions may be required to 
maximise the likelihood that the public will accept these health risks, however such 
an outcome can never be guaranteed.  
Challenge: Failure to convince the public that the health risks are not just minimal 
but also justified will potentially undermine public support. This may require the 
release of accurate data, public engagement, and assessment of the technology by 
independent experts who will enjoy public trust.  
 Backscatter whole body scanners were the subject of intense public and 
governmental debate regarding the associated health risks despite these risks 
being incredibly low. This delayed the mainstream introduction of this 
technology to the benefit of the alternative millimetre wave scanner 
technology despite it being less capable of detecting concealed objects.     
Challenge: If certain vulnerable minority sub-groups within society are at greater 
risk of harm by the security technology than the rest of the population, this fact 
may have an negative bearing on the overall acceptability to society of this 
technology; especially if this wider society is particularly protective of these sub-
groups. Examples here potentially include pregnant women, children, the elderly, 
disabled, mental patients, etc. 
 Use of less lethal weapons, such as Tasers and pepper-sprays, on individuals 






Step 2. Are you permitted to discuss the proposed security technology with the general 
public?________ If ‘yes’ complete Step 3; if ‘no’ complete step 4. 
Step 3. What is your plan for engaging with the public to ascertain the acceptability of 
the proposed security technology? Alternatively, if you are permitted to discuss this 
security technology with the public but are not planning on doing so, how are you 







Step 4. How are you planning on ascertaining the acceptability of the proposed 















Step 5. If health risks associated with the proposed security technology are identified as 
a cause for concern in Steps 3 or 4, ask yourself the following questions: 
 What design modifications, if any, could mitigate these concerns? 
 Are there situations or circumstances where the need to use this proposed 
technology outweighs the social concerns over the health risks thereby making 
this technology acceptable?  
 
 
Note on Step 4: Viable methods for ascertaining the acceptability of a security 
technology which you are not permitted to discuss directly with the public may 
include: 
 Creating a number of theoretical proxy technologies which each contain 
different elements of the genuine security technology and assessing these with 
focus groups. 
 ‘In house’ workshops with individuals not directly involved on the project but 
with sufficient clearance, focussing on their reactions to this technology.  





















Step 1. How are you planning on identifying those minority groups who will be placed 
at a greater risk of harm if targeted by the proposed security technology? Alternately, 







Step 2. How are you planning on determining the overall ‘risk of harm’ figures for these 
minority groups given the heightened inherent risks involved? Alternately, if you are 




When determining a single ‘risk to health’ value for a security technology, the 
human target used to create this risk value (while often not explicitly defined) is 
almost invariably an average person. Ostensibly this is a healthy adult of average 
fortitude without specific mental or physical ailments or other conditions. 
However, not every individual conforms to this ideal average.  
Two individuals who do not appear different may experience different reactions to 
the same stimulus from a security technology as a result of genetic differences, 
prior conditions, or lifestyle conditions. Designers of security technologies should 
seek to identify and account for the effects of such differences when determining 
the safety of their devices. Failure to do so may result in social resistance to their 
technologies led by those groups of individuals particularly susceptible to them.  
Challenge: Certain categories of individuals are vulnerable to a higher risk of injury 
and death in relation to certain stimuli. These include (but are by no means limited 
to) those who have taken drugs (illicit or prescribed), pregnant women, the elderly, 
children, the mentally disturbed, asthmatics, those with pre-existing cardiac 
conditions, and those with genetic-based susceptibility to the stimuli in question.  
Challenge: It is not always obvious to the end-user (or even to the potential target), 
whether that target falls into one of the categories listed above; i.e., an asthma 
sufferer looks the same as a non-asthma sufferer, and somebody can have a heart 










Step 3. List off all of the ‘at-risk’ groups then, one at a time, insert each group into the 
following paragraph: “A (insert group name here; e.g. pregnant woman, asthmatic, 
child, etc.) suffers a serious injury related to their risk-condition as the direct result of 
being targeted by the security technology. The use of the technology and subsequent 
injury was witnessed by members of the public and recorded on a phone with the 
footage now being replayed on national television”. For each ‘at-risk’ group describe 







Step 4. How can you build into this proposed security technology methods for 
















Note on Step 4: The challenge is to build physical protections into the technology 
itself so you are not left relying solely on the perception, judgement, and training 
of the end-user. How these would/could work depends of course on the nature of 
the technology itself, the anticipated targets, and the situations in which it is 
expected to be used. Approaches to addressing this challenge might include: 
 Methods whereby the security technology itself identifies the target as 
inappropriate given the risk, potentially with the ability for the operator to 
override this decision if they believe circumstances warrant this call. 
 Methods whereby the potential target is afforded the opportunity to identify 
themselves before deployment of the security technology. 
 Alternative settings for the security technology whereby the risk to this group 
























Step 1. How is the level of pain/discomfort produced proportionate to the intended 
security benefit?_________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 2. Can the end-user control the level of pain produced?________ If ‘yes’ what 
protection measure prevent misuse here?____________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 3. Does the proposed security technology target a single individual or is it 
designed to affect a physical area?______________ If it affects an area, what controls 
are you going to include in your design so the end-user can modify the range/shape of 
the area affected, and the effect on individuals within the affected area? 
Security technologies with the capacity to cause pain or some lower level of 
discomfort (e.g. dizziness, nausea, headaches, physical or cognitive 
incapacity/impairment, etc.) always run the risk of evoking emotive societal 
responses. Images on mainstream media and social-networking sites of non-violent 
protestors, the elderly, defenceless individuals, and/or children being subjected to 
such technologies have in the past produced outpourings of social anger. That 
being said, the fact a security technology is designed to cause pain or discomfort to 
achieve some legitimate goal in no way automatically illegitimatises that 
technology. While less lethal weapons and crowd control technologies, including 
Tasers, teargas, and long range acoustic devices have all been the source of social 
controversy in certain instances, in others they have been successfully deployed 
without social resistance. It is this contradiction in responses towards what is often 
the same technology based upon the context and manner of its use which provides 
both challenges and opportunities for clever developers.  
Challenge: Designing a technology which can cause pain or discomfort in a socially 
acceptable manner; i.e. which can as far as is possible - discriminate between 
offenders and non-offenders, is proportionate and serves a legitimate aim, is not 
open to abuse misuse or overuse, has effects which can be controlled and which 
end as soon as an offender leaves the area or stops their illegal actions. 
In the past: 
 Mosquitos have been criticised for not discriminating between offenders and 
non-offenders, preventing young people enjoying their right to assembly, for 
being used by shopkeepers to control public spaces which they do not own or 
have a right to control, and causing distress to babies and very young children 
who cannot communicate the source or nature of their pain to their parents 
who can’t themselves hear the noise being emitted so are unaware of its use. 
 Use of less lethal weapons such as Tasers and pepper sprays by police as either 
a form of punishment or against non-violent protestors or unarmed citizens 
who are arguing with them, talking back, walking away, or being discourteous 















Step 4. Will the pain/discomfort being applied to the target cease automatically if they 
leave the zone-of-effect or stop the illegal action(s), or does this rely upon the end-
user either taking or stopping some action (i.e., like taking their finger off a trigger, 
etc.) before the pain-inducing effects will stop?________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
If it is the latter, how can misuse or overuse by the end-user be prevented, especially 
in situations where the end-user is emotional (i.e., scared, angry, hyped-up, stressed, 




Step 5. How long until the pain/discomfort effects of the security technology cease for 
the target?______________________________________________________________ 




Step 6. To help minimise abuse, misuse, overuse, or illegitimate use of the proposed 




Step 7. How can the presence and zone-of-operation of the security technology be 





Note on Step 3: ‘Area effect’ security technologies are often blunt instruments, 
lacking the ability to moderate their effects depending on circumstances or to 
discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. This can lead to negative 
social responses. The ability to moderate the effect of the technology, to swiftly 
change the shape of the physical area affected, or (as the Holy Grail in this area) to 
be able to only effect ‘wrongdoers’ while not affecting innocent bystanders and 
security personal within the range of the technology may help minimise the 
probability of negative responses.  
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This section does not apply to security technologies which are designed to kill; for 
these technologies move on to Qn.1f.  
When discussing ‘physical injuries’ we have moved beyond mere pain or 
discomfort. Injuries we are concerned with here include puncture wounds, broken 
bones, internal organ damage, burns, damage to mobility or senses like sight, 
hearing, etc. beyond a transient loss of control, brain damage, severe bruising, 
muscle damage, nerve damage, etc. Within security technologies these types of 
injuries will most commonly be caused by less lethal weapons (various forms of 
baton rounds, Tasers, water cannons, etc.) however for our purposes it would also 
include non-fatal cancers resulting from those technologies which employ ionising 
radiation.  
Security technologies which are designed with the specific, deliberate, and sole 
purpose of causing the physical injuries detailed above will not enjoy widespread 
public support, will face active public resistance, and the use of these will be 
subject to legal challenge. This is because any security technology designed with 
the sole purpose of causing such injuries but without killing the target is essentially 
an instrument of torture. It is also highly likely any company developing such 
technologies would risk reputational damage.     
However, security technologies designed for specific security purposes (protecting 
citizens or property, regaining order during a riot, apprehending offenders, etc.) 
but whose deployment runs the risk of unintentional physical injuries can enjoy 
public legitimacy and support. Though gaining and maintaining this support will be 
challenging, especially if the benefits are not obvious or in the face of instances of 
abuse.  
Challenge: The need to minimise both the risk and severity of unintentional 
physical injuries resulting from the legitimate use of a proposed security 
technology whilst maintaining the effectiveness of that technology, is a challenge 
which designers must address. 
Challenge: Designers will need accurate data on the injury risks of their technology 
if they are to justify claims that the security benefits outweigh the health risks. So 
to determine the risk of injury from deploying the proposed security technology, a 
sufficient amount of ‘live’ testing will be required for accurate data to be obtained. 
While simulation may play a part here, if the risk of live testing is too dangerous 







Step 1. How can you design the proposed security technology so as to reduce the 







Step 2. How can you design the proposed security technology so as to minimise the 







Step 3. Accurate data on the expected injury risks will be required to quantify the risks 







Step 4. Would it be too dangerous to conduct live-testing of your proposed security 
technology?__________ If ‘yes’ how are you justifying the deployment of your 



































Step 1. How can you design the proposed security technology so as to reduce the 





Step 2. Accurate data on the expected risk of death will be required to quantify the risk 
involved. If accurate data is not available outline your plans for creating this 
It is possible to divide security technologies into three categories: (1) technologies 
specifically designed to kill, (2) technologies designed not to kill but possessing the 
capacity to do so, and (3) technologies which cannot kill regardless of design.  
Those in category 1 are not restricted to firearms. They include corporal 
punishment technologies (e.g. electric chairs, lethal injection drug-cocktails and 
administering devices), lethal perimeter security technologies (electrified fences, 
lethal automated response systems), etc. As these technologies are overtly 
designed to be lethal, it is not the fact they subsequently cause a fatality when 
deployed (effectively operating exactly as intended) that will be the source of 
controversy. Rather it is either; the fact they exist at all within a in society, the 
operational circumstances surrounding individual instances of use, characteristics 
of the target killed, or the manner in which they achieve their aims, which will 
create the negative social reactions.  
Those in category 3 are not relevant to the current Question. 
The main concern of this Section is those in category 2. Predominantly this includes 
a number of less lethal weapons such as Tasers, the various baton rounds, tear gas, 
water cannons, etc. It will also include technologies which subject the target to a 
dose of ionising radiation.  
Negative social reactions can arise here in a number of different ways: (a) If 
subjecting one’s self to the technology is a mandatory prerequisite for accessing a 
necessary service (such as an airport screening system), then any risk of death for 
the individual will be controversial, even if that risk is very small and outweighed by 
the security benefits. (b) If the technology is marketed, promoted, and deployed as 
an alternative to lethal force and it then kills someone, this can also easily 
undermine credibility in the technology and lead the public to question its 












Step 3. Would it be too dangerous to conduct live-testing of your proposed security 
technology?__________ If ‘yes’ how are you justifying the deployment of your 














Step 4. Given the risk of death involved, would you be prepared to have the technology 
either tested on, or deployed in the field against, either you and/or members of your 







Step 5. Could misuse of the proposed security technology increase the likelihood of a 



































Failing to be open about the health risks associated with a security technology is a 
risky ploy which can only produce short-term benefits (such as embedding a 
technology into the environment and/or increasing market share). However, these 
short-term benefits may be outweighed by any medium to long-term social 
backlash in response to the initial lack of disclosure, for it is impossible to prevent 
these health risks being made public.  
The health risks of a security technology are impossible to hide and will be made 
public through a variety of avenues. Curious independent researchers will publish 
information via peer reviewed journal articles. Individuals who are harmed by the 
security technology will seek the disclosure of previously known information from 
the developer in court. Government inquiries/hearings will draw out information. 
Pressure groups and NGOs will challenge the safety of security technologies. 
Regulators will seek information. 
Despite the fact it is impossible to hide health risks, developers continue to adopt 
this approach. 
 During the early stages of development, the manufacturers of whole body 
scanners adopted the line that the low intensity X-rays did not penetrate the 
subject and were merely reflected off their skin. Eventually they corrected this 
error. 
 The electroshock weapon manufacturer Taser International repeatedly and 
vigorously denied their weapons could produce any adverse health effects, 
suing a researcher for publishing peer-reviewed critical scientific evidence and 
a medical examiner for listing the Taser as a cause of death on a death 
certificate. They also created a refuted mental state excited delirium as an 
alternative to those deaths where a Taser was deployed. Both judges and 
Taser International have now explicitly acknowledged their health risks.  
This drip-feeding of information and/or the reversal of positions on the health risks 
of a security technology may undermine the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
developer in the eyes of the public. The volume of controversy surrounding the 
technology will also potentially be increased as now there are two stories for the 
press; the health risks inherent to the technology as well as the failure to disclose 
these health risks by governments and manufacturers.   
What is surprising about refusing to acknowledge the health risks of a security 
technology is that ultimately this is an unnecessary tactic. There are numerous 
security technologies which pose a risk to the safety of citizens which are still 
considered acceptable within society. As people are willing to accept a level of 
health risk, developers can legitimately frame the presentation of their technology 
by asking “Is it as safe as, or safer than, the alternatives?” 
Finally, the failure (by yourself or others) to test for health risks does not allow you 
to make the claim “My product is safe” as this absence of evidence on possible 





Step 1. Are you able to inform the public about the health risks of the security 




Step 2. Assuming you are able to inform the public about the health risks of the 
security technology, are you going to?______ If ‘yes’ complete step 3 only. If ‘no’ move 
on to step 4. 









Step 4. Are you going to actively deny the health risks?______ If ‘no’ move on to step 
5. If ‘yes’ explain here what benefits you expect to gain from this course of action, and 
set out how these benefits outweigh the risks of the future disclosure of the health 
risks? (Alternatively if you are too worried about the legal implications of filling out this 




Step 5. What is your plan for responding to questions/accusations when the facts 







Note on Step 3: When producing this plan consider the following questions: Where 
will you disseminate this information? How detailed will it be? Will you engage 
directly with the public before and/or after the technology is released? How will 
this public engagement occur and what will it entail? How and when will you 
engage with those citizen groups, NGOs, and issue groups which traditionally 
oppose such security technologies? etc.  
Note on Step 5: Consider here both the nature of your response (litigation, 
continued denial, silence, acceptance, information release, etc.) and the source of 
the public disclosure (former/current employees, government leak or official 
release, courts, independent researchers, peer reviewed journals, etc.). How will 
these affect the continued operation and acceptance of the technology, as well as 







































Step 1. What new security will the proposed technology provide us with?___________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
What (if any) privacy will we lose or gain because of the proposed security 
technology?_____________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Justify any changes in security and privacy resulting from your technology___________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
An individual’s right to privacy is recognised under various international 
conventions, treaties, national legislation, and constitutions. However, this right is 
rarely absolute as there are numerous legitimate reasons for encroaching upon an 
individual’s privacy, including; national security, preventing and investigating 
crimes, and the provision of public services to name but a few.  
While there may be security gains to be had by restricting privacy, the infringement 
of someone’s privacy by a security technology is probably the single hot-topic issue 
which attracts the most attention by the public, politicians, and the media. 
Previously largely restricted to physical privacy (i.e. the collection of physical 
images by CCTV, physical correspondence, or voice recordings by tapping), privacy 
now also includes informational privacy (i.e. our internet usage). It has become a 
focal point for many groups of citizens opposed to the expansions of security 
technologies, whether online or in public spaces. 
What is unfortunate is that privacy and security are often presented as 
diametrically opposing forces (i.e. decreasing privacy increases security, and 
increasing privacy decreases security) through the use of the commonly seen 
balancing metaphor. This simplistic interpretation ignores the fact that increasing 
someone’s privacy can simultaneously increase their security, and vice versa by 
decreasing their privacy we can decrease their security. There is also the issue of 
both targeted and untargeted privacy-infringing surveillance having a chilling effect 
on society when it comes to exercising other rights, such as assembly, lawful 
protest, expression, etc.  
Challenge: The challenge for designers is to develop security technologies which: 
 Protect privacy through more targeted approaches; 
 Increase our security and privacy simultaneously; 
 Do not make people less likely to exercise other legitimate rights out of fear 
of government surveillance; 
 Are socially acceptable in an environment where privacy infringing 
technologies will be scrutinised by activist organisations and a sceptical 
public; 
 Are able to justify any privacy infringement as necessary, proportionate, 
and productive (i.e. able to show real security gains for any privacy loss).  











Step 2. What privacy is lost by people who are not engaged in criminal activities but 
are subjected to the proposed security technology (i.e. what is the privacy cost to 
innocent people)?________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 3. What privacy will citizens be left with if the proposed security technology is 
successfully introduced?___________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 




Step 5. How can you minimise both any impact on privacy and any risk of negative 




Step 6. If you were personally being monitored by your proposed security technology, 
would you be as likely to engage in the following legal activities: having an 
affair?______; writing a blog criticising your employer/the government/police?______; 
sending/receiving legal documents to/from your lawyer?______; organising or 
participating in a protest rally?______; purchasing, downloading, and/or viewing 
pornography?______; seeking online advice on abortions/ medical conditions/assisted 
suicide?______; supporting/sending money to Wikileaks?______. If you answered ‘yes’ 
to any of these your technology is having a chilling effect. How can you minimise this 
effect through your design?________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note on Step 1: To justify the proposed security technology we must either; (a) 
gain security or privacy without losing the other, or (b) gain a specific amount of 
security which warrants the loss of a specific amount of privacy.  
If the situation is ‘b’ then you will need to convert security and privacy into 
common values so as to meaningfully balance these two concepts if you are to 
justify the security/privacy effects of your technology. There exists no generally 
accepted meta-rule or formula for doing this so your justification will unavoidably 
be open to questioning. 
 
  
Note on Step 4: Consider; insider threats, misuse/abuse by officials, theft of 
collected data, how this information could be used to harm a particular person, 
etc. 
   
Note on Step 5: Design ideas here may include: anonymisation of data/images etc., 
technologies which only record events of interest, limiting the time data is held, 
etc.   
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Qn.2b: Does your proposed security technology affect the ability of 























Step 1. Will your security technology be able to identify the purpose(s) for which 
personal data was collected so that it can subsequently prevent the processing of this 
data for other purposes?______ If ‘no’ why is this the case. Alternately if ‘yes’ how will 
Informational self-determination is the right of individuals to decide; what 
information about themselves should be communicated to others, under what 
circumstances this should occur, and what should happen to this information if it is 
communicated. It is a concept which has been attracting considerable attention 
throughout the EU over the past few years and encompasses ideas of privacy and 
consent.  
However, when seeking to provide security and/or tackle crime there is the 
obvious need to collect information on individuals which may override the ideal of 
informational self-determination. If somebody engaged in illegal activities could 
legitimately prevent police accessing information about these activities by hiding 
behind this principle, the implications for society would be severe.  
That being said, the provision of security and the prevention of crime are not 
automatic trump cards when it comes to competing rights. When this fact is either 
forgotten or not respected by governments and/or the developers of security 
technologies we see incidents of social resistance. The collection, storage, 
processing, and forwarding of personal data must be in response to genuine 
crime/security problems, necessary for investigative work, and proportional to the 
intervention.  
Situations where controversies have arisen in the past include incidents where; 
collected data was not securely stored, collected data was mined for purposes 
other than which it was collected thus resulting in criminal fishing expeditions, the 
affected party was not able to inspect the stored data and change erroneous 
information, data was held indefinitely regardless of the guilt/innocence of the 
individuals, and where data was transferred to third parties/countries either 
illegally or where the receiver does not have effective data protection systems.   
Challenge: To develop security technologies which simultaneously: 
 Respect informational self-determination including the ability to control, 
inspect, and amend held personal data. 
 Facilitate police in their investigations of known or suspected offences without 
alerting suspects. 
 Prevent fishing expeditions and unauthorised/illegal access of the data. 




you achieve this?_________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 2. Will your security technology be able to verify that any search/processing of 
the collected data is based on appropriate reasonable suspicion formed from other 
evidence so as to prevent fishing expeditions?______ If ‘no’ why is this the case. 








Will they be afforded the ability to view this data and to correct/challenge any errors, 
and if so how will this process be made clear to them?__________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
Will the security technology include a capability allowing for either real-time 
corrections of false data by end-users in the field (such as security screeners) or regular 
updating of the data in response to feedback from end-users or the results of other 
security technologies, thereby limiting false positives?______ If ‘no’ why is this the 




Step 4. How will your proposed security technology control access to the data to both 




Step 5. Will your proposed security technology be able to simply, quickly, and 
effectively delete data that is no longer needed, no longer relevant, or where it is no 
longer appropriate that the data be held?______ If ‘no’ why is this the case. 







Qn.2c: Could your technology influence the enjoyment of an individual’s 





















Step 1. Identify the circumstances under which it will be lawful to use your proposed 
security technology when it is having the effect of infringing someone’s right to 
assembly or association?__________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________If you cannot identify any such 
circumstances then chances are it will be unlawful to use your proposed technology. 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights citizens have the right to freely 
associate with other people and to freely assemble together. However, as with 
nearly all such rights these are not absolute. Restrictions may be placed on them if 
they are prescribed by law and necessary in our society to; protect the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of crime or disorder, to 
protect health and morals, and to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
There are two main ways in which security technologies have proven controversial 
with the public in the past. Firstly by actively preventing citizens from exercising 
these rights, and secondly via a chilling effect whereby citizens are not willing or 
less willing to exercise their rights out of fear their actions will be monitored and/or 
they will face some future repercussion(s) if they do exercise their rights.  
Security technologies in this first category include mosquitoes which force young 
people out of public spaces where they congregate, less lethal weapons being used 
to disperse protestors, and technologies which control access to communication 
services (i.e., phones, internet, etc.). Security technologies in the second category 
include mosquitoes, less lethal weapons, CCTV, online monitoring and data mining 
services, etc.  
Challenge: This brings us to the challenge for developers of security technologies 
which impact upon someone’s rights to assembly and association: How do you 
develop a technology for restricting these rights which under normal circumstances 
can be exercised freely by all citizens without lawful impediment, such that: 
 Your security technology cannot be used in situations where its use is not 
lawful or its use is not necessary to achieve the legitimate goals specified 
earlier. 
 The presence of your technology does not have a chilling effect on citizens who 
wish to exercise their rights to assembly or association. 
 Your security technology is effective in preventing association or assembly 





Step 2. Identify scenarios whereby it will be unlawful to use your proposed security 




What protections could you possibly build into your security technology to either 




If your technology is open to unlawful use and there are either no technical 
protections available (or there are but you are not going to build-in these protections), 
justify why your technology should be built.___________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 3. Explain how your technology will achieve any or all of the following: 
 protect national security or public safety; 
 prevent crime or disorder; 
 protect health and moral; 









Step 4. If you were personally being monitored by (or subjected to) your proposed 
security technology, would you be as likely to, or worried about, engaging in the 
following legal activities (which for these purposes you wish to engage in): having an 
affair?______; applying for a role at a competitor’s firm?______; attending a meeting 
of the BNP?______; organising or participating in a protest rally?______; attending an 
alcoholics anonymous meeting/drug-counselling session/mental health support 
group?______; attending a religious sect meeting?______. If you answered ‘yes’ to any 
of these your technology is having a chilling effect. How can you minimise this effect 
through your design?_____________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note on Step 3: If there is another existing technology/approach which can achieve 
the same goals as your technology with less social impact then your technology 
probably cannot qualify as a necessity.  
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Step 1. Identify specific scenarios where it will be lawful to use your proposed security 
technology when it is having the effect of infringing someone’s freedom of 
expression?_____________________________________________________________
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression; the right to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authorities. Therefore we have the right to say what we want, write what we want, 
and publically demonstrate so as to publicise these views. However, this right is not 
absolute. Where necessary it may be restricted in the interests of national security, 
public safety, and the prevention of crime and disorder, amongst other reasons. 
Security technologies can and are used to directly infringe this right, largely in the 
digital world; for example the blocking of certain websites by Internet Service 
Providers and the monitoring of internet users who visit certain sites or seek to 
access certain information. The presence of such technologies can also have a 
chilling effect, making it less likely people will exercise their right of expression. 
This restriction/monitoring can either be targeted at individuals or a blanket 
approach covering entire nations. In the physical world security technologies such 
as CCTV cameras and less lethal weapons can make people wary of exercising their 
right of expression. 
From a social perspective, security technologies which seek to restrict somebody’s 
freedom of expression or to monitor their actions are often a source of mistrust 
and anger. At one end of the scale (and regardless of their original purpose) these 
technologies have been employed by various regimes to supress democracy, target 
activists, instil fear, and prevent social change. While at the other end they have 
been used to try and prevent the sharing of files on the internet, or even the 
accessing of websites which provide links to where information is stored; thereby 
upholding the law while protecting commercial interests and/or enforcing moral 
standards. This causes problems when search blockers deliberately or inadvertently 
prevent access to information which is not illegal. 
Challenges: To create technologies: 
 Which can achieve legitimate security, public disorder, and crime prevention 
goals without inadvertently providing tools of oppression for brutal 
governments.  
 Which citizens trust to the extent that they will not be fearful of, or dissuaded 
from, exercising their freedom of expression. 






If you cannot identify any such circumstances then chances are it will be unlawful to 
use your proposed technology. 
Step 2. Identify scenarios where you think it will be unlawful to use your proposed 




What protections could you possibly build into your security technology to either 




If your technology is open to unlawful use and there are either no technical 
protections available, or there are but you are not going to build-in these protections, 




Step 3. If your were personally being monitored by (or subjected to) your proposed 
security technology would you be as likely to, or worried about, engaging in the 
following legal activities (which for these purposes you wish to engage in): attending a 
meeting of the BNP?______; organising or participating in a protest rally?______; 
writing a blog criticising the government or your employer?______; hosting a Wikileaks 
style website?______; publishing a newsletter promoting controversial views (i.e., anti-
homosexuality views based on religious doctrine, criticisms of British soldiers, assisted 
suicide, extreme religious views on the role/rights of women, anti-abortion, pro-
abortion, promotion of the death penalty, etc)?______. If you answered ‘yes’ to any of 
these your technology is having a chilling effect. How can you minimise this effect 








Note on Step 3: Freedom of expression does not mean ‘the freedom of others to 
only express uncontroversial views that you agree with’. It means the right to 
express views which others may find offensive, disgusting, even dangerous; views 
which go against everything either other individuals or the majority stand for and 
have fought for.   
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Qn.2e: Could the security technology unintentionally affect your right to 




















Step 1. Consider the scenario below before answering the questions which follow. 
Your proposed security technology has been completed and deployed. An individual 
(Louise) has been subjected to the security technology. As a direct result of this she was 
identified as a threat and relevant sanction(s) have been applied to her (the form of 
these depends upon the nature of your security technology but they may include; loss 
of current employment, refusal of future employment, detention in prison, home 
detention, restriction and/or monitoring of movements, prevented from flying or 
When I talk about trials and decisions here I am not restricting this to courtrooms 
and formal criminal trials. I am referring to the processes by which a decision is 
reached which materially affects the target of a security technology. This may occur 
at the moment the technology is applied to the target (e.g. an airport body scanner 
highlighting something of interest on the body of a passenger), or it can have a 
delayed effect which might only arise after some action by the target (e.g. a person 
being included on a no-fly-list as the result of a data-mining process - a decision 
they may only become aware of the next time they attempt to fly and are refused 
permission to do so).  
It goes without saying that no scrupulous security technology developer (such as 
yourself) would ever set out to deliberately design and built security technologies 
with either the primary or auxiliary purpose of undermining a citizen’s right to a 
fair trial or decision. Indeed if such a technology was created no democratic 
government which respected human rights would deploy such a technology, and if 
it ever was deployed it would not be afforded legitimacy by the public and would 
certainly damage the reputation of the developer. 
So why should you be concerned about an outcome you are not intending to 
create? The answer is ‘because this outcome can occur as an unintentional side-
effect of how a security technology achieves its intended goals’. Technologies 
where the internal protocols do not begin with a presumption of innocence for the 
target, where the decision making processes are opaque and/or not set out, where 
the target is not afforded the opportunity to defend themselves and/or not 
presented with the evidence against them, or where no prior reasonable suspicion 
existed before they were subjected to the technology, can all affect a person 
receiving a fair decision.  
If this Section is applicable you should look at Section 3c for the interrelated topic of 
citizens being able to determine the legality of how a security technology operates. 
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travelling, prevented from contacting certain people, internet restrictions, etc.). Louise 
seeks to challenge the decision against her. Answer the following questions basing your 
answers on the how you envision your proposed security technology operating.  
Why was Louise targeted by your security technology? Was it (a) because she must 
have sought to enter some area or access some service where everybody is targeted 
(like an airport)?; (b) because she must have performed some illegal or suspicious 
action which triggered an alarm or attracted the attention of the technology or its 
operator?; and/or (c) could she have been selected as the result of a random or mass 
search for which there was no prior action or evidence against Louise which could have 
equated to prior reasonable suspicion?______. If your answer includes (c) then your 
technology may be conducting fishing expeditions (i.e. investigating an individual or 
mining their data in an effort to uncover evidence of any illegal or suspect activities by 
that person when you did not possess any prior evidence of wrongdoing constituting 
reasonable suspicion before your investigation/mining commenced – an action which 
undermines the presumption of innocence and has led to social and judicial resistance 
in the past). Describe here what design changes can you make to prevent your 
technology being used to conduct fishing expeditions? or if you are not going to 




Step 2. The following questions are to determine how easy/possible it is for Louise be 
defend herself against, or challenge the validity of, any sanctions against her. 
 Will Louise be shown the evidence against her?______. 
 Will this evidence be presented in such a way that it explains clearly and exactly 
why any decisions against her were taken at all?______. 
 Will Louise be able to challenge any sanctions/restrictions that are going to be 
applied to her at the immediate moment that decision is taken?______. 
 Will the operator of the security technology possess the authority and physical 
ability to override any decision made by the security technology upon hearing 
Louise’s arguments and weighing them accordingly?______. 
For every ‘no’ answer you make to these questions, if it is later shown that Louise was 
not guilty of any offence and should not have been subject to any sanctions as 
determined by your security technology, then it becomes increasingly likely your 
technology will lead to resentment and resistance by the public. How can you modify 





























Step 1. Identify the rights (other than security) that will be curtailed by the 
introduction of your proposed security technology as well as the rate (nature and 
scope) of these curtailments?_______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
We as citizens have a right to safety and security. Indeed it is often stated that the 
provision of security is the single most important role of the state, and that security 
is the paramount right upon which all other rights are dependent; i.e., a secure 
environment is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other rights. Nevertheless, as 
one of many rights, security does not automatically trump these others when they 
come into competition. Indeed when security is afforded priority over other rights 
this raises the possibility of social resistance towards the security measures 
involved. Should the resulting security benefits be outweighed by losses to other 
rights then the risk of social resistance is not only heightened, it is also afforded 
legitimacy. It is therefore important that the developers of security technologies 
ensure that the gains in security arising from their proposed technology outweigh 
any concomitant losses experienced by other rights. 
There is no universal formula for determining whether security benefits outweigh 
the losses to other rights. Two of the greatest challenges you face here are that: 
1. Unlike some of the other balancing scenarios addressed throughout this tool 
at no stage will you be comparing like-for-like values; security is different to 
privacy which are both different to association, which are all different to 
religion, etc.  
2. Because all the rights are inherently different you will need to convert them 
into common denominators if you are to measure the loss/gain effects. 
Additionally citizens may assign different utility values to changes in the 
quantum of a right depending on the amount of that right they both began 
with and will be left with. This process will be subjective and your methods and 
results will be open to scrutiny.  
Finally just because the security gains from a security technology outweigh the 
losses to other rights this does not necessarily mean the technology is acceptable. 
Certain rights may be considered off-limits to citizens regardless of the security 
gains to be had. If there is only a small amount of a right left for a citizen to enjoy 
then they may be less likely to accept security technologies which would eat into 
this right. These are all factors which need to be taken into account when arriving 














Step 3. Are the ‘curtailment rates’ (Step 1) and ‘security benefits’ (Step 2) common 
values which can be compared?______ If ‘yes’ compare these two values. If ‘no’ first 
convert them into a common denominator which can be compared before going ahead 












Step 4. Do the security benefits outweigh the curtailments? If ‘yes’ what concerns 
remain regarding this calculation? If ‘no’ how can development and deployment of this 











Note on Step 3: Be aware that citizens may vary the value they place on a right 
differently depending on how much of that right they started with and how much 
they will be left with. Also certain rights may be considered off-limits such that no 
security gain will be acceptable if it requires this right be lost or even infringed.   
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Qn.2g: Could the security technology be used for torture or inhuman or 























Step 1. Are you designing your proposed security technology with the intention that it 
can be used as an instrument of torture, either as a primary or secondary 
function?______ If ‘yes’ how can you justify producing this technology given the 
massive risks (social, reputational, legal, ethical, financial, etc.) this entails? 
Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights states in simple terms that no one 
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment. This is the only 
right within the Convention that is unqualified. In other words this is the only right 
that is absolute; there are no opt-outs, circumstances, or competing reasons 
available to governments allowing them to lawfully infringe upon this right.  
There is therefore little point in security developers expending resources (time, 
money, effort, etc.) designing torture devices as commercial products for few 
governments will be able to use them; these devices will probably be subject to 
trade restrictions anyway; and in any event once the public find out it will almost 
certainly mark the end of that developer with the possibility of criminal sanctions 
for the individuals involved. 
This is also an area where developers run huge risks should they seek to exploit 
dubious grey areas in definitions. For example; waterboarding is torture! It is not 
merely an enhanced interrogation technique. Designing a better waterboarding 
device to sell to the United States and hiding behind such linguistic justifications 
will not be acceptable to the public, will most probably mean the end of your 
company, as well as opening the door to criminal sanctions.  
Given that you are not intending to develop torture devices the major concern in 
this area is the dual-use of security technologies which were designed for other 
purposes but are subsequently used as instruments of torture. The most likely 
candidates here are less lethal weapons (i.e. teargas, truncheons, water cannons, 
Tasers, baton rounds, etc.). Of these candidates Tasers are probably the most 
concerning as they are widely issued, have a history of misuse in police stations 
away from the gaze of the public, leave no lasting marks, and use pain to both 
subdue citizens and force them to comply. These are devices which are used as 
torture instruments throughout the world today.   
Challenge: To design security technologies where; (a) it is either impossible for 
them to be used as instruments of torture or inhuman treatment in addition to 
their proper intended purpose, and/or (b) where misuse of these technologies is 








If ‘no’ continue on to the remaining Steps in this Section. 
Step 2. Consider your proposed security technology. Can you conceive of any possible 
methods/scenarios where your technology could be used as an instrument of 
torture?______ If ‘yes’ list these out here, and while doing so make sure to note for 
each method whether this capacity for torture is ‘technology based’ or ‘end-user 








Step 3. For those methods/scenarios identified in Step 2 where your proposed 
technology possesses an end-user capacity to inflict torture, what design changes can 
be made to; prevent this occurring, reduce the incidents of occurrence, and/or reduce 




Step 4. For those methods/scenarios identified in Step 2 where your proposed 
technology possesses an technology-based capacity to inflict torture, what design 
changes can be made to; prevent this occurring, reduce the incidents of occurrence, 








Note on Step 2: What I mean by ‘technology or end-user based’ in relation to the 
anticipated final product’ is whether the technology only becomes a torture 
instrument because of the actions of the end-user (such as a police baton), or 
whether this is also the result of the some capability of the final product (such as a 
Taser with an inbuilt Drive Stun mode) which for our purposes is technology based 
even though it also requires actions by the end-user. 
   
Note on Steps 3 & 4: Such protections might entail: methods for monitoring and 
recording the use of the technology, restrictions on how many times and how 
often the technology can be used, designing the technology to physically break if a 
certain amount of force is applied by the end-user, reducing the power/effects of 
the technology, etc. 





















Qn.3a: Is the use, sale, or possession of similar security technologies 






















Step 1. Are there similar technologies to your proposed technology, both by design and 
effect, already on the market?___________ 
Step 2. What restrictions are placed on the sale, possession and use of these 
technologies?___________________________________________________________
It is not uncommon or controversial for security technologies to be subjected to 
restrictions governing who can legally possess and use these technologies. Similarly 
the sale of security technologies is often restricted and regulated. This reflects, 
amongst other things; the dual-use potential of many security technologies 
whereby if used inappropriately they can often cause harm as readily as they can 
provide a security benefit, the health and safety risks inherent to certain security 
technologies, and the need for special training. In certain instances the possession, 
use, or sale of a security technology is banned completely. 
Security technology restrictions also reflect the views of society. Pressure placed on 
governments (both local and national) and regulators by both the general public 
and specific activist groups has led to the restriction and/or banning of certain 
security technologies in the recent past. 
 The UK’s National Identity Register and its associated National Identity Card 
were abandoned following the ultimate display of societal power – the 
election of opposition political parties with manifestos to destroy these 
programmes.  
 The use of Mosquitos has been banned in certain local authorities following 
complaints to and from local councillors.  
 The sale of the fake handheld explosive detector ADE-651 to Iraq and 
Afghanistan was banned following media investigations and the ensuing public 
response. 
It is in the interests of both those designing security technologies and the wider 
society that security technologies with the potential to provide real security 
benefits can be developed and deployed in a manner which society finds 
acceptable.  
Challenge: To produce a security technology which will not be banned and will 
only be subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. To be achieved by 
identifying those design characteristics of similar banned/restricted security 
technologies which have justified these bans/restrictions and then using this 
















Step 3. What are the design characteristics of these technologies that are related to or 








Step 4. Consider the proposed design characteristics of your own security technology. 
Do any of these overlap with the specific design characteristics of existing technologies 
identified in step 3?______ If ‘yes’ move on to steps 5 & 6. 












Step 6. How can you address these potentially controversial design characteristics in 






Note on Step 5: Ensure that throughout the design process this list remains 
highlighted to the designers. It sets out opportunities to produce an innovative 
security technology with the potential to: 
 Be acceptable to the public 
 Maximise the uptake of this technology 






























Step 1. Sketch out your proposed technology; focussing on who will use it, where it will 
be used, what it will actually do, and how it will do it.___________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
This section is not about determining whether or not a technology is or isn’t legal. 
Rather it is about attempting to assess the likelihood somebody will challenge that 
technology in court.  
Predicting with accuracy whether a security technology possesses elements likely 
to provoke some future legal challenge can be a difficult task, unless that 
technology is blatantly illegal and/or carrying out its functions in an illegal manner 
at which point it is almost certain to face legal challenges by its targets. In any 
event, given the possible downsides of having a security technology declared illegal 
by a court, it is worth investing time in this endeavour.  
Challenges to the legality of a security technology can take considerable time to 
resolve. Court cases attract publicity and, depending on the outcome, can force 
both developers and end-users to make changes to the design of a technology 
and/or how and when it may be used, assuming the technology remains legal to all. 
Even if the technology wins, negative publicity preceding the trial may undermine 
the technology in the eyes of the public. Indeed cases need never go to trial for 
there to be a detrimental impact; by raising specific concerns of legality which will 
remain moot until there is a court ruling questions will remain over the standing of 
the technology. 
For example: 
 The use of backscatter whole body scanners on children in airports was 
temporarily halted in response to claims the images produced were in 
violation of the Protection of Children Act 1978. By the time these scanners 
were removed from UK airports no case had been brought on this point. 
We have adopted two approaches for achieving the aims of this section: 
 Encouraging the developers to step back and consider the proposed 
technology from the position of the different people subjected to it 
 Examine the proposed technology in the light of historical examples where 
elements of a security technology have raised the threat of legal challenge.  
Challenge: To identify those statutes that may apply to the proposed technology, 
and to anticipate how people who are being subjected to the technology will react. 
Then using this information to either reject changes, or to modify the proposed 









Step 2. Use the information from step 1 to identify those statutes which may apply to 
this technology. For each statute formulate a plan of action: this may be to reject the 
statute, modify the design, reject elements of the security technology, lobby for law 




Step 3. Consider possible responses to the proposed technology from the perspectives 
of members of the specific groups listed below. Assume they have been subjected to 
the technology and that it was used correctly and according to any relevant codes of 









Step 4. Repeat the process from step 3 but now consider the response if the 
technology is being misused, abused, used without proper protections, used by staff 
who are not properly trained or are acting inappropriately. How will they respond 








Notes on Step 2: Without prior experience in the regulatory field surrounding the 
proposed security technology it is advisable here to seek professional legal advice 
to identify the specific laws which may apply.  
 
Notes on Steps 3 & 4: The aim here is for the developer to mentally step back from 
their design. You may believe that what they are developing is completely justified 
because you can see the security benefits. However, it is how it interacts with 
society and social groups which will ultimately determine the acceptability and 
uptake of your technology. 
Try and place yourself in the shoes of somebody from each groups listed above. 
How would you feel and react if you were the subject of this technology, both 
when it is used properly but also if it is used inappropriately and/or deliberately 
misused by the end-user. Make sure you include extra groups to the list above if 
you can foresee the potential for specific issues for specific groups arising from 




Qn.3c: Could an individual determine whether the security technology 




















Step 1. Will information about the operation of the proposed security technology (and 
where relevant the decision making processes including decision algorithms) be made 





If ‘yes’ what information will be made available?_______________________________  
The operation of security technologies is often accompanied by a level of secrecy 
so as to hopefully enhance their effectiveness. For example profiling, data-mining, 
and data-matching technologies designed to increase the detection rates of 
terrorists and other criminals based on certain activities and/or attributes are only 
effective if the terrorist fits the previously created profile. Proponents of secrecy 
argue that if this profile is openly known then it becomes easier for terrorists to 
avoid the actions which will enhance their likelihood of being detected and/or 
recruit certain types of individuals who are less likely to trigger alarms.  
This secrecy is often not problematic providing society can have trust in how these 
technologies are formed and operate. This trust requires these technologies 
operate within the confines of the law. Security technologies which discriminate by 
religion, nationality, ethnicity, disability, age, sex, etcetera, are likely to run afoul of 
the various anti-discrimination Acts as well as the Human Rights Act 1998 
regardless of their security purpose. The public’s trust will also be called into 
question by administrative decisions taken exclusively by a security technology 
without any human oversight – especially when that decision is patently wrong. 
Finally there is the need for the decision making process to be open to scrutiny by 
those affected by it and who disagree with the decision taken. Hiding behind 
commercial secrecy or national security to prevent the open disclosure of this 
process, especially in court, will naturally call into question the integrity of the 
security technology. 
Challenge: To develop security technologies which may be subject to secrecy 
requirements, take independent decisions, and/or employ complex decision 
making algorithms, but which can also provide those affected by it the information 
they need to determine whether or not that technology was operating legally. This 
includes providing a clear rationale for why they were targeted as well as the 










Step 2. How is the information presented to the individual from step 1 sufficient to 
allow that person to determine whether or not the security technology was operating 
in a legal manner when they were subjected to it? Alternatively, if it is not sufficient 






Step 3. Is the information provided regarding any decision making processes 







Step 4. How are administrative decisions made by the security technology 
communicated to the target? When does this occur? And are these decisions 







Step 5. How can the proposed security technology be designed so as to prove that it 









Qn.3d: Is illegal use of the security technology prevented or preventable 
















Step 1. Is it possible to build protections into the technology to prevent the present or 
future misuse of that technology?______ If ‘yes’ continue on to step 2. If ‘no’ outline 







Step 2. Describe what measures could be designed into the technology to prevent that 




There is a multitude of security technologies built to protect individuals, property, 
and/or the state. Successful technologies can enhance our collective security by 
detecting, preventing, and deterring crimes, and catching offenders. Despite these 
benefits possibly all security technologies could be classified as dual-use 
technologies; possessing both the capacity to increase security (as intended by 
design) as well as the capacity to assist in the carrying out of crimes. Tasers used to 
immobilise an attacker have also been used as instruments of torture, CCTV 
cameras which record crimes for future prosecutions but also have been used to 
spy on residents, ID cards for proving a person’s identity can also perpetrate 
identity fraud, and so on. It is an inconvenient fact that some end-users in the 
security field (such as police and government officials) abuse their positions, 
access, and technologies to commit crimes.  
Security technologies which are widely viewed as open to abuse and/or are indeed 
used as tools of abuse will not enjoy the support of citizens. While of course not all 
security technologies can be designed to prevent their illegal use, for those where 
this is possible the building-in of such protection could only be beneficial. 
Challenge: To build protections into the proposed security technology that will 
prevent and/or deter the misuse and illegal use of that technology. This could be 
by protections which prevent the misuse at the time of use (present misuse), or by 
protections which record instances of misuse of that technology, thus providing 










Step 3. How could use of the technology be monitored so as to prevent misuse and/or 

















Step 4. Are there specific obligations on the user to take positive actions to prevent the 
technology being misused or used without authorisation?______ If ‘yes’ what 










Notes on Steps 2 & 3: Possible approaches here may include measures: 
 To prevent the technology from physically being used by an authorised 
person(s). 
 Whereby the technology records on a log when it was used, by whom, and 
how. 
 The in-building of privacy enhancing technology into surveillance systems to 
restrict what can be viewed. 
 An alarm system build into the technology to warn others in real time that; (a) 
a technology is being used by an end-user, and/or (b) that there is evidence to 


























Step 1. Is there an existing legal and/or regulatory system governing the use of the 
proposed security technology?______ If ‘no’ see the following Note on Step 1. If ‘yes’ 
does the proposed technology meet these requirements?______ If ‘no’ to this second 
question what changes need to be made so as to ensure compliance?______________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
Basic legal principles have formed as both our society and our legal systems have 
developed. Collectively these principles may be termed the rule of law. While it is 
tempting to skip past such ideals as too hard to define and/or too uncertain and 
subjective in nature, this is inadvisable. Concrete requirements of operation and 
fairness can be identified through an examination of the rule of law, and the 
application of these basic requirements will only strengthen a security technology, 
while ignoring them will potentially undermine social acceptability of that 
technology.  
Relevant elements of the rule of law are listed here (note that a number of these 
are examined in greater detail in other sections so will not be addressed in this 
section). We have modified these so as to apply them to the designing of security 
technologies. These requirements and their subsequently modified formats are as 
follows: 
 (rule of law) The law must be accessible, intelligible, clear, and predictable; 
(design principle) The legal basis for the security technology should be clear. 
 (rule of law) Legal rights and liabilities should be determined by application of 
the law, not the exercise of discretion; (design principle) Decision making 
processes of a security technology should not be arbitrary. It should be clear 
with a defined scope. 
 (rule of law) Adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair. 
(design principle) Decision-making procedures of a security technology should 
afford those listed as targets the opportunity to challenge this claim. 
 (rule of law) Public officers should exercise their powers fairly, for the purpose 
for which they were given, and without exceeding these powers. (design 
principle) Security technologies should be used for approved purposes and 
must not exceed the powers assigned to them. 
 (rule of law) The law should apply equally to all (see Question 3f for an 
examination of discrimination). 
  (rule of law) The law must protect human rights (see Section 2 for 










Step 2. How can the design of the security technology prevent arbitrary decision 









Step 3. How does the security technology provide opportunities for individuals to 




Can they challenge this decision/output immediately after it is produced so as to 
minimise the effects of an incorrect decision?______ If ‘no’ how long will the effects of 
an incorrect decision be applied to the target, and how can the design be modified to 




Step 4. What are the approved security purposes for the proposed security technology 




Note on Step 1: While the absence of a regulatory system governing the design of 
a security technology may allow a designer more freedom in the short term, this 
can have legal repercussions in the mid to long term. Security technologies that 
lack a statutory basis cannot rely upon such a basis if challenged in court, and 
citizens may be more likely to engage in legal challenges of this technology given 
this fact.  
Note on Step 2: Measures may include either automatically-recording, or forcing 
the user to record both when the technology is used (including the justification for 
use) as well as when the technology is not used (as well as the justification for not 
using it).  
However, there is a difference between arbitrary decision making and the use of 
human discretion/intuition. When the decision of an automated security 
technology should be overridden by a human operator because common sense 
dictates that it should be, then this must be allowed though details of such actions 
should be logged. 
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Step 1. Begin by describing both how your technology acts upon an individual as well 
as how the operation of this technology will be experienced by the typical citizen-
target. Does this technology discriminate against the typical citizen, and if so 
how?__________________________________________________________________
Discrimination against individuals based on some trait, belief, or inherent 
characteristic is rightly illegal within many countries. This is unsurprising given its 
direct relationship with some of history’s darkest moments including slavery and 
the holocaust. Discrimination encapsulates racism, sexism, ageism, religious 
intolerance, and disability discrimination to name some of its forms. Within the 
United Kingdom there are various pieces of legislation banning discrimination 
including, but not limited to, the Race Relations Act 1976, Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and the Human Rights Act 1998. The fact 
there are so many Acts should leave designers of security technologies in no doubt 
as to the unacceptability of this outcome.  
It is also clear that security does not trump the prohibition on discrimination as the 
example below from aviation security illustrates: 
 The Interim Code of Practice for the Acceptable Use of Advanced Imaging 
Technology (Body Scanners) in an Aviation Security Environment explicitly 
states, “Passengers must not be selected on the basis of personal 
characteristics (i.e. on a basis that may constitute discrimination such as 
gender, age, race or ethnic origin)”. 
The onus is on designers of security technologies to ensure their technologies do 
not directly discriminate against different groups of citizens. Additionally, given the 
likelihood of a social backlash against technologies which facilitate discrimination, 
designers should also be seeking to minimise the possibility end-users could use 
their technologies in a discriminatory manner.  
Challenge: To design technologies which do not directly discriminate while also 
minimising the probability/instances of end-users discriminating with the 
technology.  
Note on Profiling: Profiling refers to both the process of building profiles (i.e. 
discovering correlations between data so as to create a representation of a group) 
and the process of trying to match individuals to a previously created profile. The 
goal is to identify individuals with the highest probability of being a criminal before 
attacks occur. The dangers here are that; (1) the data used to form the original 
profile is discriminatory; (2) the profile is discriminatory in composition; (3) those 
trying to match individual citizens to a profile do so in a discriminatory manner. 
While profiling does have security benefits it always walks the tightrope of 
constituting discrimination which will undoubtedly result in social resistance to this 













Step 2. Using your descriptions of how the technology acts from Step 1, replace the 
‘typical citizen-target’ with an individual from each of the following eight groups; again 




children    male/female/transgender 
 different religious groups  foreign national  
 elderly     physically/mentally disabled 
 different ethnic groups  different skin colours   
Step 3. If discrimination is identified in Steps 1 or 2, how can the design of your 
potential security technology be modified so as to minimise and ultimately prevent this 





Step 4. How can you build protections into your proposed security technology to 








Note on Step 1: By ‘how your technology acts upon an individual’ we mean 
everything your technology does in relation to a target when it is operated. For 
example; for a data-mining programme this will involve what information is 
searched, what criteria were used when searching, what is chosen and discarded, 
and how it is collated and presented; for a tear-gas canister it is how the canister is 
deployed and how the gas effects an individual, how long it last, etc.   
   
Note on Step 4: Measures here might include: logs recording when the technology 
was used, by whom, and for what purpose; a capability whereby the target is 
provided information about why they were targeted as well as the history of use of 
the operator; a real-time oversight function; the public disclosure of information 
regarding how the technology is being used, etc.  
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Qn.3g: Will there be design protections within the security technology to 


























The advent of digital databases has facilitated the collection, storage, and 
processing of personal data on a scale never previously achieved in human history. 
These systems have the power to contribute to economic and social expansion, 
facilitate trade, and improve the well-being of both individuals and society.  
However they also possess the potential to threaten the individual. They can 
undermine the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, most notably their 
right to privacy. Additionally, databases of personal information are targets for 
attackers who can use this information to commit identity fraud, theft, and other 
crimes.      
It is against this conflicting backdrop of benefits and threats that has seen data 
protection principles enshrined in law through European directives (such as 
Directive 95/46/EC) and associated national legislation (such the UK’s Data 
Protection Act 1998). These provide principles governing the collection, storage, 
and processing of data; all designed to protect an individual’s personal data and to 
rein in the otherwise unrestricted collection and processing of such information. 
It must be noted that these principles and restrictions are often presented with the 
attached caveat that the scope of some of these obligations may themselves be 
restricted by governments when the collection and processing of personal data is 
necessary to safeguard national security, defence, safety, and/or the prevention, 
investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences.  
However caution is advised here, for these caveats do not afford developers or 
end-users carte blanch to ignore data protection principles. On the contrary, 
measures adopted which are not necessary will still be in breach of these 
principles. Similarly, regardless of legality if a proposed security technology appears 
excessive or disproportionate in its collection and associated processing of data, 
the real possibility arises it will lack public support and/or evoke active public 
resistance and thereby lack societal legitimacy. 
Challenge: To create a security technology that possesses design features allowing 
it to: 
 Comply with all data protection principles during normal operation; 
 Identify and facilitate the wider collection and processing of data when such 
actions are legitimately necessary to safeguard specific goals (i.e. national 
security, public security, defence, preventing crimes, etc.); 
 Provide the public with the relevant information so as to assure them that the 






Step 1. Answer the following series of ‘yes/no’ questions: 
 Has consent been given to the collection or processing of data?______ 
 Are individuals informed when their personal data is processed?______ 
 Is personal data anonymised?______ 
 Does the ability exist to block access or delete unlawfully processed data?______ 
 Does the ability exist to rectify data that is wrong or incomplete?______ and can 
this happen immediately upon discovery of the errors?______ 
 Are specific purposes specified each time data is processed?______ and are these 
purposes recorded for future examination?______ 
 Are legitimate purposes specified each time data is processed?______ and are 
these purposes recorded for future examination?______ 
For each ‘no’ answer above, identify and write down design measures and which could 
be implemented or will need to be addressed to achieve what is set out in the relevant 
question(s). Alternatively, if you have decided not to address any of the ‘no’ answered 
questions set out your justifications for doing so._______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 2. To ensure proportionality of the proposed security technology, and prevent the 
excessive collection of information; firstly set out what security problem(s) your 
technology seeks to address. Then for each identified problem set out what you 
consider to be the minimum-necessary amount of data on an individual which would 
need to be collected to address that security problem.__________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Consider now your proposed security technology. Does its data collection exceed these 
minimum-necessary limits?______ If ‘yes’ how can this be reduced through the 
design?________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
What design protections can be put into place to ensure future data collection does 
not exceed the minimum-necessary data collection limits when the security technology 
is deployed?____________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 4. What measures are built in to protect the data that is held?________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
If specific protection obligations exist do these measures meet them?______ 
Step 5. How is use of the security technology monitored to prevent illegal use by both 










































Step 1. Begin by setting down what the true purchase costs of the technology will be 
for the client assuming they wish to purchase enough units so as to effectively use 
them throughout their organisation (which for a government may be an entire nation). 
This figure includes all one-off set up costs for installing the units, 
training/accreditation costs for end-users and on-going running/upgrade costs for 1, 5 
and 10 year periods. When in doubt err on the high side of any calculations and make 
The development and implementation of security technologies where the financial 
costs outweigh the security benefits (either in reality or by appearance) have 
caused controversy in the past. Especially when systems are paid for by the public 
through taxation, any failure of the technology to deliver commensurate security 
benefits is at risk of attracting negative social and media attention. 
There is no universal formula for determining whether security benefits outweigh 
total financial costs. While in some cases a simple balancing of equivalent values 
(money saved versus costs of the security technology) may be possible, any 
calculation in this area will depend upon the characteristics of the benefits 
produced. Lives saved, injuries prevented, industries protected, jobs maintained, 
fear reduced, and business continuity maintained, etc., will all need to be 
considered and converted into common values so as to be weighed against each 
other. However when the values are not ostensibly equivalent (i.e. money versus 
lives saved; money versus reduction in fear of citizens) then the user of this tool 
will need to produce an explicit formula for converting these variables to a 
common denominator. 
When presenting the financial cost of a security technology as a justification for the 
introduction of that technology, do not simply use the per unit cost. Factor in all 
one-off and on-going costs, including maintenance, staffing, installation, training, 
etcetera; which I refer to as the true purchase cost. This information will almost 
certainly come out into the public domain, especially if the technology is 
potentially controversial for other factors. Any slow drip-feeding of information 
(whereby the price of the technology constantly rises) will only increase suspicion 
as to the actual cost. Undervaluing the true purchase cost will not change how 
much it actually is, and it is this cost which will ultimately need to be acceptable to 
the public. 
Finally, just because the security benefits of a security technology are outweighed 
by its financial costs does not mean this technology is necessarily unacceptable or 
not worth implementing. Factors other than cost may make the technology 
acceptable, such as providing comfort, protecting jobs and services, etc. These all 


















Step 3. Are the true purchase costs and security benefits common values which can be 
compared?______ If ‘yes’ compare these costs and benefits. If ‘no’ first convert harms 





Step 4. Do the security benefits outweigh the true purchase costs?______ If ‘yes’ what 












Notes on Step 1: Do not use lower-end/conservative estimations of costs; given 
the number of past security technologies which grossly exceeded their original 
design and instillation budgets; the public will not trust low estimates, and any 
future upward corrections of the price will merely justify and strengthen this 
opposition.  
Set-up costs include physical building changes necessary to accommodate the 
technology (e.g., airport terminal changes to accommodate whole body scanners) 
   
Note on Step 5: There can be benefits beyond security benefits which may justify 
the financial costs of developing and deploying a particular security technology. For 
example, reducing fear, protecting industries and/or jobs, maintaining business 
continuity, protecting reputations, etcetera.   
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Step 1. Start by setting down what the purchase costs of the technology will be for the 
client assuming they wish to purchase enough units so as to effectively use them 
throughout their organisation (which for a government may be an entire nation), 
including any one-off set up costs for installing the units, training/accreditation costs 
for end-users, and the on-going running/upgrade costs for 1, 5 and 10 year periods. 
When in doubt err to the high side of any calculations and make sure you include the 




While governments are generally willing to spend considerable money on security 
technologies, especially when perceived threat levels are high, it would be wrong 
to assume the public will automatically be as willing to consent to these large 
purchases. A number of factors can influence the likelihood such financial outlays 
will meet public resistance: 
 If the technology is controversial to begin with for reasons other than cost 
then a high price-tag will provide a convenient justification and focal point 
from which to oppose the purchase and introduction of that technology; e.g. 
see the now defunct National Identity Register and associated National 
Identity Card system. 
 If the public can see they are going to have to pay for it directly, either now 
and in the future through higher prices/fees, as opposed to the costs coming 
out of central finances, then there may be greater resistance.  
 If the public cannot be convinced that a particularly large amount of money 
should be outlaid (either on this technology or at this particular point in time), 
resistance may occur regardless of whether the benefits of the technology 
outweigh the financial costs. 
What is obvious here is that not all of these factors are necessarily within the 
power of the designer to directly control. For example if governments choose to 
maintain secrecy over the successful contraband detection rates of airport whole 
body scanners so as not to encourage attacks then this will impact upon the 
amount of information which can be released to the public when developers are 
trying to win the public over. And if trust levels in government are already low then 
the public may be less inclined to simply believe the government when they say a 
technology is good value for money, effective, and a necessary investment. 
Challenge: To design a profitable security technology while at the same time 
winning over a potentially sceptical public by proving the necessity and 
effectiveness of this technology, and doing so when they may not have control 






Step 2. Take the final figure produced from Step 1 and look at it, not as the designer of 
security technologies, but as a sceptical citizen who has no vested interest in this 
technology being successful. Ask yourself the following questions: 
 How will this amount appear to citizens given the current environment?  
 Looking at it subjectively, does it appear large or excessive?  
 How easy would it be for you personally to organise a campaign against this 
technology if you based it upon the costs involved? 
 What else could be purchased for this money? (e.g., how many teachers, nurses, 









Step 3. How will this technology be paid for? (e.g., taxes, user pays, surcharges, etc.), 







Step 4. Will you be able to freely release relevant information on the 
capabilities/detection-rates/benefits, etc., of the proposed security technology into 






Note on Step 2: For this Step to work you really need to try and place yourself in 
the shoes of the sceptical citizen. This requires you taking off your technical hat 
and forgetting about any personal gains you may make from this technology. Be 
the protagonist. Think of this technology as an invention by your main rival; how 
easily could you use the cost of this technology to lobby public resistance to its 
introduction? 
   
Note on Step 3: Even if the costs per citizen/user are low, be careful assuming this 
fact will not lead to resistance, especially if the area involved is already subject to 
many fees and charges, or alternately if the area involved was traditionally free 
from charges.   
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This question follows on from Qn.4b. It asks whether or not the figures used to 
justify the security technology will be accepted as both accurate and realistic by the 
public, and hence be trusted by them.  
The importance of this question is based on the assumption that for every security 
technology there is a financial cost threshold above which the majority of the 
public will no longer support the introduction of that technology. Of course unless 
the public are specifically asked beforehand (something which never happens) this 
value will never be known with certainty before the technology is proposed to the 
public (or indeed until the threshold is crossed).  
When releasing figures on a security technology three decisions need to be made. 
Firstly whether or not to release any information at all? There are valid reasons for 
not doing so. This information may well be commercially sensitive, and/or the 
designer may be constrained by contracts or laws forbidding them from releasing 
such information. 
Secondly, assuming information is to be released, exactly what figures will be 
released? This opens up many secondary questions: will they only reflect the price 
per unit?; will they include on-going running costs and/or initial set-up costs?; who 
will be releasing the figures?; at what stage in the design process will they be 
released?, etc.  
Thirdly, how (if at all) will these figures be verified before/after release? Will they 
simply be announced by the developing company or the client without further 
actions, or will they be independently audited so as to give extra credibility to 
these figures? 
These are all important questions. Security technologies in the past have suffered 
from the inaccurate release of cost information. When initial estimates are 
unrealistically or naïvely low, they will be easy targets for external experts to 
debunk. When corrections are constantly higher than previous figures, all those in 
the process (as well as the technology itself) risk losing credibility.   
Not releasing cost information, or releasing inaccurate information, is always a 
risky tactical ploy and one which is inherently illogical. Firstly the information will 
almost always leak anyway. Secondly there will be a maximum price that society 
will accept for a security technology. If the estimated price for a proposed security 
technology, or the actual price of a completed technology, exceeds this threshold 
then the technology will not survive in the long-term regardless of the initial 





Step 1. Do you know the true final cost of your security technology?______ If ‘yes’ set 
it down explaining exactly what this figure refers to and entails (i.e., unit price, 
maintenance costs, set-up costs, etc.). If ‘no’ set down why this is the case and 





Step 2. Will you have the authority to publically release cost information on your 
proposed security technology?_____ If ‘no’ who holds the power to do this, and why 




Step 3. What costing information will be released, and what will these figures refer to? 




Step 4. How accurate are the figures to be released? If they are inaccurate; what is the 
cause of this inaccuracy?, will this be explained with the release of the figures?, and 




Step 5. Will these figures be audited/checked/assessed before being released?______ 





Step 6. If you are not releasing pricing information (whether by deliberate choice or 
you are obligated not to) what is your strategy to respond to the public when this 













































Step 1. Begin by listing off (a) the features/functions of your proposed technology (i.e., 
what it can actually do).___________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Security technologies derive their legitimacy from the public, such that if a security 
technology is to not acceptable to the public then it will not survive over the mid- 
to long-term. Similarly if specific aspects of a security technology are not 
acceptable to the public then unless these issues are addressed through design 
changes and/or operational safeguards then again the technology will lack public 
legitimacy.     
Given the crucial importance of public legitimacy, when releasing and promoting a 
security technology within the public sphere it is not enough to simply design a 
security technology that works (i.e., that provides net security benefits) and then 
rely upon this fact alone as justification for the introduction of the technology. You 
as the designer also need to justify your design choices to a potentially sceptical, 
even hostile, public audience. 
Finding a balanced, justifiable design can be very tricky for developers of security 
technologies. On the one hand there is the temptation to create a technology with 
the greatest level of functionality and features; something which can do everything 
and anything and thereby offer the greatest potential security benefits. And yet on 
the other hand if the features which produce the security benefits are considered 
excessive in scope and operation then justifying this technology may prove 
impossible.  
Challenge: Being able to predetermine which design elements, outputs, functions 
of a proposed security technology are most likely to elicit negative social responses 
so that you are prepared in advance to justify your security technology. Examples 
of where developers have failed to achieve this in the past include: 
 Failing to justify exceeding current international standards within specific 
security fields such as aviation security; 
 Failing to convince the public that the benefits of a security technology 
outweigh the burdens this technology will bring; 
 Failing to justify the functions and features of a technology, especially if they 
are considered excessive by the public. 
Challenge: Maintaining the initiative within the social interactions by releasing 
information justifying both why you designed the security technology in the way 
you did and why your invention can do what it does, before those design choices 





Step 2. List off the features/functions of any similar security technologies already 
established within the environment, noting whether any of these technologies have or 
are encountering social resistance.__________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 3. Next set out the features of the regulatory environment (if one exists) within 
which the technology will operate (including minimum standards, legal limits and 
safeguards, ISO’s, etc.).____________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________  
Step 4. Using the information from Steps 1, 2 & 3 describe how your security 
technology compares to others (if they exist) and how it fits within both the regulatory 








Step 5. Using the information from Step 4 set out arguments justifying the presence of 




Step 6. What are the hard sells from Step 5 and why? How can you justify including 








Note on Step 4: Focus on: 
 Where/how the technology exceeds others, especially where these other 
technologies have been controversial; 
 Where your technology exceeds minimum standards; 
 Where it approaches legal limits (such as data collection, etc.).  
   
Note on Step 6: By hard sells I mean: those arguments which you do not find 
convincing; areas where you exceed accepted standards; the presence of 
functionality not directly related to your security goals, redundant functions, 
duplicated functions, etc.    
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Trust from the different groups that make up society is an essential component of 
society accepting a security technology. Technologies which lack public trust are 
consistently questioned by the public, often targeted by public pressure groups.  
What makes this fact particularly challenging for developers of security 
technologies is that trust is easy to lose. There are multitudes of different ways in 
which the publics’ trust of a technology can be undermined, and many of these are 
by actions of somebody other than the developer. Actions by end-users, 
governments, and state officials can all undermine public trust in a security 
technology. Additionally, both the way in which information on the technology is 
released as well as the composition and reliability of that information constitute a 
significant component of the trust related issues. 
Below I have listed 9 Commandments for Attaining and Maintaining Trust 
produced through an examination of controversial security technologies. This is by 
no means a definitive list of all the ways trust in a security technology can be 
undermined but they should assist developers in avoiding some of the pitfalls of 
the past when producing and presenting their technologies.   
 
9 Recommendations for Attaining and Maintaining Trust 
1. Do not deliberately withhold information on how your technology is being 
used and how successful/unsuccessful your security technology is from the 
public. 
2. Release experimentation/testing data to prove the safety and efficacy of your 
security technology. If it is not safe or effective then say so. 
3. Do not: lie about your product, spin its capabilities, make claims which are not 
fulfilled, make promises which are not kept, or exaggerate product’s potential. 
4. Ensure information released is accurate and released promptly so as to avoid 
the drip-feeding of truthful information in response to prior misinformation or 
the absence of information. 
5. Be open from the start about the risks inherent to, and created by, your 
technology. 
6. For technologies which include automated decision making capabilities, make 
sure the rationale behind decisions reached is clearly spelt out, and that the 
decision is presented in a form which can be challenged.  
7. Within the design, where possible include capabilities to prevent the misuse 
and abuse of the security technology. 
8. Within the design, include a capability which records and/or independently 
monitors whenever the security technology is used to deter and minimise 
misuse. 
9. Governments which forcibly introduce a security technology must protect 




Step 1. For each of the 9 Recommendations for Attaining and Maintaining Trust answer 
the following questions in turn: Will you be abiding by this commandment? If ‘yes’ 











Step 2. Consider your proposed security technology. Can you identify any other 
reasons or scenarios specific to your technology which may have the potential to 
undermine public trust in the technology?______ If ‘yes’ what are these and what can 





Step 3. If you are not able to meet all 9 Commandments and/or you have identified 
other reasons why public trust may be undermined, consider the combined effect of all 
these outcomes. Given these combined effects, do you foresee a risk that the public 
will not trust your proposed security technology?______  
Step 4. What are your overall strategies for obtaining, maintaining, and building-upon 











Note on Step 4: You do not need to produce detailed strategies here. Merely 
sketch out at a high level the types of actions and activities you are proposing to try 
and gain the public’s trust such as; public engagement exercises, publicity 
campaigns, the establishment of independent oversight controls, etc.  
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Step 1. What end-user engagement/advice/opinions/feedback have you collected or 
are you going to collect before the design of the security technology is locked-in?_____ 
End-users are those who actually have to make your technology work in the field. 
Sometimes this will be from a location physically removed from the security 
technology itself such as the control room for a CCTV unit. Sometimes both the 
security technology and end-user remain physically separate from human targets 
such as a security operator running a data mining programme. But other times 
both the end-user and security technology will be in physical contact with the 
human targets, such as Tasers and whole body scanners.  
In all these scenarios there is a human operator in the form of the end-user, and 
they need to trust the security technology if they are going to use it and believe its 
output. The results of technologies which produce too many false positives will be 
ignored by the operators and eventually not used at all. Technologies which 
produce too many false negatives will similarly be ignored and will likely be 
replaced by better technologies/methods in the future, especially in the face of 
successful attacks which the technology failed to prevent.  
Even technologies which purport to be automated (such as RFID card access doors 
to a building or automated threat detection systems attached to CCTV networks) 
do not exist and cannot operate without human supervision or interaction, such 
that if the human end-user does not trust the system it will be ignored or 
circumvented. For example RFID card access systems can fail to recognise 
legitimate cards, cannot think independently to allow access to a person who has 
forgotten their card, suffer from electrical faults, and/or can be tricked by fake 
cards, therefore the system will require a human supervisor if it is to operate 
effectively. Similarly, automated threat detection systems cannot physically check-
out a possible threat; they cannot open an unattended bag and search it, nor 
question a person who has inadvertently entered an area of an airport where they 
do not have permission to be. These require human end-users to assess and give 
effect to the decisions made if the system is to operate effectively.  
The point of this discussion is that human end-users are a necessary part of 
security technologies and without their belief and support in the technology it will 
be ignored, circumvented, or simply not used. Any lack of support will find its way 
into the public domain via media reports, interviews, anonymous sources, public 
pressure groups, or by those citizens who are subjected to a security technology 
and witness first-hand the lack of trust and belief the end-users have in that 














Step 3. Have there been examples of previous security technologies similar to yours 
which have been criticised by end-users?______ If ‘yes’ identify the reasons for this 
criticism and explain how the design of your proposed security technology will attempt 





Step 4. Are you going to instigate a system for collecting end-user feedback once the 
first prototypes of the security technology are produced but before the technology is 
unveiled?______ 
Step 5. Will the problems of false positives and/or false negatives potentially apply to 
your proposed security technology?______ If ‘yes’ complete Step 6. 
Step 6. How many people will be subjected to the proposed security 
technology?_______________ What will be acceptable false positive and false 
negative rates?________________________ How many people do you therefore 
predict will therefore become false positives and false negatives on any given 
day?____________________________________________________ What will be the 




























Step 1. Begin by describing both your proposed security technology and the crime or 







Step 2. Using the information from Step 1 can you come up with convincing arguments 
as to; (a) why your proposed security technology is necessary to fix these identified 
problems?, and (b) why these identified problems necessitate a technological 
solution?______ For each ‘yes’ answer to (a) and (b) set out the reasons here. If either 
The focus of this section is on whether a security technology is necessary, not 
whether that technology is desirable or useful. 
Just because you possess the technical expertise to produce a security technology, 
that fact alone does not automatically mean society needs that technology. And 
if/when citizens and governments realise an unnecessary security technology is 
redundant then it is highly unlikely they are going to want to pay for it. However, 
technologies which are considered necessary by both governments and citizens to 
promote security and fight crime are those most likely to be implemented first, to 
be more likely to enjoy public support, and be the most resilient to budget cuts and 
similar constraints. Thus being able to identify the necessary from the merely 
useful or desirable should be at the forefront of any decision by designers when 
considering new projects and products. This is not an easy process as security 
agencies and governments may not be willing to divulge information on known 
security weaknesses. Also certain crimes/threats may be occurring which have not 
been identified yet, thus representing a problem we do not even know exists. 
What makes this process more challenging is that security levels and specific crime 
rates have a temporal component; i.e., they fluctuate over time with the changing 
circumstances. Thus what is necessary today may not be necessary tomorrow.   
Challenge: To identify security technologies which are necessary and/or those 
holes within our current security processes and crime detection/response 
procedures which necessarily require a technical solution.  
Challenge: To produce a security technology that remains necessary when the 
security and crime threat levels fluctuate regardless of direction; i.e., both when 
they increase but also when they decrease.  
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is a ‘no’ explain here why this project should go ahead given the technology cannot be 






Step 3. Consider how your proposed security technology addresses the security/crime 
problem(s). Are there other technologies available which can also address these 
problems?______ If ‘no’ move to Step 4. If ‘yes’ compare your solution to the existing 
ones. Do the others achieve the same results in potentially a more acceptable and/or 
less intrusive/controversial manner than yours?______ If ‘yes’ then why should your 











Step 4. How can you design your technology such that it can respond to changing 










Note on Step 3: When comparing your proposed security technology to existing 
alternatives consider both how successful they are and how intrusive they are (i.e., 
how much information they collect, their effects on rights and liberties, whether 
they require physical contact, etc.). If they are sufficiently successful and less 
intrusive in their approach to your technology then you may have problems 
arguing yours is necessary. 
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Step 1. Explain how the proposed security technology differentiates between the 
Certain security technologies (such as profiling technologies) are based entirely on 
identifying those individuals whose characteristic fit a certain predetermined image 
(or profile); often so as to facilitate secondary screening processes. Profiles are by 
necessity minority groups; we use profiling to whittle down all the subjects so as to 
hopefully identify only those of interest and thereby maximise the application of 
our resources – if the total number of subjects who matched the profile are too 
large (which depending on the population size can be much less than 50% of all 
those screened) then resources will not be available to conduct secondary 
screening and our profiles will have failed. The use of profiling, while potentially 
valuable from a security perspective, has evoked considerable negative social 
reactions and we need to understand the underlying issues. 
Delve down into the characteristics of individuals and you soon realise that every 
single person in a society is a member of any number of minority groups; all it takes 
is the application of enough defining factors when grouping them to create a 
minority group, and you rarely need more than one or two factors to achieve this. 
It could be the realisation of this (that we are all minorities), or the fact that we do 
not always get to choose whether we belong to a group (consider medical 
conditions or ancestry), that has led society to shy away from, be wary of, and 
place restriction upon, security measures which deliberately target identifiable 
minorities. 
When employing security technologies that can target minorities or place a greater 
burden on them, a number of negative resulting effects can arise: 
 By deliberately choosing to place a greater burden on the rights and liberties of 
this group so that those in the majority may enjoy security benefits without 
paying a similar price we are discriminating against the minority group.  
 The overwhelming number of those within the minority group will be false 
positives. These people will often face repeated secondary screening, 
especially when systems cannot learn from their mistakes. 
 We may be placing individuals at greater risk of harm, abuse, and 
discrimination by including them in these minority groups. 
 By designing security technologies which are not accessible to those within 
certain minority groups we can easily discriminate against them.   
Our goal should be to design security systems which can effectively allocate 
resources and maximise security for all without increasing the burden for those in 
minority groups. 
Challenge: To design security technologies which can accurately identify actual 
threats and criminals (a minority group), minimising the number of false positives 
and the negative effects of their mistaken identification, and provide equal security 






target group and the rest of the population?___________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 2. Apply the explanation from Step 1 to the following groups. Could the proposed 
technology be configured such that members in minority groups based on the 
following characteristics would have a greater probability of being targeted as 
suspects?______ 
□ Ethnicity   □ Skin colour   □ Religious affiliation 
□ Political affiliation  □ Age    □ Sex 
□ Physical/mental conditions   
Step 3. What safeguards can you build into the technology to prevent the systematic 




                                                                                                                                                      
Step 4. To reduce the repetitive re-screening of false positives, will your technology be 
able to learn from past mistakes and not target these individuals in the future?_____ If 
‘no’ go to step 5. If ‘yes’ how do you plan to achieve this?________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ (go to Step 6) 
Step 5. What is your plan then for dealing with false positives?____________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 6. How can the system be adjusted to modify the false-positive/false-negative 
rates in response to specific information and threats?___________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 7. Will a minority of the population be at greater risk of physical harm from the 





                                                                                                                                                     
Step 8. Will there be a minority of the population who will not be able to use the 
proposed security technology?______ If ‘yes’ how can any discrimination, disruption 
and potential embarrassment to this group be mitigated?________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Note on Step 3: The key words here are systematic discrimination. A safeguard 
could be a system whereby individuals from these groups are only targeted if 
credible information of a specific threat exists and only then for the duration of 
that specific threat. 
   
Note on Step 7: Options might include: the security technology identifying these 
people and modifying its response accordingly; protections whereby the end-user 
is forced to check if the individual falls within these groups before using use; issuing 
warnings; etc.  
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Step 1. On the left side of a suitably large piece of paper, using short bullet-point 
descriptions list off all the specific security and crime problems that your proposed 
security technology is going to be designed to address (be brief for each and try to 
avoid grouping a range of offences/security-issues together with a single heading – 
instead list off all the individual crimes/security-issues as individual points). 
This section focusses solely on whether the proposed security technology 
represents a proportionate or disproportionate response to the security/crime 
problem it is built to address. It is not concerned with the necessity of that 
technology (see Qn.5d), its usefulness, or desirability.  
While we all accept the need to respond to security and crime threats, if society 
considers your response disproportionate we risk undermining public trust and 
causing more damage than we have solved, and the negative effects of such 
disproportionate actions can remain in peoples’ memories for years. For example, 
the use of batons, tear gas, and water cannons against peaceful civil rights 
demonstrators in the United States during the 1960’s shaped a generation of 
Americans and remains a sensitive issue today. It damaged both race relations and 
the relationship between citizens and the state.  
With today’s security technologies and the advent of the digital world, 
disproportionality goes beyond just end-user responses and the effects on society. 
It includes issues such as excessive functionality, excessive usage, and the inability 
of technologies to distinguish between legitimate targets and innocent citizens. 
The potential of these pit-falls arising may be exacerbated by the constant pressure 
from governments and end-users on developers to produce technologies with ever 
greater functions, capabilities, and capacities, regardless of whether they intend to 
use these functions upon deployment. 
There are also issues of whether the proposed security technology represents a 
disproportionate response to the problem it seeks to address, or whether use of 
the technology is perceived as excessive by the public.   
Challenge: To design a security technology: 
 That represents a proportional response to the security/crime problem it seeks 
to address; 
 That only possesses the features/functions it needs to achieve this goal, while 
at the same time can be upgraded and downgraded so as to remain 
proportional as crime and security levels fluctuate; 






Step 2. Now on the right hand side of the same piece of paper, using short descriptive 
bullet-points list off all the features of your proposed security technology (i.e., list off 
all the things that your proposed security technology can do). Again break them down 
into specific individual components rather than using larger generalised headings. 
Step 3. Now draw lines linking the left-hand side crime problem points to the right-
hand side functionality points where specific functionality points effectively address 
specific crime points (each point can link to as many other points as is relevant). 
Step 4. Examine your page of now-linked problems and functionalities.  
 Are there any (left-hand side) security/crime problems which are not linked to 
functionalities?______ If ‘yes’ then your proposed design will not be able to 
address those security/crime problems. 
 Are there any (right-hand side) functionalities which are not linked to specific 
crime/security problems?______ If ‘yes’ then your proposed design has redundant 
features; are there any justifications for not removing these functionalities, and if 
so what are they?_____________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 Ignoring any unlinked left- and right-hand side points, examine how the right-hand 
side functionality points are linked to the left-hand side security/crime points. Are 
there any right-hand side functionality points which could be erased such that all 
of the left-hand side security/crime points remain linked to at least one right-hand 
side functionality point?______ If ‘yes’ these erasable right-hand side points 
represent excessive functionalities. Are there any justifications for not removing 
these functionalities, and if so what are they?______________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
Step 5. Can your proposed security technology be designed to distinguish between 
offenders and innocent civilians?______ If ‘yes’ are you building such features into the 
design of your technology?______ If ‘no’, explain why not._______________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 6. Reflect upon your proposed design and the security benefits you are trying to 
achieve. Can you honestly say this is the least intrusive method/approach/design for 
dealing achieving these benefits?______ If ‘no’ how can you justify the design of this 
security technology, and are there any possible ways you can modify your design to be 


























Step 1. Consider other security technologies or security procedures which already exist 
and perform either the same or similar operations as your proposed security 
technology. Identify and write down here all of the conditions that have been attached 






Public support for all security technologies comes with conditions attached. At the 
most basic level all security technologies come with the condition that they are not 
systematically misused or used illegally: we support guns for police on the 
condition they do not start randomly shooting people on patrols, we support CCTV 
cameras on the condition they are not deliberately set up to look inside our 
bedroom windows; we support Tasers on the condition they are not used to 
torture immobilised cuffed prisoners; etc.  
Some technologies have multiple bespoke conditions attached. For example airport 
whole body scanners come with conditions regarding who views the images, how 
they are viewed, that the images are not recorded, that the low radiation dose 
from the backscatter scanners is not a health risk, that selection processes are not 
based on racial or religious discrimination, and that those being scanned will be 
treated with respect. 
Social acceptance of security technologies always depends on conditions being 
attached to them. By examining past security technologies and conditions for use, 
a reasonable conclusion is that the more controversial the security technology the 
more likely additional conditions will be attached to it. The challenge for those 
designing security technologies is that these conditions for support require the 
public knowing about the proposed security technology, its capabilities, and 
how/where it will be deployed and operated. As the public are often not included 
in the design process of a new security technology, the developers may find 
themselves rapidly trying to modify their products after release in the face of an 
angry public who are demanding both design and operation conditions be attached 
to the technology if it is to remain in use.  
Challenge: To identify those aspects of the proposed security technology’s design 
which are likely to result in conditions for support being attached to this 
technology. Then, having identified these design aspects, adding measures to allow 





Step 2. Using the information from Step 1, will the design of your technology be such 
that either these conditions will not apply to it or that your technology will be able to 
meet these conditions immediately upon release?______  If ‘no’ justify here why you 
believe your technology will be considered acceptable without being able to meet the 






Step 3. Are there any previous security technologies which did what your proposed 
security technology will do but failed to achieve public acceptance and were 
subsequently pulled?______ If ‘yes’ what conditions were attached to these 










Step 4. Now consider the design of your proposed security technology without your 
developer’s hat on but as a citizen who may be subjected to this technology. What 




What conditions would need to be attached to the use of this technology before you 





And how could you modify the design of your proposed security technology so that it 






Qn.5h: Will this security technology meet general standards of what is 















Step 1. Consider your proposed security technology. In the past, has this type of 
technology proven unacceptable to society?______ If ‘yes’ why do you believe your 
particular security technology will fare differently?_____________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Step 2. Can you imagine scenarios whereby the proposed security technology would be 
considered unacceptable if; used in certain ways?, used against certain targets?, or 
used in certain situations?______ If ‘yes’ how can you modify the design to prevent or 
minimise such usage?_____________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________(see also Qn.5g) 
Step 3. In the past has this type of security technology been perceived as fair?______ If 
‘no’ why is your proposed design going to fare differently?_______________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
If security technologies are not socially acceptable they will not survive unscathed 
over the mid- to long-term. At best a developer will be forced to modify their 
designs in the face of negative public responses. They may also find restrictions 
place on the sale and use of this technology. In the worst case the technology will 
be banned from a society altogether. Given that such outcomes all affect the 
profits, credibility, and trust of the developer, there are real incentives in ensuring 
a security technology meets society’s standards for acceptability from the moment 
it is released. 
The problem is that a society is not a homogenous entity; different people and 
groups within society have different beliefs and views on what is and is not 
acceptable. That being said, by examining previous examples of security 
technologies which have elicited negative reactions you begin to see 
commonalities within the social responses. A number of commonly held values 
begin to emerge which you can use to guide your design choices and hopefully 
minimise the risk of social rejection. 
 
Note that some (b t not all) of the Steps here are discussed in more detail in other 
sections; these sections are noted with the relevant Steps below. Feel free to ignore 
these Steps if you have completed, or are going to complete, the more detailed 










Step 4. Will your proposed security technology create new potential security 
risks?______ If ‘yes’ does the public bear the burden of these risks?______ 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Step 5. Could the proposed security technology be used to discriminate?______ If ‘yes’ 
how can your design prevent this?___________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________(see also Qn.3f)  
 
 
Step 6. Could this technology be used in such a way that it has a negative impact upon 
social cohesion?______ If ‘yes’ how can your design protect against this?___________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Step 7. Could it be used to target vulnerable members of society, and/or treat the 
symptoms of social problems while ignoring the underlying causes?______  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
Step 8. Has this or similar security technologies been restricted or banned after social 
action in the past?______ If ‘yes’ why did this happen and how will yours be 
different?_________________________________________________(see also Qn.3a)  
Step 9. Have there been incidents of misuse or abuse of similar technologies by end-
users/officials?______ If ‘yes’ how can your technology prevent such misuse?________ 
_________________________________________________________(see also Qn.7a) 
Note on Step 3: While fairness seems very hard to judge at first, you can get an 
idea on what to include here by looking at previous examples of unfair 
technologies: 
 The UK’s failed National Identity Register with its cradle-to-grave collection of 
information on citizens. 
 Mandatory biometric systems which people are forced to use to access 
services but which cannot cope with anomalies such as missing fingers, job-
related wear, age, and a variety of medical conditions. 
 Mosquitos which target young people regardless of their actions. 
   
Note on Step 5: Discrimination can be indirect; for example a profiling or data 
mining programme whose underlying data sets are themselves discriminatory will 
perpetuate this discrimination regardless of the best intentions of the end-user. 
   
Note on Step 7: Such as mosquitos marketed as a solution to people sleeping 
rough. 
   
Note on Step 6: Such as comprehensive CCTV systems being deployed in 
residential areas selected because of many of the residents are Muslim. 
   
Note on Step 4: For example the defunct National Identity Scheme proposed the 
mandatory collection of individual personal data to be held in central databases. 
This would become a prime target for attackers; hence the risks will be borne by 
the public. 













































Step 1. Create a list of all the security/crime related outcomes you are specifically 
seeking to achieve by developing your proposed security technology.______________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
Functionality is defined here as all the things your technology can do and how it 
does them. It represents the culmination of all the individual functions (i.e. the 
individual components/abilities/modes-of-use/capabilities/etc.) you choose to 
build into your security technology.  
The number of functions different security technologies possess varies hugely. At 
one end of the scale a technology may have only one intended function (e.g. a 
police baton – for hitting things), while at the other end a security technology may 
possess a vast range of intended functions (e.g. a national identity register – a 
multitude of data mining and matching capabilities, authentication capabilities, 
possible biometrics, linked to the access of state services, usable by different 
government departments for their individual bespoke needs, etc.).  
You are probably not a charity, rather you wish to sell your proposed security 
technology once you have built it and make a profit when doing so. As such two 
temptations exist when it comes to your design. One is to maximise its functionality 
thereby increasing both (a) the range of potential purchasers and (b) its 
attractiveness to these potential purchasers. The other is to exclude certain 
functions from your design which may not be essential to its operation on the basis 
of reducing production costs, which in turn may also increase the range of 
potential purchasers, and its attractiveness to them.  
Caution must be exercised at this point. Just because your security technology can 
be designed in a particular way does not necessarily mean you should design it that 
way, especially if you have not taken into account the risk of social resistance. 
Social resistance to security technologies in the past has arisen in response to 
functionality issues for three main reasons: 
1. Unnecessary functions being included in the design of the security technology. 
2. When necessary functions achieve their goals through methods which the 
public consider to be excessively heavy-handed or disproportional. 
3. When the security technology lacks certain functions which the public consider 
essential. 
Challenge: To achieve a design that will maximise the potential sales and 
profitability of your security technology. This goal requires that you minimise the 
risk your design will alienate the public and result in the sale of your technology 
being restricted or banned over the mid-term. This means you need to include the 






Step 2. Now create a second list of all the individual functions your proposed 
technology would need to possess if it was to achieve the security/crime outcomes 





Step 3. By applying your research and knowledge, are you aware of any existing 
security technologies similar to yours where the public demanded certain functions be 
incorporated into the design so as to avoid or respond to controversies related to its 




Step 4. By combining the lists created in Steps 2 & 3 you have created a list of the 
probable essential functionalities for your proposed security technology. Create a list 
here of all the functions you intend to include in your design._____________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
How does the combined list from Steps 2 & 3 compare to what you are intending to 
include in your design? (For those functions you had not included, how can you justify 
not including them now? For those functions you had included but were not on this 




Step 5. Create a list of functions you intend to include in your design having now taken 
into account the output from Step 4. Could any of these functions possibly be 
considered heavy-handed or disproportional?______ If ‘yes’ can you modify these to 






Note on Step 5: To assist in answering the first part of Step 5 apply the following 
question: Would I be happy for my loved-ones (i.e. wife/husband/parents/ 
grandparents/children/grand-children, etc.) to be subjected to this security 
technology in its current form? 
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Function creep is defined by Collins English Dictionary as “the gradual widening of 
the use of a technology or system beyond the purpose for which it was originally 
intended”. Function creep also has the potential to feed into the concept of dual-
use; the idea that materials, hardware, and knowledge with peaceful applications 
can be exploited for illicit ends. For our purposes the major difference between 
function creep and dual-use is that function creep needn’t result in a security 
technology being used for illicit purposes (i.e. the new uses for this technology may 
be completely legitimate) whereas dual-use always results in the security 
technology being used for illicit purposes.  
Dual-use, as defined above, is a relatively straightforward scenario for us in that no 
responsible developer (such as yourself) designs a security technology with the 
intention that it be used for illicit purposes, for they know such illicit use is always 
going to result in controversy and could severely damage their own reputation! 
Both the nature of this misuse and the number of times it occurs will influence the 
public’s reaction to this security technology; amd we can expect this reaction to be 
quite sudden and intense, especially if the illicit use becomes the focus of national 
media reports, political debate, and judicial actions all in a short space of time. You 
should anticipate a robust official response through the introduction of sanctions, 
such as; disciplinary/criminal actions against end-users, tighter regulation and 
monitoring of future use, forced changes to design, limiting or even banning of 
sale/use, etc. 
Function creep is less straightforward in that there can be many reasons why a 
security technology should be used for legitimate purposes beyond those originally 
intended. Also the public may call for and support this new extended functionality. 
However, the risk remains the public may not be willing to accept these new uses, 
especially if they only gave their acceptance to the technology being deployed in 
the first place on the understanding that it would not be used beyond its original 
purpose/functionality. There may also be pressure from the state/end-users to 
extend the functionality of a security technology to respond to perceived new 
threats and/or to improve the cost effectiveness of the device. If the public do not 
support this extended use there is a risk they may remove support from the 
technology entirely.  
Challenges:  
 To design a technology where the propensity for dual-use is minimised. 
 To design a technology where function creep can be controlled so as to allow 
that which is socially acceptable but to restrict/prevent that which does not 
enjoy public support. 
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Step 1. Imagine that you are no longer a responsible developer of security 
technologies; rather you have gone rogue and are seeking to use your proposed 
security technology to commit criminal offences. List off the different ways you could 




Step 2. How can you modify the design of your proposed security technology to 
minimise or mitigate the use of your technology to perform the criminal acts you 
identified in Step 1?______________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 






                                                                                                                                                     
Step 4. Examine the list created in Step 3. From a social acceptability perspective are 
any of these functions/uses mandatory (in that public support is conditional upon the 
existence of this function/use)?______ If ‘yes’ then how will your security technology 
be designed such that these functions/uses cannot be altered or removed by the end-





Step 5. Again examine the list created in Step 3, this time focussing on functions/uses 
that are not included in your list. From a social acceptability perspective are any of 
these omissions mandatory (such that public support is conditional upon the absence 
of this function/use)?______ If ‘yes’ how will your security technology be designed 





Note on Step 3: As a reminder, functions are defined as all the individual 
components/abilities/modes-of-use/capabilities/etc. you choose to build into your 
security technology. 
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Step 1. Create a list of all the individual things people need to be able to do and/or 
possess to use your proposed security technology or to be successfully cleared by your 
technology._____________________________________________________________ 
If this Section applies you should also consider the applicability of Sections 2g & 4h.  
While a security technology can be designed to benefit people (hopefully by 
providing them with security), its design also has the potential to impose a burden 
on somebody. Social resistance to a security technology can arise if this burden is 
not equally spread throughout all members of society. Leaving aside the legal 
issues surrounding possible discrimination, as well as the acceptability issue of 
what society thinks is an appropriate security response within a fair and democratic 
society, there are also the physical and temporal burdens imposed upon an 
individual by a security technology (let us call these functionality burdens). If these 
functionality burdens are not equally dispersed throughout all the subsets of 
society, a security technology runs the risk of social resistance forming, especially 
within those subsets disproportionately affected.  
The functionality of your proposed security technology (i.e. all the things your 
technology can do and how it does them) not only determines how your 
technology will work, but also how it will physically interact with the public. This 
interaction component (i.e. the type of interface you design, what you expect 
people to possess or be able to do to use the technology, how long people are 
detained for processing by the technology etc.) has the corollary effect of 
determining, amongst other things: 
 Who can and who cannot physically use the technology; 
 How long it will subsequently take someone to undergo security screening; 
 Whether or not an individual will be able to access services as a result of their 
ability/inability to use the security technology; 
 Whether or not an individual will be materially disadvantaged by their 
ability/inability to use the security technology. 
While all of these effects have the potential to create social resistance, developers 
should be particularly concerned when an individual is repeatedly subjected to 
such functionality burdens despite not having done anything wrong and through no 
fault of their own (i.e. the repeat false-positive). An example being a citizen with 
Parkinson’s disease being unable to undertake an airport whole body scan because 
they cannot remain still, and as a result being subjected to more intrusive 
secondary screening. The failure by developers to at least attempt to mitigate the 
burdens imposed upon these individuals opens the door to social resistance led by 









Step 2. Now for each of the items on your list from Step 1 identify any groups within 





                                                                                                                                                     
Step 3. Now list off all the consequences for the groups identified in Step 2 for being 





Step 4. Looking at your list from Step 2 and the consequences identified in Step 3 ask 
yourself the question; Do these people deserve to be treated as potential security 
threats suffering the identified consequences because of their membership of their 
respective groups?______ If ‘no’ then you will probably need to either modify the 
design of your technology, mitigate the effects on these groups, and/or provide 
alternatives for them if you wish to avoid controversy/resistance, for you can be sure 
the members of these groups (and the wider society) probably feel the same as you do 
when answering this question. 
Step 5. How can you minimise the effects of your proposed security technology to 





Note on Step 1: For example: stand completely still for 7-8 seconds; remember a 
password; have fingerprints; have all their fingers; not possess the combination of 
characteristics you identified as possibly threatening when you created your 
profile; not have shrapnel or metal pins within their body; etc. 
 
   
Note on Step 2: I have used ‘groups’ and not ‘individuals’ within the wording of 
Step 2 as there will almost always be more than one person who will not be able to 
meet each identified item. Examples here may include: amputees; workers within 
certain industries; Parkinson’s disease sufferers; Alzheimer’s sufferers; the elderly; 
religious affiliations; etc.  
 
   
Note on Step 3: For example: not being able to fly; more intrusive secondary 
screening; not being employable in certain role; time delays; humiliation; more 
intrusive questioning and subsequent lack of privacy; resentment; etc.  
Note on Step 5: For example: alternative screening processes, pre-screening 
registration; automatically updating databases, identification systems for certain 
groups, end-user training; enabling end-users to override automated systems, etc.   
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Step 1. (If it is possible) are you including within your design the ability to adjust the 
rates of false-positives and false-negatives?______ If ‘no’ (and it is possible) how can 






There is no such thing as 100% security. The perfect, infallible security system 
simply does not exist. As such errors will always result from the use of any security 
technology in the form of false-positives (innocent individuals wrongly identified as 
a threat) and false-negatives (attackers wrongly identified as non-threatening) or of 
people simply being missed altogether. This is why security experts recommend 
the adoption of layered-security; a range of different overlapping security 
measures, so as to minimise the number of those who slip through the security net, 
while hopefully not repeatedly targeting the false-positives. 
However, just because there will always be false-positives/negatives this does not 
mean you ‘the security technology developer’ can afford to ignore these problems 
when designing security technologies. Security technologies which repeatedly 
produce unacceptably high levels of false-positives/negatives run the risk of 
alienating both end-users (who will come to view the technology at best as 
unreliable, or at worst as a broken waste of time that should be ignored) and the 
public (who may come to resent being subjected to the technology, will question 
its cost and deployment, and may result in a loss of trust in the end-users, officials, 
politicians, etc.).  
Challenge: The challenge for developers is to design a security technology that can 
both control the rate at which errors will occur, as well as efficiently address the 
errors and their effects at the point when they do occur. This requires the design of 
a technology which: 
 Controls the rates of false-positives/negatives; 
 Recognises where errors occur within the technology; 
 Validates the accuracy of data that is inputted; 
 Allows the data which produced any decisions made by the security 
technology to be questioned by end-users; 
 Allows the results of the technology to be questioned by end-users. 
 
Note on Step 1: False-positive and false-negative rates are linked, in that increase 
the rate of one will likely decrease the rate of the other, and vice versa.   
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Step 2. Does your proposed security technology at any point rely upon data inputted 
by humans (or machine inputted data where that data was originally collected and 
inputted by humans)?______ If ‘yes’ what system do you have in place to double check 




Step 3. Will the reliability of your proposed security technology fall below acceptable 
levels as the amount of data inputted increases?______ If ‘yes’ how are you planning 







                                                                                                                                                     
Step 4. Will the end-user be able to see and review the data used to make an 
automated decision so as to question its accuracy?______ If ‘no’ why not? If ‘yes’ how 





Step 5. Will the output (including any decisions made) of your proposed security 
technology be open to questioning by the end-user, and open to being overridden by 




Will the end-user be able to modify the data held by the security technology in 
response to a false-positive so as to prevent and individual repeatedly being 





Note on Step 3: For example; within a one-to-many-matching identification system 
with a 99.99% accuracy rate and a database of 1,000,000 people, every individual 
would be falsely identified as 100 other people every single time they are scanned. 




Qn.6e: Will the proposed security technology be capable of, and 



















                                                                                                                                                      
Step 1. Will your proposed security technology work? To answer this question first 
define what working is, framing your answer as a list of one or more measurable 
values (such as; an n% reduction in a specific crime; an n% increase in arrests or seized 
goods, etc.) where current values exist so as to permit a comparison._______________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
What experiments/pilot-studies/etc., have you carried out or are planning on carrying 
out so as to measure whether or not your proposed security technology achieves the 
criteria/criterion you designated as defining working?___________________________ 
It is all well and good to build a security technology with multiple functions, which 
is cost effective, does not pose a health risk, meets all legal and human rights 
criteria, is not open to end-user abuse, and does not create additional safety and 
security issues. However, such a design will all be for nothing if that security 
technology is either incapable of, or ineffective at, achieving its ultimate goal; i.e., 
tackling the security problem(s) it was created to address. Failure to achieve this 
end will result in social resistance as the public become aware of this fundamental 
shortcoming, for the public resent paying for something which doesn’t work and 
being subjected to a security measure which does not provide security. This failure 
affords ammunition to both the media and the political opponents of those who 
authorised the purchase and introduction of such a technology, opening the door 
to a potential loss of public trust in, and respect for, those government agencies 
and the end-users. 
Challenge: When seeking to demonstrate that your proposed security technology is 
both capable of, and effective at, addressing the identified security problems, the 
initial question you will probably ask is ‘will your proposed security technology 
actually work?’. While this is a good starting position it is a question where a ‘yes’ 
answer can also paper over any number of fundamental cracks. You need to go 
deeper in you examination by asking (and answering) the tough underlying 
questions if you wish to demonstrate the security-providing pedigree of your 
proposed technology. Other questions to be answered include the following: 
 When you say it ‘works’ are you actually saying it ‘meets minimum standards?’ 
 While it may work, will it be effective? 
 And if it is effective, will it be consistently so? 
 And assuming your technology is consistently effective, will it only target 
people engaged in criminal activities or will everybody be effected? 
 Finally, will your technology address the root (or cause) of the problem, or is it 







At the point in the design/validation process where you can compare the values from 
your experiments/pilot-studies/etc. against your measures for success, does your 
security technology qualify as capable of addressing its targeted security 




Step 2. How do you plan to demonstrate that your proposed security technology works 
consistently, regardless of: 
a) Time in operation:_________________________________________ ___________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 






                                                                                                                                                     
Step 3. Does your proposed security technology effectively differentiate between 
those citizens acting illegally and those not, such that it only affects the former which 
ignoring the latter?______ If ‘no’ justify why your proposed security technology should 





Step 4. Will your proposed security technology be able to effectively reduce the 
incidents of specific crimes by preventing/deterring people from committing these 
crimes, or does it just focus on catching offenders after they have committed these 
crimes?__________________ If it is the latter how can you justify the effectiveness of 




Note on Step 2: To prove the consistent operation of your proposed security 
technology you are going to have to demonstrate that it remains effective for a 
sufficient time period beyond the moment of deployment. Also you will need to 
determine those situations/environments it operates effectively in and those it 
does not (if any).  
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Step 1. Are you planning on building something where some or all of the components 
are sufficiently innovative to be considered new, or are you only utilising existing 
technologies which are well understood in your final product design?______________ 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
To produce a completely new security technology you may not need to push the 
boundaries of science or engineering. If the technologies you are relying upon are 
well developed and understood then any uncertainty as to the operation, safety, 
and effectiveness of your new security technology will be minimised. Equally 
however, producing a new technology may require you to either utilise existing 
technologies in a novel manner and/or to push the boundaries of current science 
by developing something completely new. In these circumstances any uncertainty 
inherent to your final product may have a role to play when it comes to the social 
acceptability of your technology.  
If you are pushing the boundaries of what has been achieved before, questions will 
always arise as to the effectiveness, safety, and acceptability of your product. In 
the past, security technologies have suffered as a result of uncertainty in different 
forms: 
 Backscatter whole body scanners and various less lethal weapons faced 
questions over their safety. For whole body scanners this has led to lengthy 
delays on their widespread introduction as the health issues are debated. 
 The UK’s national identity scheme, mass biometric systems, and various data 
mining systems have all faced resistance as the result of uncertainty over their 
potential effectiveness. 
The reason why uncertainty should not be ignored is that it is the perfect tool for 
assisting the resistance of a technology. It is very hard to argue that a new 
technology is perfectly safe, reliable, and/or effective, if the evidence from 
previous use is not there to back these arguments up. In these circumstances those 
against the introduction of a particular security technology do not need to present 
any evidence themselves justifying their position. They can merely rely upon the 
absence of certainty to justify and validate their position. 
Challenge: To have accumulated enough evidence through testing to reduce any 
uncertainty surrounding your proposed security technology before it is released for 
sale and/or implementation. Also to be in a position to present this evidence in a 









                                                                                                                                                           
If you are using something new (as determined in Step 1) then continue with the Steps 
below. 
Step 2. Does the technology pose a potential risk to the health of the target, no matter 
how minute?______ If ‘yes’ what steps have you taken (or are going to take) to prove 






Step 3. Given your technology is new how are you going to prove the effectiveness of 









Step 4. How are you planning on engaging with the public to present the evidence you 








Note on Step 1: By new I mean either something which has never been developed 
before, hence you are uncertain as to its final properties/how it works/etc., or the 
novel application of an existing technology, again where you are uncertain as to its 
final properties/how it works/etc. You will need to apply your own judgement 
here. 
Note on Step 3: For example: trials in different operational situations and over 
extended time periods; independent verification of results; engagement with critics 





































Step 1. Start by identifying and listing below instances of where security technologies 
similar to your proposed technology have resulted in controversy resulting from their 






Using these identified instances, I want you to distil them down so as to create a list of 
design specifications which capture all of the fundamental design characteristic which 
A large number of security technologies have, in the past, been abused or misused. 
The scope of this abuse ranges from the mischievous (e.g. tax officials illegally 
accessing databases to look up the tax details of their neighbours or celebrities out 
of curiosity) to the catastrophic (e.g. groups, governments, and/or foreign invaders 
using identity-card information to perpetrate genocide against religious and/or 
ethnic groups). Those carrying out this abuse/misuse ranges from governments to 
state agencies, individual end-users, insiders, commercial organisations, citizens, 
and external attackers.  
As the developer of security technologies you can either choose to ignore any 
historical abuse of security technologies similar to your proposed design, or you 
can take the time to examine when and how these technologies were abused so as 
to inform your own design and hopefully produce something which is less 
susceptible to such abuse. There are benefits to adopting the latter approach. 
Social resistance to security technologies in response to past abuse can be 
widespread and long-lasting, resulting in a restricted market for your final 
products. Various countries have developed strict laws regarding the use of 
security technologies (especially in relation to privacy) in response to the past 
abuses by oppressive regimes. Citizens in some of these countries are also less 
accepting of new security technologies. In Germany, Spain, and various South 
American countries (all of which have suffered under various regimes) there is less 
acceptance of new security technologies and greater restrictions placed on 
technologies which impact the privacy of the citizen (such as CCTV, airport whole 
body scanners, ID cards, etc.).   
On the other hand by developing your proposed security technology so as to avoid 
the abuse/misuse pitfalls of competitors you have the opportunity to benefit from 
any social resistance to the alternative designs. You can rightly market your design 
as the safer, socially acceptable option, while highlighting to politicians and state 
agencies the potential reputational benefits they could reap by introducing your 
technology.      
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Step 2. Using the list of design characteristics from Step 1, create a list of alternative 
characteristics which address these issues that a future security technology could 





Are you going to incorporate these alternative characteristics into your own 






Step 3. What are your plans for setting yourself apart from these previous 







Step 4. How are you going to convince the public that your technology will not be 







Note on Step 1: For example, for whole body scanners this list may include:  
 Created images which display anatomical details including genitalia; 
 Incorporating the ability to store images; 




Qn.7b: Could the operation of the security technology potentially 





















Step 1. Imagine you have completed your proposed security technology. It has been 
deployed in the field and operates in the manner you think it should. Can you think of 
any individuals/groups who despite not engaging in any illegal activities would not 
want to be subjected to your technology out of fear that by doing so their 
safety/security is placed at risk?______ If ‘yes’ list these individuals/groups here along 
with the reasons behind their fear.__________________________________________ 
It goes without saying that security technologies are designed to provide citizens 
with some additional measure of security. However it is sometimes the case that 
the way in which certain security technologies operate (i.e., how they work to 
achieve their security goals) can have the opposite effect by jeopardising the safety 
and security of citizens. Obviously this is not the developer’s intention. When the 
operation of a security technology can be shown to jeopardise the safety and 
security of citizens, not only will this lead to resistance from those directly put at 
risk, but it opens the door to wider social resistance should those not directly 
affected take up the cause of those who are and remove their support for the 
technology as a result. 
Usually those who are jeopardised by the operation of a security technology 
constitute a small minority of the population (if it was the majority then one hopes 
the developers would realise this and be smart enough not to try and release that 
technology in its current form). The fact these individuals are placed at risk at all 
usually comes about for any of the following reasons: 
 Those adversely affected form a very small minority group(s) of individuals 
sharing one or more particular traits which make them particularly susceptible. 
Unless the designers were specifically aware of this group’s existence and the 
threats they face then the fact their concerns were not contemplated is 
understandable. 
 The safety/security threats to individuals were unrealised, unforeseen 
(potentially unforeseeable) consequences of the security technology’s 
operation. 
 The designers were focussing on the overall security benefits and felt that any 
concomitant risks were justifiable. 
 The designers assessed the safety of their technology by assuming it is being 
operated in the manner they intended; i.e., they are assuming the technology 
will not be abuse, misused, or used for non-intended purposes. 
Challenge: To force yourself to look beyond both the obvious and the intended 
when you are designing your security technology and visualising how it will work. 
Hopefully this will assist you in reducing the propensity for your proposed 
technology to place at risk the safety and security of individuals through its 











Step 2. Can you think of any circumstances where the successful operation of the 
security technology forces individuals or groups to modify their behaviour such that 
they must take on a greater level of personal risk to their safety/security?______ If 









Step 3. Going back to the approach used in Step 1, again imagine you have completed 
your proposed security technology and it has been deployed in the field, only this time 
it is being used for purposes other than you originally intended. Can you think of any 
lawful ways your proposed technology could be used such that the safety or security of 
individuals/groups (who are not doing anything illegal) could be placed at risk?______ 
If ‘yes’ describe these unintended methods of use and how they place the 







Note on Step 1: For example, the proposed UK’s National Identity Register (now 
destroyed) would have recorded information on every UK citizen including their 
current address, with a legal requirement placed on the individual to ensure this 
information was kept up-to-date. However, there are many legitimate reasons for 
not disclosing your location; women fleeing domestic violence or forced marriages, 
criminal informants, witnesses in criminal cases, etcetera. These groups would 
have been placed at risk by the operation of this security technology, and yet were 
not obvious categories of concern.  
 
Note on Step 2: For example, the use of Mosquitos in public places forces young 
people to disperse, often to areas with less pedestrian traffic. Yet young people 
themselves report that one of the main reasons they congregate in public spaces to 
begin with is that they feel safer there because there are more people about. This 
technology therefore forces them to leave public areas and move to places they 
feel less safe in.  
 
Use the answers from these three Steps to inform the design of your proposed 




Qn.7c: Could the presence of the security technology potentially 


















Step 1. In this Step you get to play the role of an attacker. Assume your proposed 
security technology has been built and deployed (congratulations!). As the attacker, is 
there value to be had from attacking the security technology? In other words, is the 
security technology a target worth attacking such that the potential gains from doing 
so outweigh the risks?______ If ‘yes’ how would you carry out attacks on your own 
proposed security technology?; why these attacks?; and what do you predict the 





In a similar vein to Qn.7b, while security technologies are designed to provide 
citizens with security, sometimes the presence of a particular security technology 
can jeopardise the safety and security of citizens. Obviously this is never the 
developer’s intention.  
All security technologies have ripple effects. Initially they may reduce a particular 
crime and/or increase prosecutions. They may also alter the offending patterns of 
criminals; i.e., criminals may change where they commit offences as well as the 
types of offences they commit. Additionally technologies may impose costs on 
citizens through higher fees and taxes or time-costs. These (and more) are all 
unintended consequences that ripple out from the introduction of a security 
technology. To have a chance at success, the benefits brought by a security 
technology need to outweigh the negative effects.  
One of the unintended ripples of any security technology is that its presence has 
the potential to jeopardise the safety and security of citizens. This not uncommon 
as security experts agree that most security technologies create new security 
problems. As such you should not reject a proposed security technology just 
because you can identify situations where its presence could produce harms. 
However at the same time this does not mean that you can ignore such effects.  
You can quickly lose public trust and support when an unacceptable number of 
citizens are harmed by the presence of a security technology, or where both the 
risk of harm and the potential consequences of that harm occurring are considered 
too high. By identifying the potential safety and security risks brought about by 
your proposed technology you will afford yourself the opportunity to address these 
issues during the design process. Hopefully this will minimise both the size of any 




Step 2. If an attacker successfully attacked your proposed security technology, what 








Step 3. Using the attack methods you identified in step 1, can you modify your 
technology so as to reduce the possibility and consequences of a successful 




Step 4. How likely is it that your security technology could be under attack (or was 




How could you modify the design of your proposed technology so as to make attacks 





Step 5. Will your proposed security technology be the most resource efficient solution 
available to tackling its intended security problem?______ If ‘no’ justify why it should 







Note on Steps 1 & 2: Could your security technology become a potential honey-pot 
for attackers? For example, if your technology stored large amounts of personal 
information on all citizens in a country in one place then it would become a prime 
target for criminals and state-sponsored hackers/attackers.   
 
Note on Step 5: If your proposed security technology diverts or ties-up security 
resources (money, people, time, etc.) away from more efficient/effective 
technologies and/or more important/larger threats, then the presence of your 




Qn.7d: Could design shortcomings of the security technology or the lack 























Step 1. Your proposed security technology has been deployed. If you were an attacker, 
how easy would it be for you to avoid the security technology? (Describe the different 
ways you could continue to carry out those illegal acts that your proposed security 
technology is attempting to address without ever coming into contact with the 
Not every security technology which is designed, developed, and deployed works 
perfectly first time, every time. Given that it is impossible to test a security 
technology against every possible eventuality that could ever be conceived it is 
highly likely that some safety/security problems with a technology will only 
become evident (or even discoverable) after the technology has been deployed in 
an operational setting. Furthermore some safety/security issues may have been 
considered so unlikely to arise or be exploited that the developers did not consider 
these necessary to address.  
However, given the number of security technologies which have been misused, 
abused, avoided, fooled, and/or circumvented in the past, all leading to the safety 
and security of citizens being placed at risk, there is no excuse for the designers 
and developers of security technologies not to assume their technology will be 
attacked, misused, and/or abused once deployed. To assume otherwise is to ignore 
reality and in turn will open the door to criticism and ridicule by those citizens 
adversely affected by the failing of a security technology.  
You should never assume your proposed security technology: will operate 
perfectly; in all situations; exactly as intended; and will provide perfect security. By 
accepting the inevitable failings of your future technology you will be in a better 
position to critically and honestly assess your design and respond to the flaws you 
see there.  
You must also assume that a minority of end-users will abuse your security 
technology. Given the negative social response to such abuse, and the probability 
of damaging media reports arising from such abuse, it is highly recommended you 
assume such abuse such that you can design against it. 
Challenges:  
 To recognise the value of your proposed security technology while at the same 
time being willing to identify those shortcomings within your proposed design 
that will have the potential to jeopardise the safety or security of citizens. 
 To recognise the value of your proposed security technology while at the same 
time recognising that some end-users of your technology will abuse it in the 
future. 
By acknowledging the truth of these two statements you will hopefully be better 








Step 2. Again acting as the attacker; if you did have to come into contact with your 
proposed security technology, describe the different ways you could fool the security 
technology into treating you as a false-negative, thereby allowing you to continue 





Step 3. Does your proposed security technology include a built-in oversight capacity or 
function so that the actions of end-users can be monitored in real-time so as to 
prevent or deter any illegal use of the security technology?______ If ‘no’ explain why 






Step 4. Does your proposed security technology record information on end-user use so 
as to deter/prevent/prosecute any illegal end-user use?______ If ‘no’ explain why not. 






Step 5. Does your proposed security technology provide the client with sufficient 
information/feedback so that they can determine whether somebody is misusing or 
abusing the technology, either in real-time or as soon as possible after the abuse has 
occurred?____ If ‘yes’ explain both how it achieves this and what information it 








Qn.7e: Is there a propensity for the security technology to be abused or 





















Step 1. Identify here as many of the different ways your proposed security technology 





Security technologies are designed to enhance the safety or security of citizens on 
the assumption they are used in the manner the designers anticipate, and that they 
are not abused. However both those who commission security technologies and 
those entrusted with their use (i.e., governments, government agencies, 
commercial businesses, public and private employees, police and other state 
officials, etc.) have a history of misusing and abusing these technologies. 
Sometimes this is at a state level while at other times this represents the actions of 
rogue individuals. When a security technology is abused, the public can lose trust in 
both the end-users and the technology itself. 
Those charged with using a security technology are uniquely placed to abuse that 
technology. Often the use of security technologies (or the use of security 
technologies in specific ways) is restricted to selected groups of people; these 
groups are trusted and considered reliable guardians of the technology because of 
their position and training. Unfortunately because these groups are trusted and/or 
because of a lack of resources, any oversight functions (whereby the watchers are 
watched) are not always robust. The result being the door is often open for end-
users to abuse their security technologies. This abuse can arise from a variety of 
situations, including: 
 People can give in to temptation to satisfy their curiosity, out of impulse, or if 
they see an opportunity. 
 The end-user may have been corrupt all along. 
 The end-user may be stressed, emotional, angry, scared, etc., when using the 
security technology and thus do not act as they would if they were 
calm/rational. 
 The end-user may be being coerced or bribed into acting illegally. 
If your proposed security technology has the potential to jeopardise the safety and 
security of citizens if abused or misused (and given the fact that many existing 
security technologies have been abused or misused by end-users in the past) then 
you must work on the assumption that end-users of your proposed security 
technology will attempt to abuse your technology. As you are obviously a 
conscientious designer/developer who does not want to see people harmed by the 
misuse or abuse of your technology then the onus falls upon you to identify how 
your technology could be abused, and by whom, so that measures can be taken to 





Step 2. Now identify which of the following groups could abuse your proposed security 
technology in the ways you identified in Step 1. For each group you identify write 







 Other law enforcement officials (identify which):___________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________; 
 Other public servants (identify which):____________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________; 









 Foreign powers:______________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________; 







Note on Step 2: Where possible try to identify design opportunities for your 
proposed security technology when identifying methods for preventing/minimising 





















































































Section:___ Qn:___ Step:___ 
Details:_________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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